J. B. v. K. B.

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2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
J. B. v. K. B.

J. B. v. K. B.*
(AC 46764)
Cradle, C. J., and Clark and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant had previously been dis-
solved, appealed from the trial court’s judgment ordering the plaintiff to
reimburse the defendant for certain medical and dental expenses incurred
by their child after she had reached the age of majority. The plaintiff claimed
that the court erred when it ordered him to pay 96 percent of those expenses
in the absence of any express language in the parties’ separation agreement
requiring the parties to pay postmajority medical and dental expenses. Held:

The trial court erred in construing the parties’ separation agreement unam-
biguously to require the plaintiff to reimburse the defendant for the child’s
postmajority medical and dental expenses because, as there was more than
one reasonable interpretation of the agreement, the agreement was ambigu-
ous as to whether the parties were obliged to pay those expenses, and,
accordingly, the case was remanded for the trial court to make a factual
determination regarding the intent of the parties, after consideration of any
extrinsic evidence presented by the parties concerning that issue.
Argued April 24—officially released August 5, 2025

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Fairfield and tried to the court, Klatt, J.; judg-
ment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other
relief in accordance with the parties’ separation agree-
ment; thereafter, the court, Moses, J., denied the defen-
dant’s motion for contempt and entered a remedial
order regarding certain expenses to be paid by the plain-
tiff; subsequently, the court, Moses, J., denied the plain-
tiff’s motion to reargue and the plaintiff appealed to
* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as
amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,
Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person
protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective
order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through
whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
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J. B. v. K. B.

this court; thereafter, the court, Moses, J., sua sponte
issued an order correcting the remedial order, and the
plaintiff amended his appeal. Reversed in part; further
proceedings.
Richard W. Callahan, for the appellant (plaintiff).
K. B., self-represented, the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

CLARK, J. This appeal arises from a postjudgment
motion for contempt filed by the self-represented defen-
dant, K. B., alleging that the plaintiff, J. B., wilfully failed
to comply with a prior court order modifying certain
provisions of the parties’ separation agreement, which
had been incorporated into their judgment of dissolu-
tion, concerning the parties’ obligation to pay for the
unreimbursed medical and dental expenses for their
daughter, K. The plaintiff claims that the court erred
by entering a remedial order requiring him to reimburse
the defendant for the cost of unreimbursed medical and
dental expenses incurred after K reached the age of
majority. We reverse in part the judgment of the trial
court.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our resolution of this appeal. The parties were
married on August 29, 1998, and had two children: G,
born in April, 2001, and K, born in May, 2003. On October
21, 2011, the court, Klatt, J., rendered a judgment of
uncontested dissolution, incorporating by reference the
terms of a separation agreement executed by the parties
on the same date (separation agreement).
Article III of the separation agreement governs ali-
mony and child support. Section 3.2 governs child sup-
port and provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) In light of the
shared custody arrangement, neither party shall pay
child support to the other. . . . (b) In the event the
shared custodial arrangement is no longer feasible due
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4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
J. B. v. K. B.

to the [plaintiff’s] procurement of employment, the
[defendant] shall be entitled to seek a modification of
said agreement, and may petition the court for child
support. . . . (c) The parties shall equally share in the
cost of all agreed upon extracurricular activities of the
children, and . . . equally share the cost of all unreim-
bursed medical [and] dental expenses.’’
Article VII of the separation agreement, titled ‘‘Medi-
cal and Hospitalization Insurance and Expenses,’’ gov-
erns the parties’ obligations to provide health insurance
and to pay for the health care expenses of the children.
Two provisions of article VII are relevant to this appeal.
First, section 7.3 provides: ‘‘The parties’ obligation to
maintain insurance coverage for the children shall
extend until each of them attains the age of nineteen
(19) or, if either or both attend college, through the age
of twenty-three (23).’’ Second, section 7.4 provides: ‘‘All
unreimbursed medical, dental, orthodontic, psychologi-
cal, [and] psychiatric expenses incurred on behalf of
the children shall be shared equally by the parties.’’1
In the years since the judgment of dissolution, the
court has entered several orders pertaining to the par-
ties’ obligation to pay for the children’s unreimbursed
medical and dental expenses. On October 2, 2013, the
1
Section 7.1 of the separation agreement provides in relevant part: ‘‘The
[plaintiff] shall maintain the existing medical, dental, major medical and
hospitalization insurance, on behalf of the children, for so long as his COBRA
coverage is available. . . .’’
Section 7.2 of the separation agreement provides: ‘‘Upon the [plaintiff’s]
procurement of employment, if health insurance coverage for the children
is available, he will pay for same. In the event he remains unemployed at
the termination of COBRA coverage, or if health insurance coverage for the
children is not available in his new employment, the parties shall share
the cost of said health insurance coverage. This provision is subject to
modification by either party.’’
Section 7.5 of the separation agreement provides: ‘‘Prior to incurring any
additional voluntary, i.e. nonemergency, unreimbursed medical expenses
on behalf of the children, each party shall obtain the consent of the other,
which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.’’
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J. B. v. K. B.

