Stroll v. Pass

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Stroll v. Pass

JOHN J. STROLL, JR. v. BETTINA GLORIA
STROLL PASS ET AL.
(AC 47165)
IN RE PROBATE APPEAL OF
JOHN J. STROLL, JR.
(AC 46635)
Elgo, Moll and Suarez, Js.

Syllabus

In these consolidated appeals, the plaintiff appealed from, inter alia, the
trial court’s judgment affirming the Probate Court’s order removing him as
the fiduciary of the trusts and estates of his parents, the decedents. He
claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly affirmed the order. Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the
plaintiff’s removal as fiduciary of the decedents’ trusts and estates was
warranted under the facts and circumstances of this case, as the court’s
factual findings that the defendant had breached his fiduciary duties were
supported by testimonial and documentary evidence in the record and the
court specifically credited testimony that the plaintiff had not provided a
full and accurate accounting of the proceeds of various loans he took out
on properties held in the decedents’ trusts and estates.

The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly
imposed sanctions on him for violating his fiduciary duties, as the record
was clear that the court set aside the Probate Court’s contempt finding and
vacated the sanction that accompanied that finding.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering three financial orders,
as by their plain terms the orders were compensatory rather than punitive
in nature and were intended to provide recompense to the decedents’ trusts
and estates for the plaintiff’s breach of his fiduciary duties.

The plaintiff’s claim that the trial court and the Probate Court failed to
consider whether his brother should be appointed as successor fiduciary
to the decedents’ trusts and estates following his removal from that role
was untenable, as the findings of both courts indicate that they credited
evidence that his brother was unwilling to serve in that role.

This court dismissed the plaintiff’s first appeal, taken from certain orders
issued by the trial court, as jurisdictionally improper, as it was not taken
from a final judgment.

Argued April 24—officially released November 18, 2025
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Stroll v. Pass

Procedural History

Appeal, in the first case, from the decision of the
Probate Court for the district of Westport removing the
plaintiff as the fiduciary of the trusts and estates of the
decedents of the named defendant et al., brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, and
appeal, in the second case, from the decision of the
Probate Court for the district of Westport, inter alia,
imposing sanctions on the plaintiff, brought to the Supe-
rior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where
the cases were consolidated; thereafter, the cases were
tried to the court, Hon. Barry K. Stevens, judge trial
referee; subsequently the court, Hon. Barry K. Stevens,
judge trial referee, issued certain orders and the plaintiff
appealed to this court; thereafter, the court, Hon. Barry
K. Stevens, judge trial referee, rendered judgment
affirming the order of the Probate Court removing the
plaintiff as fiduciary and issuing certain financial
orders, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Appeal
dismissed in AC 46635; affirmed.
Kenneth A. Votre, for the appellant in Docket Nos.
AC 47165 and AC 46635 (plaintiff).
Frederic S. Ury, with whom were Meagan A. Cauda
and, on the brief, Dana M. Hrelic, for the appellee in
Docket Nos. AC 47165 and AC 46635 (defendant Robert
E. Grant).
Opinion

ELGO, J. This appeal concerns the administration of
the trusts and estates of John J. Stroll, Sr., and Bettina
Gloria Stroll, the parents of several parties to this pro-
bate dispute.1 In Docket No. AC 47165, the plaintiff,
John J. Stroll, Jr., appeals from the judgment of the
Superior Court rendered in favor of the defendants,
1
For clarity, we refer to John J. Stroll, Sr., and Bettina Gloria Stroll
individually by first name and collectively as the parents in this opinion.
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Stroll v. Pass

Bettina Gloria Stroll Pass (Betty), Joseph G. Stroll
(Joseph), and Attorney Robert E. Grant.2 The plaintiff
claims that the court improperly (1) affirmed the order
of the Probate Court removing him as the fiduciary of
the parents’ trusts and estates, (2) imposed sanctions
on him for violating his fiduciary duties, and (3) failed
to appoint Joseph as a successor fiduciary. In Docket
No. AC 46635, an appeal the plaintiff filed while the
proceedings before the Superior Court remained pend-
ing, the plaintiff raises identical claims. We affirm the
judgment of the Superior Court in Docket No. AC 47165
and dismiss the appeal in Docket No. AC 46635 for lack
of a final judgment.
The following facts, as set forth in the court’s June
5, 2023 memorandum of decision, are relevant to this
appeal. John and Bettina were married and had three
children—the plaintiff, Betty, and Joseph. ‘‘Both John
and Bettina were grantors of inter vivos trusts. Each
trust was created in 1991 and amended in 2015. When
they died, the instruments provided that the rest of their
estates poured into the trusts. John died in September,
2015. At that time, his estate had reported assets of
$2,210,713, that included the membership shares in the
company [known as] Sterling Development, LLC [(Ster-
ling Development)]. This company owned the property
located at 980 Post Road East in Westport, having an
approximate market value of $2.2 million. . . . John’s
trust had assets of $1,013,493. . . .
‘‘[Bettina] died in February, 2017. At that time, her
estate had reported assets of $1,048,506. . . . [Her]
Betty and Joseph are siblings of the plaintiff and beneficiaries under the
2

