State v. Vickers

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
v. ) I.D. No. 1308012233A
)
DONTA E. VICKERS, )
Defendant. )

Submitted: May 7, 2025
Decided: May 28, 2025

ORDER

Upon Defendant’s Request for a Certificate of Eligibility
to File Under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f) and Del. Super. Ct. Spec. R. 2017-1(d),
DENIED.

This 28th day of May, 2025, upon consideration of Defendant Donta E.

Vickers’ pro se request for a certificate of eligibility to seek review of his

sentence under Title 11, Section 4214(f) (D.I. 143), the Attorney General’s

response thereto (D.I. 147), the complete record in this matter, and the applicable

authorities governing such requests, it appears to the Court that:

(1) Mr. Vickers is serving a cumulative sentence of five consecutive

life-imprisonment terms imposed under the Habitual Criminal Act plus an

additional ten years of incarceration. That total is comprised of sentences for

attempted first-degree robbery, home invasion, felony assault, and firearms

counts that he was convicted of in a June 2014 trial.1 More specifically, the

1
A fuller recounting of the factual and procedural history of Mr. Vickers’ crimes and
individual components of Mr. Vickers’ current cumulative sentence are:

- Attempted Robbery First Degree (IS13-10-0745)—a natural
life sentence at supervision Level V (to be served under the
then-extant provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4214(b));

- Home Invasion (IS13-08-2004)—a natural life sentence at
supervision Level V (to be served under the then-extant
provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4214(b));

- Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony
(PFDCF) (IS13-10-0747)—a natural life sentence at
supervision Level V (to be served under the then-extant
provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4214(b));

- Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony
(PFDCF) (IS13-08-2003)—a natural life sentence at
supervision Level V (to be served under the then-extant
provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4214(b));

- Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony
(PFDCF) (IS13-10-0746)—a natural life sentence at
supervision Level V (to be served under the then-extant
provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4214(b));

- Assault Second Degree (IS13-08-2003)—8 years at
supervision Level V; and

- Conspiracy Second Degree (IK12-09-0216)—2 years at
supervision Level V.2

The effective date of Mr. Vickers’ sentence is August 8, 2014, and he was

resultant sentence can be found in our Supreme Court’s decision on direct appeal. Vickers v.
State, 117 A.2d 516 (Del. 2015).
2
D.I. 101 (Corrected Sentence Order—correcting the assault sentence to comply with the
statutory maximum applicable thereto); D.I. 98 (Letter from original sentencing judge
explaining the need for that adjustment).
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credited with 359 days previously served on both the attempted robbery and

assault convictions.3

(2) Since then, Mr. Vickers’ convictions and sentence were affirmed on

direct appeal, he has filed an unsuccessful motion for postconviction relief (D.I.

102-123), and he filed a Rule 35(a) motion for correction of an illegal sentence

(D.I. 131-132). More than once, he has complained of the substance of his

habitual criminal sentence or the manner in which it was imposed.4

(3) Mr. Vickers’ suggests that the Court should now grant him a

certificate of eligibility because he believes: (a) he meets the requirements for §

4214(f) consideration; and (b) he doesn’t believe the State would seek or the

Court would impose the same sentence were there a do-over.5

(4) The Court must determine whether Mr. Vickers satisfies the

exacting threshold requirements for § 4214(f) eligibility—and many of the

arguments he forwards just are not factors the Court can consider when doing so.

(5) “[T]o be eligible to petition for sentencing relief under § 4214(f), an

3
Id.
4
See, e.g., Vickers, 117 A.2d at 516 (on direct appeal, Mr. Vickers argued that his first
conviction committed when he was a juvenile but for which he was prosecuted as an adult,
could not be counted as a prior felony conviction supporting his habitual criminal sentence);
Vickers v. State, 2023 WL 2880004 (Del. Apr. 10, 2023) (in his recent Rule 35(a) motion,
Mr. Vickers argued that the multiple life terms imposed are illegal and not intended by the
Delaware General Assembly).
5
D.I. 143 (Mot. for Certificate of Eligibility).
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inmate serving a sentence (or sentences) imposed under the pre-2016 Habitual

Criminal Act must meet both a type-of-sentence and the time-served

requirement.”6 Mr. Vickers meets the first as to the terms imposed for his

attempted robbery, home invasion, and PFDCF convictions. But he doesn’t

satisfy the second when his cumulative sentence is considered—or even as to a

single habitual-criminal component thereof.

