Commissiong v. Currytto

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Comissiong v. Currytto

MERLISSA COMISSIONG ET AL.
v. RAYMOND CURRYTTO
(AC 47680)
Alvord, Moll and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the plaintiffs
on their breach of contract claim that the defendant failed to perform home
improvement services in their home’s upstairs bathrooms in a workmanlike
manner. At trial, the plaintiffs presented expert testimony from A, a general
contractor hired by the plaintiffs after they terminated the defendant’s ser-
vices. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly
concluded that he breached the parties’ contract. Held:

The trial court properly applied the law in determining that the defendant
had not met his burden of proving that the plaintiffs had materially breached
the contract by failing to provide notice and an opportunity to cure, as the
court found that the serious deficiencies in the upstairs bathrooms would
not be corrected with additional time, and, therefore, providing notice and
an opportunity to cure would have been futile.

This court declined to review the merits of the defendant’s claim that the
trial court improperly determined that he failed to prove the count of his
counterclaim alleging unjust enrichment, as the defendant failed to provide
an adequate record for review.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting A’s testimony as an
expert in home improvement contracting or in crediting A’s testimony to
find that the work performed by the defendant in the upstairs bathrooms was
unworkmanlike, as, although A admitted that he was not an expert in plumb-
ing matters, the defendant did not identify any portion of A’s testimony that
required plumbing expertise or that exceeded the scope of his qualifications
as an expert in home improvement contracting, and the defendant did not
object to any specific portion of A’s testimony on the basis that he did not
possess the appropriate qualifications to offer an expert opinion.

This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court
deprived him of his right to a fair trial, as it was inadequately briefed.

Argued January 20—officially released May 12, 2026

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of
contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the
defendant filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the case
was tried to the court, K. Murphy, J.; judgment for the
Comissiong v. Currytto

plaintiff on the complaint; subsequently, the court, K.
Murphy, J., granted the defendant’s motion to open
the judgment and rendered judgment for the plaintiff
on the counterclaim, and the defendant appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
Raymond Currytto, self-represented, the appellant
(defendant).
Scott Jackson, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

Opinion

ALVORD, J. The self-represented defendant, Raymond
Currytto, appeals from the judgment of the trial court,
rendered following a court trial, in favor of the plaintiffs,
Merlissa Comissiong and Kyle Anderson, on their breach
of contract claim that the defendant failed to perform
home improvement services in their home’s upstairs
bathrooms in a workmanlike manner. On appeal, the
defendant claims that the court (1) improperly concluded
that he breached the contract, (2) incorrectly determined
that there was no evidence to support the counts in his
counterclaim, (3) abused its discretion in admitting
the testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert witness, and (4)
violated his right to a fair trial under the Connecticut
constitution.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant
to this appeal. On September 7, 2020, the parties entered
into a written contract for various home improvement
projects, which the defendant was to perform on the
plaintiffs’ home. The agreement itemized the follow-
ing projects: install downstairs shower stall and utility
sink, rearrange existing upstairs hall and master bath-
rooms (upstairs bathrooms), install beam in kitchen area,
remodel kitchen, paint interior of upstairs and lower
bathrooms, refinish oak floors, perform electrical work,
and make plumbing adjustments. The contract listed the
“total agreed upon price” for these items as $37,500 and
1
The defendant raises two additional claims on appeal. See footnote
3 of this opinion.
Comissiong v. Currytto

also referenced a separate budget for optional work. The
agreement further provided: “Pages 1, 2, 3, 4, comprise
the contract. Signed and dated. 3 day right of cancel-
lation acknowledged. Start date Sept.9th or sooner.
Finish date Oct 31st. Or sooner. Reasonable delays on
part of construction process timings could extend the
completion date. Such as waiting for items to arrive
or inspection schedules. All work will be completed in
workmanlike fashion.”
After the contract commenced, the scope of work
changed to encompass additional projects, particularly
in the kitchen. The contract’s completion date was fur-
ther impacted by delays attributable to both parties,
including, for example, the plaintiffs’ delay in providing
required materials and the defendant’s delay in obtaining
permitting for the kitchen beam. Due to “changes in the
work requirements of the contract and for delays in the
plaintiffs’ providing materials needed to complete the
work,” both parties waived the original completion date
of October 31. In text messages exchanged on or about
December 28, 2020, the plaintiffs asked the defendant
when his work would be complete, and the defendant
responded with the date of January 20, 2021. The plain-
tiffs ordered the defendant off the job on January 19,
2021. Prior to the defendant’s termination, the plaintiffs
had paid him, over time, $28,125 for his services.
On August 5, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a five count
complaint against the defendant, alleging breach of
contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, negligent misrepresentation, violations of the
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Stat-
utes § 42-110a et seq., and statutory theft pursuant to
General Statutes § 52-564. In count one, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant breached the contract when
he, inter alia, “failed to complete all work within the
agreed upon time period” and “failed to perform all work
in a workmanlike fashion . . . .” After filing an answer on
November 15, 2021, the defendant filed a revised answer
Comissiong v. Currytto

