Hazelett v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

BRIANA HAZELETT, §
§ No. 151, 2024
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, §
§ Court Below: Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§ Cr. I.D. No. 2203001161
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §

Submitted: January 29, 2025
Decided: April 25, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and
GRIFFITHS, Justices, constituting the Court en banc.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record below, and following

oral argument, it appears to the Court that:

(1) Defendant-Below, Appellant Brianna Hazelett asks this court to vacate

her convictions because the trial court improperly limited Hazelett’s cross-

examination of the State’s chief investigating officer. Hazelett advances several

arguments in support of this claim. First, she contends that the trial court violated

her constitutional right to present a complete defense and cross-examine her accusers

by “severely restrict[ing]” her right to impeach the chief investigating officer’s

credibility. We reject that argument because the trial court properly applied the four-
1
factor Snowden1 test to determine the scope of impeachment. Second, Hazelett

argues she was constitutionally entitled to challenge the credibility of the chief

investigating officer’s testimony regarding her alleged turn-signal violation. This

argument fails because the trial court did not preclude Hazelett from arguing that the

State had not proved the statutory elements of a turn-signal violation beyond a

reasonable doubt. Rather, the court precluded her from arguing that the traffic stop

was illegal. Third, Hazelett asserts that the trial court erred when it suggested that

defense counsel had a responsibility to disclose impeachment material to the State

before cross-examination. The trial court’s error in this respect was harmless and

did not affect the jury’s verdict. We therefore affirm Hazelett’s convictions.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

(2) On March 2, 2022, Corporal Leonard Moses of the Wilmington Police

Department (“WPD”) was conducting proactive patrol at the corner of Madison and

5th Streets in Wilmington, Delaware.2 He noticed a black Volkswagen Passat with

four occupants making “furtive movements throughout the vehicle” and began to

follow.3 When the vehicle turned onto the 600 block of West 6th Street without

using a turn signal, Corporal Moses initiated a traffic stop.4

1
Snowden v. State, 672 A.2d 1017, 1024 (Del. 1996).
2
App. to Opening Br. at A18.
3
Id. at A19–21.
4
Id. at A20–21.

2
(3) As Corporal Moses and his partner, Officer Chris Rosaio, walked

toward the stopped vehicle, Corporal Moses smelled a strong odor of marijuana

coming from it.5 The driver, Briana Hazelett, stuck her hands through the open car

window and informed the approaching officers that her firearm and a removed

magazine were on the dashboard.6 Corporal Moses saw the firearm on the dashboard

and noticed a burning marijuana blunt near the center console.7

(4) Corporal David Schulz was called to assist and arrived at the scene after

the traffic stop was underway.8 Corporal Schulz detected a strong odor of burnt

marijuana coming from the vehicle.9 He searched the vehicle at the scene and later

conducted an inventory search at the police station.10 Corporal Schulz located

marijuana near the vehicle’s emergency brake lever, baggies containing marijuana

in the front and back seat areas, and a burnt marijuana blunt by the gear shift.11

Corporal Schulz collected Hazelett’s gun, an extended magazine, and nine rounds of

ammunition that were inside the magazine.12 During the inventory search, Corporal

5
Id. at A21.
6
Id. at A21–22.
7
Id. at A21.
8
Id. at A34.
9
Id. at A35.
10
Id. at A39.
11
Id. at A35–37; App. to Answering Br. at B2 (Corporal Schulz’s Body-Worn Camera Video at
11:20).
12
App. to Opening Br. at A38–39

3
Schulz recovered a “cross body bag” on the passenger-side floor containing a pill

bottle with Hazelett’s name on it.13 The pills inside the bottle were later determined

to be methamphetamine.14

(5) On November 21, 2022, a grand jury indicted Hazelett for Possession

of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”), Illegal Possession of a Controlled

Substance, Possession of Marijuana, Driving a Vehicle While License is Suspended

or Revoked, and Failure to Use a Turn Signal.15 Hazelett’s two-day jury trial began

on May 1, 2023.16 The State called Corporal Moses, Corporal Schulz, Officer

Rosaio, Anna Wyckoff,17 and Hugh Stephey18 during its case-in-chief.19 After the

State rested, Hazelett testified in her own defense.20

(6) During Corporal Moses’s cross-examination, Hazelett’s counsel sought

to impeach him with his inconsistent sworn statements in a 2016 case involving a

different defendant, Daryus Whittle.21 In State v. Whittle, Corporal Moses authored

13
Id. at A39–40.
14
Id. at A49–50.
15
Id. at A1, A6-10.
16
See id. at A12.
17
Wyckoff testified in her professional capacity as an Analytical Chemist II with the Delaware
Division of Forensic Science. Id. at A46.
18
Stephey testified in his professional capacity as an employee of the firearms and ballistics section
of the forensic services unit at the WPD. Id. at A51.
19
Id. at A12.
20
Id.
21
Id. at A32.

