In the Matter of Rolf D. Brewster, a person with a disability

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN THE MATTER OF ROLF D. §
BREWSTER, a person with a §
disability,1 § No. 254, 2025
§
§ Court Below—Court of Chancery
§ of the State of Delaware
§
§ C.M. No. CM20694-N
§

Submitted: July 25, 2025
Decided: August 8, 2025

Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the notice to show cause and the responses, it appears

to the Court that:

(1) On September 24, 2024, Christiana Care Health Systems filed a petition

in the Court of Chancery seeking appointment of a guardian of the person and

property of “Rolf D. Brewster” under Title 12, Chapter 39 of the Delaware Code.

The court appointed an attorney ad litem for Brewster. Brewster’s wife (“Wife”)

objected to the petition.

1
The Court has assigned a pseudonym in this appeal in a guardianship matter.
(2) After an evidentiary hearing on May 23, 2025, at which Wife was

represented by counsel,2 the Senior Magistrate issued an oral final report finding that

Brewster is a person with a disability and that the Office of the Public Guardian

should be appointed as guardian of Brewster’s person and property. The Senior

Magistrate stated that exceptions could be filed under Court of Chancery Rule 144.

No exceptions were filed within the time permitted by Rule 144. On June 4, 2025,

the Senior Magistrate entered an order appointing the Office of the Public Guardian

as Brewster’s guardian (the “Guardianship Order”).

(3) On June 13, 2025, Wife filed a document in this Court that was deemed

to be a notice of appeal from the Guardianship Order. The Clerk’s office issued a

notice directing Wife to show cause why this appeal “should not be dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction because this is not an uncontested civil miscellaneous matter in

which Court of Chancery Rule 144(c)(2)(B) applies and the Chancellor or a Vice

Chancellor has not entered a final order.” In response to the notice to show cause,

Wife sets forth her claims of error but does not address the jurisdictional issue. The

Court directed the petitioner (Christiana Care) and the attorney ad litem to respond.

The attorney ad litem states that counsel “do[es] not believe [Wife] has standing, nor

the Court jurisdiction, for an appeal” and that “such appeal [is] inappropriate” under

2
A few days after the hearing, Wife’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw, indicating that Wife had
requested counsel to withdraw because Wife wanted to move forward in a self-represented
capacity. The senior magistrate granted the motion on May 30, 2025.
2
Court of Chancery Rule 144, but indicates that addressing those questions “goes

beyond [counsel’s] position” as attorney ad litem. Christiana Care did not respond.

(4) This Court traditionally has not heard appeals from magistrates’

reports—rather, even when no exceptions were filed, the Chancellor or a Vice

Chancellor was required to enter an order adopting the report before an appeal could

be taken.3 Moreover, this Court “has long held that substantive challenges to a

Magistrate’s final report that are not raised in exceptions under Court of Chancery

Rule 144 are not preserved for review on appeal to this Court.”4

(5) In 2024, the Court of Chancery amended the rules governing exceptions

to magistrate’s reports. Court of Chancery Rule 144(c)(2) now provides the

following as to taking exceptions to a magistrate’s final report:

(A) Exceptions in a Civil Action Other Than on the Civil
Miscellaneous Docket. A party may take exceptions to any Report only
after entry of the Final Report. If no party timely files a notice of
exceptions after entry of a Final Report, then the Chancellor will adopt
the Final Report and all prior Reports as orders of the Court. If a party
timely files a notice of exceptions to a Final Report or any prior Report,