and three count counterclaim alleging breach of contract,
defamation, and unjust enrichment on May 13, 2022.
The case was tried before the court, K. Murphy, J., over
the course of five days on November 17 and December
12, 2023, and January 9, 11 and 12, 2024, and closing
arguments were held on January 17, 2024. Jose Archu-
leta, the contractor the plaintiffs hired after terminating
the defendant’s services, testified as an expert witness
for the plaintiffs over two days. On direct examination,
Archuleta testified to the deficiencies he observed in the
work performed by the defendant in the upstairs bath-
rooms, explaining, “nothing was finished in its appropri-
ate order” and that when he looked under the tiling, he
identified that “[t]here was a lot of movement in some of
the flooring, floor tile, boards weren’t fastened to studs
correctly. Things were not level, plum, or square which
had to be done again. For example, in showers, there’s
hardware that’s put on and it needs to be waterproofed,
there was no RedGard of any sort, none of the joints were
taped and seal[ed] before tile went on. There was some
instances where there was tile directly on two by fours,
which is not good in a shower. So, there was just a bunch
of stuff like that that when we pulled it up, we noticed
more problems that we couldn’t see on the surface level.”
Archuleta testified with respect to the master bath-
room that “the floor tile [of the shower] met against the
wall tile, which should be in reverse, and the floor tile
should be put first and the wall tile on top of it, so that it
could shed water properly . . . .” Additionally, he testified,
“there’s a point where water could get in between a grout
joint. And that’s one problem, but because nothing was
prepped properly, this tile was going to crack, cracking
the joints, cracking the grout, which is really going to let
water go in.” He explained that, “[i]f water gets trapped
underneath a shower base in between walls, it causes
mold . . . .” He further testified that he observed grout
joints that were already cracking, as well as lippage, or
Comissiong v. Currytto

areas where the tile was not set correctly, causing it to
stick out.
Archuleta testified that, in the hall bathroom, “the
subfloor or the substrate, what goes underneath the Har-
die board before you tile, was loose, it had movement.”
He explained that “if there’s any kind of movement in
any substrate of tile, it’s going to fail, every single time
. . . whether it be the grout joints crack or the tile itself
cracks. But your substrate has to be a solid surface.”
He also testified that he observed a deficiency with the
tub faucet, explaining that, “in my experience, from
my plumbers that do the work for me, when we have
those kind of faucets that come over a tub, it needs to
be solid, it can’t move. This one was moving back and
forth, indicating it wasn’t secured underneath the trim
kit that attaches it to the floor.”
In its April 19, 2024 memorandum of decision, the
court found “that the plaintiff[s] ha[d] not met their
burden of proving a breach of contract on the part of the
defendant on the basis of failure to perform on a timely
basis” and that “[they] ha[d] also failed to prove that the
defendant breached the contract in regard [to] work-
manlike fashion on the work required in the kitchen.”
Addressing timeliness, the court noted “that there were
clearly delays in completing the work . . . but some of
the delays were attributable to delays in the plaintiffs
providing the required materials and some other delays
were due to change in work requirements ordered by
the plaintiffs.” Additionally, the court found that the
plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving that the
work in the kitchen was not conducted in a workman-
like manner. The court credited Archuleta’s testimony
that most of the kitchen work had been completed and
acknowledged that “the amount of unfinished items in
the kitchen was somewhat minimal . . . .”
The court, however, did find “that the plaintiffs ha[d]
met their burden of proving a breach of contract for
the defendant’s failure to perform a portion of the job
in a workmanlike fashion in regard to the . . . master
Comissiong v. Currytto