4
an arrest warrant in which he swore under oath that he and a fellow officer

“observed” Whittle remove a firearm from his waistband and place it inside a bundle

of newspapers.22 Corporal Moses then stated under oath that he “observed” Whittle

hide the firearm under a broken cement stairway.23 At a preliminary hearing in

Whittle’s case, Corporal Moses testified that he “observed” Whittle hide the

firearm.24 And when he testified at Whittle’s trial, Corporal Moses reiterated that he

“saw” Whittle pull the firearm from his waistband.25 After additional cross-

examination, however, Corporal Moses revealed that neither he nor his partner

personally saw Whittle handle or hide the firearm before they arrested him.26

Rather, [Wilmington Police Department] received a call from
Downtown Visions advising them that a Downtown Visions
surveillance camera recorded a man matching Whittle’s description
hiding a firearm in the manner previously described. Without viewing
the video recording, Corporal Moses and his partner then drove to the
area, arrested Whittle, and recovered the gun. Corporal Moses testified
that he eventually watched the video, but not until after he authored the
arrest warrant.27

22
Mobley v. State, 2024 WL 5316320, at *2 (Del. Dec. 5, 2024) (discussing Corporal Moses’s
inconsistent sworn statements in State v. Whittle).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.

5
The Superior Court struck Corporal Moses’s identification testimony as hearsay and

granted Whittle’s motion for judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence.28

(7) In Hazelett’s trial, the State objected when her counsel attempted to

impeach Corporal Moses by asking questions regarding his inconsistent sworn

statements in the Whittle case. The State argued that the issue was previously

addressed by the Superior Court in State v. Mobley.29 The judge in Hazelett’s trial

deferred ruling on the objection until she could research the Mobley matter.30 The

judge instructed Hazelett to move on to a different line of questioning in the

meantime.31

(8) The trial judge returned to the issue after the lunch recess.32 Armed

with an understanding of the Mobley ruling, the court permitted “cross-examination

on the impeachment line of questioning.”33 During the lunch recess, Hazelett also

28
Id. at *3.
29
App. to Opening Br. at A32 ([State]: “If it's the case that I'm thinking of, this issue was raised .
. . [in] State v. Terrell Mobley, [and the trial judge] specifically considered this issue and made no
findings regarding incorrect testimony.”).
30
Id. at A34.
31
Id. at A34.
32
Id. at A41.
33
Id.

6
provided the State with 195 pages of Corporal Moses’s prior testimony, and the court

granted the State’s request to review the voluminous materials overnight.34

(9) Later in the day, the court again raised Corporal Moses’s potential

testimony and inquired into Hazelett’s counsel’s proposed line of questioning.35

Hazelett’s counsel indicated that she planned to ask about Corporal Moses’s

probable cause affidavit, his preliminary hearing testimony, and his trial testimony

from Whittle.36 She also stated that she planned to ask Corporal Moses about the

importance of truthfulness, but did not intend to delve deeply into the facts

underlying Whittle.37

(10) The trial court applied the factors that this Court articulated in Snowden

v. State38 as a guidepost for a trial judge considering proposed limitations on cross-

examination.39 Although the court concluded that impeaching Corporal Moses’s

credibility would have limited utility because most of the observations to which he

testified were captured on body-worn camera, the court reiterated that it would allow

34
Id. at A42–43. After expressing consternation that Hazelett’s counsel did not raise the
impeachment material before trial, the trial judge concluded that it was fair to allow the State to
review the materials overnight. Id. Defense counsel did not object. Id. at A43.
35
Id. at A54–55.
36
Id. at A55.
37
Id. The trial court agreed that “delving too deeply into the facts” of Whittle was not relevant. Id.
38
672 A.2d 1017 (Del. 1996)
39
App. to Opening Br. at A55.