trusts and estates in question. Grant was appointed as successor fiduciary
for the parents’ trusts and estates in 2018. Following the plaintiff’s com-
mencement of a probate appeal in the Superior Court in 2019, Grant filed
a motion to intervene as a defendant pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52-
102 and 52-107, which the court granted. Although all three defendants have
appeared in this appeal, only Grant filed an appellate brief with this court.
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trust had reported assets of $2,634,238, including real
property at 11 North Sasco Common in Westport
[(North Sasco property)], having a net market value of
$1.5 million, and 1001 South Ocean Avenue in Seaside
Park, New Jersey, having a value of $910,000. . . . The
plaintiff was named as the executor of [John and Betti-
na’s] estates and trustee of [their] inter vivos trusts.’’
(Citations omitted.)
In November, 2015, the Probate Court for the district
of Westport admitted John’s will into probate and
appointed the plaintiff as executor. ‘‘In an order dated
July 18, 2017, the Probate Court granted a motion filed
by [Betty] for the court to accept jurisdiction over
John’s trust and ordered [the plaintiff] to produce an
accounting. . . . In a second order also dated July 18,
2017, the Probate Court appointed [the plaintiff and
Joseph] as temporary administrators of Bettina’s
estate. . . .
‘‘In an order dated October 17, 2017, the Probate
Court continued [the plaintiff and Joseph] as temporary
administrators of Bettina’s estate until February 1, 2018,
and issued the following order directed to them: ‘[T]he
temporary administrators will NOT have authority to
sell any tangible personal property, real property or
[Sterling Development] interests that own either of the
foregoing or through which the decedents conducted
their personal business without prior court approval.’
. . .
‘‘On May 10, 2018, the Probate Court issued orders
concerning a trial that was held . . . on a motion filed
by Betty to remove [the plaintiff] as a fiduciary of [the
parents’] estates and trusts. The Probate Court
appointed Grant as temporary administrator of [Betti-
na’s] estate pending the outcome of the trial proceed-
ings. . . .
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Stroll v. Pass

‘‘Between May, 2018, and May, 2019, various proceed-
ings were held before the Probate Court . . . . In [an]
August 8, 2019 order, the [Probate] Court removed [the
plaintiff] as the fiduciary of [the parents’] estates and the
trusts (Joseph was effectively removed as a fiduciary
of [Bettina’s] estate on February 1, 2018, and he
requested not to be reappointed). The [Probate] Court
appointed Grant as the administrator of the parents’
estates and trusts. The [Probate] Court also ordered
[the plaintiff] and Joseph ‘to account for all funds under
their control from the date of their appointment to date.’
. . . The [Probate] Court made various findings to sup-
port this decision, including [the plaintiff’s] failure to
provide an accounting by March 15, 2019, as ordered
by the court, failure to sufficiently explain the disap-
pearance of jewelry which Betty was entitled to receive,
use of the parents’ credit cards after their deaths,
improper withdrawal of $90,000 pursuant to a defunct
power of attorney, and a pattern of hiring and firing
expensive lawyers to the financial detriment of the
estates and trusts.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in orig-
inal.)
From that order, the plaintiff appealed to the Superior
Court in September, 2019. The plaintiff filed a second
probate appeal in the Superior Court in January, 2020.
The court subsequently granted a motion to consolidate
those appeals. A five day trial followed in October and
November, 2022, and the parties submitted posttrial
briefs.
In its June 5, 2023 memorandum of decision on those
two probate appeals, the court found that the plaintiff
had egregiously breached his fiduciary duties and that
his removal as the fiduciary of the parents’ trusts and
estates was ‘‘both warranted and necessary.’’ The court
thus entered the following orders: ‘‘(1) [The plaintiff]
is ordered to pay Grant as fiduciary all loan proceeds
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Stroll v. Pass

