State v. Owens

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State v. Owens

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MARVIN OWENS
(AC 46997)
Cradle, C. J., and Suarez and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, who had been on probation in connection with his convic-
tions, in two separate dockets, of violation of probation and interfering with
an officer, appealed from the trial court’s judgments revoking his probation
and imposing a sentence of incarceration. He claimed, inter alia, that the
court improperly denied his motion to dismiss, which alleged violations of
his right to a speedy trial and of the 120 day guideline contained in the
revocation of probation statute (§ 53a-32). Held:

The trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss was not clearly
erroneous, as § 53a-32 (c) does not extend the right to a speedy trial to
probation revocation proceedings, and the court found that the commence-
ment of the hearing was tolled in light of the defendant’s voluminous motion
practice and the numerous files pending before the court.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in waiting to rule on the defen-
dant’s request to represent himself, as the court reasonably waited to canvass
the defendant for a period of approximately six weeks while a competency
evaluation of the defendant was pending in another jurisdiction, and the
delay in the court’s canvass did not prejudice the defendant, who then
represented himself at all critical stages of the proceedings.

The trial court’s finding that the defendant violated his probation was sup-
ported by sufficient evidence, including testimony by the victim, which the
court found to be highly credible.

The defendant could not prevail on his claim that his due process rights
were violated as a result of prosecutorial impropriety, specifically, that the
prosecutor failed to correct certain statements by the victim during her
testimony, which the defendant alleged were false or misleading, as this
court’s review of the victim’s testimony revealed that the defendant had not
demonstrated that the state presented any material, false or substantially
misleading testimony that the prosecutor failed to correct, the defendant’s
claims relied on documents that were not in evidence at the probation
revocation hearing, and there was no reasonable likelihood that any allegedly
false testimony could have affected the trial court’s judgment.
Argued June 3—officially released September 30, 2025

Procedural History

Information, in each of two cases, charging the defen-
dant with violation of probation, brought to the Superior
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State v. Owens

Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the
court, Hernandez, J., denied the defendant’s motion to
dismiss; thereafter, the case was tried to the court,
Hernandez, J.; judgment in each case revoking proba-
tion, from which the defendant appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Marvin Owens, self-represented, the appellant (defen-
dant).
Meryl R. Gersz, assistant state’s attorney, with whom,
on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino, state’s attorney,
and Maura Coyne, senior assistant state’s attorney, for
the appellee (state).
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The self-represented defendant, Marvin
Owens, appeals from the judgments of the trial court
finding him in violation of the conditions of his proba-
tions and revoking his probations pursuant to General
Statutes § 53a-32.1 The defendant claims that (1) the
court improperly denied his motion to dismiss, which
alleged violations of his right to a speedy trial and of
the 120 day guideline contained in § 53a-32, (2) the court
violated his constitutional right to self-representation,
(3) the court found that he violated the conditions of
his probations on the basis of insufficient evidence, and
(4) the state violated his due process rights by failing
1
General Statutes § 53a-32 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) At any time
during the period of probation or conditional discharge, the court or any
judge thereof may issue a warrant for the arrest of a defendant for violation
of any of the conditions of probation or conditional discharge, or may issue
a notice to appear to answer to a charge of such violation, which notice
shall be personally served upon the defendant. . . . Any such warrant shall
authorize all officers named therein to return the defendant to the custody
of the court or to any suitable detention facility designated by the court. . . .
‘‘(c) . . . Unless good cause is shown, a charge of violation of any of the
conditions of probation or conditional discharge shall be disposed of or
scheduled for a hearing not later than one hundred twenty days after the
defendant is arraigned on such charge . . . .’’
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State v. Owens

