State v. Anderson

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE )
)
v. ) Crim. ID No. 2310012382
)
MICHAEL ANDERSON )

Submitted: September 10, 2025
Decided: December 5, 2025

Upon Michael Anderson’s
Motion for Postconviction Relief,
DENIED.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Beth D. Savitz, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Attorney for the State of Delaware.

Michael Anderson, Self Represented.

Lugg, Judge
Michael Anderson has filed a motion seeking postconviction relief. Despite

pleading guilty, he challenges the performance of the attorneys representing him at

various stages preceding his plea and at sentencing. The Court has reviewed

Anderson’s motion and memorandum of law,1 the affidavits of counsel,2 the State’s

response,3 Anderson’s reply,4 and the record in this case and finds no merit in

Anderson’s motion. Anderson’s motion for postconviction relief is denied.

BACKGROUND

The facts leading to Anderson’s arrest, conviction, and sentence are

straightforward. In May 2023, Delaware State Police detectives learned of a drug

dealer in the Newark and Bear Delaware areas.5 An informant provided detectives

the phone number of the alleged drug dealer; through investigative efforts, police

1
D.I. 15 (“Def. Mot.”); D.I. 24 (“Def. Mem.”).
2
D.I. 21 (“Phillips Aff.”); D.I. 22 (“Rhodunda Aff.”).
3
D.I. 30 (“State’s Resp.”).
4
D.I. 31. (“Def. Reply”).
5
Aff. (2382) at ¶ 2. Because Anderson pled guilty, the Court draws the facts from
the affidavits of probable cause leading to his arrest. And because Anderson’s plea
resolved charges associated with two cases, the Court distinguishes the docket items
and affidavits in each by referencing the last four digits of each criminal action
number: “Aff. (2382) at ¶ XX” refers to facts drawn from the affidavit associated
with C.A. No. 2310012382, and “Aff. (2110) at ¶ XX” refers to facts drawn from
the affidavit associated with Case No. 2401012110.
2
determined the drug dealer to be Michael Anderson.6 Detectives then engaged in a

series of drug purchases from Anderson that culminated in his January 2024 arrest.

In late August, 2023, an undercover detective called Anderson to purchase

cocaine.7 Anderson directed the detective to meet him in the area of Teal Circle at

Flamingo Drive to purchase crack cocaine.8 The detective responded to that location

and purchased drugs from Anderson.9 The detective returned to Delaware State

Police Troop 2 where the purchased substance tested positive for cocaine and

weighed 3.8 grams.10

The next week, an undercover detective conducted a second direct purchase

of crack cocaine from Anderson.11 Anderson met this detective in the area of

Colonial Circle off of Freedom Road in Newark, Delaware.12 Officers surveilling

the location watched Anderson conduct the drug sale with the detective and conduct

what appeared to be another drug sale at the driver side door of a vehicle.13 The

6
Aff. (2382) at ¶ 2.
7
Id. at ¶ 3.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at ¶ 4.
12
Id.
13
Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.
3
detective returned to Delaware State Police Troop 2 where the purchased substance

tested positive for cocaine and weighed 3 grams.14

In early September, 2023, an undercover detective conducted a third direct

purchase of crack cocaine from Anderson.15 Again, Anderson met the detective in

the area of Colonial Circle off of Freedom Road.16 During this transaction, the

detective purchased crack cocaine and fentanyl/heroin from Anderson.17 The

detective returned to Delaware State Police Troop 2 where the purchased substances

tested positive for cocaine (weighing 7.7 grams) and heroin (weighing 0.014

grams).18

A detective made a fourth direct purchase of crack cocaine from Anderson

later in September 2023.19 The sale was to occur in the area of Colonial Circle, but

Anderson delayed the transaction to collect the drugs.20 After gathering and

preparing the drugs, Anderson directed the detective to meet him in the area of Teal

14
Id. at ¶ 5.
15
Id. at ¶ 6.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. at ¶ 8.
20
Id.
4
Circle where Anderson sold the detective drugs.21 The detective returned to

