Watson v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

HAKEEM WATSON, §
§ No. 181, 2024
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ Cr. ID No. 2301003709A/B
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Appellee. §
Submitted: February 12, 2025
Decided: April 14, 2025

Before TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, and

following oral argument, it appears to the Court that:

(1) A police officer stopped a car, suspecting that its tinted windows did

not comply with Section 4313 of the Delaware Motor Vehicle Code.1 As soon as

the car came to a stop, Appellant Hakeem Watson exited from the car’s passenger-

side door and ran. As Watson exited from the car, the officer saw Watson’s “side

profile.” The officer gave chase in his patrol car while Watson fled on foot. During

1
See 21 Del. C. § 4313(c) (“No person shall operate any motor vehicle on any public highway,
road or street which does not conspicuously display a certificate by the manufacturer of any ‘after
manufacture’ window tinting material which may have been installed that such window tinting
material meets the requirement of [Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard] 205 in effect at the
time of the vehicle’s manufacture.”); see also Stafford v. State, 59 A.3d 1223, 1226 n.1 (Del. 2012)
(stating that Section 4313 restricts “the permissible areas and amount of window tint”).
the pursuit, the officer could only observe Watson from behind. While running,

Watson pulled a firearm from the front of his person and tossed it over a fence. The

officer eventually caught up to Watson, arrested him, and retrieved the firearm.

Watson was charged with carrying a concealed deadly weapon (“CCDW”) and

resisting arrest.2 His case proceeded to trial. After the close of the evidence, defense

counsel moved for judgment of acquittal as to the CCDW charge, which the trial

judge denied. Additionally, over defense counsel’s objection, the trial judge issued

a flight instruction to the jury, explaining to the jury that it could infer that Watson’s

flight showed “consciousness of guilt” for possessing a firearm. After deliberating,

the jury found Watson guilty of both charges.

(2) Watson now appeals the trial judge’s denial of his motion for judgment

of acquittal and issuance of the flight instruction. As explained further below, we

reverse the trial judge’s denial of Watson’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

Additionally, we conclude that Watson’s flight instruction claim is moot because

that instruction was relevant only to the CCDW charge, and, in this Order, we reverse

Watson’s conviction on that charge.

(3) During the evening of January 8, 2023, Officer Logan Crumlish of the

Wilmington Police Department noticed a black Chevrolet Impala with tinted

2
In a separate trial, the same jury found Watson guilty of possession of a firearm by a person
prohibited and possession of ammunition by a person prohibited.

2
windows while on patrol in his marked patrol car.3 Officer Crumlish conducted a

database inquiry to determine whether the Impala had a tint waiver.4 Finding no tint

waiver on file, Officer Crumlish activated his patrol car’s emergency lights to

conduct a stop of the Impala.5 As soon as the Impala pulled over, a person—later

identified as Watson—exited from the Impala’s passenger door and ran from the

scene.6 Officer Crumlish briefly observed Watson’s “side profile” when Watson

exited from the Impala and ran.7 Officer Crumlish activated his sirens and pursued

Watson in his patrol car.8 During the pursuit, Officer Crumlish observed Watson

from behind through his windshield.9 “As [Watson] was running . . ., he began to

slow down, at which time [Officer Crumlish] saw him pull a black object from the

front of his person and throw it over a fence, and then continu[e] running[.]”10 After

observing Watson toss the black object, Officer Crumlish maneuvered his patrol car

3
App. to Opening Br. at A44–45. Unless otherwise indicated, the facts are drawn from the trial
transcript.
4
Id. at A45; see also, e.g., 21 Del. C. § 4313(d) (stating that a tint waiver is available under certain
circumstances).
5
App. to Opening Br. at A46.
6
Id.
7
Id. at A54.
8
Id. at A47, A54.
9
Id. at A55.
10
Id. at A47 (Officer Crumlish Testimony).

