State v. Dore

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State v. Dore

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICHARD DORE
(AC 47243)
Cradle, C. J., and Alvord and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, after a trial to the court, of possession of child pornography in
the second degree in violation of statute ((Rev. to 2015) § 53a-196e (a) (2)),
the defendant appealed. The defendant had been charged after the police,
pursuant to a search warrant, seized one of his home computers, which
contained pornographic images of minor children that he had downloaded
from the Internet. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that subdivision (2) of
§ 53a-196e (a) violated the first amendment to the United States constitu-
tion because it was overbroad in that its breadth or scope was not limited to
pornography involving real children. Held:

There was no merit to the defendant’s claim that subdivision (2) of § 53a-196e
(a) was unconstitutionally overbroad because it does not include the term child
pornography, as subdivision (2) must be read in conjunction with subdivision
(1) of subsection (a), which expressly uses the term child pornography, the
statutory ((Rev. to 2015) § 53a-193 (13)) definition of which limits the images
proscribed under subdivision (2) to those of real children and excludes from
its ambit virtual child pornography.

This court rejected the defendant’s claim that § 53a-196e (a) (2) was uncon-
stitutionally vague on its face for the same reasons it rejected his claim
that § 53a-196e (a) (2) was overbroad, and the defendant’s contention that
subsection (a) (2) was vague as applied to his conduct also lacked merit, as
subsection (a) (2) provided sufficient notice that it proscribed the possession
of child pornography and provided sufficient guidance as to what the state
must prove to obtain a conviction, and the defendant’s conduct clearly fell
within the statute’s unmistakable core meaning of prohibited conduct,
namely, the possession of pornographic material depicting persons younger
than sixteen years of age.

The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to support his conviction insofar as it did not establish that the
images seized from his computer were those of real children younger than
sixteen years of age, as the trial court reasonably could have found that the
images depicted real children on the basis of the defendant’s statements to
the police, the file names under which he downloaded the images and the
testimony of witnesses, including that of a pediatrician, as well as the court’s
own viewing of the images.

Moreover, contrary to the defendant’s claim, there is no requirement that
the state present expert testimony to establish that the particular images
depict real children, as the language of § 53a-193 (13) provides that the
issue of whether the subject of a visual depiction was a person younger than
sixteen years of age at the time the visual depiction was created was a ques-
tion to be decided by the trier of fact, and the record was devoid of evidence
State v. Dore

concerning technology existing at the time the defendant downloaded the
child pornography or a trier of fact’s ability to distinguish realistic images
of virtual children from images of real children.

Contrary to the defendant’s assertion that the evidence was insufficient
to establish that he knowingly possessed child pornography because his
computer lacked the capability of playing the video files he had partially
downloaded, the trial court reasonably could have concluded, on the basis
of the direct and circumstantial evidence in the record and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, that the defendant was the only person with
access to his password protected computer and, thus, that he had control of
the computer and possession of its contents.

Argued October 6, 2025—officially released February 10, 2026

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with
five counts of the crime of possession of child pornogra-
phy in the second degree, brought to the Superior Court
in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford and tried to the
court, Hall, J.; thereafter, the court denied the defen-
dant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal; finding and
judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed
to this court; subsequently, the court, Hon. H. Gordon
Hall, judge trial referee, issued an articulation of its
decision. Affirmed.
E. Gregory Cerritelli, with whom, on the brief, was P.
Jo Anne Burgh, for the appellant (defendant).
Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Margaret E. Kelley, state’s
attorney, and Matthew R. Kalthoff, supervisory assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The defendant, Richard Dore, appeals
from the judgment of conviction, rendered following
a court trial, of five counts of the crime of possession
of child pornography in the second degree in violation
of General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-196e (a) (2).1
1
General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-196e (a) provides: “A person is
guilty of possessing child pornography in the second degree when such
person knowingly possesses (1) twenty or more but fewer than fifty visual
State v. Dore

On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) § 53a-196e (a)
(2) violates the first amendment to the United States
constitution because it is (a) overbroad and (b) vague,
and (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish that (a)
the child pornography he was found to have possessed
depicted real children and (b) he knowingly possessed
child pornography. We disagree with the defendant’s
claims and affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts, which were found by the trial
court or are otherwise undisputed in the record, and
procedural history are relevant to our review of the
defendant’s claims. The defendant was arrested and
charged in a second amended long form information
(operative information) with five counts of possession
of child pornography in the second degree in violation
of § 53a-196e (a) (2) following a search of his residence
conducted pursuant to a warrant. The facts underlying
the basis for the search and the charges were set forth
by the court in its decision filed September 21, 2023:
“[I]n [January] 2016, Detective David Aresco of the Con-
necticut State Police Computer Crimes Unit downloaded
a partial video file that contained apparent child pornog-
raphy from a user accessing a peer-to-peer network2 with
the eMule program.3 . . . The user reported the eMule
depictions of child pornography, or (2) a series of images in electronic,
digital or other format, which is intended to be displayed continuously,
consisting of twenty or more frames, or a film or videotape, consisting
of twenty or more frames, that depicts a single act of sexually explicit
conduct by one child.”
In this opinion, references to § 53a-196e (a) (2) are to the 2015 revi-
sion of the statute, unless otherwise indicated. We also note that the
statute was amended in 2024 to replace the term “child pornography”
with the phrase “child sexual abuse material.” See Public Acts 2024,
No. 24-118, § 5.
2
At trial, Carmelo J. Rizza, a forensic examiner with the state forensic
science laboratory, testified that peer-to-peer “is a program where users
are sharing and downloading data from each other.” On a peer-to-peer
network, the files that are shared come from “[t]he users themselves.”
An example of a peer-to-peer network is the eMule program. See foot-
note 3 of this opinion.
3
The eMule program is a computer program in which users share data
and download it from each other. The eMule program must be downloaded
State v. Dore

user name ‘newone’ and had an IP address4 within the
state of Connecticut.5 . . . On May 16, 2016, members
of the Connecticut State Police—including . . . Aresco
and Detective Daryll Christensen—participated in the
execution of a search warrant at [the property associ-
ated with that IP address] 23 Emerald Ridge Court in
Shelton.6 . . . The defendant and his wife were the only
residents of the home at that address. . . . In an interview
with . . . Aresco, the defendant identified four computer
devices that he used,7 including a computer server in the
basement. . . . The defendant provided a password that
he used for each device. . . . Prior to seizing the Gateway
computer server from the basement . . . Aresco previewed
the device and observed the eMule program running
with dozens of active downloads showing in a ‘transfers’
queue. . . . Many of the downloads had visible file names
from the Internet and installed on a computer. It is the program used
for the eDonkey network, which is a peer-to-peer file sharing network.
4
Aresco testified at trial that an “IP address” is an “Internet protocol
address,” which is “similar to a telephone number . . . it’s how informa-
tion gets transmitted through the Internet. It’s unique to a particular
computer signed on to the Internet.”
5
At trial, Aresco testified that, when he was notified on January 21,
2016, regarding possible child pornography on a computer, he determined
that the computer was using the eMule program, and, from that, he was
“able to determine the file that was being shared and the IP address from
which it was being shared. [He] was also able to determine the version of
the eMule program that was running and also a name that was assigned
to the eMule program,” which was “newone.” He explained that the
name “newone” was user specific, and that he successfully downloaded
and viewed part of a video file from the eMule user “newone.” Aresco
explained further that the video file that he had downloaded was approxi-
mately thirteen minutes and fifty seconds in length in its entirety. He
was able to download approximately fifty-three seconds of the video. He
testified that the portion that he downloaded depicted “a child that was
less than one year old. The child was in a supine position, the child’s legs
were spread apart, the camera was focused on the child’s genitalia. I do
recall that there was what appeared to be an adult male’s hand rubbing
the child’s genitalia, and I think towards the end of the video an adult
male performed oral sex on the child’s genitalia.”
6
Christensen, a former detective with the state police, testified at
trial that, in his job as a state police detective, his primary role was
in the computer crime laboratory. He testified at trial concerning the
chain of custody of the evidence seized from the defendant’s residence.
7
All four computer devices were admitted into evidence.
State v. Dore

that contained terms associated with child pornography.
. . . The defendant signed a receipt for the items seized
from his residence. . . .
“Christensen transported the items seized from the
defendant’s residence, including the Gateway computer
server. . . . On July 28, 2016, the items were delivered
to the evidence receiving section at the [state] forensic
science laboratory. . . . Forensic Examiner Carmelo [J.]
Rizza conducted a forensic examination of the Gateway
computer with serial number GCX7121004306. . . . He
was tasked with searching the computer for image or
video files suspected to contain child pornography, as
well as peer-to-peer data. . . . To conduct the search . . .
Rizza utilized a forensic process and forensic software. .
. . Rizza memorialized his findings in a report. . . . Rizza
reported that he located more than 250 files of suspected
child pornography on a one terabyte hard drive that was
removed from the Gateway computer and analyzed. . .
. Some of the files suspected to contain child pornogra-
phy—including files with the names 207.part, 230.part
and 311.part—were located within a directory with the
partial path of Shared-D/Overnet/Intermediate.8 . . .
Data obtained from the eMule program on the Gateway
computer indicated that incoming downloads would have
been written to the Shared-D/Overnet folder once com-
plete and Shared-D/Overnet/Intermediate while still in
8
Specifically, Rizza testified that the files with the names 207.part,
230.part and 311.part were contained within the Gateway computer.
He identified the files as movie files and explained the location where
the files could be found within the computer. For example, for file
207.part, “you would open up Windows Explorer . . . go to the C drive,
go to the folder Shared D, go to the folder Overnet, go to the folder
Intermediate, and then access the file 207.part.” He explained further
that “[t]he Shared D, based on [his] experience, [was] a user generated
[folder],” whereas “[t]he Overnet and Intermediate . . . [were] generated
from a software.” Through his forensic examination of the Gateway
computer, Rizza determined that the three files—207.part, 230.part
and 311.part—each had been written to the hard drive of the Gateway
computer and that a user would have access to those files. He did not
find any type of media player within the Gateway computer.
State v. Dore

progress.9 . . . The user name for the eMule program on
the Gateway computer was ‘newone.’ . . . Rizza located
terms that had been entered into the eMule program’s
search feature, including ‘2015 pthc,’10 ‘12 yo,’ and
‘lolitasex.’ . . . The defendant’s name, Richard, was
listed as a user of the computer.” (Citations omitted;
footnotes added.)
The defendant was arrested and charged with five
counts of possession of child pornography in the sec-
ond degree. Each count charged the defendant with
possession of child pornography on May 16, 2016, and
pertained to a video clip taken from the files with the
names 207.part, 230.part and 311.part. Specifically,
count one charged that the defendant “did knowingly
possess a moving picture of more than twenty frames on
a Gateway computer—to wit, file ‘207.part’ from 00:00
through 00:31—which depicted one child engaged in
sexual intercourse, in violation of [§] 53a-196e (a) (2)”;
count two charged that the defendant “did knowingly
possess a moving picture of more than twenty frames
on a Gateway computer—to wit, file ‘207.part’ from
13:48 through 15:00—which depicted one child engaged
in masturbation, in violation of [§] 53a-196e (a) (2)”;
count three charged that the defendant “did knowingly
possess a moving picture of more than twenty frames on
a Gateway computer—to wit, file ‘207.part’ from 32:57
through 33:33—which depicted one child engaged in
sexual intercourse, in violation of [§] 53a-196e (a) (2)”;
count four charged that the defendant “did knowingly
possess a moving picture of more than twenty frames on
9
When Rizza was questioned at trial regarding the properties and
sharing attributes of the Shared D folder, he testified that they indicated
that the Shared D folder was being shared on a local network. When asked
how the Shared D folder could have been found on another computer on
that local network, he explained: “If another computer was connected to
the local network, they would be able to access it through the network
program within the PC, and then access web server, and then access the
D drive as it’s labeled here [in state’s exhibit 17].”
10
Aresco testified at trial that “pthc” is a “popular” search term that
“individuals use to find files of child pornography” and is short for
“preteen hard core.”
State v. Dore

a Gateway computer—to wit, file ‘230.part’ from 37:00
through 40:10—which depicted one child engaged in
masturbation, in violation of [§] 53a-196e (a) (2)”; and
count five charged that the defendant “did knowingly
possess a moving picture of more than twenty frames
on a Gateway computer—to wit, file ‘311.part’ from
02:55 through 04:29—which depicted one child engaged
in sexual intercourse, in violation of [§] 53a-196e (a) (2)
. . . .” The defendant pleaded not guilty to the charges
and, on April 26, 2023, waived his right to a jury trial
and elected to be tried to the court. The court found
the defendant’s waiver to be knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary.
At trial, Aresco, who also examined the Gateway com-
puter, testified for the state. Specifically, he testified
that, as a member of the state police computer crimes
unit, he “primarily investigate[s] sexual exploitation
crimes with children,” for which he has received special-
ized training. One way in which he investigates such
crimes is through peer-to-peer file sharing networks, such
as the eDonkey network, for which he also has received
training. In his testimony, he explained that “[e]Mule
is the program that’s used for the eDonkey network,”
which “is the actual file sharing network.” He explained
further that a person interested in sharing or download-
ing child pornography would use a peer-to-peer program
like eMule11 because “[t]he files are easy to find, and
they download quickly,” and users can download files
from other users and share their files with other users
as well. Aresco testified further that, during the course
of his investigative work, he had become familiar with
certain terminology or search terms used by individuals
to find files of child pornography. Such terms include
“pthc, which is short for preteen hard core,” as well as
11
Aresco testified that, when the eMule program is installed on a
computer, it creates an “eMule folder and [a] downloads folder. And
then, within that eMule folder are two additional folders, one is labeled
Temp, and the other is labeled Incoming. . . . Incoming are files that are
completely . . . downloaded and being shared to the network,” whereas
temporary files are “[f]iles that are in the process of being downloaded.”
State v. Dore