bathroom and the hall bathroom.” The court found
“Archuleta was credible in giving his opinion that the
work here was seriously deficient and unworkmanlike.”
Specifically, it found “that the quality of the tile work
was not up to the standard of workmanlike quality, [that]
the defendant did not prepare the surfaces properly for
the installation of the tile and that the tile that had been
installed was crooked, not installed in a way that would
prevent water leakage in the future and the shower was
not level.” The court also noted that “the niche wood
was not properly prepared in anticipation of the tile/
marble, heating panel was damaged, the subfloor was
not properly prepared for the installation of the tile,
substandard installation of the faucet, drain leaking, tile
work was uneven and not flush, wall was not secure to
the ceiling, a damaged window area and the area under
the upstairs bathroom (visible from the garage) was very
poorly finished.”
Although the court considered the defendant’s argu-
ment that his work did not need to be completely removed,
it ultimately found that, on the basis of “the numerous
deficiencies observed by the expert, many of which went
to the functionality of the plumbing and drains and
items that could have had long-term problems without
adequate correction, it was reasonable to remove the
partially completed work and redo it entirely.” The court
therefore awarded the plaintiffs damages in the amount
of $25,200, which included $8000 for the correction of
the hallway bathroom and $16,000 for the correction
of the master bathroom, as well as $1200 for use of a
dumpster.
On May 7, 2024, the defendant filed a motion to open
the judgment, stating that the court had not ruled on his
counterclaim. The court issued the following order: “The
judgment is opened for the purpose of addressing the
defendant’s allegation that the court did not rule specifi-
cally on [his] counterclaims. The court adopts the factual
and legal findings in its decision. The defendant makes
three counterclaims, breach of contract, defamation, and
Comissiong v. Currytto

unjust enrichment. After a full trial on this matter the
court finds that the defendant has not met his burden
of proving these three counterclaims. Accordingly, the
court enters judgment in favor of the plaintiff[s] on
all three of these counterclaims.” Shortly thereafter,
the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the
court denied. This appeal followed. Additional facts and
procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that the court incorrectly
found a breach of contract with respect to the work the
defendant performed in the upstairs bathrooms. He
argues that “the plaintiffs materially breached [the con-
tract] by delaying materials, insisting on a nonfunctional
vanity, and terminating without notice or [opportunity
to] cure, barring their recovery.” We are not persuaded.
“We first set forth the general rule regarding the
review of breach of contract claims. The determination
of whether a contract has been materially breached is a
question of fact that is subject to the clearly erroneous
standard of review. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erro-
neous when there is no evidence in the record to support
it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Villwell
Builders I, LLC v. Pereira, 237 Conn. App. 45, 54, 349
A.3d 590 (2026).
The defendant argues that the court “fail[ed] to apply
the well established principles of notice and opportunity
to cure . . . .” He asserts that the plaintiffs were required
to give him notice and an opportunity to cure before ter-
minating his services and that the court was inconsistent
in its application of these principles when it considered
the plaintiffs’ failure to provide notice in the context
of the kitchen work but did not consider such failure in
the context of the upstairs bathrooms. This failure, he
Comissiong v. Currytto

contends, “invalidates the breach finding against [the
defendant].”
The defendant’s claim that the court misapplied the
law is subject to plenary review. See Mirjavadi v. Vakil-
zadeh, 310 Conn. 176, 191, 74 A.3d 1278 (2013) (“[w]hen
. . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review
is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions
are legally and logically correct and find support in the
facts that appear in the record” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Our courts recognize that the right to cure is
implied in every contract as a matter of law, but a cure
notice may be unnecessary where the breach is incurable
or the opportunity to cure proves futile. Centerplan
Construction Co., LLC v. Hartford, 343 Conn. 368, 412,
419, 274 A.3d 51 (2022). The defendant’s argument
that the court inconsistently applied the principles of
notice and opportunity to cure overlooks the court’s
finding that, unlike the situation in the kitchen, relat-
ing to which the court found minimal unfinished items,
“[a]dditional time would not correct the other serious
deficiencies represented by the work in the two upstairs
bathroom areas.” Because the court found that the seri-
ous bathroom deficiencies would not be corrected with
additional time, it follows that providing notice and an
opportunity to cure would be futile. On the basis of the
court’s findings, we conclude that the court properly
applied the law in determining that the defendant had
not met his burden of proving that the plaintiffs materi-
ally breached the contract by failing to provide notice.2
Additionally, we are not persuaded by the defendant’s
argument that the plaintiffs’ conduct prevented his
2
The defendant argues that, “[s]hould the plaintiffs argue severity of
deficiencies, their severity claim fails without notice and opportunity.”
Because the defendant does not provide any analysis to support this
assertion and relies on Chiulli v. Zola, 97 Conn. App. 699, 905 A.2d
1236 (2006), which is inapposite in that it concerns a motion to dismiss
for lack of standing; id., 702; we decline to consider this argument.
Additionally, we note that the defendant claims for the first time in
his reply brief that the court’s finding that additional time would not
correct the deficiencies in the upstairs bathrooms is clearly erroneous,
arguing that “there is no evidence supporting incurability . . . .” A claim
Comissiong v. Currytto

