Ferreira v. Ward

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Ferreira v. Ward

DANIEL FERREIRA v. CHARLES W. WARD
(AC 45340)
Alvord, Seeley and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a judgment lien on certain real property
of the defendant in 2018. After the trial court granted the plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment as to liability, the plaintiff filed a motion
for foreclosure by sale. The defendant objected and argued that the
statutory homestead exemption ((Rev. to 2017) § 52-352) of $75,000 in
effect at that time applied to preclude a judgment of foreclosure by sale
of his primary residence. The court held a hearing on the plaintiff’s
motion in February, 2022, and rendered a judgment of foreclosure by
sale, from which the defendant appealed to this court. After filing his
appeal, the defendant discovered that the February, 2022 hearing had
not been recorded. Pursuant to an order of this court, the trial court
held another hearing in November, 2022, on the plaintiff’s motion for a
judgment of foreclosure by sale. At the November, 2022 hearing, the
defendant’s counsel argued, inter alia, that the legislature’s amendment
(P.A. 21-161, § 1) to the homestead exemption, effective October 1, 2021,
and codified by statute (§ 52-352b (21)), which increased the homestead
exemption to $250,000, applied to the defendant and precluded the
sale of his primary residence. The plaintiff argued that it would be
inappropriate for the court to apply the expanded homestead exemption
because the statute had been revised after the commencement of the
foreclosure action. The court issued an order affirming its rendering of
a judgment of foreclosure by sale. Held:
1. This court concluded that the expanded homestead exemption of $250,000
pursuant to § 52-352b (21) applied retroactively to a postjudgment pro-
ceeding in which a judgment lien was issued and recorded and an action
to foreclose on the judgment lien was commenced at a time when the
now repealed statute, § 52-352b (t), was in effect, but the judgment of
foreclosure was rendered after the amended statute, § 52-352b (21), had
become effective: the expanded homestead exemption could be applied
retroactively because it was procedural in nature, as the legislature’s
intention in expanding the exemption was to focus on the exemptions
available to debtors during bankruptcy or postjudgment proceedings
and not to create, define, or regulate rights; moreover, the language of
P.A. 21-161 did not indicate that the legislature intended to carve out
preexisting or other debts from the exemption or to preclude P.A. 21-
161 from applying to a postjudgment proceeding in which the action to
foreclose on the judgment lien was commenced before it became effec-
tive, as the fact that the language of § 52-352b (t) included carve-outs
for preexisting debts but the language of § 52-352b (21) did not include
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Ferreira v. Ward
such carve-outs indicated a legislative intent not to exclude preexisting
debts from the scope of the expanded homestead exemption.
2. The trial court improperly denied the defendant’s request for an evidentiary
hearing on his claim that the expanded homestead exemption applied
to preclude the plaintiff from foreclosing on his primary residence: the
defendant raised his homestead exemption claim multiple times before
the court rendered a judgment of foreclosure and, although this court
had yet to address the specific question of whether a defendant must
be afforded an evidentiary hearing on a homestead exemption claim
prior to a trial court rendering a judgment of foreclosure, this court
concluded, on the basis of persuasive Superior Court cases, that such an
evidentiary hearing should be held; moreover, during such an evidentiary
hearing, at which the court affords the defendant the opportunity to
present support for his claim that the homestead exemption applies,
the proper procedure would be for the court to apply the definitions
set forth in the statute (§ 52-352a) to the formula contained in § 52-352b
(21) and decide, on the basis of the evidence before it, whether to render
a judgment of foreclosure; accordingly, the case was remanded to the
trial court for an evidentiary hearing as to the applicability of the defen-
dant’s homestead exemption claim pursuant to § 52-352b (21) prior to
rendering a decision on the plaintiff’s motion for a judgment of foreclo-
sure by sale.
Argued November 13, 2023—officially released April 9, 2024

Procedural History

Action to foreclose a judgment lien on certain of the
defendant’s real property, and for other relief, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Ansonia-
Milford, where the court, Hon. Arthur A. Hiller, judge
trial referee, granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment as to liability only; subsequently, the court,
Hon. Arthur A. Hiller, judge trial referee, rendered
judgment of foreclosure by sale, from which the defen-
dant appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceed-
ings.
Prerna Rao, for the appellant (defendant).
