State v. Kenneth B.

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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KENNETH B.*
(AC 45975)
Clark, Seeley and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of assault in the second degree,
and, under a part B information, on a plea of guilty, of being a persistent
serious felony offender, the defendant appealed to this court. The victim
did not testify at the defendant’s trial. Instead, the state introduced
evidence of the victim’s injuries through, inter alia, the testimony of S,
the emergency room physician who treated the victim on the night of
the incident. Over the objection of the defendant, two photographs of
the victim were also admitted into evidence. These photographs were
taken shortly after the assault occurred and depicted the victim with
lacerations on her forehead and lips and with blood on her face and
shirt. On the defendant’s appeal, held:
1. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s conviction of
assault in the second degree: the jury reasonably could have concluded
that the victim suffered a serious physical injury on the basis of the
evidence regarding her loss of consciousness during the incident, as
this court previously has held that loss of consciousness may constitute
a serious loss or impairment of the function of a bodily organ; moreover,
contrary to the defendant’s contention, the jury was entitled to rely
on S’s testimony regarding the victim’s statement to him that she had
experienced a brief loss of consciousness because the hearsay was
admitted without objection; furthermore, the evidence was not insuffi-
cient merely because it was in conflict with or inconsistent with testi-
mony that defense counsel elicited from S that certain medical records
indicated that the victim had denied any loss of consciousness to the
registered nurse who treated the victim on the night of the incident.
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence the
two photographs of the victim: contrary to the defendant’s assertions,
the photographs were relevant because they were probative of the two
statutory (§ 53a-60 (a) (1)) elements of assault in the second degree,
namely, that the defendant intended to cause the victim serious physical
injury and that he caused the victim serious physical injury, as the
defendant’s intent could be inferred from the type of wounds inflicted,
and the photographs depicted the size and location of the lacerations,
in addition to the resulting blood loss, which were indicative of the
severity of the victim’s injuries; moreover, the trial court properly con-
cluded that the photographs were not unduly prejudicial, despite their
graphic nature, because they tended to prove a material fact in issue,
and the trial court reasonably determined that their probative value
outweighed their prejudicial impact.
Argued October 11, 2023—officially released January 9, 2024

Procedural History

Two part substitute information charging the defen-
dant, in the first part, with the crime of assault in the
second degree, and, in the second part, with being a
persistent serious felony offender, brought to the Supe-
rior Court in the judicial district of New Britain, geo-
graphical area number fifteen, where the first part of
the information was tried to the jury before Baldini,
J.; verdict of guilty; thereafter, the defendant was pre-
sented to the court, Cordani, J., on a plea of guilty to the
second part of the information; judgment in accordance
with the verdict and plea, from which the defendant
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Tamar Birckhead, for the appellant (defendant).
Rocco A. Chiarenza, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Christian M. Watson,
state’s attorney, and David Clifton, senior assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, J. The defendant, Kenneth B., appeals
from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury
trial, of assault in the second degree in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (1). On appeal, the defen-
dant claims that (1) there was insufficient evidence
presented at trial to support his conviction of assault
in the second degree, and (2) the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting into evidence two photographs
of the victim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could
have found, and procedural history are relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. On the night of November 21,
2020, the defendant was in the apartment of his sister,
Emma S. (Emma). The victim, who is the defendant’s
adult daughter, was living with Emma during this time.
At approximately 9:45 p.m., while Emma was in her
bedroom, she heard the defendant and the victim
arguing in the living room. Emma shouted for the victim
to go into the bedroom, and when she did not, Emma
heard the argument continue and get louder.
Emma went into the living room and observed the
defendant standing over the victim, who was sitting on
the floor. The defendant was hitting the victim and
holding a small object in his left hand, which Emma
believed to be a handgun.1 Emma used a ‘‘grabber’’2 to
strike the defendant to get him off the victim. When
she told the defendant that she was going to call the
police, he left the apartment. Emma subsequently
called 911.