that have been received by [the plaintiff] from the mort-
gage loans placed on the estate or trust properties, and
[the plaintiff] shall be held personally liable for the
amounts not repaid. Interest shall accrue on the balance
of all unpaid amounts at the rate of 8 percent a year
until fully paid. (2) [The plaintiff] shall be held person-
ally liable for all interest, loans, fees and expenses asso-
ciated with the transfers and mortgages of all estate
and trust properties. (3) [The plaintiff] shall be held
personally liable for all attorney’s fees and taxable costs
incurred by Grant and Betty in connection with any
litigation relating to the recoupment of these funds.’’
In that memorandum of decision, the court also
stated that it would ‘‘hold a hearing at which time the
parties may be heard regarding these and any other
orders which may be appropriate. The court . . . notes
that [the plaintiff] contests the Probate Court’s order
that he either pay rent or vacate the North Sasco prop-
erty. The court will also entertain argument from the
parties on this issue that was not fully or sufficiently
addressed by the parties in their posttrial filings.’’
Despite the pendency of that proceeding, the plaintiff
filed an appeal of the court’s June 5, 2023 decision, AC
46635, weeks later.
On June 7, 2023, the court held a supplemental hear-
ing, at which it permitted the parties to be heard on,
inter alia, the issue of whether the Probate Court prop-
erly ordered the plaintiff to pay rent while residing at the
North Sasco property. The parties thereafter submitted
supplemental briefs in July and August, 2023.
On November 15, 2023, the court issued an order
titled ‘‘Final Orders of Judgment.’’ In that order, the
court stated in relevant part: ‘‘After review and consid-
eration of the parties’ most recent filings, the court
makes the following findings. On the basis of the totality
of the evidence presented (including the extent of the
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Stroll v. Pass