Christopher D. Hite, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The defendant, Charles W. Ward, appeals
from the judgment of foreclosure by sale rendered by
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Ferreira v. Ward

the trial court in this action to foreclose a judgment
lien brought by the plaintiff, Daniel Ferreira. On appeal,
the defendant claims that the court improperly rendered
a judgment of foreclosure by sale without first holding
an evidentiary hearing, as requested, to determine whether
the homestead exemption of $250,000 set forth in Gen-
eral Statutes § 52-352b (21)1 applied. We reverse the
judgment of the court.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our resolution of this appeal. On January 8,
2015, in an unrelated civil action, the plaintiff obtained
a judgment against the defendant in the amount of
$123,533.05. On May 4, 2015, to secure the judgment,
the plaintiff recorded a judgment lien in the town of
Milford land records against the defendant’s property
located at 100 Cinnamon Road in Milford (primary resi-
dence). The plaintiff then notified the defendant of the
judgment lien pursuant to General Statutes § 52-351a.2
In January, 2018, the plaintiff commenced the present
action against the defendant seeking to foreclose the
judgment lien. The plaintiff also filed in the land records
a notice of lis pendens. On June 7, 2018, the defendant
1
At the time the plaintiff commenced this foreclosure action, the home-
stead exemption was contained in General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 52-352b
(t) and exempted from the claims of creditors the value of the debtor’s
homestead up to the amount of $75,000. Subsequently, in 2021, the legislature
enacted No. 21-161 of the 2021 Public Acts, § 1 (P.A. 21-161), which repealed
General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 52-352b in its entirety effective October
1, 2021, and codified the amended homestead exemption in § 52-352b (21),
increasing the homestead exemption to $250,000. For the reasons set forth
in part I of this opinion, all references herein to § 52-352b (21) are to the
current revision of the statute.
2
General Statutes 52-351a provides: ‘‘When a lien is placed on any property
or when any postjudgment paper, other than a wage execution or property
execution levied against property of a natural person, is served on a third
person, the judgment creditor shall send a copy of the lien, or of the papers
so served, together with a statement as to where the lien was filed or on
whom the papers were served, to the judgment debtor at his last-known
address by first class mail, postage prepaid.’’
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filed an answer to the complaint and asserted as a
special defense that he ‘‘is entitled to the exemptions
provided under . . . General Statutes § 52-352a et seq.’’
The plaintiff filed a reply wherein he denied the defen-
dant’s special defense.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary
judgment as to liability only and an accompanying mem-
orandum of law in support thereof. The plaintiff appended
as exhibits to his motion for summary judgment a certi-
fied judgment lien and an affidavit wherein he averred
that the judgment lien remains unsatisfied. The defen-
dant did not file an objection to the motion, and the
court rendered summary judgment as to liability in favor
of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff then filed a motion for a judgment of
foreclosure by sale. The defendant filed an objection
to the motion and argued, inter alia, that the homestead
exemption applied to preclude a judgment of foreclo-
sure by sale of his primary residence. The court, Hon.
Arthur A. Hiller, judge trial referee, held a remote hear-
ing on the plaintiff’s motion on February 22, 2022. The
court subsequently issued an order granting the plain-
tiff’s motion and rendered a judgment of foreclosure
by sale. The court found that the debt as of February
22, 2022, was $123,533.05 and the fair market value of
the primary residence was $255,000.3 The court set a
sale date of August 27, 2022. This appeal followed.
After the filing of this appeal, the defendant, in order-
ing a transcript of the February 22, 2022 hearing, discov-
ered that the hearing had not been recorded. The defen-
dant filed a motion for rectification and requested that
the court conduct a new hearing on the motion for
judgment for purposes of providing this court with an
3
The court also found that the defendant owed $3725 in attorney’s fees
and an appraisal fee of $750.