“preteen, pedo, lolia, mafia sex [and] volia . . . .”12 He
also has “seen individuals use a number followed by y.o.
for years old. So, you may see 1yo, 2yo, all the way up to
whatever age they’re looking for.” A user of eMule can
be identified by their IP address.
Aresco also testified regarding the circumstances of
his investigation of the defendant and the search of the
defendant’s residence, including his discussion with the
defendant prior to the search. Specifically, Aresco testi-
fied that, in addition to the defendant providing Aresco
with the passwords to his computers, the defendant told
Aresco that “he used the eMule program to download
movies, software, software materials, and pornography.”
When asked specifically about the pornography, the
defendant told Aresco that he had “downloaded illegal
pornography,” which the defendant described as por-
nography involving individuals under eighteen years
of age. Aresco testified that, after he had informed the
defendant that, in Connecticut, “child pornography is
defined as pornography involving individuals under
the age of sixteen,” the defendant told him that “he had
downloaded pornography involving individuals under
the age of sixteen.” Aresco also told the defendant that
the police would “have the ability to forensically see the
search terms that [the defendant] entered to find files.”
After he explained that if, for example, the defendant
used the term “teen,” that could include both adult and
child pornography, Aresco was about to describe the
search term preteen, but before he could say the word
preteen, “the defendant used that term himself.”
During his testimony, Aresco stated that there were
devices in the defendant’s residence that had not been
seized by the police during the search, including a net-
work attached storage device called an NAS drive, along
with another external hard drive, and he explained how he
connected an external hard drive, which contained a copy
of the Shared D folder from the defendant’s computer,
12
Rizza testified similarly regarding the particular words and phrases
that are more likely to be associated with files that contain child por-
nography.
State v. Dore

to his laptop to view its contents. In its written deci-
sion, the court stated: “The contents of the Shared-D
directory as they existed on the Gateway computer [that
had been] copied to an external drive [were] introduced
as evidence. During his testimony before the court . . .
Aresco navigated to the Overnet folder, which contained
six files and three subfolders. . . . Within the Interme-
diate subfolder . . . Aresco played selected clips from
207.part, 230.part and 311.part. . . . Each video was
played using Windows Media Player.13 . . .The five clips
played corresponded to the time stamps indicated in the
state’s [operative] information: File ‘207.part’ from
00:00 to 00:31 shows a female child performing oral sex
on an adult male’s penis; [f]ile ‘207.part’ from 13:48 to
15:00 shows a close view of a female child’s genitalia as
she masturbates; [f]ile ‘207.part’ from 32:57 to 33:33
shows an adult male engaging in anal sex with a female
child; [f]ile ‘230.part’ from 37:00 to 40:10 shows a naked
female child masturbating; [f]ile ‘311.part’ from 02:55 to
04:29 shows a female child removing her underwear and
simulating oral sex with use of artificial male genitalia.”
(Citations omitted; footnote added.)
In connection with the files containing these video
clips, the court admitted into evidence state’s exhibits 40
13
At trial, defense counsel objected to the playing of the contents of
the Shared D folder, a copy of which had been made and moved to an
external drive, on the ground that there was “no evidence that [the
defendant’s] computer had the ability to play what’s on the external
drive.” Defense counsel asserted that, “without playing it through [the
defendant’s] computer, [counsel didn’t] see how the state could play it,
using, perhaps, a different media player [from what the defendant] was
able to use.” When the court asked defense counsel to explain further,
counsel mentioned Rizza’s testimony that there was no evidence that
the files on the defendant’s computer had been viewed and argued that
the state needed “to prove that [the defendant] was able to play it, [that
the defendant] was able to view it.” According to defense counsel, this
was necessary to show that the defendant knowingly possessed the child
pornography. The court disagreed that the state, to establish posses-
sion, had to show that the defendant had an ability to play the files. The
court also noted that the fact that the Gateway computer did not have
a media player did not necessarily mean that the defendant could not
play the video clips. It, therefore, overruled defense counsel’s objection.
State v. Dore

through 50, which include screenshots and information
related to the content of the downloaded clips taken from
files 207.part, 230.part and 311.part. Aresco testified
that exhibit 40 shows “the active transfers through the
eMule program” that had originated prior to May 16,
2016,14 and that the files were being transferred to the
hard drive located in the defendant’s Gateway computer.
The name of one of the files that was in the process of
being transferred is, in part, “Pthc – Vicky 2 . . . .” Aresco
was able to see the details of that downloaded file, which
were included in exhibit 42. Aresco testified that exhibit
43 shows active downloads that were taking place on the
defendant’s computer using the eMule program, which
included a file with the name “(pthc pedo) Young Video
Models - D04 - Daphne 9yo (nude) (Youngvideomodels
Yvm) . . . .” State’s exhibit 46, which shows more of the
files that were being actively downloaded, contains a file
named “[pthc] ~Under A Violet Moon~ (32m28s, HD) -
11yo 12yo 13yo 14yo . . . .”15 State’s exhibits 51, 52 and
53, which the court admitted into evidence, show the
frame rates respectively for 207.part, 230.part and 311.
part. The frame rate for file 207.part is 30 frames per
second, for file 230.part it is 25 frames per second, and
for file 311.part it is 59.94 frames per second.
State’s exhibit 54, which the court admitted into evi-
dence, is a Lenovo laptop computer (laptop) that had
been seized from the second floor of the defendant’s
residence. During Aresco’s examination of the laptop, he
discovered a link file, which he described “as a shortcut
Windows file. The Windows file creates a shortcut file
any time a user accesses a file. A shortcut file [is] just a
link to the actual file that was opened. The shortcut file
14
The process of downloading file 311.part began in January, 2016,
and for files 207.part and 230.part, it began in February, 2014.
15
The full file names that correspond with files 207.part, 230.part
and 311.part, respectively, are “Pthc - Vicky 2 - Babyj Anal Upgrade
Moskow Schoolgirl 3 Raygold Russian 7Yo Preteen Vicky (41.30Mins)
New.avi”; “(pthc pedo) Young Video Models – D04 – Daphne 9yo (nude)
(Youngvideomodels Yvm) (----,----, ------, ---------).avi”; and “[pthc]
~Under A Violet Moon~ (32m28s, HD) – 11yo 12yo 13yo 14yo opva
creampie cumshot 2014 pedo preteen anal kids lolita ptsc_cut.avi.”
State v. Dore

doesn’t contain any of the contents of the original file;
it just contains pointers of where that original file was
found.” When asked whether any of the link files on the
laptop “indicate[d] that there had been a connection to the
Overnet folder on [the defendant’s Gateway computer],”
Aresco responded, “yes.” In particular, state’s exhibit
57, which the court admitted into evidence, shows details
about one of the shortcut files on the laptop and where the
original file resided, namely, the folder named Overnet
on a networked computer. The username on the laptop
is “Richard.” State’s exhibit 59, which is a document
that was found in the drop box folder of the laptop and
has a file name of “RichardDoreFile.doc,” appears to be
a biography that the defendant attached to a resume.
It states in relevant part that the defendant “is a sea-
soned developer with extensive experience in software
architecture and developing software solutions across
different platforms . . . using different languages . . . .”
The document further describes in detail the defendant’s
knowledge of and experience with different computer
languages, as well as certain software he had designed.
The state also presented testimony from Sundes
Kazmir, an attending physician at Yale New Haven Hos-
pital, who is a board-certified child abuse pediatrician
and a board-certified general pediatrician. As the court
found, she “testified about her review of each of these five
clips. . . . Kazmir testified, based upon her knowledge and
experience, that each of the five clips depicted a real child
under the age of sixteen.” She made that determination
on the basis of her assessment of “external indicators of
physical maturation” that would be “signs of puberty,”
the onset of which she testified as occurring between the
ages of eight and thirteen. She described the children
in the video clips as being “prepubertal,” meaning that
there were no “signs indicative of later sexual matura-
tion,” which was “suggestive of younger children.” She
further testified that she had “never examined a sixteen
or older patient who did not have signs of puberty.” On
cross-examination, she acknowledged that she was not
a computer expert and did not know anything about the
State v. Dore

creation of the video files or if they had been altered in
any way. On redirect, she was asked whether the female
children depicted in the video clips appeared to be real, to
which she responded, “[y]es.” She also was asked whether
“there were any indications that anything mismatched
what [she] would expect to see in an actual child’s body,”
to which she responded that there were no such indica-
tions.
After the prosecutor rested the state’s case, defense
counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts.
First, defense counsel argued that the state did not estab-
lish that the defendant knowingly possessed child por-
nography because there was “no evidence at all that [the
defendant] had accessed or played any of [the] files,” and,
if the defendant “hadn’t accessed them, then he certainly
didn’t knowingly possess them.” Further, defense counsel
argued, relying on Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535
U.S. 234, 244, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 152 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2002),
that “virtual child pornography is constitutionally pro-
tected,” and, for that reason, “courts have required states
to prove that these are actual identifiable16 children . .
. . There’s been no evidence or testimony here that any
of the visual depictions presented by the state involve
an identified victim.” (Footnote added.) As a result,
defense counsel argued that the state did not establish
a prima facie case.
In response, the prosecutor argued that the elements
of child pornography in the second degree “do not require
the state to prove that the defendant accessed or viewed
16
Throughout the trial proceedings and in his appellate briefs, the
defendant repeatedly has made the argument that the images at issue
must depict actual, identifiable children. We must clarify that, although
General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-193 (13) defines child pornography
to include images or videos that “involve the use of a person” under the
age of sixteen, nothing in the statute requires the person depicted in the
image or video to be “identifiable.” Therefore, to the extent the defendant
claims that the child must be identifiable, he is incorrect. Our analysis,
therefore, focuses of the aspect of his claim concerning whether the
video clips at issue involve real children, rather than virtual images.
We also note that references in this opinion to § 53a-193 (13) are to the
2015 revision of that subdivision, unless otherwise indicated.
State v. Dore

the possessed child pornography in any way.” The pros-
ecutor pointed to the evidence showing that the Gate-
way computer that was seized from the residence of the
defendant, who acknowledged to Aresco that he had been
downloading child pornography, was in the process of
downloading child pornography at the time of its seizure.
The prosecutor also noted the testimony from Kazmir
indicating her opinion that the video clips depicted real
children and that there was “ample evidence to show
that [the defendant] was aware that these files of child
pornography existed on his computer.”
Following a brief recess, the court denied defense coun-
sel’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, finding “that the
evidence presented by the state could reasonably permit
a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .” Spe-
cifically, the court stated: “The testimony and evidence
established that [the Gateway] computer . . . contained
two hard drives . . . and that one of those hard drives was
believed, based on an examination at the [state] forensic
laboratory in Meriden, to contain possible child pornog-
raphy. . . . [C]ontained on that hard drive were a number
of files, which include the five files [that] are charged in
counts one through five of the [operative] information
. . . . The evidence included exhibits consisting of copies
of videos, which were found to be on the hard drive [and]
which are the videos described in counts one through five
of the [operative] information. And, having viewed the
videos, as well as heard the testimony of the witnesses, it
appears to me that a finder of fact could reasonably find
that the defendant, on . . . May 16 . . . of 2016, was in
possession of the child pornography . . . [as] described . . .
in counts one through five of the [operative] information.
“The exhibits themselves, upon the court’s viewing of
them, clearly depict what appear to be young, real females
engaged in sexually explicit activity, specifically, mas-
turbation, intercourse, and/or lascivious exhibition
of genitals . . . which would fall within a definition of
pornography.
State v. Dore