defendant filed a motion to modify the allocation of
unreimbursed medical expenses and extracurricular
activity expenses on the basis that the plaintiff, who
was unemployed at the time of dissolution, had since
obtained employment. On January 7, 2014, the court,
Owens, J., granted the defendant’s motion and ordered
that ‘‘[t]he extracurricular activities and unreimbursed
medical expenses are divided 67 percent to the plaintiff
. . . and 33 percent to the defendant . . . .’’ The plain-
tiff moved for reargument on January 24, 2014. The
court agreed to hear reargument but, on May 14, 2014,
reaffirmed the January 7, 2014 order.
On September 18, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion
for modification of the court’s January 7, 2014 order
regarding the division of unreimbursed medical expenses
and extracurricular activity expenses. On October 30,
2014, following a hearing, the court, Owens, J., granted
the plaintiff’s motion. The court ordered that ‘‘[t]he
unreimbursed expenses shall be divided 60 percent to
the [plaintiff] and 40 percent to the [defendant].’’ The
plaintiff filed motions for articulation and reargument
on November 12, 2014, both of which were denied.
On December 12, 2014, the plaintiff appealed from
the judgment denying his motion for reargument. On
June 26, 2015, however, the parties entered into a stipu-
lated agreement (2015 agreement) that resolved the
plaintiff’s appeal. The parties agreed, inter alia, that
‘‘[t]he current allocation of extracurricular and unreim-
bursed medical expenses . . . shall remain 60 percent
to the plaintiff and 40 percent to the defendant as
ordered by the court on October 30, 2014,’’ and that
‘‘[n]either party shall file a request to modify the current
allocation of extracurricular and unreimbursed medical
expenses without a substantial change in circum-
stances.’’
On May 8, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion for an
order regarding postsecondary education expenses for
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J. B. v. K. B.

G. On June 20, 2019, the parties appeared before the
2

court, E. Rodriguez, J., at which time they indicated
that they had come to an agreement concerning their
respective obligations with respect to G’s postsecond-
ary education expenses (2019 agreement).3 The court
canvassed the parties and entered the 2019 agreement
as an order of the court. The 2019 agreement provides,
inter alia, that the defendant would ‘‘continue to main-
tain health insurance for the benefit of [G] pursuant to
the . . . separation agreement’’ and that ‘‘[t]he current
orders that obligate the plaintiff to pay for 60 percent
and the defendant to pay for 40 percent of the reason-
2
Section 11.3 of the separation agreement provides that ‘‘[t]he court shall
retain jurisdiction over the parties for the purpose of entering educational
support orders pursuant to [General Statutes] § 46b-56c.’’
General Statutes § 46b-56c provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) For purposes
of this section, an educational support order is an order entered by a court
requiring a parent to provide support for a child or children to attend for
up to a total of four full academic years an institution of higher education
or a private career school for the purpose of attaining a bachelor’s or
other undergraduate degree, or other appropriate vocational instruction. An
educational support order may be entered with respect to any child who
has not attained twenty-three years of age and shall terminate not later than
the date on which the child attains twenty-three years of age.
‘‘(b) (1) On motion or petition of a parent, the court may enter an educa-
tional support order at the time of entry of a decree of dissolution, legal
separation or annulment, and no educational support order may be entered
thereafter unless the decree explicitly provides that a motion or petition
for an educational support order may be filed by either parent at a subsequent
date. . . .
***
‘‘(g) The educational support order may include support for any necessary
educational expense, including room, board, dues, tuition, fees, registration
and application costs, but such expenses shall not be more than the amount
charged by The University of Connecticut for a full-time in-state student at
the time the child for whom educational support is being ordered matricu-
lates, except this limit may be exceeded by agreement of the parents. An
educational support order may also include the cost of books and medical
insurance for such child. . . .’’
3
The parties initially appeared for a hearing on the plaintiff’s motion on
June 6, 2019. At that time, the defendant requested additional time to consider
the draft agreement because she had just received a copy of it the day
before the hearing. The court granted that request.
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J. B. v. K. B.

able and necessary unreimbursed medical and dental
expenses incurred for the benefit of [G] shall remain
in effect.’’4
On January 22, 2021, the defendant filed a motion to
modify various aspects of the parties’ obligations under
the separation agreement and subsequent orders. As
relevant to this appeal, the defendant first requested
that the court modify the separation agreement by
requiring the plaintiff to pay monetary child support
for K retroactive to March, 2020, and ‘‘through the date
she begins college . . . .’’ The defendant also requested
that the court modify the allocation of unreimbursed
medical and dental expenses and extracurricular activ-
ity expenses that the parties were required to pay on
behalf of the children, as established by the 2015 agree-
ment, on the basis that ‘‘the plaintiff’s income has
increased substantially and is well in excess of [the
defendant’s] current salary and capacity to earn.’’5 (Empha-
sis omitted.) The defendant did not reference any time
period in connection with her request to modify the
allocation of expenses.
While the defendant’s motion for modification was
pending, on June 10, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion
for an order regarding postsecondary education expenses
for K. In his motion, the plaintiff noted that K was
eighteen years old and would be starting college later
4
The 2019 agreement also set forth the amount each party was required
to contribute toward G’s tuition and other expenses she incurred while
attending college.
5
The defendant also asked the court to modify the 2019 agreement con-
cerning G’s postsecondary education expenses by adjusting the parties’
respective obligations to contribute to G’s tuition and other expenses ‘‘to
more appropriately reflect [their] individual means,’’ to order the plaintiff
to provide an accounting of the college savings account the parties had
established for G during their marriage, to excuse the defendant from paying
her share of any past due expenses, and to require the plaintiff to pay 100
percent of certain dental expenses incurred on behalf of K. Those requests
are not relevant to this appeal.
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J. B. v. K. B.