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Ferreira v. Ward

adequate record for review.4 The court denied the defen-
dant’s motion. In response, the defendant filed with this
court a motion for review of the court’s denial of the
motion for rectification. This court issued an order
granting the defendant’s motion and stated: ‘‘Review is
granted and the relief requested therein is granted in
that the trial court . . . shall hold a hearing, with coun-
sel for the parties in attendance, at which arguments
may be heard, evidence taken or a stipulation of counsel
received and approved to rectify the record to indicate
what arguments were made at the February 22, 2022
hearing on the plaintiff’s motion for judgment of foreclo-
sure by sale.’’5

On November 3, 2022, pursuant to this court’s order,
the trial court held a hearing on the plaintiff’s motion
for a judgment of foreclosure by sale during which the
defendant’s counsel argued, inter alia, that the amount
of the statutory homestead exemption was amended in
2021 to protect up to $250,000 of the homestead of
the exemptioner, that the defendant is entitled to the
increased exemption because the statute was amended
before the court rendered the judgment of foreclosure
by sale, and, thus, that the exemption precludes the sale
of the defendant’s primary residence. The defendant’s
counsel also requested that the court hear evidence in
the form of the defendant’s testimony, which the court
denied. The plaintiff then argued that the applicable
version of the homestead exemption is found in General
Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 52-352b (t) because that was
4
In support of his motion, the defendant argued that he had preserved
issues for appeal during the hearing, including, inter alia, that the homestead
exemption precluded the sale of his primary residence.
5
The rectification hearing ordered by this court was a hearing in which
the parties could present arguments concerning the applicability of the
homestead exemption and the motion for a judgment of foreclosure by
sale. That hearing, like the February 22, 2022 hearing, was not evidentiary
in nature.
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the revision in effect at the time the plaintiff com-
menced the foreclosure action. Moreover, the plaintiff
asserted that ‘‘[t]he proper procedure is for the sale to
happen, the proceeds get deposited with the court, and
then the defendant files his exemption, if he has one.’’
On December 14, 2022, the court issued an order stating
that its ‘‘previously entered order’’ of February 25, 2022
(entry #115.05) ‘‘is affirmed with the attached tran-
script’’ of the November 3, 2022 hearing.
I
Central to our consideration of this appeal is the
defendant’s contention that the $250,000 homestead
exemption set forth in § 52-352b (21) (expanded home-
stead exemption) applies. We agree and conclude that
the expanded homestead exemption set forth in § 52-
352b (21), first contained in Public Acts 2021, No. 21-
161, § 1 (P.A. 21-161), applies retroactively to a post-
judgment proceeding in which a judgment lien was
issued and recorded and an action to foreclose that
judgment lien was commenced prior to the effective
date of P.A. 21-161, but the court’s decision on the
motion for a judgment of foreclosure was rendered
after P.A. 21-161 became effective.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant. In the defendant’s March 22, 2021 objection to the
plaintiff’s motion for judgment of foreclosure by sale,
he claimed that the sale of his property was precluded
under the original homestead exemption, which was
the effective exemption at that time. During the Novem-
ber 3, 2022 hearing on the motion for a judgment of
foreclosure, however, the defendant argued that the
homestead exemption had been amended and that he
should be afforded the $250,000 protection set forth
in the expanded homestead exemption. The plaintiff
responded that it would be inappropriate for the court
to apply the expanded homestead exemption because
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the statute was amended after the commencement of
the foreclosure action and, thus, the plaintiff argued
that the court should apply the original homestead
exemption.6
In his appellate brief, the defendant cites as the appli-
cable statute the expanded homestead exemption of
$250,000 in § 52-352b (21).7 At oral argument before this
court, the plaintiff’s counsel recognized that, ‘‘unfortu-
nately for [his] client,’’ decisions issued by the United
6
The following colloquy occurred during the November 3, 2022 hearing:
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: This claim is subject to the Homestead
Exemption Act and it’s actually—foreclosure would be prohibited by the
Homestead Exemption Act for several reasons. First, the Homestead Exemp-
tion Act protects up to $250,000—not up to, a minimum of $250,000 of any
equity that my client has in his—it’s his primary residence. The total amount
that’s claimed is far less than that. So, automatically foreclosure is barred
by the Homestead Exemption Act. Second, this is a—
‘‘The Court: Well, let’s do them one at a time. Let’s do these one at a time.
Let me hear from plaintiff’s counsel on the Homestead Exemption Act.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: So Judge, we had filed a reply to that objection
that essentially indicates . . . . The exemption is for the equity. . . . And
it says that the lien cannot be enforced up to the amount of the exemption.
When this judgment entered, the exemption was [$]75,000. So, the subject
property had a net equity which far exceeded that $75,000 exemption. And
so, the proper procedure, since the amount of the debt is greater than the
amount of the homestead exemption at the time this judgment entered, then
the proper procedure would be to have a sale. And the defendant can exempt
any proceeds of the sale up to [$]75,000 and the rest would go to the plaintiff.