to correct false or misleading testimony.2 We affirm the
judgments of the court.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our resolution of this appeal. On September
7, 2021, the defendant was convicted of violation of
probation in violation of § 53a-32 and sentenced to
forty-four months of incarceration, execution sus-
pended, and four years of probation. That same day,
the defendant was convicted, under a separate docket,
of interfering with an officer in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-167a, and sentenced to one year of incar-
ceration, execution suspended, and three years of pro-
bation. The sentences were to run consecutively. As a
condition of his probations, the defendant was ordered
to ‘‘not violate any criminal law of the United States,
this state or any other state or territory.’’ He also was
prohibited from committing violence toward, threaten-
ing or harassing the victim, B.3
2
We have reframed the defendant’s claims, in some instance condensing
closely related claims, to more accurately reflect the arguments in the defen-
dant’s brief. See, e.g., Doe v. Quinnipiac University, 218 Conn. App. 170,
173 n.4, 291 A.3d 153 (2023).
The defendant also asserts that the court (1) violated his equal protection
rights, (2) exhibited judicial bias and failed to recuse itself, (3) improperly
denied his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and (4) improperly
failed to provide a written statement setting forth its reasons for revoking
his probation. The defendant’s brief, which is confusing, repetitive, and
disorganized, contains no meaningful analysis of these claims and, accord-
ingly, we decline to review them as they are inadequately briefed. ‘‘We
repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that have
been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . .
Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid
abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a
claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only
cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of
authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court to
judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on appeal
. . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their
briefs.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Y. H. v. J. B., 224 Conn. App.
793, 795–96 n.2, 313 A.3d 1245 (2024).
3
Several protective orders naming B as the protected person previously
had been issued against the defendant, certified copies of which were admit-
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Subsequently, the defendant was charged under both
dockets with violation of probation on the basis of his
arrest on charges that stemmed from an incident on
January 10, 2022, in which the defendant allegedly
assaulted B.4 On May 2 and 12, 2023, the court held a
hearing on the violation of probation charges. On the
first day of the hearing, the defendant moved to dismiss
the violation of probation charges on the ground that
the hearing was being held more than 120 days after
his arraignment without good cause. Additionally, the
defendant filed a written motion for a speedy trial and
a motion to dismiss that also raised his speedy trial
claim. The court denied the defendant’s motion to dis-
miss, noting that the defendant had several pending
files, and that he had appeared before the court ‘‘numer-
ous times with respect to various motions that [he had]
filed, plea discussions that were had, plea offers . . .
giving you time to consider those plea offers. All of that
time tolls the running of these clocks, speedy trial and
the 120 days.’’
At the hearing, the state presented the testimony of
B. B testified that, on January 10, 2022, she went with
ted into evidence. In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d)
(3) (2018), amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that party’s identity may be ascertained.
4
The defendant was subsequently convicted, following a jury trial, of
assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1),
violation of a protective order, and unlawful restraint in the first degree in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-95 in relation to the January 10, 2022
incident. See State v. Owens, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield,
Docket No. CR-XX-XXXXXXX-T. The defendant appealed the judgment of con-
viction, and that appeal is pending before this court. See State v. Owens,
Connecticut Appellate Court, Docket No. 47893 (appeal filed August 8, 2024).
Because the defendant’s appeal from that judgment remains pending, ‘‘no
portion of his challenge to the court’s finding in the present case that he
violated his probation is moot.’’ State v. Sykes, 232 Conn. App. 753, 762
n.4, 337 A.3d 1174 (2025), petition for cert. filed (Conn. June 16, 2025)
(No. 240400).
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the defendant to his home in Bridgeport. She and the
defendant started arguing and things started ‘‘escalat-
ing.’’ B then ‘‘took [the defendant’s] phone to call 211,
because he always breaks [her] cell phone . . . [and]
they told [her] to get a ride to the Bridgeport train
station and that they were gonna send me an Uber and
place me in a hotel.’’ The defendant agreed to drive
her to the Bridgeport train station. B testified that the
defendant pulled over and got out of the car, after which
time she heard glass breaking. She testified that the
defendant got into the car and began striking her with
a broken glass bottle and punching her. She stated that
the defendant restrained her arm as they proceeded
toward the highway, and, after she grabbed the steering
wheel, the defendant threw her out of the vehicle. Pho-
tographs depicting B’s injuries were admitted into evi-
dence.