“The testimony of . . . Kazmir, which the court finds
persuasive, in fact the court credits the testimony of all
the state’s witnesses, and the testimony of . . . Kazmir
to the effect that her examination of the same materials
that the court viewed, indicate to her that the females
depicted in the videos show no indications of breast devel-
opment or genital development, which would suggest
prepuberty individuals, which would suggest, accord-
ing to the testimony of . . . Kazmir, that they’re under
fourteen years of age.” The court also stated that, “other
than having proof that the defendant actually viewed
these materials himself, the evidence still . . . is such
that it would reasonably permit a finding of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt on the element of knowingness. The
evidence indicated that the computers were configured
at the time of the search warrant, in what appears to me,
anyway, to be a relatively sophisticated way. That is to
say, the idea that these computers could have become
configured as they are could have been an accident on [the
defendant’s] part seems to me to be preposterous. And,
it appears that, when the search warrant was executed .
. . the Gateway computer was . . . running what has been
described as the eDonkey and eMule program, which is
described as a source known to law enforcement through
which individuals obtain or share child pornography,
among other things.
“The volume of material that was involved in current
downloads, just based on my review of the screenshots
from the day the search warrant was executed, indicates
that there was substantial ongoing downloading activ-
ity of files with titles which suggest that their content
would be, or could be, child pornography. . . . [O]nce
again, that this could have been an accident, or that [the
defendant] would have arranged this without knowing
what he was doing, seems highly unlikely to the court. .
. . [I]n addition, and importantly, the defendant . . . did
make statements at the time the search warrant was
executed, in which the defendant admitted that he had
been involved, engaged in downloading child pornog-
raphy for an extended period. . . . [H]e admitted to law
State v. Dore

enforcement at the time of the execution of the search
warrant that the materials were pornographic in nature
and involved children.
“The testimony of . . . Kazmir establishes in the mind
of the court that the individuals depicted in the—that
are charged in counts one through five were in fact under
the age of sixteen, likely under the age of fourteen. And,
having viewed the evidence . . . the court is clear that
the materials actually do constitute child pornography
and that this could reasonably be found based on the
evidence.” The court also indicated that it “did look at
the Ashcroft case” and stated that, “having reviewed
the exhibits themselves that are described in counts one
through five, in light of also the testimony of . . . Kazmir,
I don’t detect any reason—any suggestion that the vid-
eos depict what the Ashcroft court would have called . .
. virtual pornography. I make a finding that it’s real.”
Thereafter, the defense presented testimony from
William Jacob Green, an expert witness in computer
forensics. Green testified that there was no evidence
demonstrating “that [the defendant] had accessed the
part files within the Intermediate folder of Overnet,”
and that he “observed no evidence to support the use or
the opening of any of the part files” by the defendant.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Green at
what point the data from downloading a file starts to be
written on the destination computer, and Green replied,
“[f]rom the very first piece of the partial file . . . .” The
prosecutor then stated, “[s]o, whatever portion of the
file has been downloaded is written onto the destination
computer, is that correct,” to which Green responded,
“[c]orrect.” At the conclusion of Green’s testimony, the
defense rested, and defense counsel renewed his motion
for a judgment of acquittal for the reasons previously
articulated, which the court denied.
The parties filed posttrial briefs in September, 2023.
In his posttrial brief, the defendant raised three argu-
ments. First, he argued that § 53a-196e (a) (2) is uncon-
stitutionally overbroad and vague in that it “extends
State v. Dore

beyond child pornography involving an actual child.”
Second, the defendant asserted that the state had failed
to prove that the images in the part files “were of actual,
identifiable children under the age of sixteen, as distinct
from virtual computer images.” In his third argument,
the defendant asserted that the state had failed to prove
that he had actual knowledge of the contents of the part
files. The state contended in its posttrial brief that the
evidence presented was sufficient to establish each of the
elements of the crime of possession of child pornography
in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt.
On September 14, 2023, the court heard closing argu-
ments after which it announced its finding, which was
subsequently memorialized in a written decision dated
September 21, 2023. Specifically, the court found, on
the basis of the testimony presented and the exhibits,
including its viewing of the five video clips that the
defendant is alleged to have possessed and which the
state alleged contained child pornography, that “the
state [had] proven beyond a reasonable doubt all of the
elements necessary to constitute the crime of possession
of child pornography [in the second degree] as charged.
Accordingly, [the court] found the defendant guilty of
possession of child pornography in counts one [through]
five.” The defendant was sentenced on all counts to a
total effective term of six years of incarceration, execu-
tion suspended after two years, which are mandatory,
followed by ten years of probation. This appeal followed.
On February 16, 2024, the defendant filed a motion for
articulation of the trial court’s decision, and, on June
12, 2024, the court issued an articulation.17 Additional
facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant claims that § 53a-196e (a) (2) violates
the first amendment to the United States constitution
17
The court’s articulation will be discussed further in part II A of
this opinion.
State v. Dore

because it is (1) overbroad and (2) vague. We address
these claims in turn.
As an initial matter, we note that “[t]he constitutional-
ity of a statute presents a question of law over which our
review is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Book, 155 Conn. App. 560, 564, 109 A.3d 1027,
cert. denied, 318 Conn. 901, 122 A.3d 632 (2015), cert.
denied, 578 U.S. 977, 136 S. Ct. 2029, 195 L. Ed. 2d
219 (2016). Moreover, “ ‘[l]egislative enactments carry
with them a strong presumption of constitutionality. .
. . A party challenging the constitutionality of a validly
enacted statute bears the heavy burden of proving the
statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
In the absence of weighty countervailing circumstances,
it is improvident for the court to invalidate a statute on
its face.’ . . . State v. Bennett-Gibson, 84 Conn. App. 48,
56, 851 A.2d 1214, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 916, 859 A.2d
570 (2004); see also State v. Billings, 217 Conn. App. 1,
26, 287 A.3d 146 (2022), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 907,
288 A.3d 217 (2023). This burden is especially heavy
in the context of a facial challenge. See State v. Ryan,
48 Conn. App. 148, 154, 709 A.2d 21, cert. denied, 244
Conn. 930, 711 A.2d 729, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 876,
119 S. Ct. 179, 142 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1998). Additionally,
we indulge every presumption in favor of the constitu-
tionality of the statute and approach a claim of uncon-
stitutionality ‘with caution, examine it with care, and
sustain the [statute] unless its invalidity is clear.’ . . .
“Our Supreme Court previously has stated: ‘[I]n evalu-
ating the defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality
of the statute, we read the statute narrowly in order to
save its constitutionality, rather than broadly in order
to destroy it. . . . In so doing, we take into account any
prior interpretations that this court, our Appellate Court
and the Appellate Session of the Superior Court have
placed on the statute.18 . . . [W]e may also add interpre-
tive gloss to a challenged statute in order to render it
18
We note that we have not found any case law from Connecticut
courts interpreting subdivision (2) of § 53a-196e (a).
State v. Dore

constitutional. In construing a statute, the court must
search for an effective and constitutional construction
that reasonably accords with the legislature’s underlying
intent.’ . . . State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 805–806,
640 A.2d 986 (1994).” (Citation omitted; footnote added.)
State v. Russo, 221 Conn. App. 729, 757–58, 303 A.3d
279 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 938, 307 A.3d 273
(2024).
A
The defendant’s claim that § 53a-196e (a) (2) is uncon-
stitutionally overbroad is premised on his assertion that
the language of subdivision (2) of § 53a-196e (a) does not
restrict its breadth or scope to real children. We are not
persuaded by this claim.
“[W]e set forth a general description of the overbreadth
doctrine. ‘The essence of an overbreadth challenge is that
a statute that proscribes certain conduct, even though it
may have some permissible applications, sweeps within
its proscription conduct protected by the first amend-
ment. . . . Overbroad statutes, like vague ones, inhibit
the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct. . . . A
party has standing to raise an overbreadth claim, how-
ever, only if there [is] a realistic danger that the statute
will significantly compromise recognized [f]irst [a]mend-
ment protections of parties not before the [c]ourt . . . .
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S. Ct.
2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1973), the Supreme Court stated
that where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we
believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only
be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ . . . State v. Snyder,
49 Conn. App. 617, 623–24, 717 A.2d 240 (1998); see
also Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118–19, 123 S.
Ct. 2191, 156 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2003). Finally, we note
that in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra, 613, the United
States Supreme Court stated that ‘[a]pplication of the
overbreadth doctrine . . . is, manifestly, strong medicine.
It has been employed by the [c]ourt sparingly and only
as a last resort. Facial overbreadth has not been invoked
State v. Dore

when a limiting construction has been or could be placed
on the challenged statute.’ . . . Id.; see also United States
v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 770, 143 S. Ct. 1932, 216 L.
Ed. 2d 692 (2023) (‘[b]ecause it destroys some good along
with the bad, [i]nvalidation for overbreadth is strong
medicine that is not to be casually employed’ . . .).
“Our Supreme Court has explained the rationale under-
lying the overbreadth doctrine. ‘A clear and precise
enactment may . . . be overbroad if in its reach it pro-
hibits constitutionally protected conduct. . . . A single
impermissible application of a statute, however, will not
be sufficient to invalidate the statute on its face; rather,
to be invalid, a statute must reach a substantial amount
of constitutionally protected conduct. . . . A [defendant]
may challenge a statute as facially overbroad under the
first amendment, even if the [defendant’s] conduct falls
within the permissible scope of the statute, to vindicate
two substantial interests: (1) eliminating the statute’s
chilling effect on others who fear to engage in the expres-
sion that the statute unconstitutionally prohibits; and
(2) acknowledging that every [person] has the right not
to be prosecuted for expression under a constitutionally
overbroad statute. . . . Thus, the [defendant] has standing
to raise a facial overbreadth challenge to the [statute]
and may prevail on that claim if he can establish that the
[statute] reaches a substantial amount of constitution-
ally protected conduct even though he personally did not
engage in such conduct.’ . . . State v. Cook, 287 Conn.
237, 244–45, 947 A.2d 307, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 970,
129 S. Ct. 464, 172 L. Ed. 2d 328 (2008).” (Emphasis in
original; footnote omitted.) State v. Russo, supra, 221
Conn. App. 758–59.
“The first amendment, applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment, provides that ‘Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .’
U.S. Const., amend. I. ‘[A]s a general matter, the [f]irst
[a]mendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content.’ . . . The state may violate
State v. Dore

this mandate in various ways, ‘but a law imposing crimi-
nal penalties on protected speech is a stark example of
speech suppression.’ Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
[supra, 535 U.S. 244].” (Citation omitted.) State v. Bill-
ings, supra, 217 Conn. App. 24–25.
“As a general principle, the [f]irst [a]mendment bars
the government from dictating what we see or read or
speak or hear. The freedom of speech has its limits; it
does not embrace certain categories of speech, including
defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography
produced with real children.” Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, supra, 535 U.S. 245–46. In Ashcroft, the
United States Supreme Court “consider[ed] . . . whether
the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA),
18 U.S.C. § 2251 et seq., abridges the freedom of speech.”
Id., 239. As the court explained: “The CPPA extends the
federal prohibition against child pornography to sexually
explicit images that appear to depict minors but were
produced without using any real children. The statute
prohibits, in specific circumstances, possessing or dis-
tributing these images, which may be created by using
adults who look like minors or by using computer imag-
ing. The new technology, according to Congress, makes
it possible to create realistic images of children who do
not exist. See Congressional Findings, notes following
18 U.S.C. § 2251.” Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
supra, 239–40. As a result, the court concluded that
the CPPA was unconstitutionally overbroad because
it “prohibit[ed] child pornography that does not depict
an actual child” or virtual child pornography. Id., 240.
Following Ashcroft, in 2004, the legislature amended
the definition of child pornography in the General Stat-
utes. Specifically, pursuant to Public Acts 2004, No.
04-139, § 2 (P.A. 04-139), the definition of child pornog-
raphy in General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-193 (13)19
was amended to mean “any visual depiction including
19
We note that § 53a-193 (13) was further amended in 2024 to replace
the term “child pornography” with “child sexual abuse material.” See
Public Acts 2024, No. 24-118, § 2; see also footnote 1 of this opinion.
State v. Dore

