State v. Dixon

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
)
v. ) I.D. No. 2109010261
)
KHALIL DIXON, )
)
Defendant. )

Submitted: November 10, 2025
Decided: November 17, 2025

Memorandum Opinion

On Dixon’s Motion to Suppress the January 29, 2020, March 30, 2020, and
May 13, 2020, Instagram Search Warrants – GRANTED in part, DENIED in part

On Dixon’s Motion to Suppress the AT&T March 24, 2021, Search Warrant –
GRANTED in part, DENIED in part

On Dixon’s Motion for Leave to File Suppression Out of Time – GRANTED

On Dixon’s Motion to Suppress the March 19, 2021, Instagram Search Warrant –
DENIED

On Dixon’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert William Shute – DENIED

Jamie McCloskey, Esquire, and Erica Flaschner, Esquire, Deputy Attorneys
General, Department of Justice, attorneys for the State
James J. Haley, Jr., Esquire, Ferrara & Haley, Wilmington, Delaware, attorney for
Defendant

BRENNAN, J.
Khalil Dixon (hereinafter “Dixon”) was indicted on September 27, 2021, and

charged with Murder First Degree, Conspiracy First Degree, Criminal Solicitation

First Degree, Money Laundering, and Conspiracy Second Degree for the February

25, 2020, murder of Shiheem Durham. 1 Dixon and his co-defendant Jason Calhum
0F

(hereinafter “Calhum”) were tried together on May 17, 2022. 2 On June 8, 2022, a
1F

jury found Dixon and Calhum guilty of all charges. 3 On August 24, 2022, Calhum
2F

moved for a new trial based upon juror misconduct. 4 Dixon joined this Motion on
3F

September 14, 2022. 5 Following extensive review, on February 5, 2025, the Court
F

granted the joint motion and ordered a new trial. Trial is set to begin on December

1, 2025. 6 5F

On August 20, 2025, Dixon filed four (4) motions: a Motion to Suppress the

Instagram Search Warrants dated January 29, 2020, March 30, 2020, and May 13,

2020, 7 a Motion to Suppress a March 24, 2021, Search Warrant to AT&T in the
6F

Matter of: (302) 608-4874 (hereinafter “the AT&T warrant”), 8 a Motion to Sever his
7F

1
State v. Dixon, Superior Court Criminal ID No. 2109010261, Docket Index
(hereinafter “D.I.”) 1.
2
D.I. 39.
3
D.I. 39, 41.
4
State v. Calhum, Superior Court Criminal ID No. 2004002081, D.I. 123, Def.
Mot. for New Trial.
5
D.I. 63.
6
D.I. 103, 120. Following the grant of the new trial, the original trial judge retired
and the undersigned Superior Court judge was assigned to preside over this matter.
7
D.I. 127.
8
D.I. 128.
1
trial from Calhum’s, 9 and a Motion to Dismiss for Speedy Trial Violation. 10 On
8F 9F

October 10, 2025, Dixon filed a Motion in Limine to exclude Federal Bureau of

Identification (hereinafter “FBI”) Special Agent (Ret.) William Shute’s (hereinafter

“Shute”) testimony, 11 and a Motion in Limine to exclude Instagram messages and
10F

text messages as not properly authenticated under D.R.E. 901. 12 11F

On October 22, 2025, a hearing was held to address Dixon’s then-pending

motions. 13 Following that hearing, both the Motions to Dismiss and to Sever were
12F

denied in a bench ruling. The Motion in Limine regarding the Instagram messages

was denied without prejudice, as premature, given that the State has a continuing

obligation to lay a foundation for any such evidence at trial. 14
13F

At that hearing, counsel advised the Court of Dixon’s intention to file another

suppression motion for a 2021 Instagram warrant, out of time. Dixon was instructed

to move to file out of time in a written motion, cite the support for out of time

consideration, and attach the proposed suppression motion to his request. 15 In 14F

accordance with this direction, Dixon filed his Motion for Leave to File Motion to

9
D.I. 129.
10
D.I. 130.
11
D.I. 146.
12
D.I. 147.
13
D.I. 150.
14
Id.
15
Id.
2
Suppress on October 28, 2025. 16 The State responded in opposition. 17 Without
15F 16F

ruling on the motion for leave, the Court requested the State respond to the desired

Motion to Suppress. 18 17F The State’s response in opposition was received on

November 10, 2025. 19 On November 10, 2025, an evidentiary hearing was held on
18F

the admissibility of Shute’s testimony. 20 19F

All matters are now ripe for decision. This is the Court’s decision on all of

Dixon’s outstanding motions.

I. Motions to Suppress

The first of Dixon’s suppression motions challenges three search warrants that

returned information from what is purported to be Dixon’s Instagram account. The

first warrant was signed January 29, 2020 (hereinafter “the January warrant”), the

second on March 30, 2020 (hereinafter “the March warrant”), and the third on May

13, 2020 (hereinafter “the May warrant”). Dixon challenges the January warrant as

an unconstitutional general warrant. The March and May warrants were based upon

information received following the result of the January warrant, therefore all parties

agree that both the March and May warrants’ sufficiency depends upon the challenge

to the January warrant. Should the information in the January warrant be declared

16
D.I. 154.
17
D.I. 155.
18
D.I. 156.
19
D.I. 158.
20
D.I. 159.
3
general, the March and May warrants will likewise be suppressed; should the

January warrant withstand constitutional muster, the March and May warrants stand.