3
See, e.g., Theerachanon v. FIA Cards Servs., 2024 WL 2073629, at *1 (Del. May 8, 2024) (“In
the absence of a stipulation by the parties to submit their dispute to a Magistrate for final decision
under 10 Del. C. § 350 or an order by the Court of Chancery adopting the Magistrate’s final report
under Court of Chancery Rule 144(c), this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a
Magistrate’s order.”); see also DEL. CT. CH. R. 144(c) (effective July 18, 2023, to Dec. 8, 2024)
(“Any party may take exception to a final report or a draft report. . . . Exceptions to a final report
shall be heard by the Court. . . . If a notice of exception to a final report is not timely filed, then
the parties shall be deemed to have stipulated to the approval and entry of the report as an order of
the Court.”); Appleby Apartments LP v. Appleby Apartments Assocs., L.P., 2024 WL 851809, at
*2 (Del. Feb. 29, 2024) (stating that Rule 144(c) was “not self-executing,” but required the court
to enter an order adopting a magistrate’s final report before there was a “final, appealable order”).
4
Cowan v. Furlow, 2024 WL 4362264, at *2 (Del. Sept. 30, 2024).
3
then the Chancellor will assign a Reviewing Judge to hear the
exceptions.
(B) Exceptions in an Action on the Civil Miscellaneous
Docket. In an action on the civil miscellaneous docket, a party may
take exceptions to any Report following the issuance of such Report.
The schedule for such exceptions is governed by Rule 144(d)(4). If no
party timely files a notice of exceptions after entry of a Report granting
an uncontested petition, the Report shall be deemed adopted in its
entirety as an order of the Court, and shall have the same effect as
though issued by a Chancellor or Vice Chancellor, as of the date it was
issued by the Magistrate in Chancery, nunc pro tunc.
. . . .5

Thus, the amendment eliminated the requirement that the Chancellor or a Vice

Chancellor enter an adopting order after a magistrate grants an uncontested petition

on the civil miscellaneous docket—in such a case, the magistrate’s report now is

“deemed adopted in its entirety as an order of the Court.”6

(6) But there is a gap in Rule 144(c) as to contested actions on the civil

miscellaneous docket. This case falls into that gap, because Wife contested the

guardianship petition—she filed a Notice of Objection to Guardianship Petition on

the Court of Chancery’s form, contesting the need for a guardian.7 We are reluctant

5
DEL. CT. CH. R. 144(c)(2) (effective Dec. 9, 2024, to present). Court of Chancery Rule 144(d)(4)
similarly distinguishes between contested and uncontested petitions when establishing the
deadlines for exceptions in matters on the civil miscellaneous docket. See id. R.144(d)(4) (“A
party taking exceptions to a Report entered in an action on the Civil Miscellaneous Docket must
file a notice of exceptions within 11 days of a Report or Draft Report, except that a party taking
exceptions to a Report or Draft Report addressing an uncontested petition, or for which the
Magistrate in Chancery has expedited exceptions, must file a notice of exceptions within three
days of the Report or Draft Report and proceed under Rule 144(d)(2).”).
6
Id. § 144(c)(2)(B).
7
Wife also indicated that she would like to be considered as a guardian if the Court determined
that a guardian was necessary, but did not file a cross-petition for guardianship as instructed on
the form. See Chancery Docket Entry No. 6.
4
to determine the effect of that gap in a trial court rule on this Court’s appellate

jurisdiction in the absence of meaningful input from the litigants addressing the

jurisdictional issue. But we need not do so in this case, because even assuming that

this Court has jurisdiction, by failing to file exceptions to the Senior Magistrate’s

final report, Wife did not preserve the issues of which she seeks review.8 Thus,

whether characterized as dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or affirmance because the

appellant failed to preserve any issues that could result in reversal of the Court of

Chancery’s order, we conclude that further proceedings in this appeal will not alter

the result.

(7) After Wife filed this appeal, Brewster’s daughter filed a petition

seeking to remove the Office of the Public Guardian and appoint Brewster’s

daughter as guardian. The Senior Magistrate stayed the petition pending (i) the

resolution of the notice to show cause in this Court, and (ii) the current guardian’s

filing of a status report as required by the Guardianship Order. As further

proceedings in this appeal will not alter the result and the pending appeal is inhibiting

further proceedings in the Court of Chancery, we conclude that the matter should be

remanded without further briefing.

8
Cowan, 2024 WL 4362264, at *2.
5
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that this matter is REMANDED to

the Court of Chancery for further proceedings consistent with this order. Jurisdiction

is not retained.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gary F. Traynor
Justice

6