Truitt v. Winder

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

SHEQUITA TRUITT, )
)
Individually and as Administrator of )
the Estate of G.M.T., a Minor, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
)
)
v. ) C.A. No. S20C-03-039 CAK
)
BRYAN WINDER and )
DWAYNE R. MCCONNELL, )
)
Defendants. )

Submitted: January 23, 2026
Decided: February 13, 2026

Allocation of Prejudgment Interest Between Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Robert J. Leoni, Esquire, Gilbert F. Shelsby, Jr., Esquire, and James J. Meehan,
III, Esquire, Shelsby & Leoni, 221 Main Street, Wilmington, DE 19804,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Shequita Truitt and the Estate of G.M.T.
Jeffrey A. Young, Esquire, Young & McNelis, 300 South State Street, Dover,
DE 19901, Attorney for Defendant Bryan Winder.

Daniel P. Bennett, Esquire, Mintzer Sarawitz Zeris & Willis LLC, Citizens
Bank Center, 919 North Market Street, Suite 200, Wilmington, DE 19801,
Attorney for Defendant Dwayne R. McConnell.

KARSNITZ, R. J.

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case originated as two wrongful death cases, one brought by

Shequita Truitt, both individually and as the administrator of the estate of

G.M.T., a minor (“Truitt” or “Plaintiffs”) in New Castle County Superior Court

on February 14, 2020, as amended on March 24, 2020, and the other brought

by Jeremie Handy (“Handy”) on March 27, 2020 in Sussex County Superior

Court against, inter alia, Dwayne R. McConnell (“McConnell” or “Defendant

McConnell”) and Bryan Winder (“Winder” or “Defendant Winder”)

(McConnell and Winder, collectively, “Defendants”). The cases were

consolidated for purposes of trial1 in Sussex County Superior Court on

December 15, 2022.

On June 14, 2024, Plaintiffs extended a settlement demand to Defendant

Winder, pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 2301(d), for the $300,000 liability policy limits

which Defendant Winder disclosed as the extent of his insurance coverage.

Defendant Winder did not accept the demand. Plaintiff’s offer to settle with

Defendant Winder was valid for a minimum of 30 days prior to the trial and

verdict. The demand was significantly less than the amount of the judgment

1
See 10 Del. C. § 3724(e).
3
ultimately entered against Defendant Winder (as discussed below).

Plaintiffs extended no settlement demand to Defendant McConnell

pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 2301(d),

On March 17, 2025, I severed Handy’s claim. Neither Handy nor his

counsel participated in the ensuing jury trial.

Following discovery and pretrial motions, trial was held on March 17,

18, 19, and 20, 2025. On March 21, 2025, the jury returned a verdict against

McConnell and Winder,2 found that that G.M.T. was not negligent, apportioned

negligence between McConnell (90%) and Winder (10%), awarded

$350,000.00 to the estate of G.M.T. for conscious pain and suffering and

$68,069.44 for medical bills, and awarded $1,300,000.00 to Truitt for mental

anguish.

On March 28, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Prejudgment and Post-

Judgment Interest. On April 10, 2025, Winder filed his Response to this Motion.

On April 3, 2025, Winder filed a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of

Law3 or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial,4 in which McConnell joined. After

full briefing and several oral arguments, on December 4, 2025, I issued my

2
McConnell had stipulated as to his liability.
3
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 50.
4
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 59.
4
Opinion on all issues related to this Motion. I granted Defendants’ Motion with

respect to the jury’s award of $350,000.00 to the Estate of G.M.T. for pain and

suffering, which I vacated. In all other respects, the Motion was denied.

On December 11, 2025, I received a letter from counsel for Defendant

Winder, on behalf of all counsel of record (including Jeremie Handy’s counsel),

requesting a temporary stay of Jeremie Handy v. Bryan Winder, et al. until the

Delaware Supreme Court has heard and ruled on the appeal of Defendant Bryan

Winder in this case, Shequita Truitt v. Bryan Winder, et al.

On December 16, 2025, I issued an Opinion and Order with respect to

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Prejudgment and Post-Judgment Interest, and Defendant

Winder’s Response thereto. I deducted $350,000 from the amount of the jury

award (which is the amount of the award for pain and suffering that I vacated)

and directed the parties to submit orders calculating prejudgment interest at

7.25% and post-judgment interest at 9.5%.5

On December 18, 2025, Plaintiffs, having submitted a draft order to

Defendants, wrote to the Court that a conflict had arisen between Defendants

regarding the allocation (not the amount) of prejudgment interest between

5
The parties have not challenged my Opinion and Order on the calculation of Prejudgment
Interest, or any aspect of Post-Judgment Interest. On December 16, 2025, I also entered an
Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Costs, which the parties have not challenged.
5
Defendants.