performance. Specifically, the defendant posits that,
due to their delays in providing materials and insistence
on a nonfunctional vanity, the plaintiffs prevented him
from completing the work in the upstairs bathrooms
by the January 20, 2021 deadline and, therefore, his
breach was excused. The court, however, did not find
the defendant in breach of the contract for failure to
complete the work on time. Rather, the court found that
the work in the upstairs bathrooms was not performed
in a workmanlike fashion as required by the contract.
Given this finding and the defendant’s failure to explain
how the plaintiffs’ conduct constituted a material breach
that would excuse his unworkmanlike performance, we
reject this argument.
On the basis of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that
the court improperly found that the defendant breached
the contract.3
raised for the first time in a reply brief is unreviewable, and, thus, we
decline to review this claim. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 178 Conn. App.
102, 106–107, 174 A.3d 197 (2017) (“Under our rules of appellate
practice, issues cannot be raised and analyzed for the first time in an
appellant’s reply brief. . . . This rule is a sound one because the appellee
is entitled to but one brief and should not therefore be left to speculate
at how an appellant may analyze something raised for the first time in
a reply brief, which the appellee cannot answer.” (Citation omitted.)).
Finally, even if the defendant had challenged the court’s finding as
clearly erroneous, we could not consider its merits because the defendant
did not provide this court with full transcripts of the trial. See part
II of this opinion. The clearly erroneous standard of review applies to
the court’s factual finding that the work in the upstairs bathrooms was
so deficient that additional time would not allow it to be corrected. As
noted, we can only conclude that “[a] finding of fact is clearly errone-
ous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Villwell Builders
I, LLC v. Pereira, supra, 237 Conn. App. 54. As discussed in greater
depth in part II of this opinion, in the absence of a complete record,
we cannot meaningfully review this claim to determine if the court’s
finding was clearly erroneous.
3
The defendant raises two additional claims on appeal. He claims that
“[t]he plaintiffs’ actions—material delays and abrupt termination—con-
stituted a material breach, excusing [the defendant] and supporting his
counterclaim.” The defendant also claims that the “[p]laintiffs’ material
Comissiong v. Currytto

II
The defendant next claims that the court improp-
erly determined that he failed to prove the count of his
counterclaim alleging unjust enrichment.4 Because the
defendant has failed to provide an adequate record for
review, we decline to reach the merits of this claim.
It is well established that “[u]njust enrichment is a
very broad and flexible equitable doctrine that has as its
basis the principle that it is contrary to equity and good
conscience for a defendant to retain a benefit that has
come to him at the expense of the plaintiff. . . . All the
facts of each case must be examined to determine whether
the circumstances render it just or unjust, equitable or
inequitable, conscionable or unconscionable, to apply
the doctrine. . . . Plaintiffs seeking recovery for unjust
enrichment must prove (1) that the defendants were
benefited, (2) that the defendants unjustly did not pay
the plaintiffs for the benefits, and (3) that the failure
of payment was to the plaintiffs’ detriment. . . . Our
review of the trial court’s conclusion that the defen-
dant was unjustly enriched is deferential. The court’s
determinations of whether a particular failure to pay
was unjust and whether the defendant was benefited are
essentially factual findings . . . that are subject only to
a limited scope of review on appeal. . . . Those findings
must stand, therefore, unless they are clearly erroneous
or involve an abuse of discretion. . . . This limited scope
breach—terminating [the defendant] without notice on January 20,
2021 . . . bars their $25,200 award . . . . Burns v. Adler, 325 Conn. 14,
27–28, 33–35, [155 A.3d 1223] (2017), holds that unjustified termina-
tion precludes recovery and entitles the contractor to unjust enrich-
ment for retained benefits.” We previously determined herein that the
court properly applied the principles of notice and opportunity to cure
and also rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs’ delays
and insistence on a nonfunctional vanity prevented his performance.
Therefore, we decline to give separate consideration to the defendant’s
additional claims to the extent that they raise these same arguments.
As for his contention regarding unjust enrichment, we address that
issue in part II of this opinion.
4
We decline to consider the portion of the defendant’s claim assert-
ing that the court erroneously dismissed the count of his counterclaim
for breach of contract, which rests on the same arguments raised in
his first claim.
Comissiong v. Currytto

