Romeo v. DMG Practice Management Solutions, LLC

SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
PAUL R. WALLACE LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 10400
JUDGE WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801
(302) 255-0660

Submitted: April 7, 2025
Decided: April 23, 2025
David A. Felice, Esquire Alexandra M. Cumings, Esquire
BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP Rachel R. Tunney, Esquire
2961 Centerville Road MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP
Wilmington, Delaware 19808 1201 N. Market Street
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
David B. Wechsler, Esquire
Daniel B. Grossman, Esquire
Kim L. Michael, Esquire
HARRIS ST. LAURENT & WECHSLER LLP
40 Wall Street, 53rd Floor
New York, New York 10005

RE: Anthony A. Romeo v. DMG Practice Management Solutions, LLC
C.A. No. N24C-11-273 PRW
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay

Dear Counsel:

This Letter Order resolves Defendant DMG Practice Management’s Motion

to Dismiss or Stay (D.I. 2). For the reasons explained below, Defendant DMG

Practice Management’s Motion to Stay is GRANTED; the request for dismissal is

MOOT at this point and may be revisited upon lift of the stay. Given this disposition

on the papers, the oral argument scheduled for next week will be removed from the

Court’s calendar.
Anthony A. Romeo v. DMG Practice Management Solutions, LLC
C.A. No. N24C-11-273 PRW
April 22, 2025
Page 2 of 10

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. THE PARTIES

Dr. Romeo is an individual who resides—at times relevant here, worked—in

Illinois.1

DMG Practice Management Solutions, LLC, is a Delaware limited liability

company with its principal place of business in Illinois.2

Non-party Duly, formerly known as DuPage Medical Group, is the parent

company of DMG and an Illinois corporation.3

B. THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT AND RESTRICTED UNIT AGREEMENT

Dr. Romeo is a surgeon who entered into an employment agreement with Duly

in 2020.4 His compensation included 15,000 units of DMG’s Class B Units.5 The

terms regarding the units were further outlined in the Restricted Unit Agreement that

Dr. Romeo and DMG are parties to.6 It states that:

1
Compl. ¶ 13 (D.I. 1).
2
Compl. ¶ 15.
3
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3 (D.I. 2); DuPage Medical Group Announces Rebrand to Duly
Health and Care to Reflect Growth and Organizational Evolution, DULY (Sept. 15, 2021),
https://www.dulyhealthandcare.com/news/dupage-medical-group-announces-rebrand-to-duly-
health-and-care-to-reflect-growth-and-organizational-evolution.
4
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A (“Employment Agreement”).
5
Id., Ex. C (“Restricted Unit Agreement”).
6
See generally Restricted Unit Agreement.
Anthony A. Romeo v. DMG Practice Management Solutions, LLC
C.A. No. N24C-11-273 PRW
April 22, 2025
Page 3 of 10

In the event of the termination of the Unitholder’s employment
or other service relationship with the Company or any of its
subsidiaries for Cause or due to the Unitholder’s resignation
(other than due to Retirement), or the Unitholder’s violation of
the Continuing Obligations (as defined below), whether before
or after the termination of the service provider relationship, the
Unitholder will forfeit to the Company all vested and unvested
Units, without any consideration due or payable to such
Unitholder, and such Unitholder will cease to have any further
right, title or interest in the forfeited Units.7

Section 3 of the Employment Agreement with Duly governs the termination

of the parties’ relationship.8 It grants Duly the right to terminate “for cause

immediately upon the occurrence” of specific events.9 It also allows Dr. Romeo to

terminate the agreement for cause if: (1) Duly fails to make payments and the failure

continues for 10 days post notice; or (2) Duly breaches any material terms and fails

to cure within 30 days after notice.10 Either party may terminate without cause upon

giving a 90-day notice.11

Illinois law governs the Employment Agreement with Duly; Delaware law

governs the Restrictive Unit Agreement with DMG.12

7
Id. § 3(a).
8
See generally Employment Agreement.
9
Id. § 3.1(a).
10
Id. § 3.1(b).
11
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. B (“Employment Agreement Amendment”) § 3.1(c).
12
Employment Agreement § 12.3; Restricted Unit Agreement § 11.
Anthony A. Romeo v. DMG Practice Management Solutions, LLC
C.A. No. N24C-11-273 PRW
April 22, 2025
Page 4 of 10

C. THE TERMINATION

Beginning in 2023, the relationship between Duly and Dr. Romeo soured.