‘‘The Court: The Court agrees.
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Your Honor?
‘‘The Court: Yes?
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: If I can, for the record, state my response
to counsel’s arguments. So, first, counsel clearly indicates that the lien
cannot be enforced up to the amount of the homestead exemption. So, first
of all, I take objection to the fact that counsel is trying to retroactively claim
that the homestead exemption is 75 instead of 250,000.
‘‘The Court: Was it 75 at the time of the foreclosure?
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: No, Your Honor, it was changed in 2021, I
believe, to $250,000.
‘‘The Court: This case was brought in 2018.’’
7
Specifically in his appellate brief, the defendant contends that § 52-352b
‘‘was modified via [P.A. 21-161] during the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic, and
made effective October 1, 2021, prior to the trial court making its decision
subject to appeal here.’’ (Emphasis in original.)
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States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut
suggest that the expanded homestead exemption could
be applied retroactively. In response to the defendant’s
assertion that the expanded homestead exemption
applies and the plaintiff’s representations at oral argu-
ment, this court, sua sponte, ordered supplemental
briefing on whether the expanded homestead exemp-
tion applies to postjudgment proceedings initiated prior
to the effective date of P.A. 21-161.8 The defendant
argues that it does and that the homestead exemption
applies retroactively in this case. We agree.
We begin with our standard of review on issues of
retroactivity. ‘‘Whether a statute applies retroactively
raises a question of statutory construction over which
our review is plenary.’’ Walsh v. Jodoin, 283 Conn. 187,
195, 925 A.2d 1086 (2007). ‘‘In considering the question
of whether a statute may be applied retroactively, we
are governed by certain well settled principles, [pursu-
ant to] which our ultimate focus is the intent of the
legislature in enacting the statute. . . . [O]ur point of
departure is General Statutes § 55-3, which [provides]:
No provision of the general statutes, not previously
contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes
any new obligation on any person or corporation, shall
be construed to have retrospective effect. . . . [W]e
have uniformly interpreted § 55-3 as a rule of presumed
legislative intent that statutes affecting substantive
rights shall apply prospectively only. . . . The rule is
rooted in the notion that it would be unfair to impose a
substantive amendment that changes the grounds upon
which an action may be maintained on parties who
have already transacted or who are already committed
8
The supplemental briefing order requested that the parties address ‘‘(1)
whether the amended homestead exemption; General Statutes § 52-352b
(21); applies retroactively to this case and (2) whether the enactment of
the amended homestead exemption would constitute retroactive legislation
when applied to a postenactment judgment of foreclosure; see In re Cole,
347 Conn. 284 [297 A.3d 151] (2023).’’
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to litigation. . . . In civil cases, however, unless con-
siderations of good sense and justice dictate otherwise,
it is presumed that procedural statutes will be applied
retrospectively. . . . While there is no precise defini-
tion of either [substantive or procedural law], it is gener-
ally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines and
regulates rights while a procedural law prescribes the
methods of enforcing such rights or obtaining redress.
. . . Procedural statutes . . . therefore leave the pre-
existing scheme intact. . . . [We presume] that proce-
dural or remedial statutes are intended to apply retroac-
tively absent a clear expression of legislative intent to
the contrary . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) King v. Volvo Excavators AB, 333 Conn. 283, 292,
215 A.3d 149 (2019). Further, exemptions, like the home-
stead exemption, ‘‘are construed liberally in the debtor’s
favor.’’ Rockstone Capital, LLC v. Sanzo, 332 Conn.
306, 315, 210 A.3d 554 (2019).
‘‘In 1993, the legislature, for the first time, enacted
[the] ‘homestead act,’ whereby a debtor could protect
up to $75,000 of the value of a primary residence from
attachment in postjudgment proceedings or bankruptcy
[original act]. See Public Acts 1993, No. 93-301, § 2 (P.A.
93-301).’’ In re Cole, 347 Conn. 284, 287, 297 A.3d 151
(2023) (Cole). As we have stated, that was amended by
P.A. 21-161, § 1, which expanded the amount of the
homestead exemption to $250,000.