Officer Ryan Bailen of the New Britain Police Depart-
ment arrived at the apartment to find the victim bleed-
ing. Officer Bailen observed that there was blood on
the coffee table, blood and locks of hair on the floor
of the living room, and blood on the floor of the bath-
room. A paramedic who subsequently arrived at the
scene observed that the victim was ‘‘bloodied up’’ and
‘‘[d]istraught.’’ The victim reported to the paramedic
that she was in ‘‘severe’’ pain and that she was missing
a tooth. The paramedic bandaged the victim’s wounds
and looked for the tooth.3 The victim was then trans-
ported by ambulance to the Hospital of Central Con-
necticut in New Britain.
At the hospital, the victim was treated by Theodore
Sherry, an emergency room physician. Dr. Sherry
observed that the victim had a ‘‘fairly deep’’ four centi-
meter laceration on her forehead, had two lacerations
on her lips and was missing a tooth. Dr. Sherry used
approximately twelve sutures to close all of the lacera-
tions and sutured the laceration on the victim’s forehead
in two separate layers. The victim reported to Dr. Sherry
that she had experienced a brief loss of consciousness.
Dr. Sherry ordered a computerized tomography scan
as a result of the victim’s head trauma, to assess if there
was bleeding in the victim’s brain or facial fractures;
the results of the scan showed neither.
As a result of this incident, the defendant was arrested
and charged, by way of a substitute information, with
one count of assault in the second degree in violation
of § 53a-60 (a) (1). After a trial, the jury found the
defendant guilty as charged. The defendant then
pleaded guilty to a part B information, which charged
him as a persistent serious felony offender in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-40 (c). The court subsequently
sentenced the defendant to fifteen and one-half years
of incarceration followed by four and one-half years of
special parole. This appeal followed. Additional facts
and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that there was insufficient
evidence to establish that he had caused serious physi-
cal injury to the victim, as required for a conviction of
assault in the second degree. We conclude there was
sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.
‘‘In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we
apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence
in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.
Second, we determine whether upon the facts so con-
strued and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom
the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the
cumulative force of the evidence established guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Luciano, 204 Conn. App. 388,
396, 253 A.3d 1005, cert. denied, 337 Conn. 903, 252 A.3d
362 (2021). ‘‘As we previously have explained, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond
all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis
of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been
found credible by the [finder of fact], would have
resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask
whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that
would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of
the evidence that supports the [fact finder’s] verdict
of guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Fisher, 342 Conn. 239, 249, 269 A.3d 104 (2022).
‘‘To convict the defendant of assault in the second
degree under § 53a-60 (a) (1), the state was required to
prove that (1) the defendant intended to cause serious
physical injury to another person, and (2) acting with
such intent, the defendant caused serious physical
injury to that person.’’ Id., 250. For purposes of that
statute, ‘‘serious physical injury’’ means ‘‘physical injury
which creates a substantial risk of death, or which
causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment of
health or serious loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily organ . . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-3 (4).
At trial, the state presented evidence regarding the
victim’s injuries primarily through the testimony of Dr.
Sherry. Dr. Sherry testified about the ‘‘surgical interven-
tion’’ required to close the lacerations with approxi-
mately twelve sutures and explained that, as to the
fairly deep laceration to the victim’s forehead, he ‘‘had
to suture the deeper layer first and then the superficial
layer.’’ As to the forehead laceration, Dr. Sherry testified
that he ‘‘[t]ypically’’ would expect a scar to be formed,
which would be ‘‘[t]he same length [as] the wound,’’
but that he could not say whether the victim had a scar
in the present case because he had not seen her since he
performed the surgical procedure. Dr. Sherry explained
the risks that would be present if the victim’s injuries
had gone untreated, specifically, that ‘‘any kind of exter-
nal wound that’s not treated has a risk of infection.
. . . [T]he skin is an organ; the largest in the body, and
it serves many functions, one of which is . . . a barrier
against infection,’’ and, as to ‘‘cosmetic effect . . . if
it wasn’t fixed, then there would be a larger scar.’’ Dr.
Sherry further testified as to his observation that the
victim was missing a tooth and that he did not provide
any treatment related to the tooth, as it would be appro-
priate for the victim to follow up with a dentist. In
addition to Dr. Sherry’s testimony, the state presented
testimony from the paramedic about the victim’s miss-
ing tooth and photographic evidence of the victim’s
lacerations.