According to Dr. Romeo, Duly breached the Employment Agreement by firing his

support staff and demoting him via a company-wide email with no prior notice.13

In March 2024, Dr. Romeo sent a letter to Duly. Therein, he claimed that

Duly was in breach of the Employment Agreement, specifically referencing Exhibit

1.1(a) which governed Dr. Romeo’s involvement in management.14 Duly responded

four days later stating that the issue was based on a “misunderstanding.”15 Dr.

Romeo wasn’t satisfied and sent two more letters giving official notice of Duly’s

breach.16 Still unhappy with Duly’s lack of action, Dr. Romeo sent another notice

on April 24, 2024, warning that Duly had 30 days to cure.17

About a month later, Duly responded by denying any breach and suggesting

that any possible breach “can be cured immediately and through this letter by DMG’s

previous representations that Dr. Romeo is free to resume his duties . . . .”18

13
Compl. ¶¶ 53-70.
14
Id. ¶¶ 71-72.
15
Id. ¶ 75.
16
Id. ¶¶ 76-77.
17
Id. ¶ 79.
18
Compl. ¶ 80; Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 9.
Anthony A. Romeo v. DMG Practice Management Solutions, LLC
C.A. No. N24C-11-273 PRW
April 22, 2025
Page 5 of 10

Still claiming that the breaches weren’t cured, Dr. Romeo sent a letter on June

4, 2024, which purported to provide “written notice that he is terminating the

Employment Agreement pursuant to Section 3.1(b)(ii).”19 Duly acknowledged the

termination the next day and later informed Dr. Romeo that his last day would be

June 12.20 Since his termination, Duly and DMG have refused to give Dr. Romeo

his vested units claiming that he is no longer entitled to them under the

Agreements.21

D. THE ENSUING LITIGATION

In November, Dr. Romeo filed this complaint against DMG.22 He requests

that the Court: (1) declare that the vested Units are not subject to forfeiture

(declaratory judgment); (2) find that DMG breached the Restrictive Unit Agreement

by deeming that Dr. Romeo’s vested units were forfeited; and (3) hold that DMG

violated the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection (the “IWPCA”) by deeming the

vested units forfeited.23

Dr. Romeo also filed for arbitration against Duly in Illinois over the alleged

19
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. D (“Termination Letter”).
20
Compl. ¶¶ 85-89.
21
E.g., Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 10.
22
See generally Compl.
23
Id. ¶¶ 93, 97.
Anthony A. Romeo v. DMG Practice Management Solutions, LLC
C.A. No. N24C-11-273 PRW
April 22, 2025
Page 6 of 10

breach of the Employment Agreement.24

In response to these maneuverings by Dr. Romeo, DMG brings this motion to

dismiss or stay the action.25

II. PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

DMG claims that Dr. Romeo’s complaint does not allege sufficient facts to

give rise to a breach-of-contract claim.26 It states that the Restrictive Unit

Agreement’s plain language does not support Dr. Romeo’s request for declaratory

judgment or a finding that DMG breached the contract.27 DMG also claims that Dr.

Romeo’s IWPCA claim fails because DMG is not an employer under the statute and

the units do not qualify as compensation.28 Finally, if DMG’s motion to dismiss

isn’t granted, it requests a stay to allow the arbitration between Duly and Dr. Romeo

to conclude before this case proceeds.29

Dr. Romeo requests that this action move forward now and, if there are any

fatal issues with the pleadings, that the motion to dismiss be granted with leave for

24
Id. at 10-11.
25
See generally Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss.
26
Id. at 2.
27
Id. at 12-18.
28
Id. at 18-22.
29
Id. at 22-25.
Anthony A. Romeo v. DMG Practice Management Solutions, LLC
C.A. No. N24C-11-273 PRW
April 22, 2025
Page 7 of 10

him to amend his complaint.30

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6), ‘[t]he legal issue to be decided is,

whether a plaintiff may recover under any reasonably conceivable set of

circumstances susceptible of proof under the complaint.’”31 Delaware’s pleading

standard is “minimal.”32 “When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court (i)

accepts as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint, (ii) credits vague

allegations if they give the opposing party notice of the claim, and (iii) draws all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs.”33