3
in front of Watson.11 With nowhere left to run, Watson got down on the ground and

Officer Crumlish arrested him.12

(4) Shortly after arresting Watson, Officer Crumlish returned to the area

where he had seen Watson toss the black object over a fence.13 Officer Crumlish

located a black firearm about ten feet from the fence—he found no other black

objects in the area.14 There was 9mm ammunition in the firearm’s magazine and one

round racked in its chamber.15

(5) A grand jury indicted Watson on five charges: possession of a firearm

by a person prohibited, possession of ammunition by a person prohibited, CCDW,

resisting arrest, and illegal possession of a controlled substance.16 The State later

dismissed the controlled substance charge before trial.17 On the remaining charges,

Watson moved to sever the CCDW and resisting arrest charges from the person

prohibited charges.18 The Superior Court granted that motion.19

11
Id. at A48.
12
Id. at A48–49.
13
Id. at A50.
14
Id. at A50–51.
15
Id. at A51.
16
Id. at A10–12 (Indictment).
17
Id. at A36.
18
Id. at A3–4 (Dkt. 17) (Superior Court Docket).
19
Id. at A4 (Dkt. 23) (Superior Court Docket). In granting the motion to sever, the court noted
that the State previously stated that it would file a notice of nolle prosequi for the CCDW charge.
See id. The State ultimately did not file a notice for the CCDW charge. Id.

4
(6) The State tried the CCDW and resisting arrest charges to a jury (the “A-

Trial”). Before the A-Trial started, the State told the trial judge that it intended to

seek a flight instruction.20 Defense counsel objected, arguing that “it’s prejudicial

under [Delaware Rule of Evidence] 403, and defense counsel believes [it] unfairly

comments on the evidence here, and instructs the jury to consider something that

they should be left to their own devices to consider if they think that’s part of the

fact pattern here.”21 The trial judge overruled defense counsel’s objection to the

flight instruction.22 During both its opening statement and closing argument, the

State highlighted its theory that Watson “ran because he had a gun.”23

(7) During the A-Trial, three witnesses testified for the State—Officer

Crumlish, a Wilmington Police Department forensic detective, and a Delaware

Division of Forensic Sciences DNA analyst. The State additionally published

several exhibits to the jury, including Officer Crumlish’s body-worn camera

recording depicting his pursuit and arrest of Watson and his retrieval of the firearm.24

Defense counsel called no witnesses. Before closing arguments, defense counsel

20
Id. at A35.
21
Id.
22
Id. at A41.
23
Id. (Opening Statement) (Prosecutor: “Members of the jury, this is a straightforward case. The
defendant ran because he had a gun.”); id. at A81 (Closing Argument) (Prosecutor: “Good
morning. The defendant Hakeem Watson on January 8th, 2023 ran because he had a gun.”).
24
Id. at A50–51.

5
moved for judgment of acquittal under Superior Court Criminal Rule 29(a) as to the

CCDW charge, arguing that the evidence presented was insufficient to show that

Watson concealed the firearm.25 The trial judge denied the motion, stating that “I

think it’s close, but I’m going to allow the trier of fact, the jury, to determine”

whether the evidence sufficiently established that Watson concealed the firearm.26

The jury found Watson guilty of CCDW and resisting arrest.27

(8) On appeal, Watson argues that the trial judge committed reversible

error in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the CCDW charge

because the evidence at trial did not establish that Watson concealed the firearm.