The state also presented testimony from Justin Quick,
the defendant’s probation officer, who testified con-
cerning the conditions of the defendant’s probation.
Quick testified that he prepared the violation of proba-
tion warrants in the present case on the basis of the
defendant’s arrest on new charges pending in four dock-
ets. A copy of the arrest warrant application for the
violation of probation charges was also admitted into
evidence, which referenced the defendant’s arrest on
January 13, 2022, on charges of, inter alia, assault in the
first degree. Documents were introduced into evidence
establishing the conditions of the defendant’s proba-
tion, including that he not violate any criminal law of
this state, the United States or any other state or terri-
tory, and that he refrain from violence, threats or harass-
ment toward B. The state also offered the testimony of
Gregory Sperling, the supervisor of the Office of Adult
Probation in Milford, who testified that he had reviewed
the written conditions of probation with the defendant
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personally on October 12, 2021, at which time the defen-
dant signed those written conditions. The defendant
did not present any witnesses.
On September 12, 2023, the court orally ruled that
the defendant violated his probation. The court based
its decision, inter alia, on B’s testimony relating to the
January 10, 2022 incident in which he assaulted her.
The court found that B’s testimony was ‘‘highly credi-
ble.’’ The court concluded that ‘‘[i]t’s clear to the court
that [the defendant] is a danger to the community and
confinement is appropriate for the violations of proba-
tion.’’ Accordingly, the court revoked the defendant’s
probation in both cases and sentenced him to forty-
four months of incarceration. This appeal followed.
Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth
as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that the court improperly
denied his motion to dismiss, which alleged that the
court violated (1) his right to a speedy trial under the
sixth amendment to the United States constitution and
(2) the 120 day guideline contained in § 53a-32. We are
not persuaded.
We set forth the well settled standard of review and
the following legal principles. ‘‘[O]ur review of the trial
court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [denial]
of [a] motion to dismiss will be de novo. . . . Factual
findings underlying the court’s decision, however, will
not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. . . .
The determination of whether a defendant has been
denied his right to a speedy trial is a finding of fact,
which will be reversed on appeal only if it is clearly
erroneous. . . . The trial court’s conclusions must
stand unless they are legally and logically inconsistent
with the facts.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
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State v. Owens

marks omitted.) State v. Griffin, 220 Conn. App. 225,
230, 297 A.3d 1056 (2023).
‘‘The sixth amendment guarantee of a speedy trial is
a fundamental right applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment to the United States constitu-
tion. . . . This right also is guaranteed by the constitu-
tion of Connecticut, article first, § 8.’’5 (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id., 234 n.3. ‘‘[I]t is well established
[however] that a probation revocation proceeding is
not a criminal proceeding but is instead more akin to
a civil proceeding.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Dudley, 332 Conn. 639, 648, 212 A.3d 1268
(2019). The United States Supreme Court ‘‘has never
held . . . that a prisoner subject to a [probation viola-
tion] detainer has a constitutional right to a speedy
[probation revocation] hearing.’’ Carchman v. Nash,
473 U.S. 716, 731 n.10, 105 S. Ct. 3401, 87 L. Ed. 2d
516 (1985).
Section 53a-32 (c) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Upon
notification by the probation officer of the arrest of
the defendant or upon an arrest by warrant as herein
provided, the court shall cause the defendant to be
brought before it without unnecessary delay for a hear-
ing on the violation charges. . . . Unless good cause
is shown, a charge of violation of any of the conditions
of probation or conditional discharge shall be disposed
of or scheduled for a hearing not later than one hundred
twenty days after the defendant is arraigned on such
charge . . . .’’ Section 53a-32 (c) provides a guideline
for the scheduling of a probation revocation hearing.
It does not, however, extend the right to a speedy trial
5
The sixth amendment provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial
. . . .’’ U.S. Const., amend. VI. Because the defendant has not set forth a
separate analysis of his claim under the Connecticut constitution, we address
his claim only under the sixth amendment to the federal constitution. See,
e.g., State v. Griffin, supra, 220 Conn. App. 234 n.3.
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to probation revocation proceedings. See State v. Kel-
ley, 164 Conn. App. 232, 240–41, 137 A.3d 822 (2016)
(legislative history of § 53a-32 (c) demonstrated that
120 day provision was intended to serve as goal, not
directive), aff’d, 326 Conn. 731, 167 A.3d 961 (2017);
see also State v. Smith, 178 Conn. App. 715, 724, 177
A.3d 593 (2017), cert. denied, 328 Conn. 906, 177 A.3d
564 (2018).6
The defendant argues that the court violated his
speedy trial rights by holding the probation revocation
hearing more than 120 days after his arraignment. The
foregoing case law, however, clearly establishes that
the right to a speedy trial does not extend to probation
revocation proceedings and that the 120 day provision
contained in § 53a-32 (c) is a guideline for the schedul-
ing of a probation revocation hearing, not a directive.
Moreover, the court found that the commencement of
the hearing was tolled in light of the defendant’s volumi-
nous motion practice and the numerous files pending
before the court. We cannot conclude that this finding
was clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Antrum v. State, 185
Conn. 118, 122, 440 A.2d 839 (1981) (trial court’s tolling
period was reasonable because termination of tolling
period ‘‘was entirely within the control of the defen-
dant’’). Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s first
claim.
II
The defendant next claims that the trial court violated
his right to self-representation as guaranteed by the
6
In Kelley, this court referenced the following legislative history in support
of the conclusion that § 53a-32 (c) does not create a right to a speedy trial
in probation revocation proceedings: ‘‘Representative Michael P. Lawlor
. . . distinguished the 120 day limitation from ‘the speedy trial mechanism,’
noting that ‘the speedy trial is a right. . . . [T]his [120 day limitation] is not
the same thing, this is basically a guideline, [a] goal being articulated by
the [l]egislature imposed on the judge really to bring a case to hearing.’ ’’
(Citation omitted.) State v. Kelley, supra, 164 Conn. App. 240.
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sixth amendment to the United States constitution.7
Specifically, the defendant argues that the court caused
structural error by impermissibly delaying its canvass
of him with respect to his request to represent himself.
We conclude that the court did not violate the defen-
dant’s right to self-representation.

