Williams v. Williams

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Williams v. Williams

EDWARD A. WILLIAMS III, TRUSTEE v.
EDNA M. WILLIAMS
(AC 49542)
Moll, Suarez and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment of possession for the
plaintiff in the plaintiff’s summary process action, and the plaintiff moved
to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff
claimed that the appeal was jurisdictionally late pursuant to statute (§ 47a-
35 (b)). Held:

The defendant’s appeal was timely pursuant to § 47a-35 (b), as a new five day
appeal period with respect to the judgment of possession arose, pursuant
to the rule of practice (§ 63-1 (c) (1)) governing the creation of new appeal
periods, following the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s timely motion
to reargue and reconsider the judgment, and the appeal was filed within that
new five day appeal period.

Considered April 22—officially released June 9, 2026

Procedural History

Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the
court, Thomas, J.; judgment for the plaintiff; thereafter,
the court, Thomas, J., denied the defendant’s motion
to reargue, and the defendant appealed to this court;
subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal. Motion to dismiss appeal denied.
Andrea L. Truppa, in support of the motion.
Edna M. Williams, self-represented, in opposition to
the motion.

Opinion

MOLL, J. In this summary process action, the self-
represented defendant, Edna M. Williams, appeals from
the judgment of possession rendered by the trial court in
favor of the plaintiff, Edward A. Williams III, trustee
of the Agnes C. Williams Living Trust. On January 21,
2026, the plaintiff moved to dismiss this appeal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that
Williams v. Williams

it is jurisdictionally late pursuant to General Statutes
§ 47a-35 (b).1 On April 22, 2026, we denied the plaintiff’s
motion to dismiss and indicated that an opinion would
follow. This opinion sets forth the reasoning for our
decision.
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. In August
2025, the plaintiff commenced this summary process
action against the defendant with respect to property
located at 465 Old Slocum Road in Hebron (premises).
The sole ground alleged by the plaintiff in support of
his complaint was that the defendant originally had the
right or privilege to occupy the premises but that such
right or privilege has terminated. See General Statutes
§ 47a-23 (a) (3).2 The defendant answered the complaint
1
General Statutes § 47a-35 provides: “(a) Execution shall be stayed
for five days from the date judgment has been rendered, provided any
Sunday or legal holiday intervening shall be excluded in computing
such five days.
“(b) No appeal shall be taken except within such five-day period. If
an appeal is taken within such period, execution shall be stayed until
the final determination of the cause, unless it appears to the judge who
tried the case that the appeal was taken solely for the purpose of delay
or unless the defendant fails to give bond, as provided in section 47a-
35a. If execution has not been stayed, as provided in this subsection,
execution may then issue, except as otherwise provided in sections
47a-36 to 47a-41, inclusive.”
2
General Statutes § 47a-23 provides in relevant part: “(a) When the
owner or lessor, or the owner’s or lessor’s legal representative, or the
owner’s or lessor’s attorney-at-law, or in-fact, desires to obtain posses-
sion or occupancy of any land or building, any apartment in any building,
any dwelling unit, any trailer, or any land upon which a trailer is used
or stands, and . . . (3) when one originally had the right or privilege to
occupy such premises but such right or privilege has terminated . . .
such owner or lessor, or such owner’s or lessor’s legal representative,
or such owner’s or lessor’s attorney-at-law, or in-fact, shall give notice
to each lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy of such land,
building, apartment or dwelling unit, at least three days before the
termination of the rental agreement or lease, if any, or before the time
specified in the notice for the lessee or occupant to quit possession or
occupancy. . . .”
Section 47a-23 was amended following the commencement of the pres-
ent action; see Public Acts 2025, No. 25-78, § 18; Public Acts, Spec.
Sess., November 2025, No. 25-1, § 37; however, those amendments
Williams v. Williams

