EEOC Appeal 2026002376

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Sector
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Nicki B.,1
Complainant,
v.
David Steiner,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Field Areas and Regions),
Agency.
Appeal No. 2026002376
Hearing No. 530-2024-00284X
Agency No. 1A-538-0003-24
DECISION
On May 9, 2026, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment
Opportunity 	Commission 	(EEOC 	or 	Commission), 	pursuant 	to 	29 	C.F.R. 	§
1614.403(a), from the Agency’s April 10, 2026, final order adopting the EEOC
Administrative 	Judge 	(AJ’s) 	decision 	concerning 	her 	equal 	employment
opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission
AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order.
1 	This 	case 	has 	been 	randomly 	assigned 	a 	pseudonym 	which 	will 	replace
Complainant’s 	name 	when 	the 	decision 	is 	published 	to 	non-parties 	and 	the
Commission’s website.

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BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a
Supervisor of Logistics, EAS 17 at the Agency’s Pittsburgh Processing and
Distribution 	Center 	(P&DC) 	in 	Pittsburgh, 	Pennsylvania. 	Complainant’s 	two
managers were the Manager, Logistics (Manager1) and the Manager, Logistics
Operation (Manager2).
On February 15, 2024, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the
Agency discriminated against her, that was ultimately framed in the following
manner:2
1. Whether the Agency discriminated against Complainant on the bases of sex
(female), color (light skinned African American), age (YOB 1965), and
reprisal (instant EEO complaint) when, on or around September 6, 2023,
Complainant was given the job of Network Specialist, but was never placed
into the position, remaining as the Supervisor of Logistics, and on or around
September 	9, 	2023, 	another 	employee 	was 	placed 	into 	Complainant’s
Network Specialist position.
2. Whether the Agency discriminated against Complainant based on reprisal
(filing 	of 	the 	instant 	complaint 	on 	November 	6, 	2023) 	when, 	from
September 23, 2023, through December 18, 2023, management criticized
Complainant, made threats towards Complainant, assigned her more work
than 	her 	male 	coworkers, 	and 	on 	or 	around 	December 	19, 	2023,
Complainant was forced to go out on Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)
leave due to the emotional distress.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a
copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing
before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ).
Complainant timely requested a hearing. The Agency filed a Motion for a Decision
Without a Hearing, which Complainant opposed. The Agency then filed a reply to
Complainant’s opposition. On March 27, 2026, the AJ granted the Agency’s
motion and issued a summary judgment decision in favor of the Agency.
2 See Initial Status Conference Memorandum and Case Management Order.

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In the AJ’s decision, the AJ first dismissed Claim 1 pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §
1614.107(a)(2) for untimely EEO counselor contact. Complainant made initial
EEO counselor contact on November 6, 2023. Complainant had testified that she
learned she was not placed into the Network Specialist position when the weekly
schedule was posted on September 9, 2023, and after asking Manager1, Manager1
told Complainant she would not be working as a Network Specialist. The AJ
concluded that Complainant had a reason to suspect that she was discriminated
against as early as September 9, 2023. Therefore, the discrete acts that occurred on
September 6 and 9, 2023, in Claim 1 were untimely because they occurred more
than 45 calendar days prior to Complainant’s initial EEO contact on November 6,
2023.
Regarding Claim 2 and Complainant’s allegation of reprisal, the AJ found that
Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of reprisal because she could not
show that she was subjected to materially adverse action and/or that there was a
nexus between her protected activity and the alleged adverse treatment. The AJ
found 	that 	Complainant’s 	allegations 	constituted 	supervisory 	instructions 	and
directives, insufficient to constitute materially adverse treatment. Even assuming
Complainant could establish a prima facie case of reprisal, the Agency articulated
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for sending Complainant emails, such as
inquiring 	whether 	an 	employee 	had 	submitted 	proper 	leave 	documentation,
instructions regarding an employee’s overtime, and sent an email to Complainant
and 	other 	staff 	about 	unauthorized 	employee 	overtime 	and 	in 	response 	to
Complainant’s question, Manager1 explained the relevant policy and procedure,
completing 	driver 	observations, 	and 	a 	temporary 	assignment 	to 	the 	Tour 	3
Supervisor Logistics Operations where Complainant’s schedule and pay remained
the same. The AJ determined that aside from Complainant’s subjective beliefs, the
record evidence did not show that the Agency’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons were pretext for discriminatory or retaliatory animus.
The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that
Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as
alleged. The instant appeal followed.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Complainant requests that the Commission reverse the Agency’s final
order adopting the AJ’s decision finding she was not subjected to discrimination.