The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to our discussion of this claim. The court
ordered that a public defender be appointed to repre-
sent the defendant at his arraignment on January 14,
2022. Although the defendant indicated that he did not
want a public defender, he did not request to proceed as
a self-represented party on that date.8 A public defender
entered an appearance on the defendant’s behalf on
March 30, 2022. On April 4, 2022, the defendant stated
to the court: ‘‘I waive my right to counsel, so she’s
withdrawn.’’ The court informed the defendant that it
could not yet rule on the defendant’s request to repre-
sent himself because defense counsel had not filed a
motion to withdraw her appearance and the defendant
had not yet been canvassed. The court also stated that
it would mark off certain motions filed by the defendant
without prejudice and that, ‘‘if it turns out that you’re
7
This right applies to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 406, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965).
8
We reject the defendant’s claim that the court violated his due process
rights by failing to make an on-the-record inquiry regarding his representa-
tion pursuant to Practice Book § 37-3. In addition to being inadequately
briefed; see footnote 2 of this opinion; the record reveals that, when the
defendant stated that he did not want a public defender to represent him,
the court replied that, ‘‘if you decide that you’re going to hire someone else,
you can let me know.’’
To the extent that the defendant also asserts that the court made an
inadequate investigation of his indigency, we disagree. The public defender
stated to the court at the defendant’s arraignment that ‘‘[the defendant] did
not want to speak to us . . . I do believe he’s eligible, so I’ll ask for full
appointment.’’ The court reasonably granted the public defender’s request
on the basis of those representations.
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State v. Owens

going to represent yourself pro se, I’ll hear all your
motions . . . .’’
On August 10, 2022, the court stated on the record that
a competency evaluation pursuant to General Statutes
§ 54-46d had been filed in the judicial district of Anso-
nia-Milford, and that the evaluation was still pending.
The court stated at that time that ‘‘[w]e can’t have any
meaningful discussion on the cases until that is com-
pleted.’’ On the next scheduled court date, September
23, 2022, defense counsel represented to the court that
the defendant was found competent by the court in
Milford and that the defendant still wanted to represent
himself in the present case. The court canvassed the
defendant and granted the defendant’s request to repre-
sent himself, finding that the defendant’s waiver was
knowing and voluntary.9 The court also appointed
standby counsel to assist the defendant. See Practice
Book § 44-4. The defendant represented himself at all
times thereafter, including at the probation revocation
hearing.
We first set forth the relevant legal principles govern-
ing our review of this claim. ‘‘Given the trial court’s
superior position to observe the defendant and to con-
trol the proceedings before it, we review a trial court’s
decision with respect to a defendant’s request to repre-
sent himself for an abuse of discretion. . . .
‘‘Both the federal constitution and our state constitu-
tion afford a criminal defendant the right to [forgo] the
assistance of counsel and to choose instead to represent
himself or herself at trial. . . . Godinez v. Moran, 509
U.S. 389, 396, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993)
(defendant must be found competent to waive right to
assistance of counsel).
9
The defendant has not challenged the adequacy of the court’s canvass
in this appeal.
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State v. Owens