Delaware State Police Troop 2 where the purchased substance tested positive for

cocaine and weighed 30 grams.22

In early October 2023, a detective conducted a fifth direct purchase of crack

cocaine from Anderson.23 Anderson met the detective on Raven Turn to complete

the drug sale.24 The detective returned to Delaware State Police Troop 2 where the

purchased substance tested positive for cocaine and weighed 29 grams.25

Later in October, a detective conducted a sixth direct purchase of crack

cocaine from Anderson.26 Anderson once again directed the detective to the area of

Teal Circle and Flamingo Drive where Anderson provided drugs for sale.27 The

detective returned to Delaware State Police Troop 2 where the purchased substance

tested positive for cocaine and weighed 29 grams.28

21
Id. at ¶ 9. In what appears to be a typographical error, the number 6 designates
the paragraph following paragraph number 8 of the affidavit. To avoid confusion,
the paragraphs following 8 are referred to as if properly numbered.
22
Id.
23
Id. at ¶ 10.
24
Id.
25
Id. ¶ 11.
26
Id. ¶ 12.
27
Id. ¶¶ 12-13.
28
Id. ¶ 13.
5
Delaware State Police officers arrested Anderson on January 29, 2024.29

Officers handcuffed Anderson and placed him in a Delaware State Police vehicle.30

The officer transporting Anderson to the police station observed Anderson digging

his hands into the back of the seat.31 After police removed Anderson from the police

vehicle, they discovered a bag containing 33.8 grams of a substance that tested

positive for cocaine stuffed in the seat where Anderson was sitting.32

On March 25, 2024, a Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Anderson

with several counts of dealing various quantities of cocaine, and one count of dealing

heroin.33 On June 18, 2024, Anderson pled guilty to four counts of dealing cocaine,

and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts against him.34 Anderson

acknowledged that his plea exposed him to a maximum sentence of 56 years of

incarceration.35 The parties requested a presentence investigation; Anderson

represented that he would “ask for the minimum/mandatory two (2) years of

29
Aff. (2110) at ¶ 3.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
D.I. 5.
34
D.I. 9.
35
Id.
6
unsuspended Level 5 time” and understood the State would “cap [its

recommendation] at eight (8) years of unsuspended Level 5 time.”36

On September 6, 2024, following a presentence investigation, the Court

sentenced Anderson to an aggregate term of thirty years incarceration, suspended

after five years, for two years at supervision Level IV to be served at the discretion

of the Department of Correction, followed by eighteen months at Level III with GPS

monitoring.37 Anderson did not appeal his conviction or sentence.38

On January 16, 2025, Anderson filed a “Motion for Postconviction Relief,”39

a “Motion for the Appointment of Counsel in a Post-Conviction Relief

Proceeding,”40 and a “Motion to Amend.”41 On January 30, 2024, the Court entered

an order directing the expansion of the record and denying appointment of counsel.42

Anderson filed a Memorandum of Law in support of his motion on May 29, 2025.43

36
Id.
37
D.I. 11.
38
Following his conviction and sentence, Anderson filed a “Motion for Modification
of Sentence” (D.I. 12) which the Court denied on December 13, 2024 (D.I. 13), and
on June 26, 2025, he filed a “Motion for Correction of an Illegal Sentence” (D.I. 28)
which the Court denied on July 2, 2025. D.I. 29.
39
Def. Mot.
40
D.I. 16.
41
D.I. 17.
42
D.I. 20.
43
Def. Mem.
7
Anderson’s counsel, Olivia C. Phillips, Esquire and William J. Rhodunda, Jr.,

Esquire, provided affidavits in response to Anderson’s ineffective assistance of

counsel allegations relating to their representation.44 The State responded to

Anderson’s claims,45 and Anderson replied.46

ANALYSIS

“Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 provides the exclusive remedy for setting

aside a final judgment of conviction.”47 The Rule is “intended to correct errors in

the trial process, not to allow defendants unlimited opportunities to relitigate their

convictions.”48 Rule 61 provides incarcerated individuals a procedure to seek to

have a conviction set aside on the ground that the Court lacked jurisdiction or to

collaterally attack their conviction.49 Before addressing any substantive issues this

Court must first consider and apply Rule 61’s procedural bars. The rule prohibits

the Court from considering a motion that is: (1) untimely (filed more than one year

after the judgment of conviction is final);50 (2) repetitive;51 (3) procedurally

44
Phillips Aff.; Rhodunda Aff.
45
State’s Resp.
46
Def. Reply
47
Jackson v. State, 2007 WL 2231072, at *1 (Del. Aug. 2, 2007).
48
Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013).
49
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1).
50
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
51
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
8
defaulted;52 or (4) formerly adjudicated.53 “Absent extraordinary circumstances, an

