In re Family Court Judge, 749 A.2d 1250 (Del. Jud. 2000)

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

# IN THE COURT ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN RE:

THE HONORABLE GARY E.

GRUBB,

a Judicial Officer, Respondent.

C.J. No. 10, 1999

COURT ON THE JUDICIARY
RECEIVED and FILED

MAY 1 ₺ 2000
MLN

Submitted: March 13, 2000
Decided:
May 11, 2000

Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, HARTNETT and
BERGER, Justices, CHANDLER, Chancellor, and RIDGELY, President Judge,
constituting the Court on the Judiciary.

James E. Liguori, Esquire, of Liguori, Morris and Redding, Dover,
Delaware, for Respondent.

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On December 9, 1999, the Honorable Vincent J. Poppiti, Chief Judge of the
Family Court, filed a complaint in the Court on the Judiciary against Family Court
Commissioner Gary E. Grubb.1 The complaint alleged that: (1) on December 7,
1999, Commissioner Grubb was convicted of Shoplifting, a Class A misdemeanor;
(2) Commissioner Grubb's conviction constituted an offense involving moral
turpitude; and (3) as a result, Commissioner Grubb was subject to censure or
removal by the Court on the Judiciary.

## Report of Preliminary Investigatory Panel

By Order dated December 13, 1999, this Court referred the complaint to a
Panel of the Preliminary Investigatory Committee ("Panel") for consideration.2 On
January 26, 2000, the Panel filed its investigatory report dated January 21, 2000.
The Panel determined that "the alleged conduct of Commissioner Grubb constitutes
the commission 'of an offense involving moral turpitude,' as that term is used within

1
" Any judicial officer appointed by the Governor may be censured, removed or retired by the Court on the
Judiciary. Del. Const., Art. IV, § 37. See 10 Del. C. § 915(a) (providing that the Governor shall appoint, with the
consent of the Senate, suitable persons to act as Commissioners of the Family Court).

2 Panels of the Preliminary Investigatory Committee of the Court on the Judiciary are designated to investigate
and report on any charge of misconduct. Ct. Jud. R. 3(c).

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the meaning of Article IV, Sec. 37 of the Delaware Constitution."3 (Emphasis in
original). The Panel concluded that, if the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas
became final, it would be grounds for further proceedings in the Court on the
Judiciary. The Court held the Panel's report in abeyance pending the disposition of
a motion for new trial and/or modification of sentence that was filed by
Commissioner Grubb on December 8, 1999, in the Court of Common Pleas.

## Finding of Probable Cause

By opinion dated January 28, 2000, the Court of Common Pleas denied
Commissioner Grubb's motion for new trial/and or modification of sentence.4 With
the denial.of that motion, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas became final.
As a result, this Court, in view of the Panel's report, determined that there was
probable cause to believe that Commissioner Grubb may be subject to censure or
removal under the provisions of Article IV, Sec. 37 of the Delaware Constitution.
By letter dated March 3, 2000, the Clerk of this Court informed Commissioner

3 Article IV, Section 37 of the Delaware Constitution confers authority on the Court on the Judiciary to
censure or remove a judicial officer for persistent misconduct in violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, as adopted
by the Delaware Supreme Court. The Constitution also provides authority to discipline a judge for wilful misconduct
in office, wilful failure to perform duties or the commission of an offense involving moral turpitude.

4
State v. Grubb, Del. CCP, Cr.A.No. MK99-08-0066IF, Trader, J. (Jan. 28, 2000).

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Grubb that the Court intended, within 7 days, to appoint a Board of Examining
Officers5 to carry out the presentation of formal charges.6

## Respondent's Resignation

By letter to the Governor dated March 13, 2000, and before the Court
determined whether to proceed with the appointment of a Board of Examining
Officers, Commissioner Grubb resigned his position as Commissioner of the Family
Court. By separate letter dated March 13, 2000, Commissioner Grubb, through
counsel, informed the Court that he had submitted his resignation and requested,
pursuant to Rule 12, that the Court allow him to "admit to the allegation in the
complaint in exchange for his resignation."7 Commissioner Grubb asked that the
Court consider the resignation to be the "final resolution of the matter before the
Court on the Judiciary." Commissioner Grubb waived confidentiality in how the
Court wished to address the matter.

5 Ct. Jud. R. 9.

6 Ct. Jud. R. 10.
7
Rule 12 provides that "[a]t any time after the filing of a complaint or after a matter is referred to a Panel and
before final disposition, the judicial officer may agree to admit to any or all of the allegations in exchange for a stated
sanction."

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We find that the crime of shoplifting involves moral turpitude.8 Consequently,
Commissioner Grubb's conviction of that crime subjects him to censure or removal
by the Court on the Judiciary.9 The purpose of judicial discipline, however, is not
to punish but to protect the public and to maintain "the high standards of conduct
required so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. "10
Under the circumstances, we are satisfied that taken together, the following action
accomplishes the purpose of judicial discipline under the particular circumstances
of this case: (i) Commissioner Grubb's acknowledgment of his conviction; (ii) his
resignation from office; and (iii) the publication of this Opinion and the opening of
the Court record in this case.

NOW, THEREFORE, it is ORDERED that this proceeding is DISMISSED,
and that this Opinion and the Court record are released from the confidentiality
provisions of the Constitution.

8
Moral turpitude is defined as "[c]onduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality. In the area of
legal ethics, offenses involving moral turpitude -- such as fraud or breach of trust -- traditionally make a person unfit
to practice law." Black's Law Dict. 7th ed. 1999, p. 1026.

9
Del. Const. art. IV, § 37; see In re Garrett, Fla. Supr., 613 So.2d 463, 465 (1993) (following arrest and
pretrial intervention for shoplifting, judge removed from office on ground that "it would be impossible for the public
to repose this confidence in a judge who has knowingly stolen property from another").

10
In re Buckson, Del. Jud., 610 A.2d 203, 225 (1992).