In the alternative, it is well within the Court’s discretion to grant a motion to

stay in an instance like this.34

30
Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 12-32 (D.I. 5).
31
Vinton v. Grayson, 189 A.3d 695, 700 (Del. Super. Ct. 2018) (quoting L&L Broad. LLC v.
Triad Broad. Co., LLC, 2014 WL 1724769, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 2014)).
32
Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 536 (Del. 2011)
(citing Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 895 (Del. 2002)).
33
Ont. Provincial Council of Carpenters’ Pension Tr. Fund v. Walton, 294 A.3d 65, 84 (Del. Ch.
2023) (citing Cent. Mortg., 27 A.3d at 535).
34
See Julian v. Julian, 2009 WL 2937121, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 2009) (explaining that a court
“possesses the inherent power to manage its own docket and may, on the basis of comity,
efficiency, or common sense, issue a stay pending the resolution of an arbitration, even for those
claims that are not arbitrable”); see also Bastion Rest. Grp. LLC v. Gaudelet, 2024 WL 5135977,
at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 2024) (applying the principal when addressing indemnity claims).
Anthony A. Romeo v. DMG Practice Management Solutions, LLC
C.A. No. N24C-11-273 PRW
April 22, 2025
Page 8 of 10

IV. DISCUSSION

The Court may find that a stay is proper when the facts are intertwined with

arbitration proceedings and the Court would benefit from reviewing the complete

arbitration record.35 Just so here.

In this case, Dr. Romeo’s claims against DMG rely on the allegation that the

units were wrongfully withheld.36 Such a determination is heavily dependent on

whether Duly violated the Employment Agreement. Without question, Duly’s

actions impact whether Dr. Romeo’s departure qualifies as a “resignation” that

35
See Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 926 A.2d 1071, 1075 (Del. 2007); see
also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Arco Alaska, Inc., 1983 WL 20283, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 3, 1983)
(“Here, however, given the magnitude of the situation, given the fact that the arbitration is the
product of the operating agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties, and given the enormous
burden that would be involved in the simultaneous litigation of the same basic controversy with
many of the same witnesses and attorneys on two coasts at the same time, I think that common
sense dictates that this case should be stayed pending the decision of the arbitrators.”).
There is no authority barring or counseling against exercising the Court’s discretion to grant a stay
when only one of the parties is involved in related arbitration proceedings. This is commonsensical
because claims naming different parties may still have substantially similar issues and the other
proceedings may provide useful insight to a court sitting on a closely related suit. Too, those
arbital decisions might inform the parties’ litigative acts in circumstances like this. Be sure—
though likely helpful to all involved here—the Court won’t reflexively deem any of the arbitrator’s
decisions as binding to the parties now before it.
36
While Dr. Romeo’s says otherwise, the first-filed rule is of no moment here because it doesn’t
trump controlling contractual provisions and DMG is not a party to the arbitration. See Nokia Sols.
& Networks Oy v. Collision Commc’ns, Inc., 2020 WL 2095829, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 30,
2020) (explaining that the first-filed rule applies when (1) there is a prior action pending elsewhere,
(2) in a court capable of providing prompt and complete justice, (3) involving the same parties and
issues); see also Utilipath, LLC v. Hayes, 2015 WL 1744163, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 2015) (“The
McWane doctrine is a default rule of common law, which the parties to the litigation are free to
displace by a valid contractual agreement.”) (citations omitted).
Anthony A. Romeo v. DMG Practice Management Solutions, LLC
C.A. No. N24C-11-273 PRW
April 22, 2025
Page 9 of 10

forfeits his units under the Restricted Unit Agreement.

Since the propriety of Duly’s actions are—at Dr. Romeo’s prompting—now

before an arbitrator, this Court will exercise its discretion to withhold action in this

matter until that issue is resolved there.37 There is no reason why these issues should

be arbitrated/litigated concurrently. Accordingly, this action is stayed pending the

resolution of the ongoing arbitration between Dr. Romeo and Duly. Only upon the

completion of that arbitration between Dr. Romeo and Duly should and will this

Court independently determine if DMG is liable.38

V. CONCLUSION

DMG’s Motion to Stay is GRANTED. Its prayer for dismissal of all claims

is deemed MOOT and may—upon proper application by the parties—be revisited

upon lifting of the stay.

After conferring with DMG, Dr. Romeo should file a status update in this

Court no later than 30 days after the disposition of the now-pending Romeo/Duly

arbitration.

37
See Rapoport v. Litig. Tr. of MDIP Inc., 2005 WL 3277911, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2005)
(“The granting of a stay rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.”).
38
DMG and Dr. Romeo have granted Delaware courts exclusive jurisdiction over their
relationship. Restricted Unit Agreement § 11.
Anthony A. Romeo v. DMG Practice Management Solutions, LLC
C.A. No. N24C-11-273 PRW
April 22, 2025
Page 10 of 10

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Paul R. Wallace
_______________________
Paul R. Wallace, Judge

cc: All Counsel via File and Serve