‘‘Once a defendant invokes his right to self-represen-
tation, a trial court must canvass that defendant to
determine if the defendant’s invocation of that right
and the corollary waiver of the right to counsel were
both voluntary and intelligent. . . . A court must
indulge in every reasonable presumption against the
waiver or forfeiture of fundamental constitutional
rights, and must not presume acquiescence in the loss
of fundamental rights. . . . Forcing a lawyer on an
unwilling defendant is contrary to the basic right to
defend oneself. . . . As such, the improper denial of
the right to self-representation is a structural error,
requiring a new trial. . . . Thus, a trial court can deny
a defendant’s timely request to represent himself (1)
when a defendant is not competent to represent himself,
(2) when a defendant has not knowingly and intelli-
gently waived his right to the assistance of counsel, (3)
when the request is made for dilatory or manipulative
purposes, or (4) because the defendant’s behavior is
disruptive or obstructive.’’ (Citations omitted; footnotes
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pet-
teway, 351 Conn. 682, 691–93, 332 A.3d 196 (2025).

In the present case, we conclude that the court did not
abuse its discretion by waiting to rule on the defendant’s
request to represent himself until September 23, 2022.
On August 10, 2022, the court was made aware that a
competency evaluation of the defendant was pending
in another jurisdiction.10 The court reasonably waited
to canvass the defendant for a period of approximately
six weeks while the evaluation was pending. C.f., e.g.,
United States v. Barnes, 693 F.3d 261, 274 (2d Cir.
2012) (noting, in concluding that defendant abandoned
request to represent himself, that trial court had
declined to rule on defendant’s request until pending
10
The record before us does not reveal the exact dates that the competency
evaluation was requested and completed.
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State v. Owens

competency evaluation was completed), cert. denied,
568 U.S. 1113, 133 S. Ct. 917, 184 L. Ed. 2d 704 (2013).
The court’s brief delay in ruling on the defendant’s
motion was in furtherance of its obligations under Prac-
tice Book § 44-3, which provides in relevant part that
‘‘[a] waiver will be accepted only after the judicial
authority makes a thorough inquiry and is satisfied that
the defendant . . . (1) [h]as been clearly advised of
the right to the assistance of counsel, including the
right to the assignment of counsel when so entitled; (2)
[p]ossesses the intelligence and capacity to appreciate
the consequences of the decision to represent oneself;
(3) [c]omprehends the nature of the charges and pro-
ceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and
any additional facts essential to a broad understanding
of the case; and (4) [h]as been made aware of the dan-
gers and disadvantages of self-representation.’’
Although the court did not immediately consider the
defendant’s request to represent himself, the delay in
doing so did not prejudice him. After the court can-
vassed the defendant, he represented himself at all criti-
cal stages of the proceedings. Indeed, the defendant
has not pointed to any part of the proceedings that was
impacted from March 30 until September 23, 2022. Cf.,
e.g., State v. Joseph A., 336 Conn. 247, 266–67, 245 A.3d
785 (2020) (notwithstanding defendant’s claim that he
was improperly canvassed, defendant did not point to
‘‘any aspect of the trial proceeding that was impacted
by the defendant’s self-representation during the initial
plea negotiation with the state’’); State v. Cushard, 328
Conn. 558, 583–85, 181 A.3d 74 (2018) (concluding that,
even if absence of counsel resulted from constitution-
ally inadequate waiver, any error was harmless because
hearings that occurred during time that defendant was
self-represented did not contribute to verdict). There-
fore, we reject the defendant’s second claim.
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State v. Owens

