State v. Johnson

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Crim I.D. No. 2308000243
)
KADAESHA JOHNSON, )
Defendant. )

Submitted: February 25, 2025
Decided: May 23, 2025

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal – DENIED

Jillian Bender, Esquire, Zoe Schloss, Esquire, Deputy Attorneys General,
Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, attorneys for the State of Delaware
Michael Heyden, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, attorney for Defendant

BRENNAN, J.

1
Following her convictions for Assault First Degree and Possession of a

Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony (hereinafter “PDWDCF”),

Defendant Kadaesha Johnson moves for judgment of acquittal. 1 Arguing a theory

of inconsistent verdicts, Johnson urges the Court to find the evidence insufficient to

convict. The State opposes. In its opposition, the State argues the theory of

accomplice liability supports Defendant’s convictions. The State is correct;

sufficient evidence exists under the accomplice liability theory, which can allow for

a conviction even where the jury acquits on a conspiracy charge. Therefore, the

verdicts in the case were supported by the evidence, were not inconsistent and for

the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion is DENIED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the evening of July 25, 2023, Defendant, her then-neighbors, Raney

Wooding (hereinafter “Wooding”) and Guillermo Rodriguez (hereinafter

“Rodriguez”), engaged in a verbal altercation that ultimately turned physical. 2 At

first, all were outside in the backyards of 518 and 516 Monroe Street. 3 The verbal

argument escalated when Defendant spat on Wooding, and swung a bottle at her.

1
State v. Kadaesha Johnson, Crim ID No. 2308000243, Superior Court Criminal
Docket Item (hereinafter “D.I.”) 46.
2
The facts were taken from the filed motion and responses, as well as the
testimony as presented at trial. D.I. 40, 46-48, 50-51.
3
D.I. 40.
2
After ultimately retreating into her home, the evidence presented that Defendant

called her mother to the scene. Shortly after the initial confrontation, Defendant and

her mother, Celestine Johnson, emerged from the back door adjacent to where

Wooding and Rodriguez had remained. At this time, Celestine Johnson threw hot

oil at Wooding, as Defendant threw boiling hot water. Wooding was hit with the oil

and injured. Celestine Johnson retreated back into Defendant’s home and allegedly

emerged with two knives: one with a red handle and one with a black handle. With

the help of Defendant, who held Wooding down and prevented anyone from

stopping Celestine, Celestine went after Wooding and Rodriguez. Celestine Johnson

ultimately cut Wooding with a knife. When Wooding was free, she and Rodriguez

ran into their house, at which time it was alleged that Celestine Johnson attempted

to enter their residence. During these events, a crowd had gathered to watch, and a

bystander captured the events on cell phone video. 4

On January 2, 2024, a New Castle County grand jury indicted co-defendants

Celestine and Kadaesha Johnson on charges of Assault First Degree, six counts of

Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony (“PDWDCF”),

Attempted Assault First Degree, Attempted Home Invasion Burglary First Degree,

and Conspiracy Second Degree. 5 Celestine Johnson resolved her charges pre-trial

4
D.I. 44, State’s Exhibit 21.
5
D.I.12. Count X, Conspiracy Second Degree, alleged that “Celestine Johnson…and
Kadaesha Johnson, on or about the 25th day of July, 2023,…when intending to
3
and was awaiting sentencing at the time of Defendant’s jury trial. 6 Defendant’s trial

began on October 28, 2024. 7 On October 31, 2024, the jury returned a guilty verdict

on Count I, Assault Second Degree, a lesser-included offense of Assault First

Degree, and Count II, PDWDCF. Johnson was acquitted of the remaining charges

in the Indictment. 8

Post-trial, and prior to sentencing, on November 7, 2024, Defendant filed the

instant Motion pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 29. 9 On November 12,

