In re Annabella S.

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In re Annabella S.

IN RE ANNABELLA S.*
(AC 48919)
Moll, Suarez and Wilson, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed from the trial court’s judgment terminat-
ing her parental rights with respect to her minor child. The mother claimed
that the court’s failure to canvass her in accordance with In re Yasiel R.
(317 Conn. 773) required reversal of the judgment pursuant to the plain
error doctrine. Held:

This court determined that reversal was not warranted under the plain error
doctrine, as the respondent mother failed to demonstrate that the trial
court’s error in failing to canvass the mother in accordance with In re Yasiel
R. resulted in fundamental unfairness or manifest injustice.

Argued November 20, 2025—officially released January 22, 2026**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Tolland, Juvenile Mat-
ters, and tried to the court, M. Murphy, J.; judgment
terminating the respondents’ parental rights, from which
the respondent mother appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Benjamin M. Wattenmaker, assigned counsel, for the
appellant (respondent mother).
Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom,
on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and
*
In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-
142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in
this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall
be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein
and upon order of the court.
**
January 22, 2026, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
In re Annabella S.

Angela Fierro, assistant attorney general, for the appel-
lee (petitioner).

Opinion

PER CURIAM. The respondent mother, Megan S.,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in
favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and
Families, terminating her parental rights with respect
to her minor child, Annabella S. (Annabella).1 On appeal,
the respondent claims that the court’s failure to canvass
her in accordance with In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773,
120 A.3d 1188 (2015), requires reversal pursuant to the
plain error doctrine. We disagree and, therefore, affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
The record provides the following relevant facts, which
are uncontested or were found by the trial court, and
procedural history. In June, 2023, Annabella was born
at thirty-seven weeks gestation in an ambulance en route
to Hartford Hospital. After her arrival at the hospital,
Annabella tested positive for cocaine. The respondent
reported to hospital staff that she used crack cocaine a
few hours before giving birth to Annabella.2 The respon-
dent had previously transferred guardianship of her
eldest child to the respondent’s mother, the child’s mater-
nal grandmother, and her parental rights to her two other
1
In the same proceeding, the court also adjudicated the petitioner’s
petition to terminate the parental rights of Annabella’s biological father,
Zachary S. The court rendered judgment terminating his parental rights,
and he has not appealed from that judgment. Therefore, throughout
this opinion, we refer to Megan S. as the respondent. When necessary to
refer to Zachary S., we do so by referring to him as the biological father.
2
Following Annabella’s delivery, a drug screening revealed that the
respondent tested positive for cocaine, fentanyl, and marijuana. The
record reflects that the respondent had previously tested positive for
marijuana on November 29, 2022, and positive for fentanyl, cocaine,
and marijuana on May 9, 2023, approximately one month before Anna-
bella’s birth.
In re Annabella S.

children were terminated in 2018 pursuant to petitions
by the petitioner.
Following the birth of Annabella, on June 23, 2023,
the Department of Children and Families (DCF) invoked
a ninety-six hour hold due to “the parents’ mental health
and substance misuse issues.” On June 26, 2023, the
petitioner filed a petition of alleged neglect and a motion
for an order of temporary custody on behalf of Anna-
bella. On June 30, 2023, the court sustained the order of
temporary custody and issued preliminary specific steps
for the respondent to follow in order to regain custody
of Annabella. On October 5, 2023, the respondent and
the biological father entered pleas of nolo contendere to
the allegations of neglect and Annabella was adjudicated
neglected and committed to the care and custody of the
petitioner. Final specific steps were ordered on October
5, 2023. Despite DCF’s investigation into relative place-
ments, Annabella was unable to be placed with any of
her grandparents or her maternal great grandmother.
The respondent and the biological father provided the
name of a childhood friend as a possible placement for
Annabella and subsequently agreed to the placement
of Annabella with the childhood friend and her spouse
(foster parents), who assumed care for Annabella upon
her discharge from the hospital after her birth.3
On May 2, 2024, the court approved the first perma-
nency plan of termination of parental rights and adop-
tion, found that DCF had made reasonable efforts to
reunify Annabella with the respondent and the biological
father and found that the permanency plan was in Anna-
bella’s best interest. On July 18, 2024, the petitioner
filed a petition to terminate the respondent’s and the
biological father’s parental rights as to Annabella. The
court summarized the grounds for the petition under
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) as follows: “Ground
3
Annabella has remained with her foster parents continuously since
the time of her placement. In its memorandum of decision, the trial
court found that the foster parents “meet [Annabella’s] medical, edu-
cational, and emotional needs” and that Annabella “is bonded to her
foster family . . . .”
In re Annabella S.