and asserted several special defenses, which the plaintiff
denied.
On January 5, 2026, following trial, the trial court,
Thomas, J., rendered a judgment of possession in the
plaintiff’s favor, with the court granting the defendant
a stay of execution through February 16, 2026. On Janu-
ary 12, 2026, the defendant filed a motion to reargue and
reconsider, which the court denied on January 14, 2026.
On January 20, 2026, the defendant filed this appeal
from the judgment of possession.
In moving to dismiss this appeal as jurisdictionally
late pursuant to § 47a-35 (b), the plaintiff asserts that (1)
the court rendered the judgment of possession on Janu-
ary 5, 2026, and (2) the defendant filed this appeal on
January 20, 2026, beyond the five day appeal period. In
an opposition filed in response to the plaintiff’s motion,
the defendant argues that (1) she filed a motion to rear-
gue and reconsider the judgment of possession within
the five day appeal period, which, she posits, tolled the
appeal period pending a ruling on the motion, and (2)
she timely filed this appeal within the five day appeal
period that followed the denial of her motion to reargue
and reconsider. We conclude that this appeal is timely
pursuant to § 47a-35 (b).
Section 47a-35 provides: “(a) Execution shall be stayed
for five days from the date judgment has been rendered,
provided any Sunday or legal holiday intervening shall
be excluded in computing such five days.
“(b) No appeal shall be taken except within such five-day
period. If an appeal is taken within such period, execu-
tion shall be stayed until the final determination of the
cause, unless it appears to the judge who tried the case
that the appeal was taken solely for the purpose of delay
or unless the defendant fails to give bond, as provided
in section 47a-35a. If execution has not been stayed, as
provided in this subsection, execution may then issue,
have no bearing on our resolution of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
Williams v. Williams

except as otherwise provided in sections 47a-36 to 47a-
41, inclusive.”
“Summary process is a special statutory procedure
designed to provide an expeditious remedy. . . . It
enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased premises
without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which,
under the common-law actions, they might be subjected
by tenants wrongfully holding over their terms. . . .
Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and
final determination. . . . Therefore, the statutes relating
to summary process must be narrowly construed and
strictly followed. . . .
“Appeals in summary [process] proceedings are gov-
erned by the statutes specifically relating thereto rather
than statutes relating to appeals generally. . . . Thus,
parties must comply with the five day appeal period pur-
suant to § 47a-35, rather than with the general twenty
day appeal period provided in Practice Book § 63-1 (a).3
The requirement that appeals in summary process actions
comply with § 47a-35 is jurisdictional. . . . Therefore,
compliance with its mandate is a necessary prerequisite
to an appellate court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”
(Footnote in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
62-64 Bank Street, LLC v. Amelio, 232 Conn. App. 550,
559, 336 A.3d 1261 (2025).
Against that legal backdrop, we turn to the circum-
stances of the present action. On Monday, January 5,
2026,4 the court rendered the judgment of possession,
and notice thereof issued that same day. The terminal day
of the ensuing five day appeal period was Saturday, Janu-
ary 10, 2026, a day on which the appellate clerk’s office
was closed. See Practice Book § 63-2 (“[t]he appellate
3
“Practice Book § 63-1 (a) provides in relevant part that, ‘[u]nless a
different time period is provided by statute, an appeal must be filed
within twenty days of the date notice of the judgment or decision is
given. . . .’ ” 62-64 Bank Street, LLC v. Amelio, 232 Conn. App. 550,
559 n.11, 336 A.3d 1261 (2025).
4
We may take judicial notice of the particular days on which dates
fall. See Daley v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 187 Conn. App. 587, 590
n.5, 203 A.3d 635 (2019).
Williams v. Williams