Dixon next challenges a March 24, 2021, search warrant to AT&T (hereinafter

“AT&T warrant”) which sought information seeking cell tower data for the cellular

number (302) 608-4874 during the timeframes: February 25, 2021, at 12:00 a.m.,

through February 26, 2020, 12:00 a.m. and from March 2, 2020, at 12:00 a.m.,

through 22:59 p.m. on the AT&T network. Dixon challenges this warrant as

violative of his constitutional rights and seemingly argues the warrant is general, or

alternatively, overbroad.

In his late filed motion, Dixon seeks leave to file an additional suppression

motion challenging a March 19, 2021, warrant. This warrant sought information

regarding the Instagram account “levelup_lil” which is purportedly attributed to

Dixon. Dixon seeks to challenge this warrant as unconstitutionally general and

overbroad. Other than arguing that since his first trial, the Supreme Court of

Delaware decided Terreros v. State, 21 Dixon offers no justifiable reason for this new
2 F

motion to be considered beyond the motions deadline, as counsel admits that it

wasn’t until Dixon himself requested suppression of this warrant that a motion was

prepared. The State opposes the motion, pointing out that the reason for Dixon’s

noncompliance with the motions deadline is insufficient, and that the warrant has

21
Terreros v. State, 312 A.3d 651 (Del. 2024).
4
been in the possession of defense for almost four years. Despite the very real

additional burden on the Court and opposing counsel caused by this last-minute

filing, the interests of justice are best furnished by review of this warrant. Therefore,

the proffered Motion to Suppress will be considered. Each challenged warrant will

be discussed in turn. 22
21F

A. Standard of Review

When challenging the validity of a search warrant, the defense bears the

burden to establish the search or seizure was unlawful or not supported by probable

cause. 23 Delaware courts look to the “totality of the circumstances” within the
22F

warrant itself to determine whether probable cause exists. 24 When a search warrant
23F

is challenged, review is limited to the four corners of the affidavit to determine if

sufficient facts appear on its face to establish probable cause. 25 Probable cause
24F

22
Dixon does not expressly make a claim under either the Delaware constitution or
the United States Constitution in his motion but simply requests suppression citing
Supreme Court of Delaware decisional case law. State constitutional claims will not
be addressed when a party does not specifically articulate such a claim or otherwise
fails to “indicate why the outcome would be different under the Delaware
Constitution as opposed to the Fourth Amendment.” Thomas v. State, 305 A.3d 683,
697 (Del. 2023) quoting Womack v. State, 296 A.3d 882, 899 n. 37 (Del. 2023).
Therefore, his claims will only be addressed under the Fourth Amendment.
23
State v. Heck, 2024 WL 4521809, at *4 (Del. Super. Oct. 17, 2024).
24
Sisson v. State, 903 A.2d 288, 296 (citing Fink v. State, 817 A.2d 781, 786 (Del.
2003) (internal citations omitted)).
25
Sisson, 903 A.2d at 296 (citing Fink v. State, 817 A.2d at 787) (internal citations
omitted)).
5
exists when, considering the totality of the circumstances, “there is a fair probability

that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” 26
25F

The four corners of a warrant affidavit “must set forth facts adequate for a

judicial officer to form a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and

the property to be seized will be found in [this] particular place.” 27 The four corners
26F

determination may only be supported “by the facts set forth within the warrant

affidavit or application.” 28 Great deference is to be given by the reviewing court to
27F

the decision of the authorizing judicial officer. 29
28F

1. The January, March & May, 2020, Instagram Warrants.
On January 29, 2020, in relation to a series of shootings in the Capital Park

neighborhood in Dover, Delaware State Police sought one warrant seeking

information on multiple suspect Instagrams accounts. This group warrant sought

“any and all records, recordings, or files related to Instagram users junglebabymir,

dotified and levelup_lil,” as well as for information on Facebook users Deshawn

Carrol, Dot Burris and Rome Fromdajungle Wilkbank for the specified timeframe:

December 10, 2019, through January 10, 2020. Instead of separately seeking a

warrant particularized for each account, Dixon’s account was grouped in with the

26
Sisson, 903 A.2d at 296 (citing Stones v. State, 676 A.2d 907 (Del.1996) (internal
citations omitted)).
27
Terreros v. State, 312 A.3d at 662.
28
Terreros, 312 A.3d at 662.
29
Cooper v. State, 228 A.3d 339, 404 (Del. 2020).
6
others. While there is no constitutional requirement that a separate warrant be sought

for each individual request, following review of the challenged January 2020,

warrant, it begs the question: had this practice been undertaken, would the

information collectively known about Dixon at the time been more carefully

articulated to establish probable cause?