7
inquiry into the Whittle matter.40 The court, however, placed limitations on the scope

of cross-examination. Specifically, the court prohibited the defense from arguing

that the traffic stop was illegal41 and precluded counsel from asking or implying that

Whittle was dismissed due to Corporal Moses’s contradictory statements.42 As to

that point, the court emphasized that the Whittle court made no specific finding of

dishonesty and dismissed the case for insufficient evidence.43

(11) The following day, May 2, 2023, the State re-called Corporal Moses.44

Defense counsel re-examined him, asking questions related to truthfulness and his

prior contradictory sworn statements in Whittle.45 After concluding her other

questions, defense counsel renewed her request to question Corporal Moses

regarding the dismissal of the Whittle case.46 The court denied that request, finding

that the proposed questions could tend to confuse the jury.47

40
Id. at A57.
41
Id. at A64.
42
Id. at A57.
43
Id.
44
State’s Answering Br. at 9.
45
App. to Opening Br. at A72.
46
Id. at A74.
47
Id. The judge told defense counsel that the court was willing to entertain a question about the
resolution of the Whittle matter if it did not mislead the jury. Id.

8
(12) The case was submitted to the jury later that day.48 The jury convicted

Hazelett on all counts.49 On March 15, 2024, Hazelett was sentenced to three-and-

a-half years of incarceration, suspended for probation and a fine.50

(13) On appeal, Hazelett contends that the trial court violated her

constitutional right to present a complete defense and cross-examine her accusers by

“severely restrict[ing]” her right to impeach Corporal Moses.51 Hazelett argues that

the trial court’s rulings regarding her counsel’s cross-examination of Corporal

Moses constituted error in a number of ways, including by (i) improperly suggesting

that a defendant must notify the State of an impeachment strategy; (ii) incorrectly

interpreting what occurred in Whittle and therefore precluding Hazelett from

inquiring into the dismissal; and (iii) limiting Hazelett’s ability to challenge the

truthfulness of Corporal Moses’s testimony about the turn-signal violation.52 The

State responds that the court correctly exercised its discretion to place reasonable

limitations on cross-examination.53

48
Id. at A4.
49
Id. at A4.
50
Id. Ex. B (Sentence Order).
51
Appellant’s Opening Br. at 9.
52
See id. at i–ii.
53
See State’s Answering Br. at 11.

9
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

(14) This court reviews constitutional limits on cross-examination de novo.54

Non-constitutional restrictions are reviewed for abuse of discretion.55

III. ANALYSIS

A. The trial court’s ruling did not violate Hazelett’s constitutional rights.

(15) The United States Constitution “guarantees criminal defendants ‘a

meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense’”56 Although “cross-

examination is the ‘principal means by which the believability of a witness and the

truth of his testimony are tested,’”57 “the right of cross-examination is not without

limits.”58 “Trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is

concerned to impose reasonable limits on . . . cross-examination based on concerns

about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the

witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”59

54
Wilson v. State, 950 A.2d 634, 638 (Del. 2008) (reviewing, de novo, claim that evidentiary ruling
unconstitutionally restricted right to effectively cross-examine).
55
Garden v. Sutton, 683 A.2d 1041, 1043 (Del. 1996) (addressing cross-examination of police
officer in civil suit, without constitutional implications).
56
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479,
485 (1984)).
57
Snowden v. State, 672 A.2d 1017, 1024 (Del. 1996) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316
(1974)).
58
Id.
59
Id. (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)).

10
(16) In Snowden v. State, we identified several factors that should guide a

trial court when it is asked to limit the scope of cross-examination: “(1) whether the

testimony of the witness being impeached is crucial; (2) the logical relevance of the

specific impeachment evidence to the question at bar; (3) the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues and undue delay; and (4) whether the evidence is

cumulative.”60

(17) Here, the trial court applied each of the four Snowden factors. As to the

first factor, the court determined that although Corporal Moses was the chief

investigating officer, his testimony was not as crucial as it might otherwise have

been because of the other officers’ consistent testimony and the body-worn camera

footage.61 The court explained that the only evidence to which Corporal Moses

testified that was not captured on body-worn camera was his initial observation of

the Volkswagen Passat and the turn-signal violation.62 Corporal Moses’s testimony

as to those events, however, was corroborated by Officer Rosaio, making

impeachment of Corporal Moses somewhat less critical.63

(18) As to the second Snowden factor, the trial court similarly determined

that the specific impeachment evidence was logically relevant only to the portions

60
Id. at 1025.
61
See App. to Opening Br. at A55.
62
Id.
63
Id.

11
of Officer Moses’s testimony that were not captured on body-worn camera.64

Concerning factor three, the court held that, due to the risk of confusion, “some brief

and limited cross-examination” on the Whittle matter should be permitted, but “the

defense [was] not allowed to give the impression that there was any sort of finding

of dishonesty” in the Whittle case.65 Finally, regarding factor four, the court ruled

that the evidence was “certainly not cumulative here because it is the first of its kind

that will be potentially introduced.”66 Applying those factors, the trial court

permitted Hazelett’s counsel to inquire into the areas that counsel indicated she

intended to explore during cross-examination, other than the dismissal of the Whittle

case.