(A) that the parents abandoned [Annabella] in the sense
that the parents failed to maintain a reasonable degree
of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare
of [Annabella]; Ground (B) (1) that the parents failed to
rehabilitate themselves to a degree that would encourage
the belief that they could assume a responsible position
in the life of [Annabella] within a reasonable time; and
Ground (E) that the [respondent, the] mother of [Anna-
bella], who is under the age of seven years and who has
been adjudicated as neglected, failed to achieve such
degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the
belief that the [respondent] could assume a responsible
position in the life of [Annabella] within a reasonable
period of time considering the age and needs of [Anna-
bella], and the [respondent] has two other children for
whom her rights were previously terminated pursuant
to [petitions] filed by [the petitioner].” On August 15,
2024, after the court confirmed service of the petition
on the respondent and the biological father, both were
advised of their rights4 and entered pleas denying all
allegations set forth in the petition.
On September 26, 2024, Zachary S. was adjudicated
as Annabella’s biological father based on genetic testing.
A trial regarding the termination of parental rights as
to both the respondent and the biological father com-
menced before the court, M. Murphy, J., on January
29, 2025. Both the respondent and the biological father
were represented by counsel during the proceedings.
The petitioner submitted thirty-seven exhibits and
4
The court advised the respondent and the biological father in relevant
part: “[Y]ou have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and
will be used against you. You have the right to speak with an attorney
before answering questions about your case. You have the right to have
an attorney present while being questioned, and you have the right to
stop answering questions any time you choose. . . . You have the right to
deny allegations and to have a trial before the court. You have the right
to confront the witnesses called against you, to call your own witnesses,
to testify and to testify on your own behalf if you choose. If you choose
not to testify, however, this court may draw an adverse interference
from that choice not to testify.” When asked if she understood her
rights, the respondent replied, “[y]es.”
In re Annabella S.

presented testimony from two witnesses, a DCF social
worker and a specialist with Multidimensional Family
Recovery, both of whom had worked directly with the
respondent. The respondent’s counsel submitted two
exhibits and, throughout the course of the proceedings,
objected to various motions made by the petitioner and
evidence offered by the petitioner. The respondent’s
counsel cross-examined the petitioner’s witnesses, uti-
lized the petitioner’s exhibits during her cross-examina-
tion of the witnesses, and presented closing argument.
The respondent testified on her own behalf, and it is
undisputed that the court failed to canvass the respon-
dent regarding her rights prior to the start of trial in
accordance with In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 773.5
It is also undisputed that neither party brought the omis-
sion to the attention of the court. The respondent also did
5
In In re Yasiel R., our Supreme Court “conclude[d] . . . that it [was]
proper to exercise [its] supervisory power . . . [to] require that, in all
termination proceedings, the trial court must canvass the respondent
prior to the start of the trial. The canvass need not be lengthy as long as
the court is convinced that the respondent fully understands his or her
rights. In the canvass, the respondent should be advised of: (1) the nature
of the termination of parental rights proceeding and the legal effect
thereof if a judgment is entered terminating parental rights; (2) the
respondent’s right to defend against the accusations; (3) the respondent’s
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; (4) the respondent’s
right to object to the admission of exhibits; (5) the respondent’s right
to present evidence opposing the allegations; (6) the respondent’s right
to representation by counsel; (7) the respondent’s right to testify on his
or her own behalf; and (8) if the respondent does not intend to testify,
he or she should also be advised that if requested by the petitioner, or
the court is so inclined, the court may take an adverse inference from
his or her failure to testify, and explain the significance of that infer-
ence. Finally, the respondent should be advised that if he or she does
not present any witnesses on his or her behalf, object to exhibits, or
cross-examine witnesses, the court will decide the matter based upon the
evidence presented during trial. The court should then inquire whether
the respondent understands his or her rights and whether there are any
questions. This canvass will ensure that the respondent is fully aware
of his or her rights at the commencement of the trial. It will neither
materially delay the termination proceeding nor unduly burden the
state.” In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 795.
In re Annabella S.