Dixon challenges this warrant as both lacking probable cause and the required

nexus between the crime and Dixon’s Instagram messages. Dixon seeks suppression

arguing the warrant is an unconstitutional general warrant given the laundry list of

items it seeks. The warrant sought:

1. Records concerning the identity of the account holder(s) of the
above listed accounts
2. Records concerning phone numbers associated with the
registered account holder(s) of the above listed account(s)
3. Records concerning email address(es) associated with the
registered account holder(s) of the above listed account(s).
4. Records concerning the IP address at account sign-up, logs
showing IP addresses with date and time stamps for the above
listed account(s).
5. Records concerning the content of private messages in the user’s
inbox, draft, and sent messages, for the above listed account(s). 30
29F

While Dixon acknowledges the warrant contained probable cause to conclude that

the string of shootings in Capital Park occurred, he argues the warrant fails to

30
D.I. 127, Warrant Application, p.1. The Court quoted this warrant exactly as
written and did not “sic” all punctuation errors.
7
establish probable cause that evidence of these crimes would be found within the

“levelup_lil” Instagram account, namely in his direct messages. 31 30F

a. The January 29 Warrant Is Not Unconstitutionally General.

As part of his challenge, Dixon argues that the January 2020 Instagram

warrant is a general warrant. In Terreros v. State, the Supreme Court of Delaware

found a cell phone search warrant unconstitutional for being a general warrant, as

the information sought exceeded the scope of probable cause, the warrant lacked

particularity, and had no temporal limit. 32 The Terreros Court determined the
31F

warrant was general because the request essentially encompassed all of the phone’s

available data by requesting information from so many aspects of the phone, only

one of which was sufficiently supported by probable cause. 33 As evidence of the
3 F

effective “exploratory rummaging,” the Court noted the warrant’s lack of temporal

limitations and the use of the disfavored “any and all” language in the application’s

request. 34 Founded upon its previous ruling in Wheeler v. State, 35 the Court held
33F 34F

that “law enforcement must provide a description of the items to be searched and

31
D.I. 136, State’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Supp. Instagram Search Warrants at 6.
32
Terreros, 312 A.3d at 651.
33
Id. at 667.
34
Id.
35
Wheeler v. State, 135 A.3d 282, 292 (Del. 2016).
8
seized that is as specific as possible at the current investigative juncture” to ensure a

warrant withstands Fourth Amendment Constitutional muster. 36 35F

Reviewing the January 2020 warrant, it did sufficiently describe the categories

of information sought and it contained temporal limitations, requesting only

information from December 10, 2019, through January 10, 2020. The five specific

areas and categories of information sought from the Instagram account to be

searched are articulated and do not amount to a top-to-bottom exploratory

rummaging that was problematic in Terreros and Wheeler. The January 2020

warrant requested authorization to seize:

(1) records concerning the identity of the account holder, (2) records
concerning phone numbers associated with the account, (3) email
addresses associated with the account, (4) records concerning IP
addresses, and (5) records concerning the content of private
messages. 37
36F

All categories were defined and had a logical nexus to the crimes to be investigated,

as established in its Affidavit of Probable Cause. These requests were tailored to

articulate only the areas of relevant information. Therefore, this warrant is not

unconstitutionally general on its face. The problem with the warrant, however, is

that while these categories are sufficiently particularized with appropriate temporal

36
Id. at 665, Terreros, 312 A.3d at 665.
37
D.I. 136, State’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Suppress Instagram Search Warrants,
Ex. A at 18.
9
limitations, not all the categories of requested information were supported by

articulated probable cause.

An overbroad warrant is one with sufficient particularity, however, lacks

probable cause to support the specific requests contained therein. 38 An overbroad
37F

warrant can be redacted “to strike out those portions of the warrant that are invalid

for lack of probable cause, maintaining the remainder of the warrant that satisfies

the Fourth Amendment.” 39 Where a police officer has the ability to set forth a precise
38F

description of the places to be searched, but instead requests what amounts to be a

search of all potential information, a warrant is a general warrant. 40 39F Where an

officer delineates and specifies the areas of the search, but it is not founded by

sufficient probable cause, the warrant is overbroad. 41 The January 20 warrant is
40F

overbroad with respect to requested Items 4 and 5.

b. Requests 4 and 5 Are Not Supported by Probable Cause.

The focus therefore turns to the “place” to be searched, Dixon’s “levelup_lil”

Instagram account. 42 The inquiry is whether the Affidavit demonstrates sufficient
41F

probable cause to evidence Dixon’s connections to the Capital Park shootings and

38
Terreros, 312 A.3d at 668, citing Thomas v. State, 305 A.3d 683 (Del. 2023).
39
Thomas,305 A.3d at 701, quoting Taylor v. State, 360 A.2d 602, 617 (Del. 2021).
40
Thomas, 305 A.3d at 703.
41
Id.
42
Terreros, 312 A.3d at 662.
10
that evidence of such would be found within the items requested. 43 Although the
42F

January 29 warrant contains sufficient facts to establish a reasonable belief that 1)

Dixon was an Instagram account user and 2) had involvement in those shootings, it

does not contain sufficient facts to establish probable cause that evidence related to

these shootings would be found within Dixon’s Instagram messages.

The only information provided in the warrant regarding Dixon’s Instagram

account and its relation to the Capital Park shootings consisted of two separate

Instagram posts on December 19, 2019, and December 28, 2019. 44 Because the43F

January 29 warrant appears to have been an attempt by Delaware State Police to

consolidate warrants for multiple Instagram accounts into one, Dixon was not

mentioned in this warrant until the Affiant’s paragraph 24. The only reference to

Dixon’s Instagram use in the entire warrant were found in Paragraphs 32 and 34.