(6) Mr. Vickers was sentenced to the minimum required for each of his

attempted robbery, home invasion, and PFDCF convictions—a consecutive

natural life term of imprisonment under the three-strikes provision of the then-

extant Habitual Criminal Act.7 One becomes time-served eligible for § 4214(f)

relief only “after [he] has served a sentence of incarceration equal to any applicable

mandatory sentence otherwise required by th[e current provisions of the Habitual

Criminal Act] or the statutes describing said offense or offenses, whichever is

greater.”8

6
Yelardy v. State, 2022 WL 9632128, at *2 (Del. Oct. 14, 2022) (emphasis added) (citations
and quotation marks omitted); State v. Lewis, 2018 WL 4151282, at *1-2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug.
28, 2018) (describing the requirements that must be met before this Court will issue a certificate
of eligibility to seek relief via 11 Del. C. § 4214(f)), aff’d, 2019 WL 2157519 (Del. May 16,
2019).
7
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214(b) (2013) (any person sentenced under then-existing
§ 4214(b) had to receive a natural life sentence for the triggering felony (or felonies) that
formed the basis of the State’s habitual criminal petition); id. at 3901(d) (“No sentence of
confinement of any criminal defendant by any court of this State shall be made to run
concurrently with any other sentence of confinement imposed on such criminal defendant.”).
8
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214(f) (2024) (emphasis added).
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(7) Though Mr. Vickers suggests some other means of determining his

time-served eligibility, the Court has explained just how that is done in a situation

such as his:

[T]hat requires the Court to determine where in the new habitual
criminal sentencing regime a potential § 4214(f) petitioner would
fall. And, most often, that is done easily enough by reviewing
the State’s original habitual criminal petition and determining
which new habitual criminal enhancement provision would be
applicable to the inmate’s sentence if he were to be sentenced
today.9

Just so here.

(8) Under the current provision of the Habitual Criminal Act applicable

to Mr. Vickers and each of his attempted first-degree robbery, home invasion,

and PFDCF convictions10—§ 4214(d)11—the cumulative habitual criminal

portion of his sentence for those five crimes would be no less than a minimum

mandatory term of 125 years of unsuspended imprisonment.12

9
Lewis, 2018 WL 4151282, at *2.
10
State v. Harris, 2022 WL 472518, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2022) (“The time-served
prong is calculated by applying the current version of Section 4214(a)(b)(c) or (d) based on a
defendant’s conviction history.”).
11
Mot. for Certificate of Eligibility, at 4 (acknowledging it is the current § 4214(d) that would
be applicable were he to be sentenced under the current provisions of the Habitual Criminal
Act).
12
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214(d) (2024) (providing one sentenced under this
provision must receive a minimum sentence of the statutory maximum penalty provided
elsewhere in Title 11 for the triggering felony (or felonies) that form the basis of the habitual
criminal petition). When Mr. Vickers committed his crimes in 2013, attempted first-degree
robbery, home invasion, and PFDCF each were a class B violent felony carrying a statutory
maximum of 25 years imprisonment. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 531, 832(a), 826A(a),
1447A(a), 4201(c) and 4205(b)(2) (2013). See also Yelardy, 2022 WL 9632128, at *3 (“For a
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(9) The Court must determine a § 4214(f) applicant’s time-served

eligibility consistent with the statute and cannot consider the what-ifs Mr. Vickers

offers,13 his suggested comparison to those he deems like-situated inmates, or his

claim of rehabilitation.14 Having engaged the proper means of reckoning time-

served eligibility, he is not close to meeting that requirement.

(8) Accordingly, Mr. Vickers’ request for a certificate of eligibility under

Delaware Superior Court Special Rule 2017-1(c) must be DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. /s/ Paul
R. Wallace

Paul R. Wallace, Judge

Original to Prothonotary-Sussex County

cc: Mr. Donta E. Vickers, pro se
Ms. Kathleen A. Dickerson, Chief Prosecutor, Sussex Co.

person who is serving habitual-offender sentences for multiple felony convictions in a single
case to satisfy the time-served requirement, ‘each individual count must be eligible for §
4214(d) relief.’”).
13
See Harris, 2022 WL 472518, at *4; State v. Dwyer, 2019 WL 413630, at *1 (Del. Super.
Ct. Feb. 1, 2019) (“To determine if this requirement is met the Court determines where in the
new habitual criminal sentencing regime a potential § 4214(f) petitioner would fall.”).
14
See State v. Rowan, 2022 WL 896260 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2022) (explaining that
neither a claim of rehabilitation nor a comparison to the disposition of other inmates’ cases “is
helpful in satisfying the exacting threshold requirements for § 4214(f) eligibility”); State v.
Wright, 2022 WL 1013311, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2022) (comparison to those who
may have received a § 4214(f) certificate of eligibility “does nothing to satisfy the exacting
requirements for § 4214(f) eligibility in [an] individual case”).
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