any photograph, film, videotape, picture or computer-
generated image or picture, whether made or produced
by electronic, mechanical or other means, of sexually
explicit conduct, where the production of such visual
depiction involves the use of a person under sixteen years
of age engaging in sexually explicit conduct, provided
whether the subject of a visual depiction was a person
under sixteen years of age at the time the visual depic-
tion was created is a question to be decided by the trier of
fact.”20 (Emphasis added.) This was done so that our laws
concerning child pornography comport with Ashcroft.21
With this background in mind, we next set forth the
language of the statute that is being challenged by the
20
On March 1, 2004, Commissioner of Public Safety Arthur L. Spada
submitted written testimony in support of the proposed amendments in
P.A. 04-139, stating in part: “The United States Supreme Court held
in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition [supra, 535 U.S. 234] two years
ago that ‘virtual’ pictures could not be considered child pornography.
‘Virtual’ refers to pictures that are completely rendered by computer.
Virtual images do not use children and do not involve the actual sexual
abuse of a child. Since the decision in Ashcroft, law enforcement and
the courts in Connecticut have been reluctant to fully enforce our state
child pornography law. The proposed legislation makes it clear that
Connecticut’s definition of child pornography does not include ‘virtual’
images.” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 4,
2004 Sess., p. 1419.
21
See 47 H.R. Proc., Pt. 13, 2004 Sess., pp. 4009, 4012, remarks of
Representative John E. Stone, Jr. (stating, during House of Represen-
tatives proceedings concerning P.A. 04-139, that proposed amendment
expanded current law pertaining to possession and importation of child
pornography from applying only to live performance to include “com-
puter generated types of pornography,” and clarifying that amendment
made current law “consistent with recent Supreme Court rulings”); 47
S. Proc., Pt. 7, 2004 Sess., pp. 1909–10, remarks of Senator Andrew J.
McDonald (“Madam President, the amendment now before the Cham-
ber would . . . create separate levels of crimes for the possession of
child pornography. And before I get into the different levels, Madam
President, I do want to state for the record that the definition of ‘child
pornography’ has been very painstakingly crafted in this legislation to
address certain constitutional challenges that have been raised in other
jurisdictions. I do want to specifically mention that the definition of
‘child pornography’ would require a visual depiction, including any
type of photograph, film or videotape, of a child who is an actual person
under the age of [sixteen] years. And, I should note for the record that
that would preclude the graphic composition of a child in an electronic
State v. Dore

defendant as unconstitutionally overbroad. General Stat-
utes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-196e (a) provides: “A person
is guilty of possessing child pornography in the second
degree when such person knowingly possesses (1) twenty
or more but fewer than fifty visual depictions of child
pornography, or (2) a series of images in electronic, digi-
tal or other format, which is intended to be displayed
continuously, consisting of twenty or more frames, or a
film or videotape, consisting of twenty or more frames,
that depicts a single act of sexually explicit conduct by
one child.” Under the statute, subdivision (1) concerns
still images of child pornography, whereas subdivision (2)
concerns moving images, whether in electronic, digital
or other format, such as film or videotape. In 2014, the
legislature amended § 53a-196e to add subdivision (2); see
Public Acts 2014, No. 14-192, § 2 (P.A. 14-192); under
which the defendant in the present case was charged and
convicted. The 2014 amendment was designed to “update
the [statute] to reflect the current technology through
which child pornography is produced and distributed”
and to address how images in a child pornography case are
counted. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings,
Judiciary, Pt. 6, 2014 Sess., p. 2523, written testimony
submitted by the Division of Criminal Justice; see also
Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary,
Pt. 5, 2014 Sess., p. 2289, testimony of Attorney Michael
A. Gailor of the Division of Criminal Justice (stating that
purpose of amendment is to address “computer-generated
images and other types of things that are equivalent
of videotapes”).
mode within the definition of a ‘person.’ It would actually have to be a
live, breathing individual under the age of [sixteen] years. I wanted to
make that clear.”); Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judi-
ciary, Pt. 4, 2004 Sess., p. 1269, remarks of Chief State’s Attorney
Christopher L. Morano (House Bill No. 5043 was designed to address
issues of “constitutional concern” with the law); Conn. Joint Standing
Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 4, 2004 Sess., p. 1304, remarks
of Major Timothy Palmbach, Department of Public Safety, Division
of Scientific Services (consistent with Ashcroft decision, language of
amendment reflects removal of “all the components of virtual images
from our child pornography statute”).
State v. Dore

The defendant’s claim that § 53a-196e (a) (2) is uncon-
stitutionally overbroad can be distilled to the following:
because subdivision (2) of § 53a-196e (a) does not include
in its description of the illegal materials the defined term
“child pornography,” which, as amended to comply with
Ashcroft, specifically pertains to “the use of a person
under sixteen years of age engaging in sexually explicit
conduct”; (emphasis added) General Statutes (Rev. to
2015) § 53a-193 (13); it runs afoul of Ashcroft in that
it does not limit its coverage to digital images of actual
children, as opposed to virtual images. According to the
defendant, subdivision (1) of § 53a-196e (a) “utilizes the
defined term ‘child pornography,’ thereby restricting
its scope to depictions of actual, identifiable children;
however, [subdivision (2) of § 53a-196e (a)] not only fails
to use that defined term, but it utilizes language which is
nearly identical to that which the legislature deleted in
2004 when it amended the relevant definition to comply
with Ashcroft. . . . Nothing in [subdivision] (2) evidences
legislative intent to restrict [its scope] to depictions of
actual, identifiable children. Rather than employing
the defined term, [subdivision] (2) criminalizes knowing
possession of ‘a series of images in electronic, digital
or other format . . . that depicts a single act of sexually
explicit conduct by one child.’ The statute does not say
‘one actual child’ or ‘one real child.’ More importantly,
unlike the definition of child pornography in § 53a-193
(13), it does not require that ‘the production of such
visual depiction involves the use of a person. . . .’ As
the Ashcroft court observed in 2002: ‘The new technol-
ogy, according to Congress, makes it possible to create
realistic images of children who do not exist.’ Ashcroft
[v. Free Speech Coalition, supra, 535 U.S. 240]. If the
technology existing in 2002 made possible the creation of
‘realistic images of children who do not exist,’ it stands
to reason that technological developments in recent
years have enabled the creation of much more realistic
images.”22 (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) The
22
In its written decision, the court rejected this claim, stating: “[T]he
court is satisfied that the statute charged in this case facially prohibits
the possession of images of real, although perhaps not personally identi-
fiable, children. Defense counsel argues that, because the [subdivision]
charged refers to ‘one child’ and not to suggested clarifying language
such as ‘one actual child’ or ‘one real child’ . . . the [subdivision] embraces
State v. Dore

defendant further asserts that “[t]he legislative history
of P.A. 14-192 makes no reference whatsoever to Ash-
croft or any constitutional requirements. Instead, as
noted, that legislation adopted language nearly identical
to that which had already been deemed noncompliant. . .
. [N]othing in the 2014 legislative history provides even
a scintilla of support for an interpretive gloss allowing
for a conclusion that subsection (a) (2) contains the same
restriction, i.e., involvement of a real, identifiable child,
as . . . (a) (1).” We are not persuaded.
We first look to the language of § 53a-196e (a) (2).
Although subdivision (2), by itself, does not use the
term “child pornography,” it refers to “sexually explicit
conduct by one child.” (Emphasis added.) Because the
word “child” is not defined in the statutes governing child
pornography, we “look to the dictionary to ascertain its
commonly approved meaning.” State v. Marsala, 337
Conn. 55, 74, 252 A.3d 349 (2020). The word “child” is
defined as “a young person, [especially] between infancy
and youth . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed. 2003) p. 214; see also
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) p. 239 (“[a]t com-
mon law one who had not attained the age of fourteen
years”). A “person” is defined as “human, individual .
. . .” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, supra,
p. 1184. As we already have noted, “child pornography”
under General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-193 (13)
“involves the use of a person under sixteen years of age
. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Hence, the word “child” in
subdivision (2) is consistent with the requirement under
§ 53a-193 (13) that the pornography must involve a per-
son, as opposed to virtual images. That determination
is further reinforced when subdivision (2) is construed
in conjunction with subdivision (1) and the legislative
images created without the involvement of real children. . . . The court
does not read the [subdivision] that way. The plain language of the
prohibition is to ‘sexually explicit conduct by one child,’ and there is
nothing in the [subdivision] to suggest that the legislature meant by
that one fictitious child or one nonexistent child.” (Citation omitted;
emphasis in original.)
State v. Dore

purpose underlying the statutory revision that added
subdivision (2).
It is well settled that we cannot read subdivision (2) of
§ 53a-196e (a) in a vacuum. See, e.g., Thomas v. Dept. of
Developmental Services, 297 Conn. 391, 408, 999 A.3d
682 (2010) (statutory “provision [cannot] be interpreted
in a vacuum, without reference to the statute’s other pro-
visions”); see also State v. Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 387, 743
A.2d 1 (1999) (“This court does not interpret statutes in a
vacuum, nor does it refuse to consider matters of known
historical fact. . . . And although criminal statutes are
strictly construed, it is equally fundamental that the rule
of strict construction does not require an interpretation
which frustrates an evident legislative intent.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 841,
121 S. Ct. 106, 148 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2000). When we read §
53a-196e (a) as a whole, as we must, we find no merit to
the contention that subdivision (2) is not limited to child
pornography involving a real child. First, subsection (a)
of the statute specifically provides in relevant part that
“[a] person is guilty of possessing child pornography in
the second degree when such person knowingly possesses
. . . (2) a series of images in electronic, digital or other
format, which is intended to be displayed continuously,
consisting of twenty or more frames, or a film or video-
tape, consisting of twenty or more frames, that depicts
a single act of sexually explicit conduct by one child.”
(Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) §
53a-196e (a) (2). Although there is no specific reference
to the term “child pornography” within subdivision (2),
that subdivision must be read in conjunction with the
preceding language in subsection (a) designating the
crime covered by the statute, which references “child
pornography.” The definition of that term is clearly
limited to images of an actual child and excludes from its
ambit virtual child pornography. See General Statutes
(Rev. to 2015) § 53a-193 (13).
Second, subdivision (2) also must be read in conjunc-
tion with subdivision (1), which expressly proscribes the
State v. Dore

possession of still images of child pornography.23 Sub-
division (2) was added to the statute in 2014 to address
advancing technology concerning moving images,
whether in electronic, digital or other format, such as
film or videotape; there is nothing in the record, nor have
we discovered anything in our research, indicating that
the 2014 amendment had any bearing on the change in
the law to limit application of the child pornography
statutes to real children, rather than virtual images
of children. It follows, therefore, that a harmonious
reading of both subdivisions of the statutes leads to the
conclusion that they are both aimed at the possession of
actual, not virtual, child pornography.24
23
Notably, the Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions pertaining to
§ 53a-196e and what is now referred to as “child sexual abuse material,”
which has since been substituted in General Statutes §§ 53a-193 (13) and
53a-196e (a) (2) in lieu of the term “child pornography”; see footnotes 1
and 19 of this opinion; make no distinction between the two subdivisions
of § 53a-196e (a). Specifically, instruction 7.7-4 provides in relevant
part: “The first element is that the defendant possessed child sexual abuse
material. ‘Child sexual abuse material’ is any visual depiction, including
any photograph, film, videotape, picture or computer-generated image or
picture, whether made or produced by electronic, digital, mechanical or
other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where the production of such
visual depiction involves the use of a person under [sixteen] years of age
engaging in sexually explicit conduct, provided whether the subject of
a visual depiction was a person under [sixteen] years of age at the time
the visual depiction was created is a question to be decided by the trier
of fact. A ‘computer-generated image’ is an image of a real child under
the age of [sixteen] that has been digitally captured, stored, altered,
and/or enhanced. . . .” Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions 7.7-4
(revised to March 26, 2025), available at https://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/
Criminal/Criminal.pdf (last visited February 5, 2026). This provides
further support for our conclusion that both subdivisions of the statute
apply only to images of real children.
24
We find unavailing the defendant’s claim that, because the two
subdivisions are separated by the disjunctive “or,” we should look to
the language of subdivision (2) only. Specifically, he contends that “the
use of the word ‘or’ . . . is enormously significant because it means that
a person could be convicted of only one of these two [subdivisions].”
He cites 500 North Avenue, LLC v. Planning Commission, 199 Conn.
App. 115, 132, 235 A.3d 526, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 959, 239 A.3d
320 (2020), for the proposition that “ ‘the use of the disjunctive “or”
between the two parts of the statute indicates a clear legislative intent
of separability.’ ” We agree that, because the statute uses the disjunctive
State v. Dore