Paragraph 32 stated that the account “levelup_lil” posted a video on December

19, 2019, containing several firearms. A second video was posted by this account

on December 28, 2019, which, according to the Affiant, showed Dixon taunting

unknown shooters for missing him, in reference to a shooting that occurred at 242

Governor Boulevard, Dixon’s address, the previous night. Paragraph 18 of the

43
Id.
44
D.I. 136, Ex. A ¶¶ 32, 34.
11
Affidavit referenced facts surrounding that shooting. The totality of the Affidavit

laid out sufficient probable cause to connect the shootings.

But the Affidavit does not establish probable cause to believe that evidence of

these shootings would be found in Dixon’s Instagram messaging. While paragraph

34 of the Affidavit referenced Dixon’s Instagram messaging, it failed to provide

sufficient information to establish the required nexus. This paragraph reads:

On 1/28/20, your affiant contacted Detective Warren of the Dover
Police Department. Detective Warren is investigating an unrelated
homicide which occurred on 1/24/20. [Victim] was located deceased
within the city of Dover, DE [sic] due to being shot. Detective Warren
advised he had gone through the content of [the victim’s] phone and
located Instagram messages from user “levelup_lil”.[sic] 45
44F

This is the entirety of any reference to Instagram messaging for the “levelup_lil”

account. No further detail was provided into the substance of the messages, nor was

a timeframe provided for when these messages were exchanged. This information

is insufficient to establish a nexus, by a probable cause standard, to obtain “[r]ecords

concerning the content of private messages in the user’s inbox, draft, and sent

messages, for the above listed account(s)” as requested in Item 5. Therefore, any

results provided in response to this request are suppressed and the motion is

GRANTED, in part, with respect to this section of the warrant.

45
D.I. 127, Warrant Application, ¶ 34.
12
This warrant additionally fails to provide any information whatsoever

regarding the request in Item 4 for “[r]ecords concerning the IP address at account

sign-up, logs showing IP addresses with date and time stamps for the above listed

account(s).” The Affidavit failed to show how this information would be relevant,

necessary, or much less provide evidence of the investigated crimes. Therefore, the

motion to suppress is GRANTED, in part, with respect to this section of the

warrant. As a result, the Motion to Suppress the March and May warrants is

GRANTED, as the probable cause in those warrants was grounded upon the

information obtained from the Instagram private messaging received from the

January warrant.

The motion is DENIED, however with respect to Items 1-3, as these Items

logically request information regarding the Instagram account for which probable

cause exists. The nexus was established based upon the nature of the requests

themselves. The information provided in the warrant established the nexus for the

sought identification information of the potential shooting suspects, one of which

was Dixon.

2. The March 2021 AT&T Warrant

Dixon next challenges the issuance of a search warrant directed at the AT&T

telephone number (302) 608-4874, a number presumed to be Dixon’s. This warrant

requested:

13
…Call Detail Records (CDRs) 46 … for the time period February 25,
45F

2020 from 0001 hours to February 26, 2020, 0001 hours (EST/UTC-5)
and March 2, 2020 from 0001 hours to 2359 (EST/UTC-5) on the
AT&T network by way of AT&T USA.
1. All subscriber information, including name, address, contact
numbers, activation/deactivation dates, account number, social
security number and account features
2. All device identifies, to include ESN, MEID, IMEI, and IMSI
3. Cell Site locations (tower lists, tower addresses, latitude,
longitude) and sectors for all outgoing and incoming voice,
SMS, MMS and data transactions
4. All available RTT (Real Time Tool), PCMD (Per Call
Measurement Data), NELOS (Network Event Location
System), TDOA or Timing Advance Information (True Call),
Mediation records, E911 records, and any other historical GPS,
CSLI (Cell Site Location Information), or records for any other
methods of historical precision location data, to include 1X,
EVDO, LTE and data
5. IP Session and IP Source-Destination reports
6. All Text message content to include pictures OR provide the
Cloud account which stores this content
7. Devise identifiers, such as IMEI, for all devices (watches,
HUM, tablets, etc) that are connected/paired to this
number/subscriber account 47 46F

Paragraph 40 of the warrant’s Affidavit states:

Your Affiant seeks to obtain the cell tower data and related information
in order to confirm the locations of Khalil Dixon’s cellular device in the
timeframe before, during and after the homicide of Shiheem Dirham.
Specifically, Your Affiants seek to determine if Robinson’s cell phone
was in the area of the crime scene and/or in the Capital Park

46
Hereinafter, Call Detail Records will be referred to as “CDRs.”
47
D.I. 128, Warrant Application, p. 4. Again, the Court recited this language
verbatim and is not correcting grammatical errors.
14
neighborhood following the homicide on February 25, 2020.
Moreover, Your Affiants also seek to determine Dixon’s whereabout on
March 2, 202 to determine if he was at the Dover Mall. Your Affiants
are requesting the cell tower data for the following timeframes:
February 25, 2020 from 0001 hours to February 26, 2020 0001 hours
(EST/UTC-5) and March 2, 2020 from 0001 hours to 2359 hours
(EST/UTC-5). 4847F

Dixon first argues this request amounts to an unconstitutional general warrant and

therefore, any evidence obtained must be suppressed. Dixon’s argument is based

upon the “mismatch between the limited probable cause that may be averred in a

search warrant affidavit, and far broader search parameters approved in the

warrant.” 49 Dixon argues the warrant sought much more than the cell tower location,
48F

and that the text message data requested is not supported by probable cause. Dixon

additionally argues the warrant lacks probable cause to establish a connection

between Dixon’s cell location information and the alleged crime, as well as failing

to place temporal limitations on Items 1-7. Dixon points out that the Affidavit’s

paragraph 40 seemingly seeks records of another, “Robinson,” as opposed to Dixon

himself.