On December 19, 2025, Defendant Winder wrote to the Court and argued

that there should be no prejudgment interest with respect to him based on the

10% liability assigned to him by the jury, or, in the alternative, Defendants

should be treated equally with prejudgment interest applying to both.

On December 19, 2025, Defendant McConnell wrote to the Court and

argued that Plaintiff is not entitled to any prejudgment interest against him.

On December 19, 2025, Defendant Winder filed his Notice of Appeal to

the Delaware Supreme Court in this case, Shequita Truitt v. Bryan Winder, et

al., and an Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on December 22, 2025. On

December 23, 2025, the Supreme Court issued a Notice to Show Cause by

January 2, 2026, why the appeal should not be dismissed pursuant to Supreme

Court Rule 29(b) for defendant Winder’s failure to comply with Rule 42 when

taking an appeal from an apparent interlocutory order.

December 24, 2025, I wrote to all counsel for the parties and advised that

I had no jurisdiction to consider their claims regarding prejudgment interest

while the appeal was pending before the Supreme Court.

On January 23, 2026, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as

interlocutory without prejudice as to any future appeal following the entry of
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final judgment by this Court. Now that I have regained jurisdiction, this is my

Opinion and Order on Prejudgment Interest.

ARGUMENTS OF PARTIES

Defendant Winder

Defendant Winder argues in the alternative. First, he argues that there

should be no prejudgment interest permitted in the case at all. The only demand

pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 2301(d) made to Defendant Winder was for $300,000.00.

Because the jury determined that Mr. Winder was only l0% responsible for the

damages, with an agreed $1,368,069.44 total judgment, Defendant Winder's

portion of the damages would be $136,806.94, which is less than the $300,000

demand Plaintiffs filed. Because he has a crossclaim against Defendant

McConnell for contribution and indemnification, argues Defendant Winder, the

only amount owed directly to Plaintiff is $136,806.94.

In the alternative, Defendant Winder argues that, even if Delaware law

allows prejudgment interest attached based on the overall judgment against

Defendant Winder and Defendant McConnell as joint tortfeasors, as opposed to

the individual liability of the two Defendants, then the liability for prejudgment

interest should be shared with Defendant Winder by Defendant McConnell.

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Although the judgment against Defendant Winder was less than the demand by

Plaintiffs, he argues that I should not treat the two Defendants differently.

Because he has a crossclaim against Defendant McConnell, there should be a

right of contribution and indemnification against Defendant McConnell for

prejudgment interest as well.

Defendant McConnell

Defendant McConnell argues that Plaintiffs are entitled to no

prejudgment interest against him. He offered his insurance policy limits in an

attempt to resolve the litigation, but his offer was not accepted, and no statutory

demand was ever made on him.

ANALYSIS

6 Del. C. § 2301(d) provides:

In any tort action for compensatory damages in the Superior
Court or the Court of Common Pleas seeking monetary relief for
bodily injuries, death or property damage, interest shall be added
to any final judgment entered for damages awarded, calculated
at the rate established in subsection (a) of this section,
commencing from the date of injury, provided that prior to trial
the plaintiff had extended to defendant a written settlement
demand valid for a minimum of 30 days in an amount less than
the amount of damages upon which the judgment was entered.

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Thus, if the settlement demand on a defendant is less than the amount of

damages awarded by the jury against that defendant, the plaintiffs can recover

prejudgment interest.

The purpose of this statute is to promote earlier settlement of claims by

encouraging parties to make fair offers sooner, with the effect of reducing court

congestion.6

In Christiana Care Health Services, Inc. v. Crist,7 plaintiffs brought a

survival and wrongful death action against a doctor and Christiana Care Health

Services (“CCHS”). Plaintiffs alleged that the doctor and CCHS were negligent

in the professional care provided to a patient during his stay at the hospital

following hip surgery. A Superior Court jury found that both the doctor and

CCHS were negligent, that their negligence was a proximate cause of the

patient’s death and awarded damages of $2 million in favor of plaintiffs. The

jury attributed 40 percent of the fault to the doctor and 60 percent of the fault

to CCHS.