(19) Hazelett argues that the trial court erred because it failed to address two

additional factors discussed in Snowden: “‘(1) if the jury was exposed to facts

sufficient for it to draw inferences as to the reliability of the witness and (2) if

defense counsel had an adequate record from which to argue . . . .’” 67 Hazelett

misreads Snowden; these two factors are what an appellate court considers in

64
Id. at A56.
65
Id. at A57.
66
Id. at A55.
67
Appellant’s Opening Br. at 21–22 (quoting Smith v. State, 913 A.2d 1197, 1233 (Del. 2006)).

12
determining whether a trial court’s restrictions on cross-examination violated the

defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses.68

(20) Those two factors confirm that Hazelett’s constitutional rights were not

violated by the restrictions placed on Corporal Moses’s cross-examination. First,

the jury was exposed to sufficient facts to draw inferences regarding Corporal

Moses’s reliability as a witness. Hazelett’s counsel identified her proposed line of

questioning,69 was able to ask Corporal Moses each of the questions that she

proposed without objection or restriction,70 and elicited the relevant information

from Corporal Moses. Counsel asked questions related to the importance of telling

the truth in both sworn documents and testimony, as well as Corporal Moses’s

specific acts and contradictory testimony in the Whittle case.71 “To properly evaluate

68
Smith, 913 A.2d at 1233 (quoting Snowden, 672 A.2d at 1025) (“‘When the cross-examination
relates to impeachment evidence, the test for determining if the trial judge’s limitation on cross-
examination violated the defendant's confrontation right is whether the jury had in its possession
sufficient information to appraise the biases and motivations of the witness. . . . More specifically,
we look to the cross-examination permitted to ascertain (1) if the jury was exposed to facts
sufficient for it to draw inferences as to the reliability of the witness and (2) if defense counsel had
an adequate record from which to argue why the witness might have been biased . . . .’”).
69
“My intent is to ask about what he swore in the affidavit, I plan on using his own language, what
he testified to in the preliminary hearing, using his own language, and what he testified to at the
trial, in his own language, and leave it at that. Obviously, I will be asking him questions about the
importance of telling the truth and the fact that he did swear to tell the truth in all of those
proceedings. But I’m not planning on getting deep into the facts of each of the cases, or that case
specifically. I don’t think delving too deeply into the facts is relevant.” App. to Opening Br. at
A55.
70
See id. at A71–72.
71
Id.

13
a witness, a jury must have sufficient information to make discriminating appraisal

of a witness’s motives and bias.”72 Hazelett’s jury received that evidence.

(21) Moreover, defense counsel had an adequate record from which to argue

bias. Counsel had all Corporal Moses’s inconsistent statements, including

transcripts of Whittle and Mobley, as well as his testimony in this trial. The only

restriction placed on cross-examination was inquiry into the outcome of the Whittle

trial. The court properly restricted this line of questioning because Whittle was

dismissed for insufficient evidence, and any other explanation would have been

confusing and potentially devolved into a trial-within-a-trial. The trial court did not

preclude Hazelett’s defense counsel from urging the inference that Corporal Moses

was dishonest or misleading in prior testimony—it simply held that Hazelett could

not argue that there was a previous finding of dishonesty or that the Whittle case was

dismissed because Corporal Moses was dishonest.73

B. The trial court did not err in precluding Hazelett from arguing that
the traffic stop was illegal.
(22) Hazelett contends that she was entitled to challenge the credibility of

Corporal Moses’s testimony regarding the alleged turn-signal violation and that the

trial court improperly restricted her from doing so.74 The trial court noted that the

72
Douglas v. Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1230 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45,
52 (1984)).
73
App. to Opening Br. at A57.
74
Appellant’s Opening Br. at 20.

14
initial traffic stop was not captured on body-worn camera, and impeachment

testimony related to Whittle would be particularly relevant to this portion of Corporal

Moses’s testimony.75

(23) Regarding the turn-signal violation, the court stated:

I see your point, [State], about the turn -- it is not exactly arguing a motion to
suppress, because that too is not allowed, there will be no tolerance for any
argument that the stop should not have been made, because this is not a motion
to suppress, but there is a turn signal violation that is before the jury and that
is [for] their consideration.76

Although the court’s ruling could have been clearer in hindsight, counsel could

reasonably understand that Hazelett could not challenge the justification for the

stop—akin to a motion to suppress—but could argue that the State had not met its

burden to prove the elements of the turn-signal violation beyond a reasonable doubt.