not file a motion seeking a mistrial or otherwise raise the
present issue before the court prior to filing this appeal.
The court issued a memorandum of decision on May
15, 2025, granting the petitioner’s petition to terminate
the respondent’s parental rights. The court found that
the petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence
that termination of the respondent’s parental rights
was appropriate because the respondent had failed to
rehabilitate pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)6 and (E).7
The court, however, found that the petitioner failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the respon-
dent had abandoned Annabella. In consideration of the
court’s findings and the factors set forth in § 17a-112
(k), including Annabella’s age, the court determined
that termination of the respondent’s parental rights
was in Annabella’s best interest. Accordingly, the court
terminated the parental rights of the respondent and
appointed the petitioner as Annabella’s statutory par-
ent. This appeal followed.8
The respondent acknowledges that she did not preserve
this claim before the trial court. On appeal, she asserts
that the court’s failure to canvass her as required by In
6
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) provides for the termination
of parental rights when “the child . . . has been found by the Superior
Court . . . to have been neglected, abused or uncared for in a prior pro-
ceeding . . . and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps
to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to
section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal reha-
bilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time,
considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a
responsible position in the life of the child . . . .”
7
General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (E) provides for the termination
of parental rights when “the parent of a child under the age of seven
years who is neglected, abused or uncared for, has failed, is unable or
is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would
encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering
the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible
position in the life of the child and such parent’s parental rights of
another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed
by the Commissioner of Children and Families . . . .”
8
Pursuant to Practice Book § 79a-6 (c), the attorney for Annabella
filed a statement adopting the petitioner’s brief in this appeal.
In re Annabella S.

re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 773, warrants reversal
under the plain error doctrine. We disagree.
We begin our analysis with the well established legal
framework for evaluating claims of plain error. “[The
plain error] doctrine, codified at Practice Book § 60-5,
is an extraordinary remedy used by appellate courts to
rectify errors committed at trial that, although unpre-
served, are of such monumental proportion that they
threaten to erode our system of justice and work a serious
and manifest injustice on the aggrieved party. [T]he plain
error doctrine . . . is not . . . a rule of reviewability. It is
a rule of reversibility. That is, it is a doctrine that this
court invokes in order to rectify a trial court ruling that,
although either not properly preserved or never raised
at all in the trial court, nonetheless requires reversal
of the trial court’s judgment, for reasons of policy. .
. . In addition, the plain error doctrine is reserved for
truly extraordinary situations [in which] the existence
of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and
integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceed-
ings. . . . Plain error is a doctrine that should be invoked
sparingly. . . . [An appellant] cannot prevail under [the
plain error doctrine] . . . unless he demonstrates that
the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a
failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest
injustice. . . .
“First, we must determine whether the trial court in
fact committed an error and, if it did, whether that error
was indeed plain in the sense that it is patent [or] readily
discernible on the face of a factually adequate record,
[and] also . . . obvious in the sense of not debatable. . . .
[T]his inquiry entails a relatively high standard, under
which it is not enough for the [respondent] simply to
demonstrate that [her] position is correct. Rather, [to
prevail] the party [claiming] plain error [reversal] must
demonstrate that the claimed impropriety was so clear,
In re Annabella S.