In retort, the State argues that the warrant is not general, due to the temporal

limitations provided and the contents sought do not amount to an “exploratory

rummaging” of Dixon’s account information. The State argues the reasoning in

48
Id., ¶ 40.
49
D.I. 128, ¶ 9.
15
Terreros, Buckham, and Wheeler do not implicate the same privacy here, as the

information sought is cell tower data, rather than that of a privately owned cellular

device. Additionally, the State argues the Affidavit sufficiently established probable

cause and a nexus between the phone and the crime scene for the CDR, as well as

for the additional items requested. Alternatively, the State acknowledges the

insufficiencies in the additionally requested items and argued, at most, the Court

should find this warrant overbroad and simply suppress the requested additional

materials, none of which were provided by AT&T. Finally, the State argues that the

mention of “Robinson” as opposed to “Dixon” in paragraph 40 is akin to a

scrivener’s error and does not negate the validity of the warrant, as the remainder of

the affidavit makes the intentions clear.

First and foremost, it is incumbent upon the Court to acknowledge and express

distaste with the sloppiness that has been shown in the drafting of not only this

warrant, but the other warrants reviewed in this case. The mentioning of “Robinson”

in paragraph 40 is seemingly the tip of the iceberg of the poor quality of these

warrants in an important investigation. Whether these warrants were a result of

rushing, complacency, or general sloppiness, more is expected in the presentation

and drafting of these warrants. While the State is correct that in two recent cases the

Superior Court has found that errors in warrants did not result in the suppression of

16
evidence, 50 those were case specific findings and should not be routinely relied upon
49F

to excuse sloppy warrants. Attention to detail is required when drafting and

presenting warrants.

In Buckham v. State, the Supreme Court declared a search warrant of

Buckham’s cell phone unconstitutionally general for lack of particularity.

Specifically, the Court’s decision cited the warrant’s failure to limit the search to a

particularized time frame and found it authorized a search of essentially all data on

the device. 51 The Court determined that the warrant application failed to establish
50F

the requisite probable cause as the warrant was “too vague and too general to connect

[the defendant’s] cell phone to the shooting.” 52 The open-ended language used in the
1F

Buckham warrant, in conjunction with the lack of any limiting time frame, amounted

to an impermissible general warrant, violative of the Fourth Amendment. 53 52F

Similarly in Terreros, the Supreme Court found the cell phone search warrant

in question improperly authorized a search of “nearly every major category of data

contained within the phone without regard to date.” 54 The Terreros Court reaffirmed
53F

that a warrant must contain explicit language to ensure its practical effect will only

50
State v. Martin, 2023 WL 4077677, *7 (Del. Super. June 16, 2023) and State v.
Brown, 2024 WL 913199, at *3 (De. Super. Mar. 1, 2024).
51
Buckham, 185 A.3d at 19.
52
Id, at 17.
53
Id., see also Thomas v. State, 305 A.3d at 701.
54
Terreros, 312 A.3d at 670.
17
allow law enforcement to search areas in which there is a sufficient nexus,

established by probable cause, to the investigation. 55 An affidavit of probable cause
54F

must establish a nexus and provide “facts sufficient to conclude that any evidence of

the alleged crime would be found” in the places to be searched. 56 A general warrant
55F

essentially allows law enforcement an indiscriminate search of the entire electronical

data. 57 Even where identifiable categories are set forth, if the collective result is a
56F

search of essentially the entire contents, or a “top to bottom rummaging” of all of

the electronically stored information, the warrant is general and must be suppressed

in its entirety. 58
57F

The State’s argument that Terreros and Buckham are inapplicable because

those cases dealt with the search of a personal cellular phone, as opposed to

information held by a third-party company, is somewhat misplaced. Yes, different

privacy implications are at play when searching a personal cellular device as

opposed to cell tower location information. However, privacy concerns remain with

cellular tower information. 59 And while the decisions in Terreros and Buckham
58F

speak to warrants for personal electronic devices, they provide a detailed analysis

for review of all warrants, as all warrants have the potential to be challenged as

55
Id. at 666, 667, see also Thomas v. State, 305 A.3d 683, 697 (Del. 2023).
56
Id. at 667.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
See Buckham, 134 A.3d at 1 (Del. 2018).
18
general or overbroad. The type of privacy interest protected, i.e. personal device or

records held by a third party, is just one part of the analysis. While the individualized

holdings are fact dependent, the principles that are provided in those cases can be

applicable to search warrant drafting and review for all scenarios. 60 59F

With that understanding, the AT&T warrant was reviewed to determine

whether it is an unconstitutional general warrant. It is not. The warrant contained

the temporal limitation that was lacking in Buckham. There is no question this

warrant was poorly drafted; had more thought and review been given to this warrant,

this discussion may not have been needed. However, a fair reading of the warrant

makes it clear that the temporal limitation in the CDR request applies to the

additional Items 1-7. Thus, drawing the reasonable inference permitted, the warrant

provides a temporal limitation for all information requested. 61 This inference is
60F

supported by the fact that AT&T did not provide any information beyond those dates.