2024, the State responded in opposition. 10 Defendant’s Reply was filed two days

later. 11 However, because Defendant’s Reply included an argument not set forth in

its original motion, the Court afforded the State an opportunity to address those

cases, and likewise an opportunity for Defendant to respond.12 The State did so on

promote or facilitate the commission of the felony of Assault 1st Degree, Attempted
Assault 1st Degree, or Attempted Home Invasion Burglary 1st Degree as set forth in
Count(s) I, IV and VII of this Indictment … did agree with each other that one, the
other or each of them would commit said Assault 1st Degree, Attempted Assault 1st
Degree, or Attempted Home Invasion First Degree and one, the other or each of them
did commit an over act in pursuance of said conspiracy by engaging in conduct
constituting those felonies or an attempt to commit those felonies or by committing
some other overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy.”
6
State v. Celestine Johnson, 2307015108, D.I. 21.
7
D.I. 40.
8
See Verdict Form, D.I. 45.
9
See Defendant’s Motion, D.I. 46.
10
D.I. 47.
11
D.I. 48.
12
D.I. 49.
4
February 10, 2025.13 Defendant responded on February 25, 2025. 14 Defendant’s

motion is now ripe for decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 29 (c), “[i]f the jury returns a verdict of

guilty . . . a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days

after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during

the 7-day period.” In considering a motion for judgment of acquittal, the Court must

determine “whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.”15 “Evidence of a defendant's guilt may be proven exclusively through

circumstantial evidence since this Court does not distinguish between direct and

circumstantial evidence in a conviction context.” 16

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant’s initial motion argues that there was insufficient evidence to

convict her of the two charges, given that the evidence was “clear and convincing”

that she did not possess a knife during the confrontation and assault of Wooding.17

13
D.I. 50.
14
D.I. 51.
15
Davis v. State, 706 A.2d 523 (Del. 1998).
16
Id.
17
Def. Mtn. for Judgm’t of Acquittal, p. 3, D.I. 46.
5
Citing Harley v. State, 18 Defendant argues that there must be evidence she possessed

the instrument used in the assault, as it is an essential element of the crime.19

Defendant further argues her acquittal on the remaining charges, including the

Attempted Assault 1st and accompanying PDWDCF counts evidence the

inconsistency in the verdict.20 The State argues the verdict is consistent, as it brought

its case under an accomplice theory of liability. It continues that so long it was

proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant, when intending to promote or

facilitate the assault, “[s]olicit[ed], request[ed], command[ed], importune[d] or

otherwise attempt[ed] to cause the other person to commit [assault], or aide[d],

counsel[ed] or agree[d] or attempt[ed] to aid the other person in planning or [having]

commit[ed] [assault],” Defendant’s convictions must stand. 21

In her Reply, 22 Defendant argued that her conviction must be vacated for the

reasoning set forth in both Manlove v. State 23 and Banther v. State. 24 In each case,

on re-trial, it was found to be error for the State to have presented an accomplice

theory where the respective defendant was acquitted on a conspiracy charge in a

previous trial. The State distinguishes these cases by their procedural posture and

18
534 A.2d 255 (Del. 1987).
19
D.I. 46.
20
Id.
21
D.I. 47, pp.3-4.
22
D.I. 48.
23
910 A.2d 1284 (Del. 2006).
24
884 A.2d 487 (Del. 2005).
6
argues that neither Manlove nor Banther definitively precluded proceeding on an

accomplice liability theory where there was an ultimate acquittal on a conspiracy

charge.25 Defendant responds that here, the evidence lacked sufficient facts to

support her convictions, and maintaining her inconsistent verdict arguments.26

At trial, the State called six live witnesses, including three investigating

officers, two eyewitnesses, and a forensic nurse examiner to speak to Wooding’s

injuries.27 Through those witnesses the State admitted body worn camera footage

from the night of the attack, photographs of the crime scene, and two knives

recovered from the scene.28 The State introduced and played the cell phone video

footage taken during the incident from a bystander. 29

A. CONSPIRACY AND ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY ARE SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT FORMS OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Accomplice liability holds one person liable for the acts of another “if an

appropriate degree of complicity in the offense can be proved.” 30 Specifically, Title

11 Section 271 of the Delaware Code, in pertinent part, provides:

[a] person is guilty of an offense committed by another when: ***
(2) Intending to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense
the person: a. [s]olicits, requests, commands, importunes or
otherwise attempts to cause the other person to commit it; or [b.]
25
D.I. 50.
26
D.I. 51.
27
D.I. 44.
28
See Id.
29
D.I. 47.
30
Allen v. State, 970 A.2d 203, 210 (Del. 2009).
7
[a]ids, counsels or agrees or attempts to aid the other person in
planning or committing it.31

The finding of guilt for PDWDCF required the jury to have unanimously concluded

that Defendant knowingly and unlawfully possessed a deadly weapon during the

commission of the predicate felony of Assault Second Degree. 32 In returning a guilty

verdict of Assault in the Second Degree, the jury unanimously found the requisite

felony associated with Count II, PDWDCF, was committed.33 As alleged in the

Indictment, the deadly weapon charged in Count II is a knife with a red handle.34