We are mindful that “[t]he law prefers rational and
prudent statutory construction, and we seek to avoid
interpretations of statutes that produce odd or illogical
outcomes. State v. George J., 280 Conn. 551, 574–75,
910 A.2d 931 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1326, 127
S. Ct. 1919, 167 L. Ed. 2d 573 (2007). [I]t is axiomatic
that those who promulgate statutes . . . do not intend to
promulgate statutes . . . that lead to absurd consequences
or bizarre results. . . . Consequently, [i]n construing a
statute, common sense must be used and courts must
assume that a reasonable and rational result was intended
. . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McHenry
Solar, LLC v. Hampton, 235 Conn. App. 355, 375, 345
A.3d 916 (2025); see also State v. Drupals, 306 Conn.
149, 165, 49 A.3d 962 (2012). Moreover, “the legislature,
in amending or enacting statutes, always [is] presumed to
have created a harmonious and consistent body of law . .
. .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ragalis,
235 Conn. App. 538, 569, 345 A.3d 844, cert. denied, 353
Conn. 934, 347 A.3d 877 (2025); see also State v. Webber,
225 Conn. App. 16, 30, 315 A.3d 320 (courts consider
statute “as a whole with a view toward reconciling its
parts in order to obtain a sensible and rational overall
interpretation” (internal quotation marks omitted)),
cert. denied, 349 Conn. 915, 315 A.3d 301 (2024).
“[I]n determining the meaning of a statute . . . we
look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the
broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of
“or,” only one of the two subdivisions must be shown to establish a viola-
tion of the statute. See Avon v. Sastre, 224 Conn. App. 155, 168, 312
A.3d 40, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 905, 312 A.3d 1058 (2024). Neverthe-
less, in our examination of the constitutionality of the statute and our
“search for an effective and constitutional construction that reasonably
accords with the legislature’s underlying intent”; (internal quotation
marks omitted) State v. Russo, supra, 221 Conn. App. 758; we must
look “to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our
construction”; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Webber, 225
Conn. App. 16, 30, 315 A.3d 320, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 915, 315 A.3d
301 (2024); especially in light of the presumption that the legislature
has “created a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . .” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ragalis, 235 Conn. App. 538, 569,
345 A.3d 844, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 934, 347 A.3d 877 (2025).
State v. Dore

our construction. . . . [T]he General Assembly is always
presumed to know all the existing statutes and the effect
that its action or [nonaction] will have upon any one of
them. . . . Legislation never is written on a clean slate, nor
is it ever read in isolation or applied in a vacuum. Every
new act takes its place as a component of an extensive
and elaborate system of written laws. . . . Construing
statutes by reference to others advances [the values of
harmony and consistency within the law]. In fact, courts
have been said to be under a duty to construe statutes
harmoniously where that can reasonably be done.” (Cita-
tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Webber, supra, 225 Conn. App. 30–31.
The defendant’s construction of § 53a-196e (a) (2)
ignores these well settled tenets of statutory construc-
tion. The defendant contends that “[t]he choice by the
legislature to use the defined term in (a) (1) [of § 53a-196e]
and a different, broader term in (a) (2) reflects a clear
intent that the two disjunctive [subdivisions] would
differ in scope, with only the former being limited to
images of real, identifiable children.” We disagree. It
would be illogical to conclude that, in 2004, the leg-
islature amended the definition of child pornography
in § 53a-193 (13) to limit the statutes governing child
pornography, consistent with Ashcroft, to images of
real children, but, in amending § 53a-196e in 2014 to
add subdivision (2), intentionally expanded the scope
of subdivision (2) to go beyond real children and include
virtual depictions of children, even though it was aware
of the limits imposed by Ashcroft. We cannot conclude
that the legislature intended to enact an unconstitutional
law. See Whitfield v. Empire Mutual Ins. Co., 167 Conn.
499, 508, 356 A.2d 139 (1975) (“[i]t is to be presumed
that legislatures do not deliberately enact ineffective
and unconstitutional laws” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Amsel v. Brooks, 141 Conn. 288, 295, 106
A.2d 152 (same), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 880, 75 S.
Ct. 125, 99 L. Ed. 693 (1954). Indeed, we agree with the
state that “[c]onstruing § 53a-196e (a) (2) to proscribe
possessing virtual child pornography would render it
State v. Dore

effectively futile because such a construction would
place the law in constitutional jeopardy under [Ashcroft],
the very result the legislature was aware of and sought
to avoid in 2004 when it limited the definition of ‘child
pornography’ to actual child pornography.”
Indulging every reasonable presumption in favor of
the constitutionality of the statute, we conclude that
the images covered by § 53a-196e (a) (2) must be of a
real child and that § 53a-196e (a) (2) does not allow for
a prosecution thereunder to be based on virtual images
of children. This construction results in a harmonious,
consistent body of law that aligns with the broader statu-
tory scheme designed to protect against the exploitation
and sexual abuse of children. The defendant, therefore,
has not met his heavy burden of demonstrating that §
53a-196e (a) (2) is unconstitutionally overbroad on its
face.
Moreover, an “overbreadth claimant bears the burden
of demonstrating, from the text of [the law] and from
actual fact, that substantial overbreadth exists. . . .
Virginia v. Hicks, [supra, 539 U.S. 122]; see also United
States v. Hansen, [supra, 599 U.S. 784] (to succeed on
claim, defendant must show that overbreadth is substan-
tial relative to statute’s plainly legitimate sweep); State
v. Culmo, 43 Conn. Supp. 46, 73, 642 A.2d 90 (1993)
([t]he task of demonstrating that a statute will signifi-
cantly compromise recognized first amendment rights
of parties not before the court, thus triggering facial
overbreadth analysis, is on the defendant).” (Emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Russo, supra, 221 Conn. App. 763.
We are guided by this court’s decision in State v.
Russo, supra, 221 Conn. App. 729, on this issue and
conclude that the defendant has failed to meet his burden
of showing “substantial overbreadth from the text of the
law or from actual fact. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S.
641, 650, 104 S. Ct. 3262, 82 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1984) (‘an
overbreadth challenge can be raised on behalf of others
only when the statute is substantially overbroad, i.e.,
State v. Dore

when the statute is unconstitutional in a substantial
portion of cases to which it applies’). It was the defen-
dant’s burden to demonstrate a ‘realistic danger that the
statute itself will significantly compromise recognized
[f]irst [a]mendment protections of parties not before the
[c]ourt . . . .’ Members of City Council of Los Angeles v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, [466 U.S. 789, 801, 104 S. Ct.
2118, 80 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1984)].” State v. Russo, supra,
766. In the present case, the defendant made no factual
showing demonstrating the prosecution of individuals
under the statute based on virtual child pornography.
Consequently, as in Russo, “the present case is not one
in which the ‘ “strong medicine” ’ of the overbreadth
doctrine should be employed.” Id.
Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s claim that §
53a-196e (a) (2) is unconstitutionally overbroad.
B
The defendant also claims that § 53a-196e (a) (2) is
unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied
to him. In particular, he asserts that § 53a-196e (a) (2)
is “vague on its face because it fails to utilize either the
defined term which would restrict its prohibitions to
depictions involving actual, identifiable children or any
other language that would accomplish the same goal.
Moreover . . . § 53a-196e (a) (2) is vague as applied because
the state failed to present evidence proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the images in the subject files . . .
were images of actual, identifiable children rather than
being the work of a tech-savvy content creator.” We
disagree with both aspects of the defendant’s vagueness
challenge to the statute.
Our Supreme Court recently addressed a vagueness
challenge to a statute and set forth the following legal
principles: “The determination of whether a statutory
provision is unconstitutionally vague is a question of law
over which we exercise de novo review.” State v. Winot,
294 Conn. 753, 758–59, 988 A.2d 188 (2010). In under-
taking such review, we are mindful that [a] statute is not
State v. Dore

void for vagueness unless it clearly and unequivocally is
unconstitutional, making every presumption in favor of
its validity. . . . Id., 759.
“To prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply
them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters to [police officers], judges, and juries for resolu-
tion on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. . .
. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–109, 92 S.
Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972). [A] legislature [must]
establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.
. . . [When] the legislature fails to provide such minimal
guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a standardless
sweep [that] allows [police officers], prosecutors, and
juries to pursue their personal predilections. . . . Kolender
v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 75 L.
Ed. 2d 903 (1983).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Enrrique H., 353 Conn. 823, 835–36, 347 A.3d
1156 (2025).
“A statute . . . [that] forbids or requires conduct in
terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its appli-
cation violates the first essential of due process. . . . Laws
must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may
act accordingly. . . . A statute is not void for vagueness
unless it clearly and unequivocally is unconstitutional,
making every presumption in favor of its validity. . . . To
demonstrate that [a statute] is unconstitutionally vague
as applied to [him], the [defendant] therefore must . . .
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] had
inadequate notice of what was prohibited or that [he
was] the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment. . . . [T]he void for vagueness doctrine embodies two
central precepts: the right to fair warning of the effect
of a governing statute . . . and the guarantee against
standardless law enforcement. . . . If the meaning of a
statute can be fairly ascertained a statute will not be
State v. Dore

void for vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some
inherent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and
phrases there lurk uncertainties.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Ares, 345 Conn. 290, 303–304,
284 A.3d 967 (2022).
The defendant’s facial vagueness challenge to §
53a-196e (a) (2) is based on the same claim raised in
support of his overbreadth claim, namely, that because
subdivision (2) “makes no reference to the statutorily
defined term ‘child pornography,’ even though it is used
in sub[division] (1), which, as previously discussed, is
in the disjunctive and thus reflects a clear legislative
intent of separability . . . an ordinary person would not
understand [that subsection] (a) (2) [involves] the same
depictions as the statutory definition . . . .” We rejected
this very same claim in the context of the defendant’s
overbreadth challenge and determined that the statute
does not implicate constitutionally protected speech.
See part I A of this opinion; see also State v. Ehlers, 252
Conn. 579, 585, 750 A.2d 1079 (2000). For the same
reasons already set forth in part I A of this opinion, the
defendant’s claim that the statute is vague on its face
fails and we need not discuss it further.
With respect to the defendant’s vagueness as applied
claim, our Supreme Court has stated that “a court ana-
lyzing an as-applied vagueness challenge may determine
that the statute generally provides sufficient guidance
to eliminate the threat of arbitrary enforcement with-
out analyzing more specifically whether the particular
enforcement was guided by adequate standards. In fact,
it is the better (and perhaps more logical) practice to
determine first whether the statute provides such gen-
eral guidance, given that the [United States] Supreme
Court has indicated that the more important aspect of the
vagueness doctrine is the requirement that a legislature
establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.
. . . If a court determines that a statute provides suffi-
cient guidelines to eliminate generally the risk of arbi-
trary enforcement, that finding concludes the inquiry.”
State v. Dore

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Enrrique
H., supra, 353 Conn. 836–37.
We conclude that § 53a-196e (a) (2) is not unconsti-
tutionally vague as applied to the defendant because it
“generally provides sufficient guidance to eliminate the
threat of arbitrary enforcement, which concludes [our]
inquiry.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 837.
In other words, the statute provides sufficient notice
that it proscribes the possession of child pornography,
which, as defined, means “any visual depiction including
any photograph, film, videotape, picture or computer-
generated image or picture, whether made or produced
by electronic, digital, mechanical or other means, of
sexually explicit conduct, where the production of such
visual depiction involves the use of a person under six-
teen years of age engaging in sexually explicit conduct
. . . .” General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-193 (13).
Section 53a-196e (a) (2) also provides sufficient guid-
ance concerning what the state, in a prosecution for
possession of child pornography in the second degree,
must demonstrate. Specifically, in a prosecution under
subsection (a) (2), the state must prove that the defendant
knowingly possessed “a series of images in electronic,
digital or other format, which is intended to be displayed
continuously, consisting of twenty or more frames, or a
film or videotape, consisting of twenty or more frames,
that depicts a single act of sexually explicit conduct by
one child.” As discussed previously in this opinion and
in light of the statutory definition of child pornography,
the images at issue must be of a real child, as opposed to
virtual images.
Furthermore, even if we were to conclude that the
statute fails to provide sufficient guidance, “an as-applied
vagueness challenge may nonetheless fail if the statute’s
meaning has a clear core. . . . In that case the inquiry
will involve determining whether the conduct at issue
falls so squarely in the core of what is prohibited by the
law that there is no substantial concern about arbitrary
enforcement because no reasonable enforcing officer
State v. Dore

could doubt the law’s application in the circumstances.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Enrrique
H., supra, 353 Conn. 837. In the present case, because
“the defendant’s conduct . . . clearly falls within the
statute’s ‘unmistakable core meaning of prohibited con-
duct’ . . . namely, the possession of pornographic mate-
rial depicting persons under the age of sixteen years,
he may not challenge the statute for vagueness on due
process grounds.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Ehlers,
supra, 252 Conn. 588; see also State v. Michael R., 346
Conn. 432, 462, 291 A.3d 567 (“[t]his is not a situation
[in which] the state is holding an individual criminally
responsible for conduct [that] he could not [have] reason-
ably underst[ood] to be proscribed” (internal quotation
marks omitted)), cert. denied, U.S. , 144 S. Ct. 211,
217 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2023). As a result, the defendant’s
as-applied vagueness claim lacks merit.
II
Next, we address the defendant’s challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of
possession of child pornography in the second degree.
Specifically, the defendant claims that the evidence was
insufficient to establish that (1) the video clips depict
real children and (2) he knowingly possessed child por-
nography.
Before addressing the merits of these claims, we set
forth our well established standard of review and rel-
evant legal principles. “The standard of review for a
sufficiency of the evidence claim employs a two part test.
First, we construe the evidence in the light most favor-
able to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine
whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences
reasonably drawn therefrom the [fact finder] reasonably
could have concluded that the cumulative force of the
evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
. . . This court cannot substitute its own judgment for
that of the [fact finder] if there is sufficient evidence to
support [its] verdict. . . .
State v. Dore