This warrant differs from the general warrants discussed in the cited cases, as

it did not permit an indiscriminate search or “exploratory rummaging” through the

details of Dixon’s cellular account. While this warrant haphazardly set forth a

temporal limitation, it described with particularity the places to be searched and did

60
Notably, the State cites Thomas in support of its alternative argument seeking an
overbroad determination, which also reviewed a warrant requesting an information
from a cellular phone.
61
Sisson, 903 A.2d at 296 (internal citations omitted).
19
not request information that amounted to a top-to-bottom search of Dixon’s

information. Therefore, the AT&T warrant is not an unconstitutional general

warrant.

However, the warrant is overbroad. 6261F Dixon correctly claims that “the

approved warrant authorized collection of much more, including, for example, ‘all

text message content to include pictures or provide the Cloud account which stores

this content’- a far broader sweep for records than the cell tower data search for

which probable cause had been averred in the Affidavit.” 63 62F While the warrant

delineated specified areas of the search, not all requests were supported by probable

cause. 64
63F

The warrant established a nexus between the requested CDRs, the time frame,

and evidence of the alleged crime. Much of the Affidavit details discussion between

alleged conspirators regarding the murder of Durham from cellular devices. The

device number was attributed to Dixon and electronic communications were

included that established the device was used. The Affidavit contained evidence

regarding phone use, Dixon’s location regarding the set up and final payment for the

murder, and the relationship between the evidence and the Durham’s murder. This

62
Terreros, 312 A.3d at 668 (internal citations omitted).
63
D.I 128, Def.’s Mot. to Suppress Instagram Search Warrants, ¶ 10.
64
Thomas, 305 A.3d at 703.
20
distinguishes it from infirmities in the general warrants previously discussed, where

such a nexus could not be established.

In reviewing the totality of the information presented in the entirety of the

warrant, requested Items 1-4 are founded in probable cause. The purpose of this

warrant was to request cell tower information. That was confirmed in paragraph 40,

albeit for Dixon and not Robinson. The need for subscriber and contact information

was set forth and a nexus is established, thus Item 1 passes constitutional muster.

The same logic follows for Item 2, which requested “[a]ll device identifiers.” The

Affidavit established a nexus and probable cause for cell tower location, and

naturally device identifiers stem from that request.

The descriptions themselves in Items 3 & 4 established sufficient identifying

information that allows this Court to conclude that these requests would lead to the

discovery of cell tower location information for Dixon’s purported number. Despite

the Affidavit itself not having defined these technological terms, support is found in

Items 3 & 4 by reading the totality of the information provided in the Affidavit

(paragraph 2 of the “Affiant and Witness” section), 65 along with paragraphs 20, 26,
64F

27 and 40 of the Affidavit, in conjunction with the request for “[a]ll cell site tower

location information for cell phone (302) 608-4874” written atop each page of the

Affidavit. As such, with respect to these items, the motion to suppress is DENIED.

65
D.I. 128, Warrant ¶¶1-3.
21
However, this warrant lacks probable cause to establish a nexus that evidence

of the murder would be found in requested items 5 through 7. Item 5 requests “IP

Session and IP Source-Destination reports” however the warrant is completely

devoid of information to explain this request or why this information would hold

evidence of the murder of Durham and Dixon’s involvement. If this information is

needed to provide “cell site tower location information,” it should have been

articulated in the warrant. It was not. Therefore, this request is stricken as

impermissibly overbroad and to the extent evidence was received from AT&T in

response of this request, it is suppressed.

Further, there is nothing in the warrant that established probable cause for

either Item 6 or 7. Item 6 requested, “[a]ll text message content to include pictures

OR provide the Cloud account which stores this content.” Item 7 requested,

“[d]evice identifies, such as IMEI, for all devices (watches, HUM, tablets, etc) that

are connected/paired to this number/subscriber account.” Once again, there is

nothing remotely mentioned in this warrant that could establish probable cause for

these requests. No mention of a watch or tablet is found in the Affidavit. To the

extent the Affidavit referenced electronic communications between Dixon and

others, those were made in reference to a social media account. The Affidavit did

not contain any language that connected this requested information to the cell tower

location data. Therefore, Items 6 & 7 are impermissibly overbroad, unsupported by

22
probable cause and any information received as a result of these requests are

suppressed.

The State’s argument that no privacy intrusion occurred because no items

were produced in response to the overbroad language is incorrect. The fact that

nothing was produced in response to this subpoena is of no consequence. It is the

search itself, as opposed to the result, that is the focus of the Court’s review. 66 A
65F

constitutional violation cannot be cured by the fact that no evidence was returned.