that year, and that the parties had been unable to reach
an agreement concerning her postsecondary education
expenses. The plaintiff requested that the court enter
an order pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56c con-
cerning the parties’ obligations with respect to K’s post-
secondary education expenses.
Beginning on December 20, 2021, the court, M. Moore,
J., held a trial on the defendant’s motion for modifica-
tion and the plaintiff’s motion for an order regarding
K’s postsecondary education expenses.6 Prior to trial,
on December 15, 2021, the defendant filed proposed
orders regarding the issues raised in her motion. With
respect to her request that the court modify the alloca-
tion of unreimbursed medical expenses, the defendant
requested that the court enter the following order: ‘‘For
so long as the defendant is employed and her employer
provides family coverage for health insurance, the
defendant will continue to provide health insurance for
the children until they reach the age of twenty-three,
or obtain employment which provides them health
insurance benefits (whichever occurs first). While the
children are insured under [the defendant’s] health insur-
ance coverage, the plaintiff will reimburse the defen-
dant 93 percent of all premiums paid by the defendant
for the children’s health insurance coverage, together
with 93 percent of unreimbursed medical expenses.’’
On September 9, 2022, Judge Moore entered an order
on the defendant’s motion for modification (2022
order). Addressing first the defendant’s request for
monetary child support, the court noted that ‘‘[t]he
motion for modification was served [on] the defendant
on April 27, 2021,’’ and that ‘‘[K] [had] turned [eighteen]
on May 18, 2021.’’ The court then noted that, at the
The trial before Judge Moore also concerned two motions, a motion for
6

contempt that had been filed by the plaintiff and a motion for attorney’s
fees that had been filed by the defendant. Those two motions are not relevant
to this appeal.
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J. B. v. K. B.

time of the separation agreement, both parties were
unemployed and ‘‘neither party was to pay child support
to the other based on the shared custody arrangement
for the children.’’ The court found that the plaintiff’s
income had increased substantially since the time of
the separation agreement and that his change in income
constituted ‘‘a substantial change in circumstances which
justifies modification of child support.’’ On the basis of
those findings, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay
child support in the amount of ‘‘$454 per week for a
period of April 27, 2021 . . . [through] the date [K]
turned [eighteen] for a total of [three] weeks for a total
of $1362 owed to the defendant.’’
With respect to the defendant’s request to modify the
allocation of unreimbursed medical expenses, the court
noted that, pursuant to the 2015 agreement, which was
the last order concerning the division of such expenses,
‘‘the parties were to pay extracurricular and unreim-
bursed medical expenses for the children 60 percent
to be paid by the plaintiff and 40 percent to be paid by
the defendant . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) The court
found that there was ‘‘a substantial change in circum-
stances to justify a modification of the payment of
expenses for the children as agreed in the 2015 agree-
ment’’ on the basis that the plaintiff’s income had
increased substantially since the time of the 2015 agree-
ment. The court ordered: ‘‘The plaintiff shall pay 96
percent and the defendant shall pay 4 percent of the
unreimbursed medical and dental expenses and agreed
upon extracurricular expenses. Said modification is ret-
roactive to the date of the service upon the plaintiff of
the motion for modification (April 27, 2021).’’ The order
did not indicate the date on which the parties’ obligation
to pay those expenses would terminate.7
7
On the same date as the 2022 order, Judge Moore issued a separate
order on the plaintiff’s motion for an order regarding K’s postsecondary
education expenses. The court ordered the plaintiff to pay 96 percent, and
the defendant to pay 4 percent, ‘‘of the maximum amount pursuant to [§]
46b-56c of [K’s] educational expenses . . . after the application of grants,
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On October 5, 2022, the defendant filed a motion for
clarification of several aspects of the 2022 order. As
relevant to this appeal, the defendant requested that
the court clarify, with respect to the portion of the order
modifying the allocation of unreimbursed medical and
dental expenses and extracurricular activity expenses,
‘‘whether the subject expenses include only those
expenses incurred for the [children] prior to their eigh-
teenth . . . birthdays.’’ The court denied the defen-
dant’s motion for clarification on October 24, 2022.
On December 7, 2022, the defendant filed a motion
for contempt. In that motion, the defendant claimed
that the plaintiff had violated the 2022 order by failing
to pay 96 percent of the children’s unreimbursed medi-
cal and dental expenses for the period April 27, 2021
(the retroactive date in the 2022 order), through Octo-
ber 31, 2022, and by failing to reimburse the defendant
for 96 percent of the cost of health insurance for the
children during the same period.
While the defendant’s motion for contempt was pend-
ing, on March 29, 2023, the plaintiff filed a motion for
clarification of the 2022 order. The plaintiff asserted
that ‘‘[t]here is no clear and unambiguous order regard-
ing either party’s obligation to contribute to any
expenses for the benefit of [K] now that she has aged out
of child support,’’ and requested that the court clarify
whether the 2022 order required the parties to pay for
K’s postmajority unreimbursed medical and dental
expenses.8 On April 3, 2023, the court, M. Moore, J.,
denied the plaintiff’s motion.
loans and college savings accounts. . . . The expenses to be paid for [K]
are pursuant to [§] 46b-56c. This order shall remain in effect until [K] attains
twenty-three years of age.’’ Nothing in this order addresses the parties’
obligations to pay for K’s unreimbursed medical expenses.
8
The plaintiff did not ask the court to clarify whether the 2022 order
required him to pay for any of G’s unreimbursed medical and dental
expenses. As we explain subsequently in this opinion, the plaintiff has
conceded before this court that the 2019 agreement required the parties
to pay for such expenses on behalf of G until she reached the age of
twenty-three.
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On July 6, 2023, following a two day trial, the court,
Moses, J., entered an order on the defendant’s motion
for contempt. In the order, the court first summarized
the parties’ positions as follows: ‘‘The defendant . . .
alleges that [the 2022 order] was clear and unambiguous
in its requirement that the plaintiff . . . pay 96 percent
of the unreimbursed medical and dental expenses and
extracurricular activities retroactive to April [27], 2021.9
She argued that [the 2022 order] modified [sections
7.2 and 7.4 of the separation agreement]. Section 7.2
provides in relevant part that ‘if health insurance cover-
age for the children is not available in [the plaintiff’s]
new employment, the parties shall share the cost of
said health insurance coverage.’ Section 7.4 provides
that ‘[a]ll unreimbursed medical, dental, orthodontic,
psychological, [and] psychiatric expenses incurred on
behalf of the children shall be shared equally by the
parties.’ She also argues that [the 2022 order’s] modifi-
cation of the amount of unreimbursed expenses each
party should pay must be read in conjunction with sec-
tion 7.3 of the separation agreement, which provides:
‘The parties’ obligation to maintain insurance coverage
for the children shall extend until each of them attains
the age of [nineteen] or, if either or both attend college,
through the age of twenty-three . . . .’’ (Footnote
added.) The court further explained that, ‘‘[w]hile there
is no dispute that the children . . . were attending col-
lege when the relevant costs were incurred and under
the age of twenty-three, the plaintiff . . . disagrees that
[the 2022 order] was clear and unambiguous as to
whether he was required to pay 96 percent of the unre-
imbursed medical and dental [expenses] after the chil-
dren turned the age of eighteen years old, even if they
were in college, and whether [the 2022 order] modifies
9
The initial order on the motion for contempt indicated that the retroactive
date was April 21, 2021. In response to an order of this court, however, the
trial court issued an articulation clarifying that, consistent with the 2022
order, the retroactive date was April 27, 2021.
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12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
J. B. v. K. B.