The evidence at trial did not show Defendant had physical possession of a

knife.35 Defendant argues acquittal is therefore appropriate because physical

possession of the knife is essential in proving PDWDCF.36 However, because the

State’s case relied entirely upon the theory of accomplice liability, demonstrating

Defendant actually possessed the knife was unnecessary.37 Given that Defendant’s

charges are the product of the principal, Celestine Johnson’s actions, the State’s

evidence necessarily must have showed that Defendant was an accomplice to the

31
11 Del. C. § 271
32
11 Del. C. § 1447; D.I. 42.
33
D.I. 45.
34
D.I. 12.
35
D.I. 46 and 47.
36
D.I. 46.
37
D.I. 47.
8
principal, and that Defendant acted with intent to further the principal’s criminal

objective.38

When pursuing a theory of accomplice liability, a specific agreement is not

necessarily required as evidence of a relationship between a principal and

accomplice. 39 Instead, “an accomplice…may act unilaterally, without a preexisting

agreement, by spontaneously deciding to aid, counsel, or attempting to aid another,

or by agreeing to aid a principal in planning or committing a crime.” 40 “If the State

can establish an appropriate degree of complicity among the offenses, the exact

manner of a particular defendant’s participation is immaterial.”41

After finding an accomplice-principal relationship, a jury must be satisfied

that the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant’s conduct

exhibited the requisite intent to act while also intending the principal’s criminal

objective.42 In determining intent, the jury is permitted to weigh Defendant’s

conduct and:

must be permitted, among other evidentiary alternatives, to infer that
the defendant intended the natural and probable consequences of
[their] act. If, on a given set of facts, such an inference is a

38
Dalton v. State, 252 A.2d 104, 105 (Del. 1969) (“[t]o be liable as an accomplice,
it must affirmatively appear that the defendant in some way actively encouraged the
principal to commit the crime”).
39
Banther v. State, 977 A.2d at 882.
40
Id.
41
Bryant v. State, 1990 WL 17775, at *2 (Del. 1990).
42
D.I. 42.
9
conclusion that could be reached by a reasonable jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, the evidence is sufficient. 43

The jury was presented with the testimony of both Wooding and Rodriguez,

who observed Defendant’s conduct on July 25, 2023. Both witnesses testified to the

initial verbal conflict between Defendant and Wooding, which concluded when

Defendant retreated inside her home. Their testimony revealed that after roughly

twenty minutes, Celestine Johnson emerged and threw hot oil on Wooding, while

Defendant threw boiling hot water toward the two of them. The State submitted

photographs of two purported water and oil markings visible outside the home upon

police arrival.44

Their respective testimony continued that Celestine Johnson then returned to

the 518 residence to once again emerge, but this time with knives. In conjunction

with the eyewitness testimony, the State played the cell phone video which depicted

Celestine Johnson with two knives – one of which had a red handle – who restrained

Wooding. As she does so, Rodriguez attempted to wrangle the knives from

Celestine’s hands.45 At that point, Defendant is captured on video having exited her

43
Plass v. State, 457 A.2d 362, 365 (Del. 1983); see also 11 Del. C. §306(c)(1).
44
See D.I. 44.
45
Id.
10
home and assisted Celestine Johnson. 46 While her mother attacked Wooding with a

knife, Defendant is seen having kicked, punched, and pulled Wooding’s hair.47

At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury was instructed on the legal concept

of accomplice liability, which first required the jury to determine whether an

accomplice principal relationship existed between defendant and anyone else. If so,

then [the jury] must decide if the crimes charged were intended offenses
or unintended offenses. If you unanimously find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the crimes charged in the indictment were intended offenses
between the principal and the accomplice, then all the participants are
guilty of the crimes charged. On the other hand, if you find that the
crimes charged in the indictment were unintended offenses, then you
may find an accomplice guilty only if you find that it was reasonably
foreseeable that the offenses actually committed would be committed,
and that the offenses actually committed were done in furtherance of
the original agreed upon unlawful acts. 48

Accomplice liability permits a finding of guilt for the principal’s underlying

crimes, when one acts in compliance with the principal, even if the accomplice did

not fully execute the underlying criminal conduct.49 It follows that Defendant could

be found guilty of PDWDCF through Celestine’s possession of the red handled knife

during the attack, despite never holding it herself. To convict Defendant, the jury

needed to conclude Defendant acted with dual intent to execute her own actions,

46
Id.
47
Id.
48
D.I. 42.
49
Bryant, 1990 WL 17775, at *2 (“If the State can establish an appropriate degree
of complicity among the offenses, the exact manner of a particular defendant’s
participation is immaterial”).
11
while intending for her mother’s continued participation in the underlying criminal

activity, the assault of Wooding with the red-handle knife. It appears the jury so

decided; and sufficient evidence supports its verdict.