Watson also contends that the trial judge violated Article IV, § 19 of the Delaware

Constitution by issuing the flight instruction, which, according to Watson, amounted

to an improper comment on the evidence. The State responds that Officer

Crumlish’s testimony that he saw Watson from the side and from behind without

25
Id. at A78–79.
26
Id. at A79.
27
Id. at A96 (A-Trial Verdict). After the A-Trial, the parties proceeded with the PFBPP and
PABPP charges before the same jury (the “B-Trial”). During the B-Trial, the parties stipulated
that Watson was a person prohibited from possessing a firearm and ammunition during the relevant
time. Id. at A97. After the parties presented arguments to the jury, the jury found Watson guilty
of PFBPP and PABPP. Id. at A103–04 (B-Trial Verdict). Before sentencing, the State moved to
declare Watson a habitual offender, which the Superior Court granted. Id. at A8 (Dkt. 13)
(Superior Court Docket); Ex. C to Opening Br. at 3 (Sentence Order). The Superior Court
sentenced Watson to 20 years of incarceration, followed by probation. Ex. C to Opening Br. at
1–2 (Sentence Order). Specifically, the court sentenced Watson to: 20 years of incarceration for
PFBPP; 8 years of incarceration, suspended for 18 months of probation for PABPP; 8 years of
incarceration, suspended for 18 months of probation for CCDW; and a monetary fine for resisting
arrest. Id.

6
seeing a firearm was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that Watson concealed it. The State also contends that the evidence at trial

supported issuing the flight instruction and that it was not an improper comment on

the evidence because the instruction was “substantially similar” to other flight

instructions upheld by this Court.

(9) We review de novo the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for

judgment of acquittal “to determine whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have found the essential

elements, beyond a reasonable doubt.”28 We do not distinguish between direct and

circumstantial evidence when conducting this inquiry.29

(10) Under 11 Del. C. § 1442(a), “[a] person is guilty of carrying a concealed

deadly weapon when the person carries concealed a deadly weapon upon or about

the person without a license to do so[.]” There is no dispute that Watson carried the

firearm on his person without a license to do so. The critical question is whether the

evidence at trial was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable

doubt that Watson concealed the firearm. It was not.

(11) Our law defines concealment as “hidden from the ordinary sight of

another person . . . [meaning] the casual and ordinary observation of another in the

28
Hines v. State, 292 A.3d 91, 96–97 (Del. 2023) (quoting Howell v. State, 268 A.3d 754, 775
(Del. 2021)).
29
Id. at 97.

7
normal associations of life.”30 Officer Crumlish testified that he briefly saw a side

profile of Watson when Watson exited from the Impala and ran. Officer Crumlish

also testified that he saw Watson from behind while pursuing Watson in his patrol

car, including the moment that Watson tossed the firearm. Officer Crumlish’s body-

worn camera recording shows Watson wearing a black coat on the night of the arrest.

The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, established that

Officer Crumlish observed Watson from two vantage points—the side and behind—

at night and from his patrol car while Watson fled on foot. But Officer Crumlish

testified that he saw Watson “pull a black object from the front of his person and

throw it over a fence[.]”31 The evidence here is not sufficient for a rational trier of

fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Watson hid the firearm from “the

ordinary sight of another person.”32 Officer Crumlish did not observe Watson’s

front—the place on Watson’s body where he allegedly concealed the firearm.

(12) Our cases affirming CCDW convictions on sufficiency-of-the-evidence

grounds are distinguishable from this case. In Manuel v. State, we affirmed a CCDW

conviction on sufficiency of the evidence grounds when a detective “seized a

30
Robertson v. State, 704 A.2d 267, 268 (Del. 1997) (ellipsis and brackets in original); see also
Taylor v. State 326 A.3d 686, 2024 WL 3810967, at *3 (Del. Aug. 14, 2024) (TABLE).
31
App. to Opening Br. at A47 (emphasis added).
32
See Robertson, 704 A.2d at 268.

8
handgun from [defendant]’s pants pocket” during a pat-down search.33 In Goode v.