In In re Cole, supra, 347 Conn. 310, our Supreme
Court addressed whether ‘‘the expanded homestead
exemption contained in P.A. 21-161, § 1, appl[ies] in
bankruptcy proceedings filed on or after the effective
date of the act to debts that accrued prior to that date
. . . .’’9 (Emphasis added.) The court answered the
9
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut ‘‘certified
to [the Connecticut Supreme Court] the question of ‘[w]hether [P.A.] 21-161
applies retroactively to debts incurred by the debtor before [P.A.] 21-161
took effect or prospectively.’ [Our Supreme Court] accepted certification
but . . . [answered] a slightly modified version of the certified question:
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question in the affirmative; id., 298; however, it did not
address whether the expanded homestead exemption
applies retroactively to a proceeding that was com-
menced before P.A. 21-161 became effective, but in
which a judgment of foreclosure was rendered after
P.A. 21-161 took effect. See In re Hotchkiss, United
States Bankruptcy Court, Docket No. 23-20023, *2 (JTT)
(Bankr. D. Conn. November 28, 2023) (‘‘[r]ather than
engage in a retroactivity analysis, the Connecticut
Supreme Court simply decided that, [b]ecause the legis-
lature did not direct otherwise, the expanded home-
stead exemption in P.A. 21-161 . . . applies in all . . .
postjudgment proceedings initiated on or after the
effective date of the act, regardless of when the underly-
ing debts accrued’’ (emphasis omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
The present case is factually distinguishable from
Cole in that the foreclosure action in this matter was
commenced prior to the passage of the expanded home-
stead exemption. As stated previously, Cole did not
consider whether the expanded homestead exemption
applies retroactively to postjudgment proceedings initi-
ated prior to the effective date of the act.10 For the
reasons set forth herein, we conclude that the expanded
homestead exemption applies retroactively to a post-
judgment proceeding where both the judgment lien was
does the expanded homestead exemption contained in P.A. 21-161, § 1, apply
in bankruptcy proceedings filed on or after the effective date of the act to
debts that accrued prior to that date? [Our Supreme Court answered] that
question in the affirmative.’’ In re Cole, supra, 347 Conn. 289–90.
10
In Cole, the debtor argued that, ‘‘[i]f the expanded homestead exemption
were applied to a previously commenced bankruptcy proceeding, then a
retroactivity issue would arise. But, [the debtor] contends, merely to apply
the expanded exemption in a . . . proceeding that was commenced after
the effective date of P.A. 21-161, § 1, does not raise any retroactivity concerns
. . . .’’ (Emphasis in original.) In re Cole, supra, 347 Conn. 303. Our Supreme
Court agreed and determined that retroactivity is not implicated when the
expanded homestead exemption does not apply retroactively in ‘‘postjudg-
ment proceedings initiated on or after the effective date of the act, regardless
of when the underlying debts accrued.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 310.
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recorded and the action to foreclose on the lien was
commenced prior to the effective date of P.A. 21-161,
but the judgment of foreclosure was rendered after the
effective date.
We begin by addressing whether the expanded home-
stead exemption is procedural or substantive. Our
Supreme Court has recognized that ‘‘[i]t is clear that
the purpose of the [homestead exemption] is to specify
the exemptions that are presently available to a debtor’’;
(emphasis in original) In re Cole, supra, 347 Conn. 309;
and that ‘‘the legislature increased the homestead
exemption in 2021 to keep pace with inflation.’’ Id.,
297. The legislature’s intent in enacting the expanded
homestead exemption, therefore, was not to create,
define, or regulate rights, rather it was to prescribe ‘‘the
methods of enforcing such rights or obtaining redress.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) King v. Volvo Exca-
vators AB, supra, 333 Conn. 292. Further, our Supreme
Court has explained that the legislature’s intent in
enacting the homestead exemption was to focus ‘‘on
the enforcement process—what exemptions are avail-
able to the debtor during the bankruptcy or postjudg-
ment proceeding.’’ (Emphasis in original.) In re Cole,
supra, 309. On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude
that the expanded homestead exemption is procedural
in nature.11
We next examine the text of P.A. 21-161 ‘‘to determine
whether it contains any expressed intention that it not
11
Our Supreme Court observed in Cole that ‘‘the unsecured creditors are
presumed to have been aware that the legislature could increase the size
of the homestead exemption at any time and that their rights might otherwise
be adversely impacted by changes in federal or state law. . . . Any expecta-
tion that the debtor would be perpetually limited to a $75,000 exemption
[is], in short, unreasonable.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Cole, supra, 347 Conn. 308. That observation provides further
support for the proposition that the expanded homestead exemption is
procedural because it involves the methods by which a judgment debtor is
afforded redress.