Dr. Sherry also testified that the victim had reported
a brief loss of consciousness. On cross-examination,
defense counsel elicited testimony from Dr. Sherry that
certain medical records indicated that the victim had
denied any loss of consciousness to a registered nurse
who treated her at the hospital. On redirect examina-
tion, Dr. Sherry testified that he was not present when
the victim talked to the registered nurse, and he con-
firmed that the victim did report directly to him that
she had lost consciousness.
The victim did not testify at trial. An inspector with
the New Britain State’s Attorney’s Office testified
regarding his efforts to serve a subpoena on the victim
and his inability to locate her despite those efforts.
After the state rested, defense counsel made an oral
motion for a judgment of acquittal, which the court
denied.
During the state’s closing argument, the prosecutor
argued that there were multiple theories under which
the jury could find that the defendant had caused seri-
ous physical injury to the victim. Specifically, the prose-
cutor argued that the victim’s forehead laceration and
missing tooth constituted serious disfigurement, the
laceration constituted a serious impairment of the vic-
tim’s health, and the laceration and the victim’s brief
loss of consciousness constituted a serious impairment
of the function of her bodily organs, i.e., her skin and
her brain.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence
of the victim’s loss of consciousness was insufficient
to support a finding that the victim suffered a serious
physical injury because the evidence constituted hear-
say and there was conflicting evidence as to whether
the victim had in fact suffered a loss of consciousness.
The defendant also argues that there was no evidence
that the forehead laceration or missing tooth caused
serious disfigurement to the victim.4
We conclude that there was sufficient evidence that
the victim suffered a serious physical injury on the basis
of the evidence regarding her loss of consciousness.
Because the jury reasonably could have concluded that
the victim suffered a serious physical injury on the basis
of the evidence of her loss of consciousness, we do not
address the defendant’s remaining arguments as to the
victim’s forehead laceration and missing tooth.
This court previously has held that loss of conscious-
ness may constitute a serious loss or impairment of the
function of a bodily organ and, thus, a serious physical
injury. See State v. Morlo M., 206 Conn. App. 660, 673–74,
261 A.3d 68 (jury reasonably could find serious physical
injury on basis of testimony that victim lost conscious-
ness at some point during defendant’s repeated beating
of her), cert. denied, 339 Conn. 910, 261 A.3d 745 (2021);
see also State v. Miller, 202 Conn. 463, 488–89, 522 A.2d
249 (1987) (severe facial lacerations and temporary loss
of consciousness caused by strangling were ‘‘ ‘serious
physical injur[ies]’ ’’ supporting conviction of assault in
first degree); State v. Rumore, 28 Conn. App. 402, 413–
15, 613 A.2d 1328 (temporary loss of consciousness and
laceration requiring surgical stapling satisfied ‘‘serious
physical injury’’ element of assault in first degree of
elderly victim), cert. denied, 224 Conn. 906, 615 A.2d
1049 (1992). In Rumore, this court explained that § 53a-
3 (4) ‘‘does not require that the impairment of the organ
be permanent. The jury could properly interpret the
evidence to prove that the victim’s brain was not func-
tioning at a cognitive level when she was unconscious
and thus was impaired.’’ State v. Rumore, supra, 415.
The defendant contends that the evidence regarding
the victim’s loss of consciousness was insufficient
because ‘‘there was no testimony aside from a hearsay
statement attributed to [the victim] that she experi-
enced a brief loss of consciousness,’’ and there was
no direct testimony from the victim herself and other
corroborating witnesses about that loss of conscious-
ness. It is well established, however, that ‘‘when hearsay
is admitted without objection, it is a sufficient basis, if
believed by the trier, for a finding of fact.’’ State v.
Thompson, 305 Conn. 412, 438 n.7, 45 A.3d 605 (2012),
cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1146, 133 S. Ct. 988, 184 L. Ed.
2d 767 (2013); see also Walker v. Commissioner of
Correction, 103 Conn. App. 485, 492 n.2, 930 A.2d 65,
cert. denied, 284 Conn. 940, 937 A.2d 698 (2007); State
v. Outlaw, 70 Conn. App. 160, 168, 797 A.2d 579 (2002).
Indeed, ‘‘[i]n viewing the evidence, [i]f [inadmissible]
evidence is received without objection, it becomes part
of the evidence in the case, and is usable as proof to
the extent of the rational persuasive power it may have.