clerk’s office shall be open from 8:30 a.m. until 5 p.m.
on weekdays, with the exception of legal holidays and
closures for exigent circumstances”). Pursuant to § 47a-
35 (a) and (b), intervening Sundays and legal holidays
are excluded when computing the five day appeal period
of subsection (b); however, the statute is silent as to the
consequences of the terminal day of the appeal period
falling on a Saturday.
This particular issue was addressed by the Appellate
Session of the Superior Court in Evergreen Cooperative,
Inc. v. Michel, 36 Conn. Supp. 541, 418 A.2d 99 (App.
Sess. 1980). In Michel, a summary process appeal, the
trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on Mon-
day, September 24, 1979. Id., 542. Pursuant to § 47a-35,5
the terminal day of the ensuing five day appeal period
was Saturday, September 29, 1979, on which day the
trial court clerks’ offices were closed. Id. The defendant
filed an appeal from the judgment on Monday, October 1,
1979, “in accordance with [Practice Book (1978) § 405,
the predecessor to Practice Book § 7-17], which allows
any matter due on a day when the [trial court] clerk’s
office is closed to be filed on the next business day that
the office is open.” Id. The plaintiff claimed that the
appeal was jurisdictionally late because the defendant
filed it outside of the five day appeal period. Id., 541–42.
In particular, the plaintiff maintained that “when the
terminal day [of the five day appeal period] falls on Sat-
urday the appeal must be taken within four days from
the date of judgment.” Id., 542.
The Appellate Session of the Superior Court rejected
the plaintiff’s claim. Id. First, the court observed that,
5
General Statutes (Rev. to 1979) § 47a-35, which was in effect at the
time that judgment was rendered in Michel, provides in relevant part:
“Execution shall be stayed for five days from the date judgment has
been rendered, but any Sunday or legal holiday intervening shall be
excluded in computing such five days. No appeal shall be taken except
within said period . . . .”
Although the statute subsequently was amended; see Public Acts
1979, No. 79-571, § 60; Public Acts 1980, No. 80-399, § 7; Public Acts
1996, No. 96-74, § 3; both the 1979 and current revisions of the statute
Williams v. Williams

“[a]t common-law, when the terminal day for the per-
formance of an act fell on a Sunday or a legal holiday,
performance on the following day was permissible. . . .
The reasons underlying the common-law rule are twofold:
A party was not obligated to act before the date fixed
for his performance . . . and he was powerless to act on
terminal Sundays or legal holidays. . . . Sundays and
legal holidays were not excluded from all computations
of time. Intervening Sundays, for example, were always
included in the computation. . . . Thus, by providing for
the exclusion of intervening Sundays and legal holidays
from the computation of time for appeals from summary
process judgments, the legislature thereby extended
the time for appeal by the corresponding business days.
. . . If we assume that § 47a-35 represents the legisla-
tive determination that five days is a reasonable time to
evaluate the judgment and prepare the appeal papers,
the exclusion of Sundays and holidays merely allows
litigants five working days to prepare the appeal, while
resting on Sundays and holidays, traditional days of
rest. . . . In making this determination, the legislature
was expressing no intent regarding terminal days which
fell on days when the clerk’s office was closed.” (Citations
omitted.) Id., 542–43.
The court then determined that “whether the appeal
may be filed on the next business day when the terminal
day falls on a Saturday is a matter of statutory construc-
tion. Taking an appeal requires action not only by the
appellant; it also requires action by the clerk of court who
is to receive the appeal. . . . It is impossible to file an appeal
on the fifth day if the clerk’s office is closed. Nothing in
the language of the summary process statute suggests
that in such circumstances the time within which the
appeal is to be taken is limited to four days. Were we to
take that view, the legislative will could be frustrated
in every case by the simple device of always scheduling
short calendar sessions in summary process actions on
set forth a five day appeal period with intervening Sundays and legal
holidays excluded in computing the appeal period. Thus, in the interest
of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
Williams v. Williams

Mondays. We hold that § 47a-35 is to be construed so
that when the fifth day falls on a day when the clerk’s
office is closed an appeal filed on the next business day
is deemed to be filed within five days from the date of
judgment.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 543–44. The court
further stated that, because Ҥ 47a-35 does not contain
an express provision for extending the [five day] period,
our construction of the statute does no more than ensure
that litigants will, in all cases, have five days within
which to file the appeal rather than the four days urged
by the plaintiff for those whose judgment happened to
be rendered on a Monday.” Id., 544.
We deem the reasoning in Michel to be persuasive and
adopt it in resolving the jurisdictional issue before us.
Accordingly, we conclude that an appeal from the judg-
ment of possession filed on Monday, January 12, 2026,
would have been deemed to be timely filed within the five
day appeal period that arose following the judgment.6
The defendant did not file an appeal from the judgment
of possession on, or before, January 12, 2026; however,
on that day, she filed a motion to reargue and recon-
sider the judgment. “Pursuant to Practice Book § 63-1
(c) (1),7 the filing of certain motions during an appeal
period functions to create a new appeal period after the
motions are resolved as detailed in the provision. Sec-
tion 63-1 (c) (1) applies to summary process actions.”
6
Moreover, we note that our rules of practice provide that, “[w]hen
the last day of any limitation of time for filing any document under
these rules or an order of the court falls on a day when the office of the
clerk of the trial court or of the appellate clerk is closed, the document
may be filed on the next day when such office is open.” Practice Book
§ 63-2. This further supports our conclusion that an appeal from the
judgment of possession filed on January 12, 2026, would have been
treated as being timely filed within the five day appeal period that arose
after the judgment. See Young v. Young, 249 Conn. 482, 495–96, 733
A.2d 835 (1999) (consulting rules of practice when § 47a-35 was silent
as to whether filing of motion to reargue within five day appeal period
operated to toll appeal period).
7
“Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1) provides: ‘If a motion is filed within the
appeal period that, if granted, would render the judgment, decision or
acceptance of the verdict ineffective, either a new twenty day period or
applicable statutory time period for filing the appeal shall begin on the
Williams v. Williams