obvious and indisputable as to warrant the extraordinary
remedy of reversal. . . .
“[A]lthough a clear and obvious mistake on the part
of the trial court is a prerequisite for reversal under the
plain error doctrine, such a finding is not, without more,
sufficient to warrant the application of the doctrine.
Because [a] party cannot prevail under plain error unless
it has demonstrated that the failure to grant relief will
result in manifest injustice . . . under the second prong of
the analysis we must determine whether the consequences
of the error are so grievous as to be fundamentally unfair
or manifestly unjust. . . . Only if both prongs of the analy-
sis are satisfied can the appealing party obtain relief.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Sydnei V., 168
Conn. App. 538, 562–64, 147 A.3d 147, cert. denied,
324 Conn. 903, 151 A.3d 1289 (2016). In considering
the claim of plain error, we recognize that “[w]hether
the trial court’s failure to strictly comply with the rule
announced in In re Yasiel R. warrants the granting of
a new trial raises a mixed question of law and fact over
which we exercise plenary review.” In re Leilah W., 166
Conn. App. 48, 60, 141 A.3d 1000 (2016).
The petitioner concedes, and we agree, that the respon-
dent has satisfied the first prong of the plain error analy-
sis—that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a
canvass pursuant to In re Yasiel R. See footnote 5 of this
opinion. Therefore, our inquiry is limited to whether the
respondent has met her burden of demonstrating that the
consequences of the trial court’s error were so harmful
that the failure to reverse the trial court’s judgment will
result in manifest injustice.
The respondent urges this court to conclude that,
because our Supreme Court was motivated to imple-
ment a canvass for all termination proceedings by a belief
that doing so would enhance “public confidence in the
integrity of the judicial system,” a trial court’s failure
to provide a canvass during a termination proceeding,
regardless of the facts or circumstances of a case in which
such failure occurred, constitutes reversible error. More
In re Annabella S.

precisely, the respondent claims that the court’s error
alone serves as “satisf[action] [of] the second prong of the
plain error test as a matter of law because the error is so
harmful that it affects the fairness and integrity of and
public confidence in the judicial proceedings.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) We are unpersuaded.
The respondent’s assertion that the court’s failure to
canvass her at trial automatically satisfies the second
part of the plain error test (and requires reversal) is
tantamount to a claim of structural error. Structural
error is “a defect affecting the framework within which
the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the
trial process itself. . . . Such errors infect the entire trial
process . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Lopez, 271 Conn. 724, 733, 859 A.2d 898 (2004).
Under the structural error doctrine, “the error always
results in fundamental unfairness.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Simmons, 188 Conn. App. 813,
837, 205 A.3d 569 (2019). This court in In re Sydnei V.
rejected the appellant’s argument that the mere fact that
the trial court failed to provide a canvass in accordance
with In re Yasiel R. satisfies the second prong of the
plain error doctrine as a matter of law. See In re Sydnei
V., supra, 168 Conn. App. 564, 568. This court disagreed
with the respondent’s structural error argument and
stated: “[M]erely demonstrating that a trial court has
violated a supervisory mandate is not alone enough to
warrant a reversal. The party raising the issue of noncom-
pliance also must demonstrate actual harm.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 566; see also, e.g., In re
Elijah G.-R., 167 Conn. App. 1, 18, 142 A.3d 482 (2016)
(This court rejected the respondent’s claim that the
failure to give a canvass prior to the commencement of
a termination hearing in accordance with In re Yasiel R.
was structural error, stating: “[T]he respondent argues
only that the timing of the In re Yasiel R. canvass after
the end of trial, but prior to the court deciding the case,
amounts to structural error, and, thus, if the canvass
is not conducted prior to the start of trial, a new trial
always is required. This contention, however, expressly
In re Annabella S.

was rejected by this court in [In re Leilah W., supra, 166
Conn. App. 48].”).
Although the respondent argues primarily that the
failure to canvass her requires automatic reversal, she
also attempts to demonstrate that she was “actually
prejudiced” by the court’s error and, therefore, meets her
burden as to the second prong of the plain error analysis.
In this regard, the respondent argues “that as a result
of the trial court’s failure to canvass her regarding her
rights at trial and to ensure that she understood that she
had a right to remain silent at trial, she was prejudiced
because she testified under oath, and her testimony was
manifestly harmful to her defense.” She identifies two
portions of her testimony in support of her claim of
prejudice resulting from the court’s failure to canvass
her, the first regarding her engagement with an online
therapy service, and the second regarding her substance
misuse in October, 2024, approximately three months
prior to trial.9 The respondent argues that, because these
two portions of her testimony were later used against
her by the petitioner’s counsel during closing arguments
and were referred to by the court in its memorandum of
decision, “[she] was prejudiced because she testified with-
out fully understanding the significant consequences of
testifying under oath, and her testimony was damaging
9
The respondent testified regarding her engagement with an online
therapy service. When asked about the number of therapists she had
worked with since late 2023, the respondent replied, “[f]ive.” The
respondent was also unable to recall the name of her newest provider,
with whom she had not yet met. The petitioner’s counsel referenced this
testimony in closing arguments as an indication of the respondent’s
failure to rehabilitate, arguing that the respondent had “cycled through
five therapists from an online therapy website and to this day is not in
treatment for any type of mental health counseling.” The court also
cited to this testimony in its memorandum of decision as evidence of
the respondent’s failure to rehabilitate. The respondent additionally
testified that she had used illegal substances in October, 2024, three
months before the termination of parental rights trial. During her
closing argument, counsel for the petitioner cited this testimony as
evidence of the respondent’s failure to “[rehabilitate] from [her] sig-
nificant substance misuse.”
In re Annabella S.