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Ferreira v. Ward

be applied retroactively.’’ King v. Volvo Excavators AB,
supra, 333 Conn. 295. It does not. Public Act 21-161
‘‘begins by repealing General Statutes (Rev. to 2021)
§ 52-352b in its entirety. It then provides, with respect
to the homestead exemption: ‘The following property
of any natural person shall be exempt . . . (21) The
homestead of the exemptioner to the value of two hun-
dred fifty thousand dollars, provided value shall be
determined as the fair market value of the real property
less the amount of any statutory or consensual lien
which encumbers it . . . .’ P.A. 21-161, § 1. Finally, the
act provides that it is ‘[e]ffective October 1, 2021 . . . .’
P.A. 21-161, § 1.’’ In re Cole, supra, 347 Conn. 294–95.
Significantly, ‘‘[n]othing in the language of the act indi-
cates that the legislature intended to carve out preex-
isting (or any other) debts from the reach of the exemp-
tion’’; id., 295; nor does anything in the language of
P.A. 21-161, § 1, suggest that the legislature intended to
preclude it from applying to a postjudgment proceeding
in which the action to foreclose on the judgment lien
was commenced before P.A. 21-161, § 1, became effec-
tive. Accordingly, after a thorough review of the text
of P.A. 21-161, § 1, we are persuaded that the expanded
homestead exemption is available under the facts of
this case.
This determination is buttressed by our well settled
principles of statutory construction. ‘‘As we have stated
many times, [when] a statute, with reference to one
subject contains a given provision, the omission of such
provision from a similar statute concerning a related
subject . . . is significant to show that a different
intention existed. . . . This principle applies with
equal force to reenactments of previous statutes.’’ (Cita-
tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
297. In the present case, P.A. 21-161 omits the carve-
out for preexisting debts that was set forth in the origi-
nal act. Specifically, P.A. 93-301 provided: ‘‘This act
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Ferreira v. Ward

shall take effect October 1, 1993, and shall be applicable
to any lien for any obligation or claim arising on or
after said date.’’ P.A. 93-301, § 3. In contrast, P.A. 21-
161 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Section 52-352b of the
general statutes is repealed and the following is substi-
tuted in lieu thereof (Effective October 1, 2021) . . . .’’
P.A. 21-161, § 1. ‘‘The fact that the legislature included
a special carve-out for preexisting debts in the original
homestead act but did not include one in the 2021 act
indicates an intent not to exclude preexisting debts
from the scope of the expanded homestead exemption.’’
(Emphasis in original.) In re Cole, supra, 347 Conn. 297.
On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the
expanded homestead exemption applies retroactively
to a postjudgment proceeding in which a judgment lien
was recorded and the action to foreclose on the judg-
ment lien was commenced at a time when the now
repealed statute was in effect, but the judgment of fore-
closure was rendered after P.A. 21-161 became effec-
tive.
II
We now turn to the defendant’s claim on appeal that
the court improperly rendered a judgment of foreclo-
sure by sale. Specifically, the defendant maintains that
the court incorrectly denied his request for the court
to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether
the expanded homestead exemption applies to preclude
the plaintiff from foreclosing on the defendant’s primary
residence.12 We agree.
12
The plaintiff’s brief to this court presents fewer than two pages of
argument and inexplicably relies on Spears v. Elder, 156 Conn. App. 778,
115 A.3d 482 (2015). In that case, the defendant did not raise a homestead
exemption claim until after a judgment of foreclosure had been rendered.
Id., 782–83. Accordingly, Spears is procedurally different from the present
appeal, and we disagree with the plaintiff’s contention that it supports his
position in this appeal.
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The homestead exemption is codified in Chapter 906
of the General Statutes, titled ‘‘Postjudgment Proce-
dures,’’ and ‘‘relates to the enforcement of money judg-
ments. Under this chapter, a judgment creditor may
enforce a money judgment by execution or foreclosure
‘against any property of the judgment debtor unless the
property is exempt from application to the satisfaction
of the judgment under section . . . 52-352b . . . or any
other provision of the general statutes or federal law.’