Defendant challenges the jury’s outcome because “[t]he not guilty verdict on

the conspiracy charge shows that the jury did not find that a principle-accomplice

relationship existed.”50 Further, Defendant contends Manlove v. State51 and Banther

v. State, 52 support her position because in both cases the defendant, who was

acquitted of conspiracy, could not be tried under a theory of accomplice liability

evidenced by a plan or agreement.

In Manlove, the Supreme Court of Delaware delineated between conspiracy

and accomplice liability. “Co-conspirator and accomplice liability are different

forms of criminal conduct. A conspiracy requires an agreement between co-

conspirators, but the object of the conspiracy need not be accomplished. For

accomplice liability, generally no prior agreement is required, but the underlying

criminal conduct must have occurred.”53 The legal distinction between conspiracy

and accomplice liability allowed the Court to conclude “Manlove’s acquittal of

Conspiracy in the Second Degree at his first trial did not collaterally estop the State

50
D.I. 48.
51
901 A.2d 1284 (Del. 2006).
52
884 A.2d 487 (Del. 2005).
53
Manlove, 901 A.2d at 1288.
12
from seeking a conviction for Robbery in the First Degree on the basis of accomplice

liability at Manlove’s retrial.”54

In Manlove, the Court found the State was limited when trying him a second

time under an accomplice liability theory. The Court held that “any conviction based

on accomplice liability at his second trial could [have] only [been] based on

Manlove’s unilateral actions and could not [have been] based on a plan or

agreement,” because the jury’s acquittal already considered whether a plan or

agreement existed, and found that it did not.55 Banther similarly held “that the earlier

conspiracy acquittal collaterally estopped the State from arguing an accomplice-

liability theory based on an agreement.” 56 This is not the case here.

Neither Manlove nor Banther dictate that the Defendant acquittal of

Conspiracy Second Degree conflicts with her convictions for Assault Second Degree

and PDWDCF. The State’s theory of accomplice liability did not rely on a plan or

agreement. Rather, the State alleged Defendant is criminally responsible for having

solicited, requested, committed, or otherwise having attempted to aid Celestine

Johnson executing a crime, even without a specific agreement to do so.57

Contemplating the existence of an agreement, while not essential to convict

54
Id. at 88-89.
55
Id. at 89.
56
Banther, 884 A.2d at 494 (emphasis added).
57
D.I. 42.
13
Defendant, was an appropriate inquiry for the jury because Defendant, unlike the

Manlove and Banther defendants, Defendant had never been previously acquitted of

conspiracy.

Further, an acquittal on the conspiracy charge does not equate to an

inconsistent verdict; conspiracy and accomplice liability are separate and distinct

forms of criminal conduct. While an agreement is the hallmark of conspiracy, it is

not required in accomplice liability.58 Instead, and as the jury was instructed, an

accomplice:

is someone who has the same state of mind as the person who
personally commits the acts, and intending to promote or facilitate the
commission of the crime, solicits, requests, commits, or otherwise
attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing the crime, or
aids, counsels, or agrees to attempt or aid the other person in planning
or committing a crime. 59

The disjunctive is important here. “[T]he use of the disjunctive ‘or’ in the

accomplice-liability statute allows the jury to find that a defendant either ‘aided’ or

‘counseled’ another without actually ‘agreeing’ to do so in advance.” 60 The jury’s

verdict is consistent with a finding of guilty pursuant to accomplice liability.