sections 7.2 and 7.4 [of the separation agreement]. He
also argues that [any alleged violation of the 2022 order
was not willful because] he filed a motion for clarifica-
tion on [the 2022 order] that was denied by the court.’’10
With respect to the allocation of unreimbursed medi-
cal expenses, the court found ‘‘by clear and convincing
evidence that the plaintiff . . . was in violation of a
clear and unambiguous court order requiring him to
pay 96 percent of the unreimbursed medical and dental
expenses and extracurricular activities retroactive to
April [27], 2021, and until his children turned ‘the age
of [nineteen] or, if either or both attend college, through
the age of twenty-three . . . .’ This order clearly modi-
fied the requirement that the parties ‘equally share’
unreimbursed medical and dental expenses as provided
in section 7.4 [of the separation agreement].’’ The court
further found, however, that the plaintiff’s violation of
that order was not wilful. Specifically, although the
court ‘‘[did] not find ambiguity in [the 2022 order] requir-
ing the [plaintiff] to pay 96 percent of the unreimbursed
medical and dental expenses until his children turn
twenty-three,’’ it found ‘‘that the [plaintiff] sincerely
was unsure about his obligation, and correctly sought
clarification.’’
With respect to the allocation of the cost of health
insurance premiums for the children, the court ‘‘dis-
agree[d] that [the 2022 order] was clear and unambigu-
ous as it pertains to a modification of section 7.2 [of
the separation agreement]. It is not clear what, if any
court order modified the requirement that the parties
10
The plaintiff also argued before the trial court that, even if the 2022
order did require him to pay 96 percent of the children’s unreimbursed
medical expenses after they reached the age of majority, he did not violate
that order because the expenses were incurred without his knowledge or
consent in violation of section 7.5 of the separation agreement. The court
rejected that argument, however, and the plaintiff does not challenge that
portion of the court’s decision on appeal.
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J. B. v. K. B.