[General Statutes] § 52-350f.’’13 KLC, Inc. v. Trayner,
426 F.3d 172, 175 (2d Cir. 2005).
Section 52-352b sets forth property exempt from post-
judgment procedures and provides in relevant part:
‘‘The following property of any natural person shall be
exempt . . . (21) The homestead of the exemptioner
to the value of two hundred fifty thousand dollars, pro-
vided value shall be determined as the fair market value
of the real property less the amount of any statutory
or consensual lien which encumbers it . . . .’’ Addi-
tionally, General Statutes § 52-352a is titled ‘‘Definitions
for exempt property provisions’’ and provides in rele-
vant part: ‘‘As used in . . . section . . . 52-352b . . .
(1) ‘Value’ means fair market value of the exemptioner’s
equity or unencumbered interest in the property . . .
(3) ‘Exempt’ means, unless otherwise specified, not
subject to any form of process or court order for the
purpose of debt collection . . . [and] (5) ‘Homestead’
means owner-occupied real property . . . used as a
13
General Statutes § 52-350f provides in relevant part: ‘‘A money judgment
may be enforced against any property of the judgment debtor unless the
property is exempt from application to the satisfaction of the judgment under
section . . . 52-352b . . . or any other provision of the general statutes or
federal law. The money judgment may be enforced, by execution or by
foreclosure of a real property lien, to the amount of the money judgment
with (1) all statutory costs and fees as provided by the general statutes, (2)
interest as provided by chapter 673 on the money judgment and on the costs
incurred in obtaining the judgment, and (3) any attorney’s fees allowed
pursuant to section 52-400c.’’
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primary residence.’’ Accordingly, in interpreting Con-
necticut’s statutory homestead exemption, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed
that the definitions set forth in § 52-352a ‘‘mean that a
judgment lien can attach on a homestead, but that such
a lien cannot be enforced up to the amount of the
exemption.’’ KLC, Inc. v. Trayner, supra, 426 F.3d 175.
In his appellate brief, the defendant argues that ‘‘Con-
necticut trial courts have consistently required eviden-
tiary hearings to resolve claims under the homestead
exemption . . . prior to issuing foreclosure judg-
ments.’’14 Although our appellate courts have yet to
address the specific question of whether a defendant
must be afforded an evidentiary hearing on a homestead
exemption claim prior to the court rendering a judgment
of foreclosure, decisions of the Superior Court support
the claim that such a hearing should be held. See Barker
v. Bell, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford,
Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (June 8, 2012) (54 Conn.
L. Rptr. 123, 123), (court determined that, ‘‘[w]hen a
party asserts a [h]omestead [e]xemption, the court is
required to conduct an evidentiary hearing’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Unifund CCR Part-
ners v. Scheappi, Superior Court, judicial district of
Hartford, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (March 20, 2008)
(45 Conn. L. Rptr. 221, 222) (same); Lienfactors, LLC v.
Belamour, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield,
Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (November 20, 2007)
(same). The Second Circuit noted that ‘‘Connecticut
Superior Courts . . . uniformly allow the homestead
exemption before ordering foreclosure on a judgment
lien.’’ KLC, Inc. v. Trayner, supra, 426 F.3d 177. We
agree with the defendant and find these cases persua-
sive for the proposition that, when a defendant asserts
a homestead exemption claim before a judgment of
14
In his appellate brief, the plaintiff does not respond to the defendant’s
argument in reliance on these cases.
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foreclosure is rendered, the proper procedure is for the
court to afford the defendant with the opportunity to
present support for their claim by way of an evidentiary
hearing.
We anticipate that the specific procedure of that evi-
dentiary hearing would include the court applying the
statutory definitions set forth in § 52-352a to the formula
contained in § 52-352b (21) and deciding, on the basis
of the evidence before it, whether to render a judgment
of foreclosure. Specifically, the court should find the
value of the property, which is ‘‘determined as the fair
market value of the real property less the amount of
any statutory or consensual lien which encumbers it’’
and subtract from that value the amount of the exemp-
tion. General Statutes § 52-352b (21). The result is the
amount to which the judgment lien can attach. If the
result is negative, the court may determine to withhold
foreclosure or deny the motion for a judgment of fore-
closure. See Barker v. Bell, supra, 54 Conn. L. Rptr.
124; see also Unifund CCR Partners v. Scheappi, supra,
45 Conn. L. Rptr. 223 (‘‘A foreclosure action is equitable
in nature. . . . A trial court has discretion, after review
of the equities, to withhold foreclosure. . . . When [a]
plaintiff could well realize nothing in this action, the
court can properly deny the plaintiff a foreclosure judg-
ment.’’ (Citations omitted.)).