III
The defendant’s third claim is that there was insuffi-
cient evidence that he violated his probation.11 We dis-
agree.
The following principles are relevant to our review
of the defendant’s claim. ‘‘The law governing the stan-
dard of proof for a violation of probation is well settled.
. . . [A]ll that is required in a probation violation pro-
ceeding is enough to satisfy the court within its sound
judicial discretion that the probationer has not met the
terms of his probation. . . . [E]vidence is not insuffi-
cient [merely] because it is conflicting or inconsistent.
[The fact finder] is free to juxtapose conflicting versions
of events and determine which is more credible. . . .
It is the [fact finder’s] exclusive province to weigh the
conflicting evidence and to determine the credibility of
witnesses. . . . The [fact finder] can . . . decide
what—all, none, or some—of a witness’ testimony to
accept or reject. . . . A challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence is based on the court’s factual findings.
The proper standard of review is whether the court’s
findings were clearly erroneous based on the evidence.
. . . A court’s finding of fact is clearly erroneous and
its conclusions drawn from that finding lack sufficient
evidence when there is no evidence in the record to
support it . . . or when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mis-
take has been committed. . . . [A] trial court may not
find a violation of probation unless it finds that the
11
Although it appears that the defendant’s statement of issues, which is
not a model of clarity, does not distinctly raise this claim, we address it
because both parties have fully briefed the issue. See, e.g., Whisper Wind
Development Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 32 Conn. App. 515,
523–24, 630 A.2d 108 (1993) (addressing issue not raised in statement of
issues when claim was fully briefed), aff’d, 229 Conn. 176, 640 A.2d 100
(1994).
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State v. Owens