(24) The court later clarified:

Well, I asked [defense counsel] at the . . . beginning of one of our discussions
this afternoon . . . what she was planning to explore on this line of questioning,
and . . . she answered very limited. And so . . . obviously there can't be any
argument that it was an improper illegal stop. But . . . it’s a turn signal
violation here, and it was testified to that that was the basis of the stop . . .
whatever inferences can be appropriately argued, I expect that all parties will
stay within that.77

75
App. to Opening Br. at A57.
76
Id.
77
Id. at A64.

15
To the extent that Hazelett’s counsel was unsure whether this ruling permitted or

barred certain questions, Hazelett did not seek clarification. Counsel did not identify

for the trial court—and has not identified on appeal—what additional questions

regarding Corporal Moses’s credibility that Hazelett should have been permitted to

ask to challenge the turn-signal evidence. The trial court correctly held that Hazelett

could not argue that the stop was illegal, and it was incumbent on counsel to clarify

any confusion she had regarding the parameters of the court’s ruling. In the context

of a fast-moving trial, the trial judge can reasonably expect that trial counsel will

speak up if they do not understand an evidentiary ruling.

C. Any error in the trial court’s rulings was harmless.
(25) Finally, Hazelett urges that the trial court erred in stating or implying

that defense counsel ambushed the State by not apprising it of Hazelett’s intent to

raise the Whittle matter in impeachment.78 The State concedes that the trial court

erred when it suggested that defense counsel was obligated to turn over impeachment

material before cross-examination.79 Any implication that defense counsel engaged

78
Appellant’s Opening Br. at 16–19.
79
State’s Answering Br. at 17.

16
in trial by ambush80 was not consistent with our discovery rules.81 There was,

however, no “chilling effect” caused by the trial court’s ruling.82

(26) When reviewing claims of harmless error, this Court “‘considers the

probability that an error affected the jury’s decision. To do this, [we] must study the

record to ascertain the probable impact of error in the context of the entire trial.’” 83

In Hazelett’s trial, the court’s error regarding defense counsel’s obligation to

disclose impeachment evidence did not affect the jury’s verdict. As discussed above,

defense counsel created a record from which she could argue that the jury should not

believe Corporal Moses. Moreover, Corporal Moses’s testimony was corroborated

by Officer Rosaio, Officer Schulz, and body-worn camera footage.

(27) For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not violate Hazelett’s

constitutional right to present a complete defense and cross-examine her accusers—

80
App. to Opening Br. at A58.
81
See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 16; see e.g. United States v. Robertson, 2020 WL 6786186, at *3
(D.N.M. Nov. 18, 2020) (“discovery obligations are not symmetrical. The government must turn
over any requested documents . . . it ‘intends to use . . . in its case-in-chief at trial’ or if the item is
‘material to preparing the defense.’ The defense, by contrast, must only turn over documents . . .
it ‘intends to use . . . in the defendant’s case-in-chief at trial.’”); United States v. Medearis, 380
F.3d 1049, 1057 (8th Cir. 2004) (“reciprocal pre-trial disclosure . . . includes only documents []
the defendant intends to introduce during his own case-in-chief”); United States v. Moore, 208
F.3d 577, 579 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding document used only for impeachment is not excludable
under Rule 16); United States v. Gray-Burriss, 791 F.3d 50, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (same).
82
See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 3–4 (citing People v. Carter, 86 A.D.2d 451, 457–58 (N.Y. 1982);
State v. Foster, 1990 WL 174008 at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 6, 1990)). The cases Hazelett cites
are not analogous to what occurred in this case. Unlike the cited cases, there was no suggestion by
trial court here that defense counsel was acting unethically or could be disciplined.
83
Harris v. State, 113 A.3d 1067, 1078 (Del. 2015) (quoting Hansley v. State, 104 A.3d 833, 837
(Del. 2014)).

17
it properly applied the four-factor Snowden test to limit the scope of impeachment.

Furthermore, the trial court did not err in precluding Hazelett from arguing that the

initial traffic stop was illegal. Any error in the trial court’s ruling that defense

counsel was obligated to turn over impeachment material before cross-examination

was harmless and did not affect the jury’s verdict.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the

Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Abigail M. LeGrow
Justice

18