losses to the estate caused by the plaintiff’s actions and
the value of the North Sasco property to the estate), this
court finds, as did the Probate Court, that the plaintiff
should either pay rent or vacate the North Sasco prop-
erty. The specifics of any rental arrangement or the
plaintiff’s departure from the property shall be deter-
mined through further proceedings in the Probate
Court. Additionally, the court finds that [Betty’s] request
for attorney’s fees should be denied. The court declines
to make any further findings or issue any further orders.
. . . [T]his court’s June 5, 2023 memorandum of deci-
sion and this present order constitute the final disposi-
tion of these probate appeals. These proceedings are
now referred back or returned to the Probate Court
for its consideration of any further matters or orders
appropriate or necessary.’’ The plaintiff filed an appeal
from that judgment, AC 47165, on December 5, 2023.
Before considering the specific claims presented in
this appeal, we note that ‘‘[a]n appeal from a Probate
Court to the Superior Court is not an ordinary civil
action. . . . When entertaining an appeal from an order
or decree of a Probate Court, the Superior Court takes
the place of and sits as the court of probate. . . . In
ruling on a probate appeal, the Superior Court exercises
the powers, not of a constitutional court of general
or common law jurisdiction, but of a Probate Court.’’
(Citations omitted.) Kerin v. Stangle, 209 Conn. 260,
263–64, 550 A.2d 1069 (1988). In cases in which no
record was made of the proceedings before the Probate
Court, ‘‘the Superior Court [is] required to undertake
a de novo review of the Probate Court’s decision.’’3
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Salce v. Cardello,
348 Conn. 90, 104, 301 A.3d 1031 (2023); see also Kerin
v. Stangle, supra, 264 (function of Superior Court in
appeals from order or decree of Probate Court ‘‘is to
3
It is undisputed that no record was made of the Probate Court proceed-
ings in the present case.
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take jurisdiction of the order or decree appealed from
and to try that issue de novo’’).
I
In AC 47165, the plaintiff first claims that the Superior
Court improperly affirmed the order of the Probate
Court removing him as the fiduciary of his parents’
trusts and estates. We do not agree.
The term fiduciary, as defined in our probate statutes,
expressly includes ‘‘the executor or administrator of a
decedent’s estate’’; General Statutes § 45a-315; and a
‘‘trustee, conservator or guardian.’’ General Statutes
§ 45a-199. The authority of the Probate Court to remove
a fiduciary is codified in General Statutes § 45a-242 (a).
It provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Probate Court having
jurisdiction may, upon its own motion or upon the peti-
tion of any person interested . . . after notice and
hearing, remove any fiduciary if: (1) The fiduciary
becomes incapable of executing such fiduciary’s trust,
neglects to perform the duties of such fiduciary’s trust,
wastes the estate in such fiduciary’s charge, or fails
to furnish any additional or substitute probate bond
ordered by the court, (2) lack of cooperation among
cofiduciaries substantially impairs the administration
of the estate, (3) because of unfitness, unwillingness
or persistent failure of the fiduciary to administer the
estate effectively, the court determines that removal of
the fiduciary best serves the interests of the beneficiar-
ies, or (4) there has been a substantial change of circum-
stances or removal is requested by all of the beneficiar-
ies, the court finds that removal of the fiduciary best
serves the interests of all the beneficiaries and is not
inconsistent with a material purpose of the governing
instrument and a suitable cofiduciary or successor fidu-
ciary is available . . . .’’ General Statutes § 45a-242 (a).
‘‘Whether grounds exist for an executor’s removal is
a question addressed to the sound discretion of the
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Probate Court. . . . On appeal from probate, the
[Superior Court] may exercise the same discretion de