of review is consistent with the general proposition that
equitable determinations that depend on the balancing
of many factors are committed to the sound discretion
of the trial court.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) National Waste Associates, LLC v.
Scharf, 183 Conn. App. 734, 741–42, 194 A.3d 1 (2018).
“A determination regarding whether the court’s find-
ing was clearly erroneous requires that we review all of
the evidence presented to the trial court, including the
testimony of the witnesses. Thus, the transcript of the
trial is necessary on appeal in order to properly evaluate
whether the evidence presented to the trial court sup-
ports the court’s conclusion . . . .
“[An appellant] has the burden of providing this
court with a record from which this court can review
any alleged claims of error. . . . Practice Book § 61-10
(a) provides: It is the responsibility of the appellant to
provide an adequate record for review. . . . The general
purpose of [the relevant] rules of practice . . . [requiring
the appellant to provide a sufficient record] is to ensure
that there is a trial court record that is adequate for an
informed appellate review of the various claims presented
by the parties. . . . It is not an appropriate function of
this court, when presented with an inadequate record,
to speculate as to the reasoning of the trial court or to
presume error from a silent record.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Meineke Bristol, LLC v. Premier Auto,
LLC, 227 Conn. App. 64, 73, 319 A.3d 826 (2024).
In the present case, the defendant did not provide
transcripts of the first day of the trial, November 17,
2023. For the remaining days, the defendant provided
only excerpts and not transcripts of the entire proceeding
on those days. For example, the defendant provided only
eight pages of the January 12, 2024 transcript, covering
proceedings from 2:16 to 2:25 p.m., and the transcript
expressly indicates that preceding and subsequent pro-
ceedings were not included in the excerpt.
Resolution of the defendant’s claim that the court
improperly determined that he failed to prove the unjust
enrichment count of his counterclaim would require
Comissiong v. Currytto

that we review the evidence presented at trial, including
evidence of a testimonial nature. In the absence of com-
plete transcripts, we would have to resort to speculation
to resolve the defendant’s claim. Accordingly, we are
unable to address the merits of this claim because the
defendant has not provided this court with an adequate
record for review.5
III
The defendant next claims that the court abused its
discretion in “admitting [Archuleta’s] testimony as
an expert, particularly on plumbing matters, without
properly establishing his qualifications.”6 We are not
persuaded.7
The following additional procedural history is relevant
to our consideration of this claim. On November 16, 2023,
during an in-court proceeding, the defendant requested
5
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the portion of the
defendant’s claim arguing that “unjustified termination precludes
recovery and entitles the contractor to unjust enrichment for retained
benefits.” Because we have already determined that this claim is not
reviewable, we decline to give it separate consideration.
6
To the extent that the defendant’s claim on appeal relies on State v.
Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 80–90, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523
U.S. 1058, 118 S. Ct. 1384, 140 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1998), we conclude that
the claim was not preserved. The defendant failed to raise a Porter claim
to object to the validity of the expert’s methods, and, thus, the court
never held a hearing, received testimony, or rendered a decision on the
validity of Archuleta’s methods. We therefore find the defendant’s
arguments that rely on Porter or its criteria unpreserved. See Weaver
v. McKnight, 313 Conn. 393, 415–16, 97 A.3d 920 (2014) (“[t]he failure
to raise a Porter claim in the trial court results in waiver of that claim
and it will not be considered for the first time on appeal”).
7
As discussed in part II of this opinion, the defendant’s failure to
provide complete transcripts precludes our review of any claims that
would require us to review the entire record to assess whether the trial
court’s conclusion is supported by the evidence presented to it. See
Meineke Bristol, LLC v. Premier Auto, LLC, supra, 227 Conn. App. 73
(“the transcript of the trial is necessary on appeal in order to properly
evaluate whether the evidence presented to the trial court supports the
court’s conclusion” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Regarding
the specific claim raised by the defendant with respect to Archuleta’s
testimony, the record available to this court, which includes all of
Archuleta’s testimony, is adequate.
Comissiong v. Currytto