“It is axiomatic that the [fact finder] must find every
element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to
find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but]
each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those con-
clusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
. . . If it is reasonable and logical for the [fact finder] to
conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the
[fact finder] is permitted to consider the fact proven and
may consider it in combination with other proven facts
in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the
evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements
of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . On
appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of
the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis
of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reason-
able view of the evidence that supports the [fact finder’s]
verdict of guilty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Abdulaziz, 231 Conn. App. 789, 829–30, 334
A.3d 1007, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 906, 343 A.3d 503
(2025); see also State v. Inzitari, 351 Conn. 86, 92, 329
A.3d 215, cert. denied, U.S. , 145 S. Ct. 2787, 222
L. Ed. 2d 1080 (2025).
“[P]roof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof
beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a
reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis
of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been
found credible by the [finder of fact], would have resulted
in an acquittal. . . . Moreover, it does not diminish the
probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole
or in part, of evidence that is circumstantial rather than
direct. . . . It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact
of a multitude of facts [that] establishes guilt in a case
involving substantial circumstantial evidence. . . . In
evaluating evidence, the [finder] of fact is not required
to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consis-
tent with the defendant’s innocence. . . . The [finder of
fact] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or
facts established by the evidence it deems to be reason-
able and logical.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Ragalis, supra, 235 Conn. App.
State v. Dore

547–48. With these principles in mind, we address the
defendant’s claims in turn.
A
The defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient
to establish that the video clips depict real children.
In support of this claim, the defendant asserts that,
“[a]lthough the state introduced evidence from three
computer experts who testified in detail about such issues
as the chain of custody, none of the experts referred
even tangentially to the question of whether the images
were computer generated. Rather, the sole person who
testified on this issue was . . . Kazmir. Not only was this
issue far outside her expertise as a pediatrician, but her
sworn testimony was clear [that she was not a computer
expert and did not know about the creation of the images
or whether they had been altered in any way]. . . . Both
the trial court and the state took the position that expert
testimony is not needed to ascertain whether images are
of real, identifiable children as opposed to being virtual
images, which are computer generated. Both cited deci-
sions [from] 2006 for this position. As a result, both failed
to account . . . for the dramatic changes in technology
over the past twenty years, including, inter alia, the
extent to which creators can generate images that are
indistinguishable from real ones to the naked, untrained
eye.” (Citation omitted.) In addition to those arguments,
the defendant also found it “troubling” that the court
relied on its own viewing of the images and based its
conclusion on its own observation and opinion. For the
reasons that follow, we reject this claim.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to this claim. After the defendant filed this
appeal, he filed a motion for articulation seeking to have
the trial court articulate whether it found that § 53a-196e
(a) (2) “requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the images at issue are of real persons rather
than images generated by artificial intelligence or other
technological means,” and, if so, to set forth whether
the state met that burden, including the evidence in
State v. Dore

support thereof, as well as the factual and legal bases for
its finding that the subject images were of real persons.
In its written articulation, the court answered the
first question as follows: “The court found that . . . §
53a-196e (a) (2) requires the state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the images in question are of real
persons. In finding that this is a required element of the
offense charged, the court relied on the plain language
of the statutory section at issue and the language of the
applicable definitions in . . . § 53a-193, including, but not
limited to, [subdivision] (13), ‘child pornography.’ The
court notes that the definitions section does not include
a definition of ‘child’ or ‘person.’ The court also relied on
Connecticut [Criminal] Jury Instructions 7.7-4, which
provides that it is the state’s burden to prove that the
allegation involved an ‘actual, real person.’ ” The court
also cited a number of cases for the proposition that juries
or fact finders are able to distinguish between real and
virtual images, and that expert testimony is not required.
The court, in its articulation, answered the second
question by stating: “The court found that the state
sustained its burden on the issue of whether the images
in question were of real persons. In doing so, the court
relied on the law cited in [its response to question one],
as well as all of the evidence in the record, including, but
not limited to, the court’s review of the images at issue;
see State v. Sorabella, [277 Conn. 155, 188, 891 A.2d 897
(overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Douglas
C., 345 Conn. 421, 285 A.3d 1067 (2022)), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 821, 127 S. Ct. 131, 166 L. Ed. 2d 36 (2006);
and the expert testimony of . . . Kazmir, a board-certified
pediatrician, that, based on her knowledge and experience
and her review of the five video clips on which the charges
were based, [those video clips] depicted a real child under
the age of sixteen. This testimony was not seriously chal-
lenged by the defense, and the court found it credible
and persuasive. Again, the defendant produced no evi-
dence regarding the generation of any images, much less
those before the court, by artificial intelligence or other
State v. Dore

technological means. The court also found persuasive on
this issue evidence concerning the file names under which
the images in issue were downloaded by the defendant,
the testimony of law enforcement witnesses regarding
their experience with the online sources from which the
defendant obtained the images, and the statement made
by the defendant to law enforcement officers at the time
of his arrest regarding the images at issue, his history of
seeking and downloading such content, and his intention
in doing so as to the images at issue.” Finally, the court
stated that its “conclusion that the images in the subject
files were real persons [was] legally and factually based
on the matters recited . . . in [answers one and two].”
We now turn to relevant law. General Statutes (Rev.
to 2015) § 53a-196e (a) provides in relevant part: “A
person is guilty of possessing child pornography in the
second degree when such person knowingly possesses
. . . (2) a series of images in electronic, digital or other
format, which is intended to be displayed continuously,
consisting of twenty or more frames, or a film or video-
tape, consisting of twenty or more frames, that depicts
a single act of sexually explicit conduct by one child.”
“Child pornography” is defined as “any visual depiction
including any photograph, film, videotape, picture or
computer-generated image or picture, whether made
or produced by electronic, digital, mechanical or other
means, of sexually explicit conduct, where the production
of such visual depiction involves the use of a person under
sixteen years of age engaging in sexually explicit conduct,
provided whether the subject of a visual depiction was a
person under sixteen years of age at the time the visual
depiction was created is a question to be decided by the
trier of fact.” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Rev.
to 2015) § 53a-193 (13).
Similar to the claim raised by the defendant in the pres-
ent case, the defendant in State v. Sorabella, supra, 277
Conn. 187, who had been convicted of, inter alia, import-
ing child pornography, claimed on appeal that “the state
should have been required to adduce expert testimony to
State v. Dore

prove that the images depicted a real person under sixteen
years of age. In support of [that] claim, the defendant
underscore[d] the fact that ‘new technology . . . makes
it possible to create realistic images of children who do
not exist.’ Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, [supra, 535
U.S. 240].” In rejecting that claim, our Supreme Court
stated: “We agree that, at least in some cases, it may be
difficult for a lay observer to distinguish between real
and virtual images. As the defendant acknowledges,
however, the vast majority of courts have rejected the
claim that, in light of technological advances, the pros-
ecution, in every case, must present expert testimony
to establish that a particular image depicts a real child.
E.g., United States v. Slanina, 359 F.3d 356, 357 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 845, 125 S. Ct. 288, 160
L. Ed. 2d 73 (2004); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d
1132, 1142 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1083, 124
S. Ct. 945, 157 L. Ed. 2d 759 (2003); People v. Phillips,
215 Ill. 2d 554, 571–75, 831 N.E.2d 574 (2005); see also
United States v. Deaton, 328 F.3d 454, 455 (8th Cir.
2003); United States v. Hall, 312 F.3d 1250, 1260 (11th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 954, 123 S. Ct. 1646,
155 L. Ed. 2d 502 (2003). Indeed, he cites to no contrary
authority. In the absence of any persuasive support for
the view advocated by the defendant, we see no compel-
ling reason to adopt a special rule of evidence for cases
such as the present case, which involves images transmit-
ted over the Internet. Although we cannot conclude, in
light of evolving technology, that such a rule never will
be necessary, we believe that ‘[j]uries are still capable
of distinguishing between real and virtual images; and
admissibility remains within the province of the sound
discretion of the trial judge.’ United States v. Kimler,
supra, 1142; accord United States v. Slanina, supra,
357.” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Sorabella, supra,
187–88.
It is also important to note that, although Sorabella
was decided in 2006, the court applied the definition of
child pornography in the 1999 revision of § 53a-193 (13),
which provided that “ ‘[c]hild pornography’ means any
State v. Dore

material involving a live performance or photographic
or other visual reproduction of a live performance which
depicts a minor in a prohibited sexual act.” General Stat-
utes (Rev. to 1999) § 53a-193 (13). When the statute was
revised in 2004, the revision added the language that
the issue of “whether the subject of a visual depiction
was a person under sixteen years of age at the time the
visual depiction was created is a question to be decided by
the trier of fact”; P.A. 04-139, § 2; which did not apply
under the facts of Sorabella. The present case, however,
is governed by that statutory language.
We also find informative and persuasive to our dis-
cussion of this issue the recent decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United
States v. Schram, 128 F.4th 922, 925 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, U.S. , 146 S. Ct. 172, L. Ed. 2d (2025), on
which the state relies in its appellate brief. In Schram,
the defendant was indicted by a grand jury in 2020 and
charged with and convicted of four counts of advertising
child pornography and one count of engaging in a child
exploitation enterprise, and, at trial, “the government
presented evidence that he administered four sites where
he and other users shared links to what appeared to be
child pornography.” Id., 924–25. On appeal, the defen-
dant in Schram argued that the evidence was insufficient
to support his conviction because it failed to establish
“that he advertised depictions of real children engaged
in sexually explicit conduct.” Id., 925. The court con-
cluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the
defendant’s conviction “because the jury saw excerpts
from pornographic content [the defendant] advertised
on his websites, all of which featured children. It could,
therefore, inspect those excerpts and decide for itself
that the children were real. We have said as much before,
and so have our sister circuits. [United States v.] Koch,
625 F.3d [470, 479 (8th Cir. 2010)]; see, e.g., United
States v. Pawlak, 935 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 2019) [cert.
denied, 589 U.S. 1221, 140 S. Ct. 1214, 206 L. Ed. 2d
214 (2020)]; United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 957
(10th Cir. 2005); cf. also United States v. Vig, 167 F.3d
State v. Dore