novo, reviewing the facts relating to the propriety of
removal without regard to the Probate Court’s decision.
. . . Our task, then, is to determine whether the [Supe-
rior Court] abused its discretion . . . .’’4 (Citations
omitted.) Ramsdell v. Union Trust Co., 202 Conn. 57,
65, 519 A.2d 1185 (1987). ‘‘In determining whether the
[Superior Court] abused its discretion, this court must
make every reasonable presumption in favor of its
action. . . . The manner in which [this] discretion is
exercised will not be disturbed so long as the court
could reasonably conclude as it did.’’5 (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Moore v. Ferguson, 232 Conn. App.
797, 806, 337 A.3d 1166 (2025).
In its June 5, 2023 memorandum of decision, the
Superior Court made a number of factual findings
regarding the plaintiff’s activities as the fiduciary of the
parents’ trusts and estates. Specifically, the court found
that ‘‘the plaintiff filed what he called an ‘accounting’
[with the Probate Court] on April 2, 2019. . . . [T]his
purported accounting was so disorganized and unintel-
ligible that it was essentially useless. . . . [B]eginning
in May, 2019, [the plaintiff] engaged in numerous trans-
actions involving property of the parents’ trusts. There
is no dispute that [the plaintiff] engaged in these trans-
actions and that they occurred while the Probate Court
4
We note that the plaintiff has not identified the applicable standard of
review for any of the claims set forth in his appellate briefs, as required by
Practice Book § 67-4 (e).
5
In his principal appellate brief, the plaintiff argues that the Superior
Court, in reviewing his performance as the fiduciary of his parents’ trusts
and estates, ‘‘disregarded . . . well established rules for testamentary con-
struction’’—namely, that the expressed intent of a testator must control.
The plaintiff misunderstands the relevant inquiry before the court. The issue
was not whether the parents intended for him to serve as the fiduciary of
their trusts and estates but, rather, whether the plaintiff had breached his
fiduciary obligations while serving in that capacity, such that his removal
was warranted.
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was considering a motion, filed by Betty, to remove
[the plaintiff] as fiduciary.
‘‘On May 9, 2019, [the plaintiff] established Kirk Prop-
erty I, for which he was the sole member. As the fidu-
ciary of [Bettina’s] trust, [the plaintiff] then transferred
[the North Sasco property from Bettina’s trust] to this
entity for no consideration. On May 22, 2019, [the plain-
tiff] encumbered this property with a one year mortgage
in the amount of $1,155,000. The interest rate of this
mortgage was high, at 11 percent, and the settlement
charges associated with this mortgage were also high,
$72,940. The points charged by the lender for this loan
totaled $57,500. [The plaintiff] placed the loan proceeds
into various accounts that were solely in his name.
After Grant became the fiduciary and this mortgage
transaction was revealed, he extended the loan for six
months at a cost of $23,000 to [Bettina’s] trust. Grant
testified that a full accounting of the net proceeds of
this transaction, approximately $919,088, was never
provided by [the plaintiff]. At the time of the trial on
these probate appeals, this mortgage was under foreclo-
sure.
‘‘On May 9, 2019, [the plaintiff] established Kirk Prop-
erty 2, LLC, for which he was the sole member. As
fiduciary of [Bettina’s] trust, he transferred another
property from [her] trust, 1001 South Ocean Drive in
[Seaside Park] New Jersey, to this entity for no consid-
eration. He then encumbered [that] property with a
$754,872 mortgage. Again, the interest rate was high,
11 percent, and the origination fee for this transaction
was high, $37,000. [The plaintiff] placed the proceeds
from this mortgage in various stock bank accounts that
were solely in his name. . . .
‘‘[John’s] estate . . . held the membership shares of
Sterling Development, which, in turn, owned property
located at 980 Post Road East in Westport. This property
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Stroll v. Pass