‘share the cost of said health insurance coverage,’ and
the percentage share.’’
The court therefore denied the defendant’s motion
for contempt, but entered a remedial order requiring
the plaintiff ‘‘to reimburse the [defendant] for 96 percent
of the unreimbursed medical and dental expenses and
[the cost of] extracurricular activities retroactive to
April [27], 2021, and until his children turn the ‘age of
[nineteen] or, if either or both attend college, through
the age of twenty-three . . . .’ The [plaintiff] is also
responsible for any late fees, interest, and other charges
accrued.’’ The plaintiff filed a motion for reargument on
July 19, 2023, which the court denied the following day.
The plaintiff filed the present appeal on August 7,
2023. On November 2, 2023, the court, Moses, J., sua
sponte, entered an order correcting the July 6, 2023
remedial order (corrected order). The corrected order
provides: ‘‘As a remedial order, the plaintiff . . . is
ordered to comply with paragraph 2 of the [2022 order]
. . . . The second paragraph [of the 2022 order], titled
‘Modification of Division of Costs for the Expenses of
the Children,’ provides that the plaintiff is ordered to
pay 96 percent of all unreimbursed medical and dental
expenses and agreed upon extracurricular activities for
‘the children.’ . . . The only issue before this court
on the defendant’s motion for contempt . . . was the
plaintiff’s compliance with [the 2022 order] as it related
to the payment of unreimbursed medical and dental
expenses the defendant paid on behalf of the children
during the relevant time period. To make the defendant
whole, the court orders the plaintiff to, in accordance
with [the 2022 order], reimburse the defendant for 96
percent of the unreimbursed medical and dental
expenses she has incurred, including late fees, interest,
and penalties.’’ On November 30, 2023, the plaintiff filed
an amended appeal to challenge the corrected order.11
11
On August 20, 2024, the plaintiff again amended his appeal to challenge
two additional orders of the court entered on July 31, 2024. First, in connec-
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14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
J. B. v. K. B.