443, 449 (8th Cir.) [cert. denied, 528 U.S. 859, 120 S.
Ct. 146, 145 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1999), and cert. denied, 528
U.S. 859, 120 S. Ct. 314, 145 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1999)].
“With improvements in image-generation technol-
ogy, we may someday have to revisit our precedent,
cf. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, [supra, 535 U.S.
259] (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment), but [the
defendant] has not convinced us that today is that day.
We will suppose, for present purposes, that we could dis-
regard our court’s prior decisions if changes in technol-
ogy undermined their assumption that jurors can reliably
distinguish images of real children from images of virtual
children. But see United States v. Rodriguez-Pacheco,
475 F.3d 434, 442 (1st Cir. 2007). The trouble for [the
defendant] is that the record here, far from undermining
that assumption, is entirely consistent with it.
“Until this appeal, that was obvious because the record
was devoid of evidence about the distinguishability of
real and virtual children. And it is only slightly less obvi-
ous now, after [the defendant] pointed us to a handful
of webpages about computer image generation. Those
webpages, which we assume we can consider, are less
than illuminating. They reveal, at most, that computer
programs could generate images of virtual people at the
time of [the defendant’s] offense and that their realistic
output was becoming ever more realistic. Few could dis-
pute that, but it is beside the point. What matters is how
accurate jurors are in distinguishing realistic images of
virtual children from images of real children. See id.,
443 n.8. And on that question, the webpages are silent.
“Without more, we are not prepared to depart from
our court’s precedent allowing juries to decide whether
images depict real children based on the images them-
selves. At the foundation of that precedent is the prin-
ciple that the government need not produce evidence to
negate a speculative assertion that a child in an image
is virtual. [United States v.] Vig, [supra, 167 F.3d
450]. That principle is as true today as it was when we
announced it—three years after Congress found that one
State v. Dore

could make images of virtual children almost ‘indistin-
guishable to the unsuspecting viewer’ from images of
actual children. Child Pornography Prevention Act, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–26 (1996).
And it requires us to reject [the defendant’s] challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence. On the nearly empty
record here, [the defendant’s] concern that images shown
to the jury depicted virtual children is just speculation
unsupported by any concrete facts.” United States v.
Schram, supra, 128 F.4th 925–26; see also United States
v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 120–21 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting
claim that Ashcroft increased government’s evidentiary
burden by requiring specific type of proof to show use of
actual child or, in absence of direct evidence of identity,
expert testimony to prove that images are of real and not
virtual children).
The defendant in the present case appears to be urging
this court to take the position that the circumstances of
this case and advances in technology warrant a departure
from Sorabella and require testimony from an expert in
computers to prove that an image involves a real child.25
The problem with this argument is threefold. First and
foremost, the language of General Statutes (Rev. to
2015) § 53a-193 (13) expressly provides that “whether the
25
In his primary appellate brief, the defendant criticizes the state
and the trial court for relying on Sorabella and United States v. Irving,
supra, 452 F.3d 110—both cases decided in 2006—arguing that, by
doing so, the court and the state “both failed to account . . . for the
dramatic changes in technology over the past twenty years, includ-
ing, inter alia, the extent to which creators can generate images that
are indistinguishable from real ones to the naked, untrained eye.” He
argues further that, “during the eighteen . . . years since Irving was
decided, it is undisputed that technology has changed dramatically,
as references to AI [artificial intelligence], CGI [computer generated
imagery], morphing, and deepfakes have become part of the lexicon and
lay people have struggled to discern the differences between virtual and
real images. See, e.g., [S.] Thompson, ‘A.I. Can Now Create Lifelike
Videos. Can You Tell What’s Real?’ New York Times, September 9,
2024.” In his discussion of morphing, a type of image editing process,
the defendant also cites to W. Wilder, “Virtual Vice: The Urgent Need to
Reassess Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition in the Age of AI-Generated
Child Pornography,” 48 Law & Psych. Rev. 169, 173–74 (2023–2024).
State v. Dore

subject of a visual depiction was a person under sixteen
years of age at the time the visual depiction was created is
a question to be decided by the trier of fact.” There is no
requirement of expert testimony in the statute. Thus, in
the present case, it was proper for the court, as the trier
of fact, to make a finding that the video clips depicted
real children on the basis of its viewing of the video clips
and the evidence presented, including its credibility
assessment of Kazmir’s testimony. To the extent the
defendant suggests impropriety with the court making
that finding on the basis of its “personal opinion” after
viewing the video clips, any such claim lacks merit.
Second, “[i]t is axiomatic that, [a]s an intermediate
appellate court, we are bound by Supreme Court prec-
edent and are unable to modify it. . . . [W]e are not at lib-
erty to overrule or discard the decisions of our Supreme
Court but are bound by them. . . . [I]t is not within our
province to reevaluate or replace those decisions.” (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Yury G., 207
Conn. App. 686, 693–94 n.2, 262 A.3d 981, cert. denied,
340 Conn. 909, 264 A.3d 95 (2021). Thus, we decline the
defendant’s invitation to establish a new rule requiring
the state, in a prosecution under § 53a-196e (a) (2), to
adduce expert testimony to prove that the images depict
a real person under sixteen years of age.26
Third, the record in the present case, similar to Sch-
ram, does not undermine the assumption that a trier
of fact is capable of making this determination, as it
is devoid of any evidence concerning the technology
existing in 2016 or the ability of a trier of fact in 2016
to distinguish realistic images of virtual children from
images of real children. As the court noted in its articu-
lation, “the defendant produced no evidence regarding
the generation of any images, much less those before
the court, by artificial intelligence or other technologi-
cal means.” At trial, the defendant never offered any
26
Notably, the defendant has not directed this court to any authority,
in Connecticut or elsewhere, requiring expert testimony to establish
that a particular image depicts a real child.
State v. Dore

documentary or testimonial evidence to establish in
the record his contention that then existing technology
was such that a layperson would not be able to discern
whether the images depicted real or virtual children.27
See United States v. Schram, supra, 128 F.4th 926 (“[o]n
the nearly empty record here, [the defendant’s] concern
that images shown to the jury depicted virtual children
is just speculation unsupported by any concrete facts”);
United States v. Pawlak, supra, 935 F.3d 350 (defendant
failed to point to any evidence establishing that images
at issue “were anything other than what the government
contended they were: child pornography involving actual
prepubescent children,” and, even “though it was ‘the
[g]overnment’s burden to show that actual children were
depicted,’ here . . . ‘the images themselves sufficed to
authenticate them in this regard’ ”). Instead, in his appel-
late brief, he makes bald assertions about technology and
types of image editing and relies on newspaper and law
review articles that were not raised before or presented
to the court, which we, thus, decline to consider. See,
e.g., State v. Owens, 235 Conn. App. 482, 498 n.14, 345
27
Contrary to the defendant’s suggestion, requiring him to provide
a record in support of his assertion that technology has advanced such
that an expert is needed to discern whether images depict real or virtual
children does not improperly shift the burden of proof in the case. The
law is clear, as the trial court stated in its articulation, that § 53a-196e
(a) (2) requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
images in question are of real persons, and the court held the state to
that burden in this case. The law in Connecticut is equally clear that
such a determination may be made by a fact finder, without the need
for expert testimony. See General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-193
(13); State v. Sorabella, supra, 277 Conn. 187–88. Nevertheless, in
Sorabella, in concluding that a jury or trier of fact is “still capable of
distinguishing between real and virtual images,” our Supreme Court
recognized that, “in light of evolving technology,” that rule may need
to change. State v. Sorabella, supra, 188. It necessarily follows that
a defendant claiming that the time has come for a change in that rule
needs to present evidence in support of such a claim demonstrating the
existing technology and why it precludes a layperson from being able to
detect real images from virtual ones. Otherwise, any such claim is based
on speculation, and there would be no basis in the record from which a
court could reach a conclusion that expert testimony is necessary. See
United States v. Schram, supra, 128 F.4th 925.
State v. Dore

A.3d 489 (2025) (declining to consider evidence that was
not before trial court).
Accordingly, having concluded that the state was
not required to present expert testimony to prove that
the video files depict actual children, we now examine
whether the evidence presented by the state was suf-
ficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
video files—207.part, 230.part and 311.part—found on
the defendant’s computer depict real children. In support
of this burden, the state presented copies of five sepa-
rate video clips taken from the files retrieved from the
defendant’s computer, each of which corresponded to a
count of the operative information. The video clips were
admitted into evidence during the trial and viewed by the
court. The state presented testimony from Christensen
regarding the chain of custody of the evidence seized
from the defendant’s residence. The state also presented
testimony from Kazmir, a board-certified pediatrician,
about her review of each of the five video clips, which
the court specifically found credible. The court found
that “Kazmir testified, based upon her knowledge and
experience, that each of the five clips depicted a real child
under the age of sixteen.”
Kazmir made that determination on the basis of her
assessment of “external indicators of physical matura-
tion” that would be “signs of puberty,” the onset of which
she testified as occurring between the ages of eight and
thirteen. She described the children in the video clips as
being “prepubertal,” meaning that there were no “signs
indicative of later sexual maturation” and which was
“suggestive of younger children.” She further testified
that she had “never examined a sixteen or older patient
who did not have signs of puberty.” Even though she
acknowledged on cross-examination that she was not a
computer expert and did not know anything about the
creation of the images or if they had been altered in any
way, on redirect she was asked whether the female chil-
State v. Dore

dren depicted in the video clips appeared to be real, to
which she responded, “[y]es.” She also was asked whether
“there were any indications that anything mismatched
what [she] would expect to see in an actual child’s body,”
to which she responded that there were no such indica-
tions. Again, the court relied on her testimony, as well
as its own viewing of the video clips, in finding that the
state met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the video clips involved real children. As stated in
its articulation, the court also “found persuasive on this
issue evidence concerning the file names under which
the images in issue were downloaded by the defendant,
the testimony of law enforcement witnesses regarding
their experience with the online sources from which the
defendant obtained the images, and the statement made
by the defendant to law enforcement officers at the time
of his arrest regarding the images at issue, his history of
seeking and downloading such content, and his intention
in doing so as to the images at issue.”
Construing the evidence and the inferences reasonably
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to sustain-
ing the verdict, we conclude that the court, as the fact
finder, reasonably could have found that the video clips
depict real children. The court made that finding on the
basis of the testimony from Kazmir, which it specifically
credited; see State v. Wright, 235 Conn. App. 143, 153,
345 A.3d 504 (appellate courts “must defer to the trier
of fact’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses”
(internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 353
Conn. 935, 347 A.3d 877 (2025); and on the basis of its
own viewing of the video clips. See General Statutes (Rev.
to 2015) § 53a-193 (13); State v. Sorabella, supra, 277
Conn. 187–88; see also United States v. Schram, supra,
128 F.4th 925; United States v. Pawlak, supra, 935 F.3d
350; United States v. Irving, supra, 452 F.3d 120–21.
Accordingly, the defendant’s challenge to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence on this ground fails.
State v. Dore

B
Next, the defendant claims that the evidence was
insufficient to establish that he knowingly possessed
child pornography. In support of this claim, he relies
on the testimony of Rizza and Green that the Gateway
computer did not have a media player capable of playing
the video files, as well as Green’s testimony that there
was no evidence that the defendant did or could open the
video files on the Gateway computer. According to the
defendant, “if a person performed a search using search
terms associated with child pornography, while they
might be attempting to download such files, there is no
way to know until they see the images or videos whether
they have, in fact, succeeded. The only way for a person
to know with any certainty whether they possess child
pornography is if they open the file and view the con-
tent—and the evidence is undisputed that this did not
happen.” (Emphasis in original.) The defendant concedes
that “the state presented evidence that the subject files
were located on [the defendant’s] computer’s hard drive”
and argues, instead, that the state “presented no evidence
whatsoever which, if credited, would prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he possessed actual knowledge that
these files were illegal child pornography.” (Emphasis
omitted.) We disagree and conclude that the defendant
misapprehends the “knowingly possesses” element of §
53a-196e (a) (2).
For the defendant to be found guilty of possession of
child pornography in the second degree under § 53a-196e
(a) (2), the court had to find that “the defendant know-
ingly possessed the contraband”; State v. Spence, 165
Conn. App. 110, 123, 138 A.3d 1048, cert. denied, 321
Conn. 927, 138 A.3d 287 (2016); namely, that he know-
ingly possessed “a series of images in electronic, digital
or other format, which is intended to be displayed con-
tinuously, consisting of twenty or more frames, or a
film or videotape, consisting of twenty or more frames,
that depicts a single act of sexually explicit conduct by
State v. Dore

one child.” General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-196e
(a) (2).28
“Possess, as defined in [General Statutes] § 53a-3 (2),
means to have physical possession or otherwise to exer-
cise dominion or control over tangible property. . . .
Our jurisprudence elucidating this definition teaches
that such possession may be actual or constructive. . . .
Nevertheless, [b]oth actual and constructive possession
require a person to exercise dominion and control over the
[contraband] and to have knowledge of its presence and
character. . . . Actual possession requires the defendant
to have had direct physical contact with the [contraband].
. . . Typically, the state will proceed under a theory of
constructive possession when the [contraband is] not
found on the defendant’s person at the time of arrest,
but the accused still exercises dominion and control. .
. . In this regard, [t]he essence of exercising control is
not the manifestation of an act of control but instead it
is the act of being in a position of control coupled with
the requisite mental intent. In our criminal statutes
involving possession, this control must be exercised
intentionally and with knowledge of the character of
the controlled object. . . . State v. Spence, [supra, 165
Conn. App. 123].” (Footnote omitted; internal quotation
28
The defendant does not contest the sexually explicit nature of
the images on the files—207.part, 230.part and 311.part—found on
the hard drive of his Gateway computer, nor does he raise any claim
concerning the frame rate of the video clips. The five video clips that
were admitted into evidence, which form the basis for the five charges
against the defendant, show a female child performing oral sex on an
adult male’s penis (file 207.part from 00:00 to 00:31), a close view of a
female child’s genitalia as she masturbates (file 207.part from 13:48 to
15:00), an adult male engaging in anal sex with a female child (file 207.
part from 32:57 to 33:33), a naked female child masturbating (230.part
from 37:00 to 40:10), and a female child removing her underwear and
simulating oral sex with the use of artificial male genitalia (311.part
from 02:55 to 04:29), all of which fall within the definition of “[s]exu-
ally explicit conduct” under General Statutes § 53a-193 (14). The state
also presented evidence demonstrating the frame rates for each of the
video clips, specifically, the frame rate for file 207.part is 30 frames
per second, for file 230.part it is 25 frames per second, and for file 311.
part it is 59.94 frames per second.
State v. Dore