The fact that it was inadmissible does not prevent its
use as proof so far as it has probative value. . . .
[T]herefore . . . appellate review of the sufficiency of
the evidence . . . properly includes hearsay evidence
even if such evidence was admitted despite a purport-
edly valid objection.’’5 (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Chemlen, 165 Conn. App. 791, 817–18, 140
A.3d 347, cert. denied, 322 Conn. 908, 140 A.3d 977
(2016). Accordingly, the jury was entitled to rely on
Dr. Sherry’s testimony, to which the defendant did not
object, regarding the victim’s statement to him that she
had experienced a brief loss of consciousness.
In addition, although the defendant elicited testimony
from Dr. Sherry regarding the victim’s inconsistent
report to a registered nurse, as reflected in the medical
records, we are mindful that ‘‘[e]vidence is not insuffi-
cient . . . because it is conflicting or inconsistent.
. . . The [jury] can . . . decide what—all, none, or
some—of a witness’ testimony to accept or reject.’’
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Michael T., 194 Conn. App. 598, 621, 222 A.3d
105 (2019), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 982, 242 A.3d 104
(2020). As explained previously, Dr. Sherry testified
on redirect examination, consistent with his testimony
during direct examination, that the victim reported
directly to him that she lost consciousness. On the basis
of Dr. Sherry’s testimony, we conclude that there was
sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably
could have found that the victim suffered a serious
impairment of the function of a bodily organ and, thus,
a serious physical injury.
II
The defendant next claims that the court abused its
discretion in admitting into evidence two photographs
of the victim. Specifically, the defendant claims that
the photographs were (1) irrelevant and (2) unduly prej-
udicial. We disagree.
The following additional facts are relevant to this
claim. At trial, the state sought to admit into evidence
two photographs of the victim during its direct examina-
tion of Officer Bailen. The photographs depicted the
victim with lacerations on her forehead and her lips and
with blood on her face and her shirt. Defense counsel
objected to the admission of both photographs on the
basis that they were ‘‘[m]ore prejudicial than proba-
tive . . . .’’
The court heard arguments from the parties outside
the presence of the jury. The state argued: ‘‘[O]ne of
the elements that the state has to prove here is serious
physical injury. I think those photos accurately depict
the injuries on the night in question. Obviously, the
jury’s not going to have the victim here to testify about
what those injuries did to her. There will be medical
personnel to talk about the medical treatment that
related to those injuries; however, the state does need
to put forward proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
the assault caused serious physical injury, and I would
report that those two photos accurately depict that
element.’’
Defense counsel argued that the photographs would
‘‘unduly arouse the jury’s emotions and cause prejudice.
As [the prosecutor] has said . . . he’s going to call the
medical [personnel] to testify to the conditions of the
lacerations. And the pictures here have blood every-
where, Your Honor. They’re not exactly explaining the
injury in itself, Your Honor. Just because there’s blood
everywhere that can arouse the jury’s emotions. I think
that the harm is serious and inflammatory.’’
The court overruled defense counsel’s objections and
determined that the photographs were admissible. The
court explained: ‘‘I find that [these photographs] would
assist in establishing elements of this offense, including
intent, causation and the issue of serious physical
injury. . . . I am mindful that the appropriate test is
relevancy, not necessity. Also, that a potentially inflam-
matory photograph, which I think that’s the defense’s
argument in this particular case, that both photographs
are inflammatory. Those photographs that may be char-
acterized that way may be admitted if the court in its
discretion determine[s] that the probative value of the
photograph outweighs the prejudicial effect that it
might have on this particular jury. These photographs,
in this court’s assessment, have a reasonable tendency
to prove or disprove a material fact at issue. I do believe
that the probative value does outweigh its prejudicial
effect with respect to both photographs. I’ve considered
the case law, including State v. Lane, [206 Conn. App.
1, 258 A.3d 1283, cert. denied, 338 Conn. 913, 259 A.3d
654 (2021)], along with State v. Kelly, [256 Conn. 23,
770 A.2d 908 (2001)]. I therefore find that these photo-
graphs, both of their probative value does outweigh
[their] prejudicial effect. And I also note . . . with
regard to the number of photographs, there are two.’’