On October 2, 2024, this court, sua sponte, ordered
the court to articulate, inter alia, ‘‘what it meant when
it stated in [the corrected order] that the second para-
graph of Judge Moore’s [2022 order] required the [plain-
tiff] to pay 96 percent of all unreimbursed medical and
dental expenses and agreed upon extracurricular activi-
ties for ‘the children.’ ’’ On October 7, 2024, the court
articulated that ‘‘[t]he language [of the corrected order]
should have tracked [the 2022 order] . . . [which]
states the following, in relevant part: ‘The plaintiff shall
pay 96 [percent] and the defendant shall pay 4 [percent]
of the unreimbursed medical and dental expenses and
agreed upon extracurricular expenses. Said modifica-
tion is retroactive to the date of the service upon the
plaintiff of the motion for modification (April 27, 2021).’ ’’
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred
in entering the remedial order requiring him to reim-
burse the defendant for 96 percent of K’s unreimbursed
medical and dental expenses that were incurred after
K reached the age of majority. The plaintiff concedes
that, pursuant to the 2019 agreement, the parties agreed
to pay for such expenses on behalf of G, and, therefore,
tion with a motion for contempt filed by the defendant, the court entered
a remedial order requiring the plaintiff to pay for a portion of K’s college
textbooks. Second, in connection with a motion by the defendant for an
order requiring the plaintiff to reimburse her for health insurance premiums
she paid on behalf of the children, the court entered an order denying the
plaintiff’s claim that the motion was barred by collateral estoppel. Although
the plaintiff filed an amended appeal form in which he indicated that he
intended to appeal both orders, he failed to present any argument or analysis
with respect to either issue in his principal appellate brief or his reply brief.
Accordingly, to the extent that the plaintiff claims that the court erred in
entering these orders, we decline to review such claims. See Buchenholz
v. Buchenholz, 221 Conn. App. 132, 142 n.6, 300 A.3d 1233 (‘‘We repeatedly
have stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that have been
improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . [F]or
this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on
appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in
their briefs.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 348 Conn.
928, 304 A.3d 860 (2023).
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he does not challenge the remedial order to the extent
that it requires him to reimburse the defendant for
expenses incurred on behalf of G. The plaintiff argues,
however, that ‘‘[t]here is nothing in the history of the
parties’ agreements or the court’s orders that supports
the trial court’s finding that the 2022 order . . .
required the plaintiff to pay for the postmajority [medi-
cal and dental] expenses of his adult child [K].’’ The
defendant contends that the court properly concluded
that the 2022 order required the plaintiff to reimburse
her for 96 percent of K’s unreimbursed medical and
dental expenses until she reached the age of twenty-
three. Specifically, she argues that the separation agree-
ment requires the parties to pay for the children’s medi-
cal and dental expenses through the age of twenty-
three, and that ‘‘[n]owhere in [the 2022] order [did]
Judge Moore specify that the healthcare expenses made
subject to retroactive reallocation were limited to ‘pre-
majority’ medical or dental expenses.’’ (Emphasis omit-
ted.)
Before addressing the plaintiff’s claim, we clarify the
issue that is before us in this appeal. Although the court
entered the remedial order based on its conclusion that
the plaintiff had violated the 2022 order, we do not
construe the court’s rulings as determining that the 2022
order expressly required the plaintiff to pay for K’s
postmajority medical and dental expenses. As stated
previously, the 2022 order was silent on the issue of
whether the parties were obligated to pay for the chil-
dren’s unreimbursed medical expenses past the age of
majority, and the defendant did not argue before the
trial court that the 2022 order expressly required the
plaintiff to pay such expenses. Rather, as the court
explained in its ruling on the defendant’s motion for
contempt, the defendant argued that the 2022 order
‘‘must be read in conjunction with section 7.3 of the
separation agreement, which provides: ‘The parties’
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obligation to maintain insurance coverage for the chil-
dren shall extend until each of them attains the age of
[nineteen] or, if either or both attend college, through
the age of twenty-three . . . .’’ Moreover, although the
court found that the 2022 order ‘‘clear[ly] and unambigu-
ous[ly] . . . require[d] [the plaintiff] to pay 96 percent
of the unreimbursed medical and dental expenses and
extracurricular activities retroactive to April [27], 2021,
and until his children turned the ‘age of [nineteen] or,
if either or both attend college, through the age of
twenty-three,’ ’’ the italicized portion of the court’s rul-
ing does not appear in the 2022 order. Rather, that
language appears in section 7.3 of the separation agree-
ment. In addition, during oral argument before the trial
court, when the plaintiff argued that ‘‘nowhere in [the
2022] order . . . does Judge Moore say that her orders
[reallocating the parties’ obligation to pay for the chil-
dren’s unreimbursed medical and dental expenses] con-
tinue past the age of majority,’’ the court responded: ‘‘I
get that, but . . . the [separation] agreement does say
that.’’ Finally, on appeal, the parties focus on whether
the separation agreement requires them to pay for K’s
unreimbursed medical and dental expenses through the
age of twenty-three.12 Accordingly, we focus our analy-
sis on the question of whether, in entering the remedial
order, the court correctly construed the parties’ separa-
tion agreement.
The following legal principles and standard of review
guide our resolution of this appeal. ‘‘It is well estab-
lished that a separation agreement that has been incor-
porated into a dissolution decree and its resulting judg-
12
Although the defendant argues on appeal that ‘‘[a] plain reading of
[the 2022 order] indicates Judge Moore’s intention to modify the parties’
obligation to contribute towards unreimbursed medical and dental expenses
and to make that modification effective’’ until K reaches the age of twenty-
three, she does not argue that the 2022 order contains any language expressly
addressing that issue. Rather, the defendant’s argument is based on her
contention that the separation agreement requires the parties to pay for K’s
unreimbursed medical and dental expenses through the age of twenty-three,
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ment must be regarded as a contract and construed
in accordance with the general principles governing
contracts. . . . When construing a contract, we seek
to determine the intent of the parties from the language
used interpreted in the light of the situation of the
parties and the circumstances connected with the trans-
action. . . . [T]he intent of the parties is to be ascer-
tained by a fair and reasonable construction of the
written words and . . . the language used must be
accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning
and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject
matter of the contract. . . . When only one interpreta-
tion of a contract is possible, the court need not look
outside the four corners of the contract. . . . Extrinsic
evidence is always admissible, however, to explain an
ambiguity appearing in the instrument. . . . When the
language of a contract is ambiguous, the determination
of the parties’ intent is a question of fact. . . . When
the language is clear and unambiguous, however, the
contract must be given effect according to its terms,
and the determination of the parties’ intent is a question
of law. . . .
‘‘A contract is unambiguous when its language is clear
and conveys a definite and precise intent. . . . The
court will not torture words to impart ambiguity where
ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity. . . .
Moreover, the mere fact that the parties advance differ-
ent interpretations of the language in question does not
necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambigu-
ous. . . .
‘‘In contrast, a contract is ambiguous if the intent of
the parties is not clear and certain from the language
of the contract itself. . . . [A]ny ambiguity in a contract
and that ‘‘[n]owhere in her order does Judge Moore specify that the health-
care expenses made subject to retroactive reallocation were limited to
‘premajority’ medical and dental expenses.’’ (Emphasis omitted.)
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must emanate from the language used by the parties.
. . . The contract must be viewed in its entirety, with
each provision read in light of the other provisions . . .
and every provision must be given effect if it is possible
to do so. . . . If the language of the contract is suscepti-
ble to more than one reasonable interpretation, the
contract is ambiguous. . . . The threshold question of
whether contractual language is itself ambiguous is a
question of law over which our review is plenary.’’ (Cita-
tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Simp-
son v. Simpson, 352 Conn. 81, 94–96, 335 A.3d 472
(2025).
Two provisions of the separation agreement concern
the parties’ obligation to pay for the children’s unreim-
bursed medical and dental expenses. First, section 3.2
(c) provides that ‘‘[t]he parties shall equally share in
the cost of all agreed upon extracurricular activities
of the children, and . . . equally share the cost of all
unreimbursed medical [and] dental expenses.’’ Second,
section 7.4 provides that ‘‘[a]ll unreimbursed medical,
dental, orthodontic, psychological, [and] psychiatric
expenses incurred on behalf of the children shall be
shared equally by the parties.’’ Although neither provi-
sion expressly addresses when the parties’ obligation
to pay for the expenses in question terminates, both
parties claim that the language of the separation agree-
ment unambiguously supports their respective posi-
tions. For the following reasons, we conclude that both
parties have set forth a reasonable interpretation of the
separation agreement, and, therefore, that the agree-
ment is ambiguous.
First, as the plaintiff argues, it would be reasonable
to infer from the absence of any express language
requiring the parties to pay postmajority unreimbursed
medical and dental expenses that the parties did not
intend for the separation agreement to impose such an
obligation. As the plaintiff notes, the default rule in this
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state is that, in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, ‘‘[t]he obligation of a parent to support a child
[generally] terminates when the child attains the age
of majority, which, in this state, is eighteen.’’13 (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Barbour v. Barbour, 156
Conn. App. 383, 400, 113 A.3d 77 (2015). Because unre-
imbursed medical expenses are a component of child
support; see General Statutes § 46b-84 (f) (2) (C);14 if
the parties did not agree to pay such expenses that
were incurred past the age of majority, that obligation
would terminate as a matter of law once the children
reached the age of majority.
Moreover, when one provision of a contract contains
a specific term, that may indicate that the exclusion of
the same term from another provision was intentional.
See, e.g., Dolan v. Dolan, 213 Conn. App. 112, 128, 277
A.3d 829 (2022) (where separation agreement provided
‘‘that the duration of alimony payments ‘shall be non-
modifiable,’ ’’ absence of similar language from another
provision indicated that parties did not intend latter
provision to be nonmodifiable); Ceddia v. Ceddia, 164
Conn. App. 266, 274, 137 A.3d 830 (2016) (‘‘[w]hen the
parties wished to preclude one aspect of possible peri-
odic alimony modification, they knew how to do so’’).
Here, section 7.3 of the separation agreement—which
immediately precedes section 7.4—expressly provides
that the parties’ ‘‘obligation to maintain [health] insur-
ance coverage for the children shall extend until each
13
Although the age of majority in this state is eighteen; see General Statutes
§ 1-1d; pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-84 (b), the obligation of a parent
to support his or her child after the dissolution of a marriage or legal
separation extends ‘‘until such child completes the twelfth grade or attains
the age of nineteen, whichever occurs first.’’
14
General Statutes § 46b-84 (f) (2) (C) provides in relevant part: ‘‘An order
for payment of the child’s medical and dental expenses . . . that are not
covered by insurance or reimbursed in any other manner shall be entered
in accordance with the child support guidelines established pursuant to
section 46b-215a.’’
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20 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
J. B. v. K. B.