to her defense in several different respects.” We are
unpersuaded.
Although the respondent argues that she was “mani-
festly harm[ed]” by portions of her testimony, it appears
that she benefited in part by her own testimony in light
of the court’s finding that the petitioner failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence the allegation that she
had abandoned Annabella. Specifically, the court found
that, “[w]hile . . . the parents did not visit [Annabella]
as often as possible, [it could not] find that they did
not maintain interest or concern for [Annabella]. The
parents did maintain contact with [Annabella] after she
was removed from their home. The court [found] that
the parents provided gifts of clothing for [Annabella]
and typically showed up to visits with food for her. The
parents inquired about [Annabella’s] well-being and
attempted to keep a journal with the foster parents even
if, in the long run, the mutual journal was unsuccessful.
The court does not doubt that the respondent parents
care about [Annabella] and love her.”
Our review of the record also demonstrates that evi-
dence regarding the respondent’s inconsistent engage-
ment with mental health services and her continued
substance misuse did not come only from the respondent’s
testimony but was also established by the petitioner’s
exhibits and by the credited testimony of the petitioner’s
witnesses. In finding that the respondent had “failed
to rehabilitate herself to the extent that she is able to
assume a responsible position in the life of [Annabella]
within the foreseeable future,” the court cited multiple
exhibits offered by the petitioner and credited witness
testimony as evidentiary support for its factual findings.
The respondent does not challenge the court’s factual or
legal findings on appeal.
Insofar as the respondent argues that she was preju-
diced because she was not advised that she had a right
to remain silent, we previously noted that, at the start
of the respondent’s plea hearing on August 15, 2024,
on the termination of parental rights petition, she was
In re Annabella S.

advised of her right to remain silent. See footnote 4 of
this opinion. More importantly, the canvass mandated
by In re Yasiel R. does not expressly include an advise-
ment concerning a respondent’s right to remain silent.
See footnote 5 of this opinion. Instead, the canvass man-
dated by In re Yasiel R. includes an advisement that the
respondent has the “right to testify on his or her own
behalf” and “if the respondent does not intend to testify
. . . the court may take an adverse inference from his or
her failure to testify” and must “explain the significance
of that inference.” In re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 795.
Such a canvass was not provided at trial. At trial, the
respondent chose to testify on her own behalf. Thus, the
respondent’s argument that she was manifestly harmed
because the trial court failed to “ensure that she under-
stood that she had a right to remain silent at trial” is
not persuasive.
Finally, during oral argument before this court, the
respondent’s counsel was unable to point to a single right
encompassed in the canvass mandated by In re Yasiel R.
of which the respondent was deprived because of the trial
court’s failure to canvass her. This further supports the
conclusion that the respondent is unable to demonstrate
that a manifest injustice occurred in the trial proceeding.
See, e.g., In re Sydnei V., supra, 168 Conn. App. 567–68
(In concluding that reversal was not warranted, this court
noted that, although the trial court did not canvass the
respondent pursuant to In re Yasiel R., the respondent
“failed to explain what she did not know or understand
about the termination of her parental rights without
the court’s canvass. She [did] not [explain] what she
would have done differently if the court had canvassed
her and how the outcome of the case would be different.
In other words, the respondent . . . failed to explain how
the court’s failure to canvass her was harmful per se.”).
For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that
the respondent has failed to demonstrate that the trial
court’s error in failing to provide the canvass mandated
by In re Yasiel R. resulted in fundamental unfairness
In re Annabella S.

or manifest injustice. Accordingly, the respondent has
failed to demonstrate that reversal of the judgment is
warranted under the plain error doctrine.
The judgment is affirmed.