Jake Scott v. Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families TPR

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JAKE SCOTT,1 §
§ No. 471, 2025
Respondent Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below–Family Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ File No. 23-02-11TN
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES § Petition No. 25-11773
FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND §
THEIR FAMILIES, §
§
Petitioner Below, §
Appellee. §

Submitted: April 14, 2026
Decided: May 8, 2026

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the no-merit brief and motion to withdraw filed by the

appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26.1(c), the responses thereto, and

the Family Court record, it appears to the Court that:

(1) By order dated October 20, 2025, the Family Court terminated the

parental rights of the appellant, Jake Scott (“Father”), in his son, born in April 2024

(the “Child”).2 Father appeals.

1
The Court previously assigned a pseudonym to the appellant under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
2
The Family Court’s order also terminated the parental rights of the Child’s mother. We refer only
to facts in the record that relate to Father’s appeal.
(2) On appeal, Father’s counsel has filed an opening brief and a motion to

withdraw under Rule 26.1(c). Counsel asserts that she has conducted a conscientious

review of the record and the relevant law and has determined that Father’s appeal is

wholly without merit. Counsel informed Father of the provisions of Rule 26.1(c),

provided him with a copy of counsel’s motion to withdraw and the accompanying

brief, and advised him that he could submit in writing any additional points that he

wished for the Court to consider. Father has submitted arguments for the Court’s

consideration. The Delaware Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their

Families (DSCYF) as the appellee and the Child’s attorney from the Office of the

Child Advocate have responded to counsel’s Rule 26.1(c) brief and argue that the

Family Court’s judgment should be affirmed.

(3) On August 23, 2024, DSCYF petitioned for emergency custody of the

Child after the Child’s mother violated a safety plan that DSCYF put in place

because of its concerns about the Child’s mother’s untreated mental health

diagnoses, history of domestic violence, and prior involvement with DSCYF.

(4) With the filing of DSCYF’s dependency-and-neglect petition, the

mandated hearings ensued.3 At the preliminary protective and adjudicatory hearings,

Father stipulated that the Child was dependent in his care because he was

3
When a child is removed from his home by DSCYF and placed in foster care, the Family Court
is required to hold hearings at regular intervals under procedures and criteria detailed by statute
and the court’s rules. 13 Del. C. § 2514; Del. Fam. Ct. Civ. Proc. R. 212-219.
2
incarcerated for, among other things, endangering the welfare of a child and

violating a protection-from-abuse (PFA) order.

(5) In November 2024, DSCYF developed a case plan to facilitate Father’s

reunification with the Child. Father’s case plan required him to, upon his release

from prison: (i) undergo a psychological evaluation and follow all treatment

recommendations; (ii) undergo a substance abuse evaluation and follow all treatment

recommendations; (iii) work with a family interventionist to, among other things,

obtain and maintain stable employment and housing; (iv) complete a parenting class;

(v) enroll in (and successfully complete) the Offender Intervention Services program

offered by Child, Inc.; and (vi) attend the Child’s medical appointments and work

with his treatment providers to ensure that his medical needs were being met. The

case plan also required that Father refrain from committing new criminal offenses

or violating the existing PFA order prohibiting him from contacting the Child’s

mother. The case plan also noted that there was a presumption that the Child could

not be placed in Father’s home because Father was a perpetrator of domestic

violence.4

4
See 13 Del. C. § 705A(a) (“Notwithstanding other provisions of this title, there shall be a
rebuttable presumption that no perpetrator of domestic violence shall be awarded sole or joint
custody of any child.”), id. § 705A(c) (providing that the presumption will be overcome if “there
have been no further acts of domestic violence” and the perpetrator of domestic violence has,
among other things, successfully completed “a program of evaluation and counseling designed
specifically for perpetrators of family violence and conducted by a public or private agency or a
certified mental health professional”).
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(6) At the March 14, 2025 review hearing, Father stipulated that the Child

remained dependent in his care because he was still incarcerated. Because Father

continued to be incarcerated, he had neither made any progress on his case plan nor

visited with the Child.

(7) On May 30, 2025, the Family Court granted DSCYF’s motion to

change the permanency plan from reunification to termination of parental rights

(TPR) for the purpose of adoption. The same day, DSCYF moved to terminate

Father’s parental rights for his failure to plan for the Child’s physical needs or mental

and emotional health and development.5 As of the June 2, 2025 permanency hearing,

Father remained incarcerated, and DSCYF had no information about any progress

that he might have made on his case plan.