had a value of approximately $2.2 million. On June 5,
2019, [the plaintiff] placed an $800,000, one year mort-
gage on this property. The interest rate for this mortgage
was 14 percent. [The plaintiff] apparently accomplished
this transaction by representing that he was his
deceased father. [The plaintiff] placed the proceeds of
this loan into accounts that were solely in his name.
Grant eventually extended the maturity date of this loan
for six months at a cost of $32,000.
‘‘The Probate Court . . . issued an order on August
8, 2019, removing [the plaintiff] and appointing Grant
as fiduciary of the estates and the trusts. Nevertheless,
[o]n October 29, 2019, [the plaintiff] purchased gold
bars valued at $480,133 with the funds he received from
the loan proceeds he obtained from the mortgage trans-
actions. [The plaintiff] also wrote a series of checks
from an account held by Sterling Development. These
checks were purportedly dated August 6, 7 and 8, 2019,
but were only sent to vendors . . . months after [the
plaintiff] had been removed as fiduciary. One of these
checks was for $800,000, which [the plaintiff] made
payable to himself and deposited in September, 2019.
Grant testified that [the plaintiff] has not provided a full
accounting for this $800,000. In summary, [the plaintiff]
removed millions of dollars in cash from the trusts and
estates and encumbered millions of dollars of assets of
the trusts and estates, which had been mostly mortgage
free. He has not provided a full, appropriate accounting
of the assets of the trusts and estates, and about his
activities during the time he served as fiduciary.’’ In
addition, the court found that the plaintiff ‘‘encumbered
the equity value and misappropriated funds of the
estates and trusts for his own benefit and control to
the exclusion of his siblings’ interests while accomplish-
ing an unwarranted and irrational waste of these assets.
. . . [The plaintiff] neither advised [Betty and Joseph]
about his actions, nor acquired their approval or the
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Probate Court’s approval for the transactions. [Betty
and Joseph] had neither agreed to any settlement war-
ranting any liquidation or mortgaging of trust and estate
assets, nor did they authorize or consent to these trans-
actions.’’
Those factual determinations find ample support in
the testimonial and documentary evidence in the record
before us. Moreover, the court specifically credited
Grant’s testimony that the plaintiff had not provided a
full and accurate accounting of the proceeds of the
various loans he took out on the properties held in the
parents’ trusts and estates.6 ‘‘In a case tried before a
court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility
of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific
testimony. . . . It is within the province of the trial
court, as the fact finder, to weigh the evidence pre-
sented and determine the credibility and effect to be
given the evidence.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Cadle Co. v. D’Addario, 268 Conn.
441, 462, 844 A.2d 836 (2004). For that reason, this
court on appeal ‘‘cannot retry the facts or pass on the
credibility of the witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) McKay v. Longman, 332 Conn. 394, 417, 211
A.3d 20 (2019).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the court
did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
the plaintiff’s removal as fiduciary of the parents’ trusts
and estates was warranted under the facts and circum-
stances of this case.
II
The plaintiff claims that the court improperly
imposed sanctions on him for violating his fiduciary
duties. We disagree.
6
We reiterate that Grant was appointed as the temporary administrator
of Bettina’s estate in May, 2018, fifteen months before the Probate Court
removed the plaintiff from his role as fiduciary of the parents’ trusts and
estates.
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‘‘The decision to enter sanctions . . . and, if so, what
sanction or sanctions to impose, is a matter within the
sound discretion of the trial court. . . . In reviewing
a claim that this discretion has been abused the unques-
tioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of
the trial court and every reasonable presumption should
be given in favor of its correctness.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy, 349 Conn. 513,
556, 321 A.3d 295 (2024).
A
We first address the plaintiff’s contention that the
court improperly imposed a punitive sanction in contra-
vention of the maxim that civil contempt sanctions are
remedial, rather than punitive, in nature. As our
Supreme Court has explained, ‘‘[j]udicial sanctions in
civil contempt proceedings may, in a proper case, be
employed for either or both of two purposes: to coerce
the defendant into compliance with the court’s order,
and to compensate the complainant for losses sus-
tained. . . . Civil contempt proceedings are not puni-
tive—i.e., they are not imposed for the purpose of vindi-
cating the court’s authority—but are purely remedial.’’
(Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) DeMartino v. Monroe Little
League, Inc., 192 Conn. 271, 278–79, 471 A.2d 638 (1984).
The record indicates that, in October, 2017, the Pro-
bate Court issued an order prohibiting the sale of ‘‘any
tangible personal property, real property, or [Sterling
Development] interests’’ without prior court approval.
In an order dated October 24, 2019, the Probate Court
found that the plaintiff intentionally violated that order.
Accordingly, the Probate Court found the plaintiff in
contempt and entered various sanctions, including a
‘‘penalty of $1945.60 per day.’’
At trial, the plaintiff challenged the propriety of that
contempt finding. In its June 5, 2023 memorandum of
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decision, the Superior Court stated: ‘‘As part of this
appeal, [the plaintiff] contests this finding of contempt
and the contempt sanctions imposed by the Probate
Court. This court agrees that [the plaintiff’s] appeal
should be sustained in this regard.’’7 The court thus set
aside the finding of contempt and vacated the $1945.60
daily penalty.
The foregoing belies the plaintiff’s claim that the
Superior Court improperly imposed a punitive sanction.
To the contrary, the record is clear that the court set
aside the Probate Court’s contempt finding and vacated
the $1945.60 daily penalty that accompanied that find-
ing.
B
We therefore turn our attention to the propriety of
the three financial orders entered by the Superior Court
7
As the court explained: ‘‘The Probate Court order at issue states: ‘Not-
withstanding the foregoing, the temporary administrators [the plaintiff and
Joseph] shall NOT have authority to sell any tangible personal property,
real property or [Sterling Development] interests that own either of the
foregoing or through which the decedents conducted their personal business
without prior court approval.’ . . . On its face, this order appears only to
apply to [Bettina’s] estate because the order was directed to the temporary
administrators who at that time were the administrators of [her] estate.
Furthermore, [that] order did not apply to [Bettina’s] trust because the
Probate Court had not yet exercised jurisdiction over this trust. . . .
‘‘This procedural background is important because, at least on its face,
the October, 2017 order for which [the plaintiff] was found in contempt
only appears to preclude the temporary administrators from transferring
property from [Bettina’s] estate. The evidence does not indicate that the
transfers for which [the plaintiff] was held in contempt involved assets of
[Bettina’s] estate. For example, the North Sasco . . . property and the South
Ocean Avenue property were in [Bettina’s] trust. The mortgage placed on
the Post Road property involved the estate and the trust of [John]. Although
the Probate Court expressed the view that the October, 2017 order fully
applied and was violated by [the plaintiff] . . . a finding of contempt must
be premised on an order that is clear and unambiguous. Although this court
finds that [the plaintiff’s] conduct violated his fiduciary duties, under these
circumstances, the court cannot find that the transfers violated a clear and
unambiguous order of the Probate Court.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis
in original.)
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Stroll v. Pass