Prior to trial, plaintiffs made a settlement offer to the doctor and CCHS

for $1.25 million each, which both parties rejected. The trial judge found that

6
Rapposelli v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 988 A.2d 425 (Del. 2010).
7
956 A.2d 622 (Del. 2008).
9
the combined settlement offer ($2.5 million) exceeded the $2 million award of

damages by the jury and denied prejudgment interest. While the trial judge

acknowledged that plaintiffs could collect the entire $2 million jury award from

each defendant, he found that the apportionment of the jury verdict

demonstrated that each individual defendant's liability did not exceed the

settlement demand. The trial judge found that the apportionment of the jury

verdict was less than the settlement demand to the individual tortfeasors and

denied prejudgment interest. In reaching this decision, the trial judge focused

on the total amount of the two settlement offers.

The Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded, and held that an

award of prejudgment interest was required under 6 Del. C. § 2301(d) because

plaintiffs' settlement offer to the doctor of $1.25 million, and its separate

settlement offer to CCHS of $1.25 million, were each for an amount less than

the amount of the $2 million judgment entered against them jointly and

severally, notwithstanding the right of contribution between joint tortfeasors.8

8
In the event a party pays more than its pro rata share of the “common liability,” it may
recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor. See 10 Del. C. § 6302.
10
The Supreme Court interpreted 6 Del. C. § 2301(d) consistent with its

interpretation of Rule 68 relating to offers of judgment.9 In ruling on the trial

judge’s statutory interpretation de novo,10 the Court explained that “[a]lthough

a defendant may still phrase an offer of settlement as a collective one to multiple

plaintiffs, an award of costs is only available under Rule 68 where the offer is

formally apportioned among each of the plaintiffs individually.”11 The $2

million judgment in favor of plaintiffs was a common liability of both the doctor

and CCHS. Thus, plaintiffs may collect upon the full amount of the judgment

from either tortfeasor. The written settlement demand for each tortfeasor was

for less than $2 million.25 Although a jury apportionment of fault affects

contribution among joint tortfeasors, it does not change the common liability of

each tortfeasor to plaintiffs for the entire amount of the judgment. The plain

language of 6 Del. C. § 2301(d) requires that prejudgment interest be awarded

when the settlement demand was less than the amount of damages upon which

9
See Super Ct. Civ. R. 68, which provides in relevant part: “If the judgment finally obtained
by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred
after the making of the offer.”
10
Leatherbury v. Greenspun, 939 A.2d 1284, 1288 (Del. 2007).
11
Cahall v. Thomas, 906 A.2d 24, 27 (Del. 2006).
11
the judgment was entered, regardless of how the jury apportioned fault among

the joint tortfeasors for purposes of contribution.

Under Crist, I would ordinarily agree with Defendant Winder that the

liability for prejudgment interest should be shared by Defendant Winder and

Defendant McConnell. Although the percentage jury verdict against Defendant

Winder was less than the $300,000 settlement demand by Plaintiffs, Defendant

Winder has a crossclaim against Defendant McConnell. Thus, ordinarily

Defendant Winder would have a right of contribution and indemnification

against Defendant McConnell for prejudgment interest, and I would not treat

the two Defendants differently.

However, Defendant McConnell must be liable to plaintiffs for

prejudgment interest under 6 Del. C. § 2301(d) in the first place. As he points

out in his argument, he is not. He offered his policy limits in an attempt to

resolve the litigation, but it was not accepted, and no settlement demand was

ever made. Defendant McConnell cannot be punished by assessing prejudgment

interest against him when no settlement demand was made by Plaintiffs. To hold

otherwise would contravene the purpose and intent of the statute.

12
In Crist, the same demand was made to both Defendants, and neither

Defendant agreed to offer the amounts demanded. In this instance, no demand

was ever made upon Defendant McConnell. Therefore, 6 Del. C. §2301(d) was

never triggered as to Defendant McConnell, and no prejudgment interest can be

awarded.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the statutory liability for prejudgment

interest rests solely upon Defendant Winder. Using the calculations contained

in my December 16, 2025, Opinion and Order with respect to Plaintiffs’ Motion

for Prejudgment and Post-Judgment Interest, and Defendant Winder’s

Response thereto, the parties are directed to submit an Order consistent with

this Opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Craig A. Karsnitz
Craig A. Karsnitz

cc: Prothonotary
Tasha M. Stevens-Gueh, Esquire

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