(Footnote in original.) 62-64 Bank Street, LLC v. Ame-
lio, supra, 232 Conn. App. 560–61. “Section 63-1 does
not enlarge or modify the statutory appeal period, but,
rather, gives guidance in determining when the appeal
period shall commence, and in the case of any motion,
which, if granted, would allow the court to render a new
judgment, when the new appeal period shall commence.”
Young v. Young, 249 Conn. 482, 495, 733 A.2d 835
(1999). Because the defendant filed the motion to rear-
gue and reconsider on a day that, as we have concluded,
an appeal taken from the judgment of possession would
have been deemed to be timely filed within the five day
appeal period, we likewise treat the motion to reargue
and reconsider as having been filed within the appeal
period. It necessarily follows that, pursuant to § 63-1
(c) (1), a new five day appeal period as to the judgment
of possession was created when notice of the court’s
day that notice of the ruling is given on the last such outstanding motion,
except as provided for additur or remittitur in the next paragraph.
‘If a motion for additur or remittitur is filed within the appeal period
and granted, a new twenty day appeal period shall begin upon the ear-
lier of (A) acceptance of the additur or remittitur or (B) expiration of
the time set for the acceptance. If the motion is denied, the new appeal
period shall begin on the day that notice of the ruling is given.
‘Motions that, if granted, would render a judgment, decision or accep-
tance of the verdict ineffective include, but are not limited to, motions
that seek: the opening or setting aside of the judgment; a new trial; the
setting aside of the verdict; judgment notwithstanding the verdict;
reargument of the judgment or decision; collateral source reduction;
additur; remittitur; or any alteration of the terms of the judgment.
Motions that do not give rise to a new appeal period include those that
seek: clarification or articulation, as opposed to alteration, of the terms
of the judgment or decision; a written or transcribed statement of the
trial court’s decision; or reargument of a motion listed in the previous
paragraph.
‘If, within the appeal period, any motion is filed, pursuant to Section
63-6 or 63-7, seeking waiver of fees, costs and security or appointment
of counsel, a new twenty day appeal period or statutory period for filing
the appeal shall begin on the day that notice of the ruling is given on
the last such outstanding motion. If a party files, pursuant to Section
66-6, a motion for review of any such motion, the new appeal period
shall begin on the day that notice of the ruling is given on the motion
for review.’ ” 62-64 Bank Street, LLC v. Amelio, supra, 232 Conn. App.
560–61 n.12.
Williams v. Williams

denial of the motion to reargue and reconsider issued
on January 14, 2026. See id., 485–86, 496 (defendants’
appeal from judgment of possession was timely when
defendants filed appeal three days following denial of
motion to reargue, which motion defendants filed three
days after judgment).
We now address the defendant’s filing of this appeal
on January 20, 2026. Under § 47a-35 (a) and (b), inter-
vening Sundays and legal holidays are excluded when
calculating the five day appeal period of subsection (b).
There were two such intervening days that followed the
issuance of notice of the court’s January 14, 2026 denial
of the defendant’s motion to reargue and reconsider: (1)
Sunday, January 18, 2026, and (2) Monday, January 19,
2026, which was Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, a legal
holiday. Excluding those two days, the new five day
appeal period attendant to the judgment of possession
that arose following the denial of the motion to reargue
and reconsider expired on January 21, 2026. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that this appeal, filed within the new
five day appeal period, is timely pursuant to § 47a-35 (b).
The motion to dismiss is denied.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.