in its June 5, 2023 memorandum of decision.8 In that
decision, the court determined that the plaintiff’s
removal as the fiduciary of the parents’ trusts and
estates was ‘‘both warranted and necessary.’’ After con-
cluding that the punitive sanction related to the finding
of contempt was improper, the court stated: ‘‘[O]ther
orders relating to [the plaintiff’s] breach of his fiduciary
responsibilities are warranted. . . . [T]he transfers
made by [the plaintiff] can only be described as a gross
and egregious violation of his fiduciary duties. His argu-
ments to the contrary are meritless and nonsensical.
The Probate Court ordered that [the plaintiff] transfer
the properties back to the appropriate trust or estate
and it appears that these transfers have been made.
These properties, however, have been returned with
crippling encumbrances, and . . . [the plaintiff] has
not returned all the loan proceeds received by him and
has not provided a full and accurate accounting of these
funds. . . . The court finds that the following orders
are warranted: (1) [The plaintiff] is ordered to pay Grant
as fiduciary all loan proceeds that have been received
by [the plaintiff] from the mortgage loans placed on the
estate or trust properties, and [the plaintiff] shall be
held personally liable for the amounts not repaid. Inter-
est shall accrue on the balance of all unpaid amounts
at the rate of 8 percent a year until fully paid. (2) [The
plaintiff] shall be held personally liable for all interest,
loans, fees and expenses associated with the transfers
and mortgages of all estate and trust properties. (3)
[The plaintiff] shall be held personally liable for all
attorney’s fees and taxable costs incurred by Grant and
Betty in connection with any litigation relating to the
recoupment of these funds.’’
8
In his principal appellate brief, the plaintiff also argued that the court,
in its November 15, 2023 order, improperly ordered him to ‘‘either pay rent
or vacate the North Sasco property.’’ At oral argument before this court,
the plaintiff’s counsel formally abandoned that claim.
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At a subsequent hearing held on June 7, 2023, the
court offered the parties ‘‘a further opportunity to be
heard’’ on the issue of its financial orders ‘‘before [the
June 5, 2023] decision became final . . . .’’ At that time,
the plaintiff’s counsel characterized the court’s three
financial orders as ‘‘sanctions’’ and stated that he did
not ‘‘believe the court [was] allowed to punish [the
plaintiff] for his conduct . . . .’’ In response, the court
stated: ‘‘Although the [June 5, 2023] order . . . used
the word sanction . . . that’s not the language that I
used in the written decision itself. I didn’t indicate that
the orders I was issuing were sanctions specifically or
per se. The orders I issued flowed from what the court
found to be violations of fiduciary duties. . . . [Those
financial] orders . . . are not viewed by the court to
be punitive or a punishment in any way. They are viewed
to be remunerative and compensatory to the estate as
a result of the actions. I want to provide that qualifica-
tion.’’
We agree with that assessment and conclude that the
three financial orders entered by the court in its June
5, 2023 memorandum of decision are not punitive in
nature. By their plain terms, those orders are compensa-
tory and intended to provide recompense to the parents’
trusts and estates for the plaintiff’s breach of his fidu-
ciary duties. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 108, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 197 L. Ed.
2d 585 (2017) (‘‘a sanction counts as compensatory . . .
if it is calibrate[d] to [the] damages caused by the bad-
faith acts on which it is based’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also O’Brien v. O’Brien, 326 Conn.
81, 104, 161 A.3d 1236 (2017) (explaining that court has
discretion to impose remedial financial order so long
as its value does ‘‘not exceed the reasonable value of
the injured party’s losses’’). Indulging every reasonable
presumption in favor of the correctness of the court’s
ruling, we conclude that the Superior Court did not
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abuse its discretion in entering those three financial
orders.
III
The plaintiff also contends that both the Probate
Court and the Superior Court failed to consider whether
Joseph should be appointed as the successor fiduciary
following the plaintiff’s removal from that role. That
claim is without merit.
The parents’ wills contain identical provisions regard-
ing the ‘‘[a]ppointment of [f]iduciaries’’ and designate
Joseph as a successor executor in the event that either
their spouse or the plaintiff could not serve in that
capacity.9 At oral argument before this court, the plain-
tiff’s counsel stated that the Probate Court ‘‘never
looked at those documents’’ or considered them in
appointing Grant as the successor fiduciary of the par-
ents’ trusts and estates. The record before us indicates
otherwise.
On August 8, 2019, the Probate Court issued a lengthy
decree in which it enumerated sixty-two detailed find-
ings of fact, which was admitted into evidence as an
exhibit before the Superior Court. In those findings, the
Probate Court expressly acknowledged that ‘‘[a]rticle
IV of [Bettina’s] will appointed [the plaintiff] as execu-
tor, and stated that if [he] could not act as executor, then
Joseph would be executor.’’ That finding demonstrates
that the court was mindful of the appointment of fiduci-
aries provision contained in the parents’ wills and con-
sidered that provision in appointing a successor fidu-