of them attains the age of nineteen . . . or, if either
or both attend college, through the age of twenty-three
. . . .’’ As the plaintiff argues, the absence of similar
language in section 7.4 may indicate that the parties did
not intend for their obligation to pay for the children’s
unreimbursed medical expenses to extend past the age
of majority.
The plaintiff’s interpretation of the agreement is a
reasonable one. Under his interpretation, the separation
agreement would require the parties to maintain health
insurance for their children until they reached the age
at which they would be likely to enter the workforce—
either after high school or, if they attend college, after
completing their undergraduate education—but would
not require the parties to pay for any medical or dental
expenses that were not covered by insurance after the
children reached the age of majority. The parties rea-
sonably may have agreed to maintain health insurance
for their children until they entered the workforce and
were able to obtain coverage through an employer,
while not obligating themselves to pay for any medical
expenses that were not covered by insurance once the
children reached the age of majority.
As the defendant argues, however, it also would be
reasonable to read sections 7.3 and 7.4 of the separation
agreement together, such that the parties’ obligation to
pay for the children’s unreimbursed medical expenses
is coextensive with their obligation to provide them
with health insurance. According to the defendant, sec-
tion 7.4 of the separation agreement cannot be read in
isolation, but, rather, must be read in conjunction with
section 7.3, which requires the parties to maintain
health insurance for the children until they reach the
age of either nineteen or twenty-three, depending on
whether they attend college. The defendant argues that
the inclusion of section 7.4 immediately following sec-
tion 7.3 reflects a deliberate choice that ‘‘clearly evinces
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J. B. v. K. B.

[the parties’] intent to pay [the] unreimbursed medical
and dental expenses while insurance is also being pro-
vided.’’

It is well established that ‘‘a contract must be viewed
in its entirety, with each provision read in light of the
other provisions . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Fazio v. Fazio, 162 Conn. App. 236, 248, 131
A.3d 1162, cert. denied, 320 Conn. 922, 132 A.3d 1095
(2016). ‘‘The law is clear that a contract includes not
only what is expressly stated therein but also what is
necessarily implied from the language used. . . . No
special form of words, but that the promise appears
upon a fair interpretation, is the essential.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Viera v. Cohen, 283 Conn.
412, 439, 927 A.2d 843 (2007). Here, section 7.4 is situ-
ated in article VII of the separation agreement, which
generally addresses the parties’ obligation to provide
for their children’s medical care. It also appears immedi-
ately following section 7.3, which expressly requires
the parties to maintain health insurance for the children
until the age of twenty-three if they attend college. As
the defendant argues, the inclusion of section 7.4 imme-
diately following that provision may indicate that the
parties ‘‘intended to pay for unreimbursed medical and
dental expenses for the [children] during the same time
period, as any part-time college jobs they might find
would almost certainly not provide adequate income
which would allow them to pay those costs independent
of [the parties’] support.’’ Thus, although section 7.4
does not expressly state that the parties are obligated
to pay for the children’s postmajority unreimbursed
medical expenses, it would be reasonable to infer that,
by including that section immediately following section
7.3, the parties intended to pay for the unreimbursed
expenses during the time the children are covered by
their parents’ insurance.
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In arguing that the separation agreement unambigu-
ously does not require the parties to pay for postmajor-
ity unreimbursed medical expenses, the plaintiff relies
on the fact that section 10 of the 2019 agreement, which
concerns payment of expenses for G’s postsecondary
education, provides that ‘‘[t]he current orders that obli-
gate the plaintiff to pay for 60 percent and the defendant
to pay for 40 percent of the reasonable and necessary
unreimbursed medical and dental expenses incurred
for the benefit of [G] shall remain in effect.’’ Specifically,
he argues that, if the separation agreement already
required the parties to pay for G’s unreimbursed medi-
cal expenses while she was in college, there would have
been no reason for the 2019 agreement to include that
requirement.
As the defendant argues, however, that provision of
the 2019 agreement may also be construed to mean that
the parties had a preexisting obligation to pay for G’s
unreimbursed medical expenses through the age of
twenty-three, and that this obligation was not being
modified by the 2019 agreement. By providing that the
‘‘current orders’’ requiring the parties to pay for G’s
unreimbursed medical expenses ‘‘shall remain in
effect,’’ section 10 of the 2019 agreement implies that
the parties had an existing obligation to pay for G’s
unreimbursed medical expenses, and that that obliga-
tion would continue after the entry of the 2019 agree-
ment. The parties entered that 2019 agreement on June
20, 2019.15 As of that date, G already had turned eighteen
years old, and there is no evidence in the record as to
whether G was still in high school at that time. Under the
15
We note that, although the first page of the 2019 agreement is dated
June 6, 2019, the parties did not enter the agreement on that date. Rather,
as mentioned previously; see footnote 3 of this opinion; when the parties
appeared in court on that date, the defendant requested a continuance
because she had just received a draft of the 2019 agreement from the plaintiff
the night before. The court accepted the parties’ agreement and entered it
as an order of the court on June 20, 2019.
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plaintiff’s interpretation of the separation agreement,
however, the parties’ obligation to pay for G’s unreim-
bursed medical expenses terminated as a matter of law
either when she turned eighteen or when she graduated
from high school, whichever occurred later. See foot-
note 13 of this opinion and accompanying text. Thus,
under the plaintiff’s interpretation of the separation
agreement, if G had already graduated from high school
at the time the parties entered the 2019 agreement, it
would make no sense to say that the ‘‘current orders
. . . shall remain in effect,’’ because there would have
been no such order in effect at that time.