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim cannot be asserted leading to a judgment of

conviction.”54 Anderson’s motion is timely and none of Rule 61’s procedural bars

preclude consideration of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Anderson must meet

the two-prong test established by Strickland v. Washington.55 Under Strickland, a

defendant must show (1) “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness;”56 and (2) “that there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.”57 “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.”58

The Court may dispose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if the

defendant fails to show a reasonable probability of a different result but for the

52
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
53
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
54
Kellam v. State, 341 A.3d 475, 489 (Del. 2025).
55
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
56
Id. at 688.
57
Id. at 694.
58
Id.
9
counsel’s alleged errors.59 “[A]ctual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in

attorney performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant

affirmatively prove prejudice.”60 A defendant must allege prejudice and then

substantiate that allegation.61 Because a defendant must prove both parts of an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a failure to establish sufficient prejudice

alone is enough to defeat an ineffective assistance of counsel allegation. “It is not

enough ‘to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the

proceeding.’”62 The “court must consider the ‘totality of the evidence,’ and ‘must

ask if the [movant] has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would

reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.’”63

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a question of whether trial

counsel’s actions were adequate.64 A review of counsel’s representation is subject to

a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was professionally reasonable.65 As

59
Id. at 697.
60
Id. at 693.
61
Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1196 (Del. 1996).
62
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
693).
63
State v. Reyes, 155 A.3d 331, 343 (Del. 2017) (citing Swan v. State, 28 A.3d 362,
384 (Del. 2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96)).
64
State v. Wright, 2023 WL 2128338, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2023).
65
Id.
10
such, mere allegations will not suffice; instead, a defendant must make concrete

allegations of ineffective assistance, and then substantiate them, or risk summary

dismissal.66 And, “a defendant who enters a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary

guilty plea waives his right to challenge errors occurring before the entry of the

plea.”67

Anderson’s Claims

1. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to dismiss or to seek a
reduction of bail.

Anderson alleges Phillips “provided IAC to [him] because counsel failed to

file a motion to dismiss or a motion for bail reduction after the state failed to have

[him] indicted within 45 days from [his] arrest.”68 Phillips responded that she “did

not file a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Indictment,” but that “Anderson was

indicted 56 days after his arrest.”69 Further, Phillips “file[d] a Motion for Reduction

of Bail on Mr. Anderson’s behalf on March 5, 2024;”70 this motion was

unsuccessful.71 For its part, the State asserts that, to the extent there was some delay

66
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 553, 556 (Del. 1990).
67
Dollard v. State, 2020 WL 2393353, at *2 (Del. May 11, 2020) (citing Miller v.
State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003)).
68
Def. Mot at 3; see also Def. Mem. at 5, ¶ 10.
69
Phillips Aff. at ¶ 2.
70
Id.
71
Id.
11
in presenting Anderson’s case to a grand jury, that delay was the result of the parties’

ongoing preindictment plea negotiations.72

Anderson pled guilty. A judge of this Court accepted his pleas and found

“them to be knowing, intelligent and voluntary.”73 By pleading guilty, Anderson

waived any alleged errors occurring before the entry of his plea.74 And, in any event,

he has failed to demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice resulting in his

delayed indictment.

Anderson fails to establish that Phillips’ decision not to file a motion to

dismiss was unreasonable and prejudiced him. First, to succeed on a motion to

dismiss, Anderson must show that there has been an “unnecessary delay in

presenting the charge to a grand jury.”75 In this case the delay was, in part,

attributable to the parties’ plea negotiations. And, importantly, Anderson was

indicted 56 days after his arrest. This Court recently found a delay of 91 days, “only

46 days beyond the 45-day directive of the Administrative Order,” to be “far less

than the delay in other cases” and not “presumptively prejudicial to [the

72
State’s Resp. at ¶¶ 19, 21.
73
State’s Resp. Ex. A (“Plea Colloquy”) at 7.
74
Dollard, 2020 WL 2393353, at *2 (citing Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232
(Del. 2003)).
75
State v. Miller, 2006 WL 3404644, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2006).
12
defendant.]”76 So too here. A motion to dismiss for a less than two week delay

beyond this Court’s administratively imposed 45 day timeframe would not have

found success.

2. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence.

Anderson alleges Rhodunda “provided IAC to [him] because counsel failed

to secure a continuance of time in regard to the established briefing schedule so that

counsel could file a motion to suppress evidence seized in this matter by police in a

manner inconsistent with the 4th Amendment.”77 In his responsive affidavit,

Rhodunda explained that he “did not file – and reasonably believed there was no

valid, good faith basis to file – a motion to suppress given the evidence as [he]

understood it to be.”78 The State contends that Anderson fails to substantiate a

Constitutional violation supporting suppression and, for that reason, offers a “mere

allegation of ineffectiveness” that, without more, must fail.79

As with Anderson’s first claim, this allegation precedes his guilty plea and is,

thus, waived.80 Further, “[a]n ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the

76
State v. Moore, 2024 WL 2292230, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. May 21, 2024).
77
Def. Mot. at 3; see also Def. Mem. at 10, ¶ 17.
78
Rhodunda Aff. at ¶ 5.
79
State’s Resp. at ¶ 24.
80
Dollard, at *2 (Del. May 11, 2020) (citing Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232
(Del. 2003)).
13
failure to file a motion is without merit if trial counsel lacked a legal or factual basis

to do so.”81 Here, Anderson fails to articulate the basis for suppressing evidence

against him, and Rhodunda explained that he did not file a motion because he lacked

a legal or factual basis to do so.82

“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly deferential.”83 “Courts

must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range

of professional assistance,” and the burden falls on the defendant to rebut this “strong

presumption.”84 Anderson, through his unsubstantiated allegations, fails to meet this

burden. Rhodunda’s informed decision not to seek suppression and to focus on

securing the best possible resolution for Anderson was professionally reasonable.

3. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge dismissed charges.

Anderson asserts Rhodunda “provided IAC to [him] because counsel failed to

challenge the charges [he] faced in regard to the alleged ounce of cocaine found in

the front seat of the police vehicle that [he had] been placed in.”85 Anderson

contends that the charge is “factually baseless” and the State used this charge “as a

bargaining chip in order to get [Anderson] to enter a plea instead of using one of the

81
State v. Ryle, 2019 WL 2714817, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. June 27, 2019).
82
Rhodunda Aff. at ¶ 5.
83
Cooke v. State, 338 A.3d 418, 455 (Del. 2025) (cleaned up).
84
Id. (cleaned up).
85
Def. Mot. at 3; see also Def. Mem. at 11, ¶ 18.
14
legitimate charges and counsel allowed it to happen.”86 Rhodunda responded that

he “negotiated what [he] believe[d] [to be] a fair and reasonable plea agreement

based upon the relative strengths of each charge, individually, and in the totality of

the circumstances. The Defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily accepted

the plea agreement.”87 The State responded that Anderson “can point to no piece of

evidence and no fact which would support any mere allegation by him that the

cocaine did not come from his person during transport.”88

The State aptly notes, had Anderson wished to challenge any of the charges

against him he could have done so at trial.89 He did not. Rather, Rhodunda

negotiated a plea on Anderson’s behalf and, in so doing, reduced Anderson’s overall

sentencing exposure and compelled the State to “cap” its sentence recommendation.

The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant is entitled to effective

assistance of counsel during plea negotiations.90 Rhodunda fulfilled this obligation.

86
Id.
87
Rhodunda Aff. at ¶ 6.
88
State’s Resp. at ¶ 26.
89
State’s Resp. at ¶ 25.
90
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012). (“In order to prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a guilty plea, a defendant must
demonstrate that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on proceeding to trial.” Bradley v. State,
2007 WL 1599991, at *1 (Del. June 5, 2007) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
58 (1985))).
15
In the face of overwhelming evidence, including Anderson’s multiple direct

deliveries of drugs to police officers and strong evidence of his efforts to conceal a

large quantity of drugs in a police car at the time of his arrest, Rhodunda negotiated

a resolution beneficial—and acceptable—to Anderson.91

The decision to accept or reject the plea offer tendered by the State was

Anderson’s alone.92 The Court conducted a plea colloquy to confirm Anderson was

entering his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.93 The State dismissed

various charges as part of the negotiated plea, and Anderson fails to establish how

the outcome of his case would have been different. Anderson chose to plead guilty;

Rhodunda’s failure to challenge a specific charge—a charge dismissed in the plea

negotiation process—does not amount to ineffective assistance.

4. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s factual
misstatements at sentencing.

Anderson alleges Rhodunda “provided IAC to [him] because counsel

permitted the state prosecutor to misrepresent the number of times that [Anderson]

had allegedly performed illegal drug sales to an undercover police officer(s) at the

91
See generally, Plea Colloquy.
92
Taylor v. State, 28 A.3d 399, 406 (Del. 2011). (“A criminal defendant has ‘ultimate
authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to
plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.’”
(quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983))).
93
Plea Colloquy at 7; Ayers v. State, 2002 WL 1836600, at *1 (Del. Aug. 9, 2002).
16
sentencing hearing.”94 Anderson contends that the prosecution represented that he

made eight illegal transactions, when the record only reflects six illegal

transactions.95 Rhodunda acknowledged that he did not object to the

misrepresentation made by the prosecutor, but explained that his focus on sentencing

was not on the number of Anderson’s transactions, but on the fact that Anderson

engaged in drug deals with undercover officers.96 The State concedes its

misstatement but contends that it “does not appear to have affected the Court’s final

sentence in any negative way.”97 The State is correct.

The transcript of Anderson’s sentencing hearing reveals that the prosecutor’s

misstatement played no role in the Court’s sentence. After hearing from counsel and

Anderson, the Court explained:

So part of my job, as you probably could suspect from comments
I’ve made thus far, is to kind of cut through it and try to figure out
what’s the best result in the case based upon the objective facts and
circumstances. I will start with this: One, I appreciate the comments
that you [Anderson] have offered to the Court. You’re displaying a
level of maturity that hopefully indicates – or maybe its commensurate
with your age. I mean, you are a bit older to be in here on this, what is
often considered a young person’s endeavor. And you probably are at
a point where you want to get your life on track, I suspect.

*****

94
Def. Mot. at 4; see also Def. Mem. at 15, ¶ 22.
95
Id.
96
Rhodunda Aff. at ¶ 7.
97
State’s Resp. at ¶ 31.
17
The corollary here, kind of converse to that though is, is that there
is almost a decade by decade experience that you have beginning in
2003. You had a felony drug offense in 2003. You had a felony drug
offense in 2013. And now we are back a little over – maybe it started
in 2023. It’s 2024 – so you are back here again. And so, Mr.
Rhodunda’s comment about imposing the minimum and then having
probation as a hammer – I suspect that’s been a discussion that has been
had with you at various times prior to today.

I also see that you participated and completed the CREST
program at some point in 2014.

*****

And now we’re back again. So all that’s to say is this is not a
minimum mandatory appropriate case because you have a proven
criminal history, but I do not believe that an eight-year term is
warranted.98

The prosecutor’s factual misstatement did not influence the Court, and

Anderson suffered no prejudice.99 Rather, the Court focused on Anderson’s conduct

over time, not the number of undercover transactions leading to his present

indictment.

98
State’s Resp. Ex. B (“Sent. Trans.”) at 14-15.
99
See e.g., Lawhorn v. State, 2016 WL 6649222, at *3 (Del. Nov. 9, 2016) (defendant
not prejudiced where State offered comments at sentencing that could be perceived
to violate terms of plea agreement).
18
CONCLUSION

Anderson knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily pled guilty. His

negotiated plea agreement reduced the number of charges he faced and his overall

sentencing exposure. Further, as part of the agreement, the State agreed to cap its

sentencing recommendation. Then, following a presentence investigation, the Court

imposed a sentence beneath that sentencing cap. Anderson’s trial counsel were

effective in their representation and, equally importantly, Anderson suffered no

prejudice as a result of any of the errors he alleges. For the reasons set forth herein,

Anderson’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

_______________________
Sean P. Lugg, Judge

cc: Prothonotary
Olivia C. Phillips, Esquire
William J. Rhodunda, Jr., Esquire

19