an “opportunity to qualify” Archuleta, who began reno-
vation work on the home after the plaintiffs terminated
the defendant’s services. The court responded that the
defendant would have the opportunity to voir dire the
witness and instructed the defendant to raise his concern
“at the appropriate time.” The defendant then sought
to make an oral motion in limine, arguing that because
Archuleta is not a licensed plumber, he does not have
credentials to testify on matters related to plumbing.
The court stated that at that time it would not preclude
Archuleta from testifying and told the defendant that
he would “have the opportunity to ask [Archuleta] ques-
tions that may impact negatively on his qualifications”
at the time of the proposed testimony.
At trial, shortly before the plaintiffs called Archu-
leta to testify, the defendant raised the issue of Archu-
leta’s qualifications: “And, Your Honor, if I may, I would
remind the court that you agreed to voir dire the expert
as to whether or not he is eligible to testify as an expert.”
The court responded, “[w]ell, the answer on that is, if
someone does ask a question, sort of an expert type ques-
tion, you have a right to object. If you object, then, I
will consider whether the person is capable of giving an
opinion in a particular area and I’ll decide that.” Shortly
thereafter, the plaintiffs’ counsel called Archuleta to
the stand, questioned him about his credentials and then
offered him as an “expert in home improvement contract-
ing,” to which the defendant objected: “Vague. Vague,
too many areas involved . . . that will be brought up in
his testimony.” In response, the court questioned Archu-
leta about his experience, to which Archuleta responded
that he had been working in the home improvement
business for almost nine years, that he had worked on
approximately three hundred houses, and that his work
included “finish work . . . tearing down sheetrock, hir-
ing plumbers or electricians, in what I am not an expert
in, to work with plans or architectural drawings, put
everything back together, tile, painting, trim, additions,
framing, whatever . . . they need to do.” The court then
concluded: “I’ll find that Mr. Archuleta is a[n] expert in
Comissiong v. Currytto

home improvement contracting. He’s been doing it for
nine years, he’s worked on over three hundred houses.
And he’s worked both as a contractor himself, but also
as a [general contractor] hiring other contractors. So,
I’ll find that he is an expert in the area.”
“We review a trial court’s decision to [admit] expert
testimony for an abuse of discretion. . . . We afford our
trial courts wide discretion in determining whether to
admit expert testimony and, unless the trial court’s
decision is unreasonable, made on untenable grounds . . .
or involves a clear misconception of the law, we will not
disturb its decision.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Prescott v. Gilshteyn, 227 Conn. App. 553, 573, 322 A.3d
1060, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 926, 326 A.3d 248 (2024).
The defendant asserts that the court ignored Archu-
leta’s admission that he is not an expert in plumbing and
that this “misstep” led to the court’s finding that, “based
upon the numerous deficiencies observed by [Archuleta],
many of which went to the functionality of the plumb-
ing and drains and items that could have had long-term
problems without adequate correction, it was reason-
able to remove the partially completed work and redo
it entirely.” The defendant further contends that the
court “acknowledged [the defendant’s] right to voir dire
Archuleta but never afforded [him] the opportunity and
failed to conduct a thorough examination of his quali-
fications, despite the court’s agreement, particularly
concerning plumbing expertise.”
When raising an evidentiary claim on appeal, it is the
appellant’s burden to identify the specific evidence that
was erroneously admitted and the objection to that tes-
timony that was raised at trial. See Local 84, Theatrical
Stage Employees, Moving Picture Technicians, Artists
& Allied Crafts of the United States, its Territories &
Canada, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Francis, 138 Conn. App. 77,
91, 51 A.3d 401 (2012) (declining to review claim that
trial court improperly admitted expert testimony where
appellants “failed to provide any citations to the spe-
cific portions of [the expert’s] testimony that they claim
Comissiong v. Currytto