In fact, another provision of the 2019 agreement
seems to support the defendant’s argument that section
10 was intended to reaffirm an existing obligation. Spe-
cifically, even though both parties agree that the separa-
tion agreement required them to maintain health insur-
ance for the children through the age of twenty-three,
section 9 of the 2019 agreement—which immediately
precedes the provision relating to unreimbursed medi-
cal expenses—provides that ‘‘[t]he defendant shall con-
tinue to maintain health insurance for the benefit of
[G] pursuant to the parties’ separation agreement.’’
(Emphasis added.) That the 2019 agreement contains
at least one other provision reaffirming a preexisting
obligation under the separation agreement undercuts
the plaintiff’s contention that the parties would have
had no reason to include a provision reaffirming their
obligations with respect to unreimbursed medical
expenses. Accordingly, we disagree with the plaintiff’s
contention that the 2019 agreement supports his inter-
pretation of the separation agreement.

Because both parties have set forth reasonable inter-
pretations of the separation agreement that is grounded
in the language used in that agreement, we conclude
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24 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
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that the agreement is ambiguous.16 We further conclude,
therefore, that the trial court erred in construing the
separation agreement unambiguously to require the
plaintiff to reimburse the defendant for K’s postmajority
medical and dental expenses. Because the agreement
is ambiguous with respect to that issue, the proper
interpretation of the agreement is a question of fact
that must be resolved by the trial court. See Simpson
v. Simpson, supra, 352 Conn. 100. Accordingly, this
case must be remanded to the trial court to make a
factual determination regarding the intent of the parties,
after consideration of any extrinsic evidence presented
by the parties concerning that issue.17 See id. (where
separation agreement was ambiguous, court reversed
remedial order and remanded case for ‘‘trial court to
resolve the ambiguity in the parties’ agreement through
a determination of their intent after consideration of
all available extrinsic evidence and the circumstances
surrounding the entering of the agreement’’).
16
We recognize that our analysis does not address the significance, if any,
of the fact that the separation agreement contains two separate provisions—
sections 3.2 (c) and 7.4—that contain substantially similar language
addressing the parties’ obligation to pay for the children’s unreimbursed
medical expenses. As a general matter, ‘‘the law of contract interpretation
. . . militates against interpreting a contract in a way that renders a provi-
sion superfluous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Halperin v. Halperin,
196 Conn. App. 603, 616, 230 A.3d 757 (2020). In the present case, however,
neither party offers a convincing explanation for the inclusion of both provi-
sions in the agreement or for whether or how section 3.2 (c) should affect our
analysis of whether the parties intended to pay for the children’s postmajority
unreimbursed medical expenses. To the extent the parties believe that extrin-
sic evidence may shed additional light on the meaning of these two provi-
sions, they may present such evidence to the trial court on remand.
17
‘‘We recognize . . . that none of the parties on remand has an obligation
to present extrinsic evidence, whether testimonial or documentary, to
resolve this ambiguity. Nor does any party have an obligation to present
evidence as to who drafted the agreement, such that, in the event that
extrinsic evidence did not resolve the ambiguity, the contra proferentem
rule could properly be applied. We simply note that a [party] who fails to
present any evidence that would permit the fact finder to resolve a material
ambiguity risks failing to satisfy [their] burden of proof.’’ Murchison v.
Waterbury, 218 Conn. App. 396, 415 n.19, 291 A.3d 1073 (2023).
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The judgment is reversed as to the remedial order and
corrected order and the case is remanded for further
proceedings in accordance with this opinion; the judg-
ment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.