It is the search that is the intrusion. Not the results. 67
66F

It is notable that all the warrants at issue in this case were all sought and

reviewed in 2020 and 2021, prior to the instructive rulings provided in Terreros and

Thomas. Issues with the attention to the drafting of these warrants aside, the

concepts of general versus overbroad warrants have recently been articulated by the

Supreme Court in these cases, which provided helpful guidance to reviewing courts.

Therefore, with respect to Dixon’s motion to suppress the March 24, 2021, warrant

seeking information related to (302) 608-4874, the motion is GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part.

66
Terreros, 312 A.3d at 670.
67
Id.
23
3. The March 19, 2021, Instagram Warrant
Dixon challenges the issuance of the March 19, 2021, Instagram warrant as

an unconstitutional general warrant. Once again, the State argues that Terreros,

Taylor and Thomas – all cited by Dixon, are inapplicable for the reasons previously

discussed. The State additionally argues that Coffield v. State, 68 distinguishes these
67F

warrants from those of Terreros, Taylor and Thomas.

The State is correct that Coffield upheld an Instagram search warrant in part

by distinguishing Terreros, Taylor and Thomas on the basis that different privacy

implications exist when searching a personal device rather than information received

from a third-party provider. However, Coffield endeavored the same review

regarding particularity and temporal limitations. Again, the privacy interest is a

factor in the constitutional analysis. It is not determinative of whether such an

analysis needs to occur.

Nevertheless, the March 19, 2021, Instagram warrant used here is essentially

the same as the one presented for review in Coffield. 69 The language used in the
68F

“Greetings” page of the Coffield warrant is the exact language used in the March 19,

2021, warrant challenged here. The only difference is that this warrant naturally

68
Coffield v. State, 333 A.3d 491(TABLE) (Del. 2025), 2025 WL 85345.
69
Id. See also Coffield v. State, No. 288, 2023, D.I. 60, State Reply App. B42.
24
speaks to Dixon and the time frame relevant in this case. Dixon’s warrant places

the temporal limitation of January 29, 2020, to March 17, 2020.

Dixon acknowledges the warrant is based upon probable cause and states his

challenge extends only to the argument that it is an impermissible general warrant

due to the language used. From the Court’s review of the accompanying Affidavit,

the warrant is based upon probable cause and a sufficient nexus exists to justify each

search request. Given this, and following the logic delineated in Coffield, the

warrant is constitutionally sufficient. The late-filed motion to suppress is therefore

DENIED.

II. Motion in Limine to Exclude Shute Testimony

Finally, Dixon moves in limine to exclude the testimony of the State’s

proffered expert William Shute, retired Special Agent, who founded the FBI’s

Cellular Analysis Survey Team (hereinafter “C.A.S.T.”) Unit. An evidentiary

hearing was held on November 10, 2025, at which testimony was taken by Shute.

For the reasons set forth below, that motion is DENIED.

After receiving the Call Detail Records received from the AT&T warrant, the

State requested former FBI Special Agent William Shute (hereinafter “Shute”)

analyze the CDRs to determine the approximate location of Dixon’s cell phone on

the requested dates by locating the cell towers to which it connected. In Dixon’s

first trial, the State presented Shute’s testimony to argue Dixon was in Dover on the

25
date of the murder and on March 2, 2020, to make the final payment for the murder. 70
69F

The State’s theory is that Dixon arranged the murder for hire scheme and coordinated

with Deonte Robinson (hereinafter “Robinson”) and Calhum to kill Durham. Dixon

paid in two installments, both in person, in Dover.

The State presented cell tower record evidence through Shute from the date

of the murder that placed Dixon, Calhum, and Robinson all within the cell tower

sectors that covered a shopping center on South Bay Road in Dover, near the scene

of the crime. 71 Call detail records from March 2, 2020, show Dixon and a witness,
70F

Tyree Burton (hereinafter “Burton”) called each other several times up until 12:49

p.m. At the same time, Burton’s Probation & Parole GPS records placed him at the

Dover Mall while Dixon’s cell tower records placed him in the corresponding tower

sector that covers the Dover Mall. 72 After the murder, Robinson collected a partial
71F

cash payment from Dixon at a nearby store. 73 Dixon paid Robinson the remaining
72F

cash balance when they met at the Dover Mall several days later. 74 73F Shute’s

testimony placed Dixon’s phone at each location nearby given the cell tower

coordinates.

70
D.I. 137 at 2.
71
Id. at 3.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 4.
74
Id.
26
The State seeks to reintroduce this testimony in Dixon’s new trial. Shute’s

testimony is now challenged by Dixon, despite it being admitted without objection

in the first trial. Dixon argues that since his conviction, the New Jersey Superior

Court, Appellate Division, decided State v. Demby. 75 Demby found information
74F

obtained from AT&T towers to determine location information to lack reliability

because AT&T does not provide Real Time Tracking information. 76 Dixon urges
75F

this Court to follow the same analysis and exclude Shute’s testimony in his new trial.

The State argues that Demby was founded on incorrect reasoning and is not binding

on this Court. The State further argues that under Delaware jurisprudence and the

Delaware Rules of Evidence, the proffered testimony of Shute satisfies all

requirements and should be re-admitted.