ciary.
9
Article IV of the respective wills of John and Bettina provides in relevant
part: ‘‘I appoint my spouse as [e]xecutor of my [w]ill. If my spouse fails or
ceases to act as [e]xecutor, I appoint [the plaintiff] as [e]xecutor of my
[w]ill. If [the plaintiff] fails or ceases to act as [e]xecutor, I appoint [Joseph]
as [e]xecutor of my [w]ill.’’
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Significantly, the Probate Court also found that, ‘‘[a]t
the May, 2018 hearing, Joseph told the court that he
did not wish to be appointed as a fiduciary in this
matter.’’ In light of Joseph’s unwillingness to serve in
that role, the court appointed Grant as the successor
fiduciary of the parents’ trusts and estates. There is no
indication in the record that, at any time during the
proceedings before the Probate Court, any party
requested to have Joseph appointed as the successor
fiduciary or claimed that his appointment to the role
was mandated by the parents’ wills, as the plaintiff’s
counsel acknowledged at oral argument before this
court.
In its June 5, 2023 memorandum of decision, the
Superior Court likewise found that, during the proceed-
ings before the Probate Court, Joseph explicitly asked
to be removed as a fiduciary of Bettina’s estate and
the Probate Court granted that request. On appeal, the
plaintiff has not challenged those factual findings as
clearly erroneous.
The foregoing findings of the Probate Court and the
Superior Court undermine the plaintiff’s claim that they
ignored the provisions in the parents’ wills regarding
the appointment of Joseph as a successor fiduciary.
Rather, they indicate that both courts credited evidence
that Joseph was unwilling to serve in that capacity, as
was their prerogative as finders of fact. See Cadle Co.
v. D’Addario, supra, 268 Conn. 462. For that reason,
the plaintiff’s claim that the courts failed to consider
whether Joseph should be appointed as a successor
fiduciary is untenable.
IV
As a final matter, we note that the plaintiff’s appeal
in AC 46635 raises identical claims as those presented
in AC 47165, which obviates the need for further sub-
stantive discussion thereof. We nevertheless conclude
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that the plaintiff’s appeal in AC 46635 is jurisdictionally
improper.
‘‘The lack of a final judgment implicates the subject
matter jurisdiction of an appellate court to hear an
appeal. A determination regarding . . . subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law [over which we exercise
plenary review].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. 928, 936, 293 A.3d 851 (2023).
‘‘The jurisdiction of the appellate courts is restricted to
appeals from judgments that are final. . . . The policy
concerns underlying the final judgment rule are to dis-
courage piecemeal appeals and to facilitate the speedy
and orderly disposition of cases at the trial court level.
. . . The appellate courts have a duty to dismiss, even
on [their] own initiative, any appeal that [they lack]
jurisdiction to hear.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Wolfork v. Yale Medical Group,
335 Conn. 448, 459, 239 A.3d 272 (2020).
On June 26, 2023, the plaintiff filed the appeal in AC
46635. On his appeal form, the plaintiff stated that he
was appealing from the court’s June 5, 2023 decision.
As we have noted, the court did not definitively resolve
the plaintiff’s claims in that decision and instead indi-
cated that it would hold an additional hearing on those
claims.10 The court held a supplemental hearing later
in June, 2023, at which it expressly indicated that it
wanted ‘‘to give the parties a further opportunity to be
heard’’ before its June 5, 2023 decision ‘‘became final.’’
The court then permitted the parties to submit supple-
mental briefs in July and August, 2023, and issued what
10
In its June 5, 2023 memorandum of decision, the court stated in relevant
part: ‘‘The court will hold a hearing at which time the parties may be heard
regarding these and any other orders which may be appropriate. The court
. . . notes that [the plaintiff] contests the Probate Court’s order that he
either pay rent or vacate the North Sasco property. The court will also
entertain argument from the parties on this issue that was not fully or
sufficiently addressed by the parties in their posttrial filings.’’
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it termed its ‘‘final orders of judgment’’ on November
15, 2023.11
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the plain-
tiff’s June 26, 2023 appeal in AC 46635 was not taken
from an appealable final judgment, as the court’s June 5,
2023 decision neither terminated a separate and distinct
proceeding nor ‘‘so [concluded] the rights of the parties
that further proceedings [could not] affect them.’’ State
v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). Accord-
ingly, we dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal in AC 46635.
The appeal in AC 46635 is dismissed; the judgment
in AC 47165 is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

11
In its November 15, 2023 order, the court stated that its ‘‘June 5, 2023
memorandum of decision and this present order constitute the final disposi-
tion of these probate appeals. These proceedings are now referred back or
returned to the Probate Court for its consideration of any further matters
or orders appropriate or necessary.’’ The plaintiff timely appealed from that
final judgment when he filed the appeal in AC 47165 with this court on
December 5, 2023. That appeal contains claims that are identical to those
set forth in the plaintiff’s appeal in AC 46635