(8) The Family Court held a TPR hearing on October 20, 2025. Father, who

had been released from prison in June, did not appear. The Family Court heard

testimony from Father’s DSCYF treatment worker, the Child’s DSCYF permanency

worker, the Child’s foster mother, and the Child’s court-appointed special advocate.

Father’s certified criminal history showed that he was arrested for shoplifting in

July—just weeks after he had been released from prison. At the time of the TPR

hearing, Father was on probation in Delaware and Pennsylvania and had several

5
When a child comes into DSCYF custody as an infant, DSCYF may file a TPR petition after the
child has been in DSCYF custody for six months. 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5)(b).
4
outstanding warrants. Except for one phone call to his treatment worker in May

2025, Father had not communicated with DSCYF, and his current whereabouts were

unknown. Nor had Father been communicating with his attorney, who advised the

court that she had received just one phone call from Father, asking her—without

explanation—to request a continuance of the TPR hearing. The Child, who had

initially struggled to meet some developmental milestones, was doing well in foster

care and was transitioning to a home that was an adoptive resource. At the conclusion

of the hearing, the Family Court granted DSCYF’s TPR petition. This appeal

followed.

(9) On appeal, this Court is required to consider the facts and the law as

well as the inferences and deductions made by the Family Court.6 We review legal

rulings de novo.7 We conduct a limited review of the factual findings of the trial

court to assure that they are sufficiently supported by the record and are not clearly

erroneous.8 If the trial judge has correctly applied the law, then our standard of

review is abuse of discretion.9 On issues of witness credibility, we will not substitute

our judgment for that of the trier of fact.10

6
Wilson v. Div. of Family Servs., 988 A.2d 435, 439-40 (Del. 2010).
7
Id. at 440.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979).
5
(10) The statutory framework under which the Family Court may terminate

parental rights requires two separate inquiries.11 First, the court must determine

whether the evidence presented meets one of the statutory grounds for termination.12

When the statutory basis for termination is failure to plan, the Family Court must

also find proof of at least one additional statutory condition.13 If the Family Court

finds a statutory basis for termination of parental rights, the court must then

determine whether, under 13 Del. C. § 722, severing parental rights is in the child’s

best interest.14 Both of these requirements must be established by clear and

convincing evidence.15

(11) Here, the Family Court found that DSCYF had proved, by clear and

convincing evidence, that the termination of Father’s parental rights was appropriate

because of his failure to plan16 and that the Child had been in DSCYF custody for

more than six months.17 The Family Court also found, by clear and convincing

evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest.

11
Shepherd v. Clemens, 752 A.2d 533, 536-37 (Del. 2000).
12
Id. at 537.
13
13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5)(a)-(e) (listing additional conditions).
14
Shepherd, 752 A.2d at 536-37.
15
Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, Youth and Their Families, 963 A.2d 724, 731 (Del.
2008).
16
13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5).
17
Id. § 1103(a)(5)(b).
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(12) In the points that Father has submitted for the Court’s consideration,

Father argues, in essence, that DSCYF did not provide meaningful reunification

services to him. Father also maintains that an attorney who represented him earlier

in the dependency-and-neglect proceedings was ineffective. Father’s arguments are

unpersuasive.

(13) The record reflects that Father had the contact information for his

DSCYF treatment worker and declined to communicate with her until May 2025—

more than eight months after the Child (then a four-month-old) had been placed in

DSCYF custody. And Father made no attempt to contact DSCYF or visit with the

Child after he was released from prison in June 2025. We also note that Father was

reminded repeatedly by the Family Court that he would not be able to make progress

on his case plan while he was incarcerated. Finally, despite knowing that there was

a legal presumption that the Child could not be placed with him, Father did not (and

does not) claim that he made any effort to enroll in (much less complete) the

Offender Intervention Services program. That is, even if Father had maintained

contact with DSCYF, completed some elements of his case plan, and appeared at

the TPR hearing, the Child could not have legally been placed with him following

the hearing because Father had not satisfied the case plan’s domestic-violence

component.

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(14) To the extent that Father maintains that his previous attorney’s

ineffective representation led to the termination of his paternal rights, the record does

not support his claim. Father fails to identify any action that counsel could have

taken on his behalf that would have mitigated, much less excused, Father’s failure

to complete the elements of his case plan.

(15) Having carefully reviewed the parties’ positions and the record on

appeal, we find that the Family Court’s factual findings are supported by the record,

and we can discern no error in the court’s application of the law to the facts. We

therefore conclude that Father’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any

arguably appealable issues. We are satisfied that Father’s counsel made a

conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and properly determined that

Father could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family

Court is AFFIRMED. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is moot.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Chief Justice

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