predicate facts underlying the violation have been
established by a preponderance of the evidence at the
hearing—that is, the evidence must induce a reasonable
belief that it is more probable than not that the defen-
dant has violated a condition of his or her probation.
. . . In making its factual determination, the trial court
is entitled to draw reasonable and logical inferences
from the evidence. . . . This court has observed that
to support a judgment of revocation of probation, [o]ur
law does not require the state to prove that all condi-
tions alleged were violated; it is sufficient to prove that
one was violated.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Sykes, 232 Conn. App. 753,
769–70, 337 A.3d 1174 (2025), petition for cert. filed
(Conn. June 16, 2025) (No. 240400).
In the present case, there was sufficient evidence
in the record to support the court’s finding that the
defendant violated his probation. The court heard B’s
testimony recounting the January 10, 2022 incident,
including that the defendant struck B with a broken
glass bottle, punched her, restrained her, and threw her
out of a moving vehicle. The court also had before it
photographs depicting B’s injuries. The court found B’s
testimony to be ‘‘highly credible . . . .’’ The defendant
argues that the court’s factual findings were based on
B’s ‘‘perjured’’ testimony.12 The defendant essentially
12
In the section of his brief discussing his sufficiency claim, the defendant
asserts that the court failed to provide a written statement of its decision
and that the transcript of the proceedings did not put forth the basis of its
ruling. To the extent that the defendant intends to raise a separate claim
regarding the clarity of the court’s ruling, we conclude that this claim is
inadequately briefed. See footnote 2 of this opinion. To the extent that the
defendant intends to argue that the court improperly failed to provide a
written statement in support of his sufficiency claim, we disagree. As long
as ‘‘the ultimate findings of the court, that there was a violation of a condition
of probation and that probation should have been revoked, were reasonable
. . . the court need not have made specific subsidiary findings of fact.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lachowicz, 79 Conn. App. 199,
209, 829 A.2d 874, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 921, 835 A.2d 61 (2003). Moreover,
in the present case, it is clear that the court based its finding that the
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asks us to overturn the court’s credibility determina-
tions, which we decline to disturb on appeal. See, e.g.,
State v. Campbell, 61 Conn. App. 99, 102, 762 A.2d 12
(2000) (‘‘[a]s a reviewing court, we may not retry the
case or pass on the credibility of witnesses’’), cert.
denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 105 (2001). From the
evidence presented, the court reasonably could have
concluded that the state established, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the defendant violated the
conditions of his probation by violating a law of this
state on January 10, 2022, and by committing violence
toward B. The defendant’s third claim therefore fails.
IV
The defendant’s final claim is that his due process
rights were violated as a result of prosecutorial impro-
priety.13 Specifically, the defendant argues that the pros-
ecutor failed to correct certain statements made by B
during her testimony, which he alleges were false and/
or misleading. We are not persuaded.
We first set forth relevant legal principles. ‘‘Whether
a prosecutor knowingly presented false or misleading
testimony presents a mixed question of law and fact,
with the [trial] court’s factual findings subject to review
for clear error and the legal conclusions that the court
drew from those facts subject to de novo review.’’
Greene v. Commissioner of Correction, 330 Conn. 1,
14, 190 A.3d 851 (2018), cert. denied, 586 U.S. 1167, 139
S. Ct. 1219, 203 L. Ed. 2d 238 (2019). As a general
proposition, ‘‘[d]ue process is . . . offended if the
state, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it
defendant violated his probation on the credibility of the witnesses, specifi-
cally, B.
13
This claim was preserved for appeal by the defendant’s argument before
the trial court that the state improperly presented ‘‘perjured testimony [on]
May 2, which was extensive,’’ and that, in failing to correct this testimony,
the state engaged in prosecutorial misconduct.
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to go uncorrected when it appears. . . . This constitu-
tional safeguard prohibits not only the solicitation of
false evidence, which is objectively untruthful, but the
solicitation of evidence that substantially mischaracter-
izes facts and, thus, has a tendency to mislead the finder
of fact. . . . .
‘‘The rules governing our evaluation of a prosecutor’s
failure to correct false or misleading testimony are
derived from those first set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, [373 U.S. 83,
86–87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)] . . .
[in which] the court held that the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process [when] the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the [prosecutor]. . . .
The United States Supreme Court also has recognized
that [t]he [fact finder’s] estimate of the truthfulness and
reliability of a . . . witness may well be determinative
of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors
as the possible interest of the witness in testifying
falsely that a defendant’s life or liberty may depend.
. . . Accordingly, the Brady rule applies not just to
exculpatory evidence, but also to impeachment evi-
dence . . . which, broadly defined, is evidence having
the potential to alter the [fact finder’s] assessment of
the credibility of a significant prosecution witness.’’
(Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Ayuso v. Commissioner of Correc-
tion, 215 Conn. App. 322, 340–42, 282 A.3d 983, cert.
denied, 345 Conn. 967, 285 A.3d 736 (2022). ‘‘The phrase
substantially misleading describes testimony that,
although made in good faith, is untrue in a manner that
should be obvious to the state. . . . False testimony,
by contrast, occurs when the prosecutor knows that a
state witness has committed perjury.’’ (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. John-
son, 345 Conn. 174, 205, 283 A.3d 477 (2022).
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First, our review of B’s testimony at the probation
revocation hearing reveals that the petitioner has not
demonstrated that the state presented any material,
false, or substantially misleading testimony that the
prosecutor failed to correct.14 B’s testimony is the only