State, we found witness testimony sufficient to affirm a CCDW conviction when the

witness testified that he saw the defendant “pull[] out a pistol from under his

clothing” and point it at another person.34 And in Thomas v. State, we affirmed a

CCDW conviction based on circumstantial and direct evidence.35 In that case, a

building’s video surveillance depicted a defendant without a firearm visible on his

person leaving the building despite other evidence establishing that the defendant

retrieved a firearm from an apartment within that building before leaving.36 And a

witness later “saw [defendant] ‘reach for his waistband, reach his arm out . . . and

shoot [the victim].’”37

(13) In these cases, the evidence established that a person found the weapon

concealed on the defendant (Manuel), a person saw the defendant pull the weapon

from a concealed position to an unconcealed one (Goode), and a recording captured

the defendant without a weapon visible and a witness later saw that defendant pull a

33
Manuel v. State, 186 A.3d 103, 2018 WL 2127136, at *1–2 (Del. May 8, 2018) (TABLE); see
also Woods v. State, 204 A.3d 1264, 2019 WL 643862, at *4 (Del. Feb. 14, 2019) (TABLE)
(affirming CCDW conviction when a police officer testified that “he found [defendant’s] pocket
knife inside of [defendant’s] right front pants pocket”).
34
Goode v. State, 136 A.3d 303, 307, 314 (Del. 2016) (emphasis added).
35
Thomas v. State, 207 A.3d 1124, 2019 WL 1380051, at *5 (Del. Mar. 26, 2019) (TABLE). In
Thomas, defense counsel did not move for judgment of acquittal, so this Court reviewed for plain
error. Id. at *4. However, this Court also stated that “[t]his [evidence] would suffice to defeat
[defendant’s] insufficient evidence claim even had he not waived it.” Id. at *5.
36
Id. at *5.
37
Id. (ellipsis in original).

9
weapon from his clothing (Thomas). The common thread is that the evidence in

each case was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable

doubt that the weapon was “hidden from the ordinary sight of another person.”38

Here, by contrast, the evidence established that Officer Crumlish did not observe

Watson from the front at any time before Watson tossed the firearm from the front

of his person. None of the State’s evidence allowed for a conclusion as to how

Watson was carrying the firearm in front of his body. Thus, the jury could not find

beyond a reasonable doubt that Watson “hid[] [the firearm] from the ordinary sight

of another person.”39 We therefore reverse the Superior Court’s denial of Watson’s

motion for judgment of acquittal as to the CCDW charge.

(14) Because we reverse the trial court’s ruling on Watson’s motion for

judgment of acquittal, we need not decide his objection to the flight instruction given

by the trial judge. This Court has held that a flight instruction is proper “where there

is evidence of flight supporting an inference that defendant fled out of consciousness

of guilt.”40 Here, the flight instruction was relevant only to the CCDW charge, not

38
Robertson, 704 A.2d at 268.
39
Id.
40
Robertson v. State, 41 A.3d 406, 409 (Del. 2012); Thomas v. State, 467 A.2d 954, 958 (Del.
1983) (“A flight instruction is proper where there is evidence of flight or concealment and the
evidence reasonably supports an inference that defendant fled because ‘of consciousness of guilt
and a desire to avoid an accusation based thereon, or for some other reason.’” (emphasis in
original) (quoting Tice v. State, 382 A.2d 231, 233 (Del. 1977))).

10
the resisting arrest charge.41 And Watson has not appealed his resisting arrest

conviction.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is REVERSED as to the motion for judgment of acquittal and MOOT as to

the flight instruction.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths
Justice

41
The State’s opening statement and closing argument advanced its theory that Watson “ran
because he had a gun.” App. to Opening Br. at A41 (Opening Statement) (Prosecutor: “Members
of the jury, this is a straightforward case. The defendant ran because he had a gun.”); id. at A81
(Closing Argument) (Prosecutor: “Good morning. The defendant Hakeem Watson on January
8th, 2023 ran because he had a gun.”). The flight instruction stated in part that evidence of flight
“is admissible as a circumstance tending to show consciousness of guilt.” Id. at A92 (Jury
Instructions). The “consciousness of guilt” was, according to the State, connected to Watson
having a firearm. See Answering Br. at 8 (“It was reasonable to infer that Watson fled to avoid
culpability for the firearm offense.”). CCDW was the only firearm offense in the A-Trial.

11