were improperly admitted by the court” and “failed to
provide this court with any specific objections made to
the trial court, as invited by that court, regarding those
specific portions of testimony”). The defendant places
significant emphasis on Archuleta’s admission that he
was not a plumber or plumbing expert; however, he does
not identify any portion of Archuleta’s testimony that
requires plumbing expertise or that exceeds the scope
of his qualifications as an expert in home improvement
contracting. Additionally, the record reveals that the
defendant did not object to any specific portion of Archu-
leta’s testimony on the basis that he did not possess the
appropriate qualifications to offer an expert opinion.
Therefore, the defendant has failed to carry his burden
of demonstrating that the court’s decision to admit the
plaintiffs’ expert testimony was unreasonable, made
on untenable grounds, or involved a misconception of
the law.8
The defendant also asserts that “[t]he court relied on
contradictory testimony of Archuleta indicating that
[the defendant’s tile] installation would ‘not prevent
8
In his appellate brief, the defendant makes a passing assertion that
the court improperly permitted Archuleta to testify as an expert witness
in home improvement contracting. Specifically, he asserts that, “[i]n
ignoring Archuleta’s admission that he is not an expert in plumbing,
this admission by Archuleta directly exposes the trial court’s decision
to qualify him as an expert in home improvement contracting . . . as
problematic . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) We find this
claim to be inadequately briefed and, thus, conclude that the defendant
abandoned such argument. “[When] a claim is asserted in the statement
of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief
without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed
to be abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously and efficiently
. . . consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly
and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Cokic v. Fiore Powersports, LLC, 237 Conn. App. 558,
561, 351 A.3d 434 (2026). The defendant rests much of his claim that
the court abused its discretion in admitting Archuleta’s testimony on
his contention that Archuleta was not qualified as an expert in plumb-
ing. The defendant fails to offer any substantive discussion or authority
challenging Archuleta’s qualifications as an expert in home improve-
ment contracting specifically, nor does he elaborate on why an expert
in home improvement contracting would require expertise in plumbing.
Comissiong v. Currytto

water leakage in the future’ ” and that “[t]he court relied
on . . . inconsistent testimony, describing an improperly
installed shower fixture . . . .” These contentions relate
to the weight given to Archuleta’s testimony by the fact
finder, rather than its admissibility. It is axiomatic that,
“[i]n a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole
arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight
to be given specific testimony. . . . The credibility and the
weight of expert testimony is judged by the same stan-
dard, and the trial court is privileged to adopt whatever
testimony [it] reasonably believes to be credible. . . . On
appeal, we do not retry the facts or pass on the credibil-
ity of witnesses.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Kohl’s Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Rocky Hill, 219 Conn. App.
464, 485, 295 A.3d 470 (2023).
We conclude that the defendant has not carried his bur-
den of establishing that the court abused its discretion in
admitting into evidence Archuleta’s expert testimony or
in crediting Archuleta’s testimony to find that the work
performed by the defendant in the upstairs bathrooms
was unworkmanlike.
IV
The defendant’s final claim asserts that “[t]he trial
court’s overreach—disregarding counterclaims for
breach, unjust enrichment, and defamation, including
admitted exhibits . . . ignoring defenses . . . restrictive
rulings, pro se prejudice, and bias—violated [the defen-
dant’s] fair trial rights . . . .” We find this claim to be
inadequately briefed and, thus, decline to review it.
“We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required
to review issues that have been improperly presented
to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analy-
sis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in
order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief
the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the
statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory
attention in the brief without substantive discussion or
citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. . . .
Comissiong v. Currytto

For a reviewing court to judiciously and efficiently . . .
consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties
must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their
briefs.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cokic v.
Fiore Powersports, LLC, 237 Conn. App. 558, 560–61,
351 A.3d 434 (2026).
“In addition, briefing is inadequate when it is not only
short, but confusing, repetitive, and disorganized. . . .
We are mindful that [i]t is the established policy of the
Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-represented]
litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights
of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally
in favor of the [self-represented] party. . . . Nonetheless,
[a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigants some
latitude, the right of self-representation provides no
attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630,
273 A.3d 271 (2022).
We conclude that the defendant’s claim that the court
deprived him of his right to a fair trial is inadequately
briefed. The defendant’s assertions in support of this
claim primarily rest on a recitation of the arguments
repeatedly made throughout his appellate brief and
thoroughly addressed in this opinion. With respect to
the remaining arguments, the defendant offers bullet
points, many of which consist of a single sentence provid-
ing nothing more than a cursory assertion with no legal
authority or analysis. See id., 631 (briefing is inadequate
where it is lacking meaningful analysis). Furthermore,
in some instances, the defendant fails to provide the
necessary facts for this court to determine the context
from which the claim arises. Because the defendant’s
briefing of his final claim is inadequate for us to conduct
any meaningful review, we decline to review it.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.