In Delaware the admissibility of expert testimony is determined using the

Daubert 77 standard. Under this standard, the Court asks whether:
76F

(i) the witness is “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education; (ii) the evidence is relevant and
reliable; (iii) the expert's opinion is based upon information reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field; (iv) the expert testimony
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue; and (v) the expert testimony will not create unfair
prejudice or confuse or mislead the jury. 78
77F

75
State v. Demby, 2024 WL 3039795 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 18, 2024).
76
Id. at *5-6.
77
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 (1993).
78
State v. Pierce, 222 A.3d 582, 588 (Del. Super. Mar. 6, 2019) (citing Eskin v.
Carden, 842 A.2d 1222, 1231 (Del. 2004) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. at 113).
27
As the gatekeeper, the trial judge's role “is to make certain that an expert, whether

basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the

courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an

expert in the relevant field.” 79
78F

Dixon contends that “Agent Schute’s report relies upon assumptions that have

no basis in fact and is unsupported by the necessary empirical data, given the lack

of True Call data, the absence of drive testing, and the failure to determine the actual

coverage footprints of the relevant AT&T cell towers.” 80 Consequently, Dixon
79F

claims that the proffered expert testimony will not assist the trier of fact and carries

a high risk of prejudice which may mislead the jury. 81
80F

Dixon solely relies on New Jersey’s Demby decision for his proposition that

because AT&T towers do not have Real Time Tracking (“RTT”) technology, Agent

Schute’s testimony is essentially his opinion and cannot be presented to the jury.

Dixon’s reliance on Demby, however, is misplaced. New Jersey and Delaware have

different standards for admission of expert testimony. New Jersey follows a

judicially created “net opinion” standard, which prohibits a witness testifying as an

expert if the testimony is not factually supported. This is different from Delaware’s

79
Pierce, 222 A.3d at 588.
80
D.I. 146, Def. Mot. in Lim. to Exclude CAST Expert William Shute ¶ 2.
81
Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.
28
standard for admission of this evidence, which is governed by Delaware Rule of

Evidence (“D.R.E”) 702. D.R.E. 702 states:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise
if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case. 8281F

A hearing was held following argument on Dixon’s motion at which Shute

testified to his training, experience and reasoning for his opinions in this case.

Notably, Shute has provided expert testimony in numerous cases in both Delaware

and Pennsylvania courts, including testimony during Dixon’s first trial. While there

is no written opinion in Delaware regarding Shute’s expert designation, the Superior

Court of Pennsylvania has previously ruled that Shute was an expert in the field of

historical cellular site analytics. 83 In Commonwealth. v. Page, the court held Shute
82F

was qualified to provide testimony in this field, as “Shute received specialized

training in the field of cellular technology from the FBI and from outside

companies,” which “included, but is not limited to, GSN technology, CDMA

82
D.R.E. 702.
83
Page, 2014 WL 10965747 at *22.
29
technology, IDEN technology and radio frequency theory.” 84 Page concluded that
83F

“Shute has extensive experience (1) working with commercial cellular telephone

carriers; (2) analyzing historical cell site data; and (3) with the operation of handset

technology within cell phone towers and the larger cellular network.” 85 The court
84F

ultimately held that “[g]iven Special Agent Shute's experience, training, specialized

knowledge and professional qualifications, [the Court] had no reservations in

recognizing Special Agent Shute as an expert in the area of historical cell site

analysis.” 86
85F

The same conclusions can be made following the hearing before this Court.

Shute testified to his extensive training and experience, that he essentially created

the C.A.S.T. Unit within the FBI and has extensive knowledge regarding the

technology surrounding his review of cellular data and information provided by

cellular providers dating back decades. Shute testified to the R.T.T. technology,

when it became available, how it can assist when it is provided, and that whether this

R.T.T. technology is available does not alter the reliability of his conclusions.

In reviewing the standards under D.R.E. 702, Shute’s testimony regarding

Dixon’s cell phone location will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence

presented to determine whether Dixon was in Dover at the relevant times. The

84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
30
proffered testimony is based upon sufficient facts and data, is the product of reliable

principles and methods, and is not based upon Shute’s opinion alone. Shute has

reliably applied the principles and methods of cellular analysis to the facts of this

case. His conclusions are based upon information and methods relied upon by

experts in the field of cellular analysis.

With all due respect to the Demby Court, the New Jersey standard of

admission for expert testimony differs from the Delaware standard. After hearing

thorough testimony regarding the scientific basis for the opinions in which Shute

holds, a reliable basis for Shute’s testimony has been established. The absence of

R.T.T. information provided by AT&T does not change Shute’s qualifications or the

reliability of his opinion. Shute has been analyzing data and providing expert

opinions to this Court and others before the emergence of this R.T.T. technology.

This proffered testimony proves to be no less reliable. A technological advancement

offered by some cellular providers should not serve as an impediment to the

admission of previously reliable testimony.

Therefore, the Motion in Limine to exclude Shute’s testimony is DENIED.

III. Conclusion

Therefore, the Motion to Suppress the January 29, March 30 and May13, 2020

Instagram Warrants is GRANTED, in part and DENIED, in part. The Motion to

Suppress the AT&T Warrant is GRANTED, in part and DENIED, in part. The

31
Motion for Leave to File Out of Time is GRANTED, but the corresponding Motion

to Suppress is DENIED. Finally, the Motion in Limine is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

_________________________
Danielle J. Brennan, Judge

32