After the jury returned to the courtroom, the court
explained that the photographs were admitted as full
exhibits. Officer Bailen testified that the photographs
accurately depicted the victim’s appearance on the
night of November 21, 2020.
As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable
standard of review. ‘‘Our standard of review for eviden-
tiary matters allows the trial court great leeway in decid-
ing the admissibility of evidence. The trial court has
wide discretion in its rulings on evidence and its rulings
will be reversed only if the court has abused its discre-
tion or an injustice appears to have been done. . . .
The exercise of such discretion is not to be disturbed
unless it has been abused or the error is clear and
involves a misconception of the law. . . . In addition,
[e]very reasonable presumption should be made in
favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling in
determining whether there has been an abuse of discre-
tion.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Lane, supra, 206 Conn. App. 14.
On appeal, the defendant first claims that the photo-
graphs were irrelevant.6 Section 4-1 of the Connecticut
Code of Evidence provides that ‘‘ ‘[r]elevant evidence’
means evidence having any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is material to the determination
of the proceeding more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.’’ This court has noted
that ‘‘[r]elevant evidence is evidence that has a logical
tendency to aid the trier in the determination of an
issue. . . . One fact is relevant to another if in the
common course of events the existence of one, alone
or with other facts, renders the existence of the other
either more certain or more probable. . . . Evidence
is not rendered inadmissible because it is not conclu-
sive. All that is required is that the evidence tend to
support a relevant fact even to a slight degree, [as] long
as it is not prejudicial . . . . In determining whether
photographic evidence is admissible, the appropriate
test is relevancy, not necessity.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lane, supra,
206 Conn. App. 14–15.
At trial, the state bore the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to cause
the victim serious physical injury and caused the victim
serious physical injury. See General Statutes § 53a-60
(a) (1). The two photographs at issue are probative
as to both statutory elements. As to the first element,
because ‘‘[i]ntent to cause . . . serious physical injury
may be inferred from the . . . type of wound inflicted,’’
the photographs have probative value to show intent.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lane,
supra, 206 Conn. App. 15; see also State v. Best, 337
Conn. 312, 320, 253 A.3d 458 (2020) (‘‘[t]he extent and
severity of injuries often are used as indirect proof of
intent’’); State v. Osbourne, 162 Conn. App. 364, 372,
131 A.3d 277 (2016) (photographs depicting victim’s
blood loss and bloody clothing were relevant to issue
of ‘‘whether the defendant possessed the requisite
intent of the crime charged’’). As to the second element,
the photographs depict the size and location of the
lacerations on the victim’s face, in addition to blood
loss resulting from those lacerations, which were indic-
ative of the severity of those injuries. State v. Best,
supra, 318 (amount of blood loss suffered by victims
immediately after shooting was indicative of severity
of wounds and had tendency to prove that wounds
were grievous enough to cause death of one victim and
serious physical injury to other victim); State v. Lane,
supra, 15 (photographs depicting black eye and surgical
wounds were indicative of severity of injuries and had
tendency to prove that injuries were sufficiently severe
to constitute serious physical injury); State v. Osbourne,
supra, 371–72 (photographs depicting blood loss and
bloody clothing were relevant, among other reasons,
to establish that victim suffered physical injury).
Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that the photographs were
relevant.
We next address whether the trial court properly
concluded that the photographs were not unduly preju-
dicial. Section 4-3 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence
provides that ‘‘[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice or surprise, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.’’
The defendant argues that the photographs are
unduly prejudicial because they are ‘‘graphic’’ and gory,
as they depict the victim ‘‘moments after the incident,
covered in blood . . . .’’ He contends that the photo-
graphs served only ‘‘to disgust and inflame the jur[ors],
deterring them from carefully considering whether the
state had met its burden.’’ As our Supreme Court noted
in Best, however, even gruesome photographs can be
admissible if they tend to prove or disprove a material
fact. State v. Best, supra, 337 Conn. 323–24. ‘‘[P]hoto-
graphs [that] have a reasonable tendency to prove or
disprove a material fact in issue or shed some light upon
some material inquiry are not rendered inadmissible
simply because they may be characterized as gruesome.