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Complainant argues that there are material facts in dispute that warrant a hearing.
Additionally, regarding Claim 1, Complainant argues that she was given the
Network Specialist position but since management kept requiring her to remain in
her former role, the discriminatory conduct continued beyond September 9, 2023,
making her EEO Counselor contact timely.
ANALYSIS
The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to grant summary judgment when they
find that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). An
issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could
find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23
(1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-49 (1986). A fact is
“material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. Id. When
considering summary judgment, facts and inferences must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557,
586 (2009).
To successfully oppose a decision by summary judgment, a complainant must
identify, with specificity, facts in dispute either within the record or by producing
further supporting evidence and must further establish that such facts are material
under applicable law. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)(2); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24; see
also EEO MD-110, at Chap. 7, § III.E. Such a dispute would indicate that a hearing
is necessary to produce evidence to support a finding that the Agency was
motivated by discriminatory animus. Here, however, Complainant has failed to
establish such a dispute.
With regards to Claim 1, Complainant learned she was not placed into the Network
Specialist position when the weekly schedule was posted on September 9, 2023.
We agree with the AJ’s determination that Complainant had reasonable suspicion
to suspect she was discriminated against as early as September 9, 2023, when the
weekly schedule was posted and she learned that she was not placed in the
Network Specialist position. As a discrete act, Complainant needed to initiate EEO
counselor contact within 45 days of September 9, 2023, or by October 24, 2023.
However, Complainant made initial EEO Counselor contact on November 6, 2023.
We find that the AJ properly dismissed Claim 1 for untimely EEO Counselor
contact pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 1614.107(a)(1).

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Regarding Claim 2, we find that Complainant failed to provide any evidence that
management’s actions were motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus.
Complainant 	alleged 	that 	she 	experienced 	reprisal 	due 	to 	filing 	the 	instant
complaint, and due to the Agency’s retaliatory conduct, she went on extended
FMLA leave beginning December 19, 2023. Complainant’s allegations of reprisal
include management criticizing Complaint and being threatened with discipline if
she did not follow instructions. Complainant submitted emails that generally show
management providing Complainant with instructions and Agency policies and
procedures, 	such 	as 	employee 	overtime. 	Complainant 	testified 	that 	she 	was
assigned more work than her two male coworkers (CW1 and CW2, respectively)
and one female coworker (CW3). She testified that she had to do requests for
information, process and answer grievances, conduct pre-disciplinary interviews
and issue discipline. Manager1 stated that all EAS-17 employees working in the
Logistics department have responsibilities and the Complainant was not the only
one performing the above mentioned tasks. For example, Manager1 explained that
if a grievance is filed and Complainant was working at the same time as the
allegations in the grievance, then she would be expected to prepare a response.
Manager1 also testified that all employees had required duties and that CW1 and
CW3 were Network Specialists and had a different set of duties than someone
working as a Supervisor of Logistics. Manager1 also explained that CW2 was not a
Form 50 Supervisor, therefore, he could not perform some of official duties, such
as timekeeping, because he was not authorized to access certain systems.
Having thoroughly reviewed the record and construing any inferences raised by the
undisputed facts in favor of Complainant, we find that a reasonable fact-finder
could not find in Complainant’s favor. Upon careful review of the AJ’s decision
and the record evidence, as well as the parties’ arguments on appeal, we conclude
that the AJ correctly determined that the preponderance of the evidence did not
establish that Complainant was discriminated against by the Agency as alleged.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, we
AFFIRM 	the 	Agency’s 	final 	order 	implementing 	the 	AJ’s 	decision 	finding
Complainant was not subjected to discrimination as alleged.

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STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1125)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if
Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or
evidence that tend to establish that:
1. 	The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of
material fact or law; or
2. 	The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Sector
(OFS) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party
requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the
request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for
reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of
another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or
statement 	in 	opposition. 	See 	29 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1614.405; 	Equal 	Employment
Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at
Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015).
Complainant should submit their request for reconsideration, and any statement or
brief in support of their request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at
https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx. 	Alternatively, 	Complainant 	can
submit their request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Sector, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box
77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street,
NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFS receives it by mail within
five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. §
1614.604.
An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the
EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g).
Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files their request via the
EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required.

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Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s
request 	for 	reconsideration 	as 	untimely, 	unless 	extenuating 	circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must
be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(f).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0124)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District
Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this
decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint
the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that
person by their full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the
dismissal of your case in court. 	“Agency” or “department” means the national
organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If
you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will
terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so,
you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without
paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent
you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you.
You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an
attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests.

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Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the
paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time
limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
T. Gimbrere 	_________ 	Acting Director's signature
T. Gimbrere, Acting Director
Office of Federal Sector
September 22, 2026
Date