58
11 Del. C. §§ 271, 512; see also Manlove, 901 A.2d at 1288.
59
D.I. 42 (emphasis added).
60
Banther, 884 A.2d at 493; citing State v. Travis, 1992 WL 147996 (Del. Super.
June 9, 1992).
14
B. THE VERDICT IS OTHERWISE CONSISTENT AND SUFFICIENTLY
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT DEFENDANT’S TRIAL

Defendant also challenges the verdict by arguing the evidence presented at

trial varies from Count II of the indictment, which alleged Defendant “did knowingly

and unlawfully possess a knife with a red handle … during the commission of

Assault [Second] Degree.”61 In support, Defendant cites to Harley v. State,62 in

which a defendant was convicted of PDWDCF with the indicted deadly weapon

being a “tire iron,” but at trial witnesses testified the defendant used a “automobile

tire jack stand.” 63 A post-trial motion to amend the indictment was granted, which

replaced “tire iron” with “jack stand.” 64 On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed the

untimely amendment was prejudicial, because:

the nature and description of the instrument used during an assault is an
essential element of the crime of possession of a deadly weapon during
the commission of a felony. There are important differences between
a ‘tire iron’ and the part of a jack which was described as having been
used in this case…The variance between the instrument described in
the indictment and the instrument actually used created ambiguity such
that the issue presented to the jury was unclear and caused a guilty
verdict to depend on a factual determination not justified by the
evidence.65

61
D.I. 12.
62
534 A.2d 255 (Del. 1987).
63
Id. at 256.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 256-57 (holding that while the variance prejudiced defendant’s substantial
rights related to his PDWDCF conviction, his assault conviction was upheld because
“the exact nature and description of the instrument used during the altercation is not
an essential element of the crime”).
15
Defendant is misapplying the Harley ruling to the facts at bar. According to

Defendant, because the indictment alleged a knife, and there was no evidence

presented at trial to show Defendant herself possessed a knife, Defendant’s rights

were similarly prejudiced.66 In Harley, trial testimony described the use of an

entirely different, larger, and heavier deadly weapon than the tire iron alleged in the

indictment. Defendant’s indictment alleged a red handle knife. Evidence was

presented in the form of eyewitness testimony, a video and photographs, that depicts

a red handle knife. Further, Wooding’s injuries were consistent with having been

cut by a knife. Finally, two knives were admitted into evidence – one of which had

a red handle.67 No alternative weapon or instrument was revealed at trial. As already

discussed, Defendant’s actual possession of the knife was immaterial to her

convictions based on the theory of accomplice liability. Thus, no inconsistencies

between the indictment and evidence created ambiguity for the jury as to what deadly

weapon was involved.

Last, Defendant challenges her PDWDCF verdict of guilt as inconsistent with

the acquittal on Counts III through X, which included two charges of PDWDCF.

Counts III, V & VI charged Defendant with PDWDCF. Count III charged

possession of the black handled knife, and related to Count I, Defendant’s Assault

66
D.I. 46.
67
D.I. 44, State’s Ex. 19, 20.
16
[Second] Degree conviction in which Wooding was the victim. Counts V& VI

incorporated the Attempted Assault First Degree charge in Count IX, in which

Rodriguez was the named victim, and charged Defendant with PDWDCF for the red

handled knife (Count V) and the black handled knife (Count VI).

The fact that the jury only convicted Defendant of the lesser-included offense

of Assault Second Degree and the corresponding PDWDCF charge for Wooding

does not support a finding of insufficient evidence or inconsistent verdicts.

Evidently the jury was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was

an accomplice to Celestine’s use of the black handle knife in her attack of Wooding,

or that there was an Attempted Assault First Degree that occurred against Rodriguez.

The fact that Defendant was convicted of one PDWDCF and acquitted of others,

with a different weapon and for a different victim is of no consequence here.

The evidence supports the fact that the jury found Defendant liable as an

accomplice for the crime of Assault in the Second Degree, which is supported by the

testimony and the cell phone video. The jury’s inability to find Defendant guilty,

beyond a reasonable doubt, the other alleged predicate felonies, does not mandate a

finding of inconsistent verdicts. These charges were for separate and distinct crimes,

some of which corresponded to a different victim. Thus, the jury’s verdict is

consistent.

17
IV. CONCLUSION
In viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the State, sufficient

evidence was presented at trial to allow a rational trier of fact to convict Defendant

of Counts I, Assault Second Degree, as well as Count II, PDWDCF. Such a finding

is not inconsistent with the remaining verdicts, including the Conspiracy Second

Degree acquittal. Therefore, the Defendant’s post-trial Motion for Judgment of

Acquittal is DENIED. Defendant is to now be scheduled for sentencing.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

_________________________
Danielle J. Brennan, Judge

18