. . . The question is not solely whether the evidence
is gruesome, disturbing or otherwise inherently prejudi-
cial but whether its prejudicial nature is undue or unfair,
a question that requires the trial court to undertake
the relativistic assessment of probative value versus
prejudicial effect . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lane, supra, 206
Conn. App. 16.
Thus, contrary to the defendant’s contention, the pho-
tographs at issue in the present case are not rendered
inadmissible simply because they may be characterized
as ‘‘graphic’’ or gory. The court reasonably determined
that the probative value of the photographs, depicting
injuries sustained by the victim, outweighed their preju-
dicial impact. See State v. Best, supra, 337 Conn. 316,
325 (concluding that trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in determining that, on balance, probative value of
photographs depicting bloody interior of car out-
weighed their prejudicial effect); State v. Osbourne,
supra, 162 Conn. App. 375 (‘‘although the photographs
admitted into evidence depicted blood found at the
scene and the victim’s bloody clothing, the trial court’s
determination that they were more probative than prej-
udicial [did] not constitute an abuse of discretion’’).
Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting into evidence the challenged
photographs.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of
victims of family violence, we decline to identify the victim or others through
whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
1
At trial, Emma testified that she did not remember seeing anything in
the defendant’s hand and she did not remember telling the police that the
defendant had a gun. A redacted copy of a written statement that Emma
had provided to the police subsequently was admitted into evidence as a
full exhibit, which contained Emma’s report that the defendant had been
holding what she believed to be a small handgun.
2
At trial, Emma described the object that she identified as a ‘‘grabber’’
as a metal stick that she uses to pick up items and demonstrated to the
prosecutor its approximate length by showing him the cane she had with
her on the stand.
3
At trial, the paramedic testified that she did not find the tooth at the
apartment, but she believed someone located the tooth in the victim’s bra
when the victim subsequently was taken to the hospital.
4
Specifically, the defendant argues that (1) there was no evidence that
the forehead laceration left a scar, as the victim did not testify at trial and
Dr. Sherry testified only as to the risk of a scar, and (2) ‘‘there was no
evidence as to [the victim’s] age, suggesting that [the missing tooth] could
have been a baby tooth that would ultimately be replaced by an adult tooth
or that it was a wisdom tooth that would have otherwise been extracted.’’
5
To be clear, the defendant did not object to Dr. Sherry’s testimony and
does not claim on appeal that the testimony was inadmissible.
6
The state contends that the defendant did not raise a relevancy objection,
and, therefore, he failed to preserve this claim for appellate review. ‘‘[T]he
standard for the preservation of a claim alleging an improper evidentiary
ruling at trial is well settled. . . . In order to preserve an evidentiary ruling
for review, trial counsel must object properly . . . [by] articulat[ing] the
basis of the objection so as to apprise the trial court of the precise nature
of the objection and its real purpose . . . . [T]he determination of whether
a claim has been properly preserved will depend on a careful review of the
record to ascertain whether the claim on appeal was articulated below with
sufficient clarity to place the trial court on reasonable notice of that very
same claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taylor G., 315
Conn. 734, 769–70, 110 A.3d 338 (2015). At trial, the defendant objected to
the admission of the photographs on the basis that they were ‘‘[m]ore
prejudicial than probative . . . .’’ He did not raise a separate relevancy
objection, nor did he argue that the photographs had no probative value.
See State v. Best, 337 Conn. 312, 317 n.1, 253 A.3d 458 (2020) (defendant
functionally preserved relevancy claim where he argued that photographic
evidence was devoid of any probative value). Nevertheless, the defendant
subsequently argued that the photographs were ‘‘not exactly explaining the
injury in itself,’’ which is the same claim he makes on appeal. The state
addressed the relevancy of the evidence in response to the defendant’s
objection, arguing that the photographs were probative of the victim’s injur-
ies, and, in the court’s ruling, it specifically addressed the relevancy of the
photographs, which ‘‘eliminate[s] any concerns that the trial court was not
on notice of the argument.’’ State v. Streit, 341 Conn. 170, 187 n.14, 266
A.3d 864 (2021). We therefore conclude that the defendant functionally
preserved his relevancy claim. See State v. Best, supra, 317 n.1.