marks omitted.) State v. Kenneth G., 237 Conn. App. 93,
103–104, A.3d (2026), petition for cert. filed (Conn.
January 7, 2026 (No. 250272). General Statutes § 53a-3
(12) provides: “A person acts ‘knowingly’ with respect
to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute
defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is
of such nature or that such circumstance exists . . . .”
As we stated, the defendant appears to have conceded
the possession element of the charges in that he acknowl-
edges that “the state presented evidence that the subject
files were located on [the defendant’s] computer’s hard
drive . . . .” As a result, our discussion of this element
is brief. In the present case, the police discovered child
pornography on a password protected Gateway computer
in the defendant’s home, in which the defendant and his
wife were the sole occupants, and the defendant provided
the police with the password to that computer. Rizza tes-
tified that the files with the names 207.part, 230.part and
311.part were contained within the Gateway computer.
He identified the files as movie files and explained the
location where the files could be found within the com-
puter. Rizza testified further that the defendant’s name,
Richard, was listed as a user of the Gateway computer.
We conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence
from which the court reasonably could have concluded
that the defendant was the only person with access to the
password protected Gateway computer that contained
the child pornography and, thus, that he had control of
the Gateway computer and possession of its contents. See
State v. Spence, supra, 165 Conn. App. 124–25 (infer-
ence of possession of contraband can be made when “the
contraband is contained within another object, [such as
a] computer, that itself could be controlled and secured
through the use of a password” and when “there are other
pieces of evidence tying the defendant to dominion and
control,” and, because defendant was only person with
control and access to password protected computer that
contained child pornography, jury reasonably could have
drawn “a rational conclusion that if the defendant had
State v. Dore

control of the computer, then he had possession of its
contents” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The crux of the defendant’s claim on appeal concerns
whether the state established beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant’s possession of the child pornogra-
phy was knowing. As we have stated, he asserts that,
to demonstrate that he knowingly possessed the video
files containing child pornography that were found on
the Gateway computer, the state was required to prove
that he had actual knowledge of the child pornography
and that he was able to and did play, open and view those
video files on the Gateway computer. We do not agree.
At the outset, we reject the defendant’s contention
that § 53a-196e (a) (2) requires “actual knowledge.” In
support of this contention, the defendant argues that
the term “knowingly” in the statute is a specific intent
term, which thereby requires the state to prove his actual
knowledge of the contents of the file beyond a reasonable
doubt. We disagree. The plain language of § 53a-196e (a)
(2) does not require actual knowledge, and the defendant
has not directed this court to any authority supporting
this contention, nor have we found any. In fact, case law
involving the crime of possession of child pornography
shows that knowledge can be inferred. See State v. Inzi-
tari, supra, 351 Conn. 119 (“deleted files associated with
the defendant’s personal email address . . . are indicative
that the defendant had knowingly possessed child por-
nography”); State v. Kenneth G., supra, 237 Conn. App.
109 (“[T]he jury could have inferred that the images were
not downloaded inadvertently or by mistake and that the
defendant was aware of their existence on the basis of the
evidence that the defendant was familiar with nude and
sexually suggestive photos of children and how to search
for and store such material on his devices. See United
States v. Huyck, [849 F.3d 432, 443 (8th Cir. 2017)
(‘evidence detailing [the defendant’s] knowledge of, and
interest in, child pornography [was] probative as circum-
stantial evidence regarding [the defendant’s] knowing
possession of the [hard drive containing thumbnails of
State v. Dore

child pornography]’. . . .” (Emphasis added.)); State v.
Kirby, 156 Conn. App. 607, 615, 113 A.3d 138 (2015)
(“the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defen-
dant copied the photographs onto his computer when he
transferred the information from the victim’s old cell
phone to the new one, and that he knew that they were
on his computer because he rotated them and altered
the victim’s face in one photograph” (emphasis added)).
Moreover, the defendant’s argument conflates intent
with knowledge. See State v. Denby, 235 Conn. 477,
482, 668 A.2d 662 (1995) (“[a]n ‘intent’ element is not
synonymous with a ‘knowledge’ element, each of which is
specifically defined in the [P]enal [C]ode”); see also Gen-
eral Statutes § 53a-3 (12) (“[a] person acts ‘knowingly’
with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described
by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that
his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance
exists”). If the legislature had intended to require actual
knowledge under § 53a-196e (a) (2), “it knew how to
effectuate that intent.” State v. Barnes, 227 Conn. App.
760, 767, 323 A.3d 1166, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 922,
325 A.3d 1093 (2024); see also State v. Avoletta, 212
Conn. App. 309, 331, 275 A.3d 716 (2022) (“ ‘[i]t is a
well settled principle of statutory construction that the
legislature knows how to convey its intent expressly . .
. or to use broader or limiting terms when it chooses to
do so’ ”), aff’d, 347 Conn. 629, 298 A.3d 1211 (2023).
In addressing the defendant’s knowledge in its written
decision, the trial court stated in relevant part that “the
defendant’s ability to play or view the images is not part
of the state’s burden. . . . [U]nder the relevant statutes,
child pornography may take the form of ‘any visual
depiction.’ General Statutes [Rev. to 2015] § 53a-193
(13). A ‘”[v]isual depiction” includes undeveloped film
and videotape and data . . . that is capable of conversion
into a visual image and includes encrypted data.’ Gen-
eral Statutes [Rev. to 2015] § 53a-193 (15) . . . . ‘Visual
depiction’ is not limited by the statute to the enumerated
examples. The court rejects the notion that the legislature
contemplated undeveloped film and encrypted files as
State v. Dore

sufficient to satisfy the state’s burden, but not files that
readily play in Windows Media Player.” (Emphasis omit-
ted.) We agree with the court’s analysis in this regard.
The fact that a visual depiction may include undeveloped
film undermines the defendant’s argument that the state
was required to show that he had viewed the video files
at issue on his Gateway computer.
In the present case, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s guilty
finding, we conclude that the court’s determination
that the defendant knowingly possessed the partially
downloaded video files on his Gateway computer that
contained child pornography was based on sufficient
direct and circumstantial evidence in the record and the
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, which included
Aresco’s testimony about the defendant’s inculpatory
statements, the evidence seized from the defendant’s
residence and the Gateway computer, the evidence show-
ing the defendant’s sophistication with computers and
familiarity with the eMule program and search terms
associated with child pornography, and the evidence
concerning the investigation by Aresco that led to the
seizure of the defendant’s computers.
Significantly, Aresco testified29 regarding inculpatory
statements made to him by the defendant at the time of
the search of the defendant’s residence, namely, that
the defendant told Aresco that he had downloaded por-
nography involving individuals under the age of sixteen.
The defendant also admitted to Aresco that he used the
eMule file sharing program, which the defendant had
installed on the Gateway computer, for the purpose of
downloading movies, software, software manuals, and
“illegal pornography.” They also discussed search terms.
In particular, Aresco explained to the defendant that he
had “the ability to forensically see the search terms that
[the defendant] entered to find files,” and when Aresco
was about to describe the search term preteen, before
29
As we have mentioned, the court credited the testimony of all the
state’s witnesses.
State v. Dore

he could do so “the defendant used that term himself.”
Thus, the record shows that, not only did the defendant
admit to downloading “illegal” child pornography involv-
ing individuals under the age of sixteen, but also that he
acknowledged using search terms commonly associated
with child pornography.
The defendant’s statements were corroborated by the
evidence seized from his residence and the Gateway com-
puter, which, at the time of the search, was in the process
of downloading a number of files of child pornography,
including files 207.part, 230.part and 311.part. Many of
the downloads had visible file names that contained terms
associated with child pornography. See footnote 15 of
this opinion. For example, the state presented evidence
showing the active transfers through the eMule pro-
gram in the Gateway computer that corresponded to files
207.part, 230.part and 311.part, which had file names,
respectively, of “Pthc - Vicky 2 - Babyj Anal Upgrade
Moskow Schoolgirl 3 Raygold Russian 7Yo Preteen Vicky
(41.30Mins) New.avi”; “(pthc pedo) Young Video Models
– D04 – Daphne 9yo (nude) (Youngvideomodels Yvm) (---
-,----, ------, ---------).avi”; “[pthc] ~Under A Violet Moon~
(32m28s, HD) – 11yo 12yo 13yo 14yo opva creampie
cumshot 2014 pedo preteen anal kids lolita ptsc_cut.avi.”
Through his forensic examination of the Gateway com-
puter, Rizza determined that the three video files—207.
part, 230.part and 311.part—each had been written to
the hard drive of the Gateway computer and that a user
would have access to those files. The active downloads
that were taking place on the defendant’s computer at the
time of the search had been in that process for a lengthy
period of time: the process of downloading file 311.part
began in January, 2016, and for files 207.part and 230.
part, it began in February, 2014.
The evidence also shows the defendant’s sophistica-
tion with computers. As the court30 found in its written
30
We note that the trial court elaborated further regarding the defen-
dant’s sophistication with computers when it denied the defendant’s oral
motion for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the state’s case-in-chief:
“The evidence indicated that the computers were configured at the time
State v. Dore

decision, “[a] document named ‘RichardDoreBio.doc’ was
recovered from the defendant’s . . . laptop computer, and
it explained, in part, ‘Richard Dore is a seasoned devel-
oper with extensive experience in software architecture
and developing software solutions across different plat-
forms . . . .’ ” The defendant had four computers in his
home, and the Shared D folder on the Gateway computer
was being shared with his other computers by way of a
local network. Rizza explained that another computer
connected to the local network would be able to access
the Shared D drive of the Gateway computer. The court
concluded in its written decision that “[i]t is reasonable
for the court to infer, and the court does infer, that a
sophisticated computer user like the defendant knew
that partially downloaded child pornography files existed
on his computer.”
Finally, the defendant’s knowledge of the contents
of the partially downloaded video files on his Gateway
computer can be inferred from the evidence concerning
the investigation by Aresco that led to the seizure of the
defendant’s computers. Aresco had downloaded a partial
video file that contained apparent child pornography;
see footnote 5 of this opinion; from a user accessing
a peer-to-peer network with the eMule program. The
user reported the eMule user name “newone,” which
was specific to that user, and the IP address associated
with the user who was sharing the file was traced to the
of the search warrant, in what appears to me, anyway, to be a relatively
sophisticated way. That is to say, the idea that these computers could
have become configured as they are could have been an accident on [the
defendant’s] part, seems to me to be preposterous. And, it appears that,
when the search warrant was executed . . . the Gateway computer was .
. . running what has been described as the eDonkey and eMule program,
which is described as a source known to law enforcement through which
individuals obtain or share child pornography, among other things.
“The volume of material that was involved in current downloads, just
based on my review of the screenshots from the day the search warrant
was executed, indicates that there was substantial ongoing downloading
activity of files with titles which suggest that their content would be, or
could be, child pornography. . . . [O]nce again, that this could have been
an accident or that [the defendant] would have arranged this without
knowing what he was doing, seems highly unlikely to the court.”
State v. Dore

Gateway computer belonging to the defendant. Rizza
testified that the user name for the eMule program on
the Gateway computer was “newone,” and he located
terms that had been entered into the eMule program’s
search feature on the Gateway computer, which included
terms commonly associated with child pornography such
as “ ‘2015 pthc,’ ‘12 yo,’ and ‘lolitasex.’ ” Although this
does not directly establish the defendant’s knowledge of
the contents of the video files 207.part, 230.part and 311.
part, it demonstrates the defendant’s familiarity with
the sharing of video files containing child pornography
from his Gateway computer via the eMule program and
the eDonkey network, which, along with the other evi-
dence previously mentioned, lends further support for
an inference that the defendant was aware that the video
files that were partially downloaded using the eMule
program and had file names commonly associated with
child pornography contained child pornography.
As we have stated, “[a] person acts ‘knowingly’ with
respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a
statute defining an offense when he is aware that his
conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists
. . . .” General Statutes § 53a-3 (12). On the basis of the
evidence presented and the inferences drawn therefrom,
the court reasonably determined that the defendant was
aware that the files 207.part, 230.part and 311.part
that he had partially downloaded to the hard drive of his
Gateway computer contained child pornography, even
though he had not yet viewed the files. Accordingly, the
evidence supports the court’s determination that the
state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant knowingly possessed child pornography.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.