testimony that the defendant claims was false and/or
misleading, and the court found that B’s testimony was
‘‘highly credible.’’ As stated previously, it is not the role
of this court to ‘‘second-guess the credibility determina-
tions made by the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Young v. Commissioner of Correction, 219
Conn. App. 171, 187, 294 A.3d 29, cert. denied, 347 Conn.
905, 297 A.3d 567 (2023).
B testified at the probation revocation hearing that,
after the defendant exited his vehicle, she heard glass
shatter. The defendant attempts to establish that this
testimony was false, relying on an incident report and
warrant application in which B allegedly indicated that
she heard glass shatter at the defendant’s house, before
she and the defendant entered his vehicle. Neither of
those documents was in evidence and, therefore, we
do not consider them. See footnote 14 of this opinion.
Even if that evidence were properly before the court,
mere inconsistencies in a witness’ testimony do not
equate to false testimony or perjury. See, e.g., State v.
Gradzik, 193 Conn. 35, 42 n.10, 475 A.2d 269 (1984)
(‘‘Not every inconsistency constitutes a falsehood.
14
We agree with the state’s observation that, in support of his claim, the
defendant has submitted voluminous documents that were not admitted as
evidence at the probation revocation hearing. We decline to consider any
evidence that was not before the court at the probation revocation hearing.
See, e.g., Dushay v. Southern Connecticut Hockey League, LLC, 234 Conn.
App. 609, 612 n.3, A.3d (2025). ‘‘A reviewing court cannot go beyond
the proper record before it in the determination of issues presented on
appeal. . . . It is axiomatic that this court does not take evidence and
does not make factual determinations.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Dyous, 153 Conn. App. 266, 278 n.10, 100 A.3d 1004
(2014), appeal dismissed, 320 Conn. 176, 128 A.3d 505 (2016).
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Claiming perjury, with nothing more, is inappropri-
ate.’’); see also United States v. Josephberg, 562 F.3d
478, 494 (2d Cir.) (‘‘[d]ifferences in recollection do not
constitute perjury . . . and when testimonial inconsis-
tencies are revealed on cross-examination, the [fact
finder] [i]s entitled to weigh the evidence and decide the
credibility issues for itself’’ (citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 965,
130 S. Ct. 397, 175 L. Ed. 2d 302 (2009).
The defendant also challenges several statements
made by B on cross-examination. The defendant exten-
sively questioned B regarding certain prior incidents
that did not pertain to the January 10, 2022 incident.
Although the defendant asserts that B’s responses to
his questions were false, the only evidence he has pre-
sented to refute her testimony are documents that were
not in evidence. For example, the defendant asked B
about a prior incident in July, 2021, and inquired as to
whether B had ‘‘made a report that [the defendant] was
to shoot your male companion in the head.’’ B denied
knowledge of this incident. B also denied ever ‘‘plac[ing]
a claim . . . [that was] found to be untrue.’’ The defen-
dant asserts that B testified falsely with respect to a
prior accusation she made that the defendant had sexu-
ally assaulted her and with respect to a prior incident
involving B that occurred at the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Ansonia-Milford. He also claims that
B offered perjured testimony by denying that she had
ever tried to harm herself. Finally, he argues that B
testified falsely by denying that she had spoken with
the defendant’s son in February, 2022. The defendant’s
arguments amount to mere conclusory assertions that
B’s statements were false. The majority of B’s allegedly
false statements were elicited on cross-examination by
the defendant and involved issues that were not relevant
to the event that led to the filing of the violation of
probation charges. We, therefore, are not convinced by
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the defendant’s assertions that B’s testimony pertaining
to the incident that led to the allegation that he violated
the conditions of his probations was false or substan-
tially misleading. See, e.g., Young v. Commissioner of
Correction, supra, 219 Conn. App. 195–96.
Second, we agree with the state that, even if we were
to conclude that the portions of B’s testimony that the
defendant has challenged were false or substantially
misleading, the defendant is unable to demonstrate that
the prosecutor’s failure to correct the statements was
fundamentally unfair because ‘‘there is no reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected
the judgment of the [finder of fact].’’ Ayuso v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, supra, 215 Conn. App. 345. As
stated previously, most of the challenged statements
were not relevant to any material issue in the case, and,
instead, concerned prior, unrelated incidents between
B and the defendant.15 The only challenge that the defen-
dant makes to B’s testimony relating to the January 10,
2022, incident is her statement regarding the timing of
when she heard glass shatter. The defendant challenges
this testimony with documents that were not properly
before the court. Moreover, any mere inconsistencies
in B’s memory regarding the incident were wholly
within the province of the trial court, as the finder of
fact, to weigh. As stated previously, the court’s finding
that B’s testimony was ‘‘highly credible’’ is not one we
disturb on appeal. ‘‘As the sole finder of fact in the
probation revocation proceeding . . . the court was
entitled to arrive at its own conclusion regarding the
witnesses’ credibility and what weight to afford their
testimony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Blake, 108 Conn. App. 336, 343, 947 A.2d 998, aff’d,
15
Indeed, the court noted during the defendant’s cross-examination that
‘‘none of this is actually relevant to anything that [the prosecutor] went into
on direct. Ordinarily, I would sustain objections to your questions, sir. But,
I’m gonna give you a little bit of leeway, inasmuch as you’re not an attorney.’’
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289 Conn. 586, 958 A.2d 1236 (2008). Even if B was
mistaken about the timing of when she heard glass
shattering, we cannot conclude that such a mistake
would have affected the court’s judgment with respect
to her testimony regarding the incident as a whole. In
light of the foregoing, we conclude that the defendant
has not demonstrated that his due process rights were
violated by the prosecutor’s purported failure to correct
B’s testimony.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.