In the present case, the defendant raised his home-
stead exemption claim several times before the court
rendered a judgment of foreclosure: (1) as a special
defense;
(2) in his objection to the plaintiff’s motion for a judg-
ment of foreclosure; and (3) during the November 3,
2022 hearing. At the November 3, 2022 hearing, the
defendant argued that his homestead exemption claim
precludes the court from rendering a judgment of fore-
closure with respect to his primary residence. In
response, the plaintiff argued that the homestead
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exemption would apply only after the foreclosure sale
had occurred and that ‘‘[t]he proper procedure is for
the sale to happen, the proceeds get deposited with the
court, and then the defendant files his exemption, if he
has one.’’15 Also at the November 3, 2022 hearing, the
defendant’s counsel requested to present, and for the
court to consider, evidence in support of the defen-
dant’s homestead exemption claim.16 In response, the
15
At oral argument before this court, the plaintiff’s counsel conceded that
a remand of the case for a new hearing on the motion for a judgment of
foreclosure by sale is necessary, specifically to set a new fair market value
of the property. The plaintiff’s counsel, however, maintained that the defen-
dant’s homestead exemption claim should not be argued at that time and
instead, should be argued only after the foreclosure sale of the defendant’s
primary residence has occurred. Because we conclude that an evidentiary
hearing on whether a defendant is entitled to the homestead exemption is
to occur prior to a court rendering a decision on a plaintiff’s motion for
judgment of foreclosure, we disagree with the plaintiff’s proposed procedure.
16
The following colloquy occurred:
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: And my client is also here to testify specifi-
cally about the equity as well.
‘‘The Court: Your client is not an appraiser, is he?
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: He is the owner of the property and people
are allowed to testify about—
‘‘The Court: As to their feeling of the value. I know that, as to their feeling
as to the value of the property. If you want him to, I’ll let you, but—
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Judge, if I may be heard . . . . This is not an
evidentiary hearing, motions for strict or sale are not evidentiary presenta-
tions. It would be improper for the court to hear testimony from the defen-
dant on any subject, but especially on something like value which—
‘‘The Court: I got you. All right. . . .
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: If I may respond to that for the record, Your
Honor? The Appellate [Court] order specifically says . . . that the trial court
. . . shall hold a hearing with counsel for the parties in attendance at which
arguments may be heard, evidence taken . . . . And so, Your Honor, I think
that I do have a right to present the witness.
‘‘The Court: But do I know that that argument was made at the Febru-
ary hearing?
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: We don’t know because there’s no record.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Judge, that’s disingenuous. [The defendant] did
not testify at that hearing.’’
‘‘The Court: Well, that’s for sure.
(Simultaneous Speaking)
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: And I’m requesting for him to testify here
again.
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plaintiff’s counsel maintained that it is inappropriate
for a court to consider evidence during a hearing on a
motion for a judgment of foreclosure by sale. The court
agreed with the plaintiff and denied the defendant’s
request to present evidence. See footnote 5 of this opin-
ion.
On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that,
because the defendant raised his homestead exemption
claim before the court rendered a judgment of foreclo-
sure, the court’s denial of the defendant’s request for
an evidentiary hearing on his claim was improper.
Accordingly, the appropriate remedy is for this court
to reverse the judgment of foreclosure by sale and
remand the case to the trial court for an evidentiary
hearing, consistent with the procedure set forth pre-
viously in this opinion, as to the applicability of the
defendant’s homestead exemption claim pursuant to
§ 52-352b (21) prior to rendering a decision on the plain-
tiff’s motion for a judgment of foreclosure by sale.17
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

‘‘The Court: Yeah, but you know he did not testify at the last hearing.
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: But I’m asking for him to testify just like I
did last time.
‘‘The Court: I’m going to pass on that. I’m not going to agree to that.
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Can I ask why, Your Honor?
‘‘The Court: Yeah, because I don’t think that’s appropriate at this point
in what we were sent back to do.’’
17
The defendant also argues in his appellate brief that ‘‘[t]he trial court
improperly refused to take evidence regarding applicable housing laws
which lower the permitted resale value of the property.’’ The plaintiff does
not respond to this argument in his appellate brief. We need not address
this claim in light of our determination that the judgment of foreclosure by
sale must be reversed and the case remanded for an evidentiary hearing.