EEOC Appeal 2025002567

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Sector
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Newton P.,1
Complainant,
v.
Bill Renick,
Chair,
Tennessee Valley Authority,
Agency.
Appeal No. 2025002567
Agency No. TVA-2023-0005
DECISION
On April 25, 2025, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment
Opportunity 	Commission 	(EEOC 	or 	Commission), 	pursuant 	to 	29 	C.F.R. 	§
1614.403(a), from the Agency’s March 28, 2025, final decision concerning his equal
employment 	opportunity 	(EEO) 	complaint 	of 	employment 	discrimination 	in
violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. 	For the following reasons, the Commission
MODIFIES the Agency’s final decision.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the Agency’s final decision on compensatory damages was sufficient to
make Complainant whole for the Agency’s failure to accommodate Complainant’s
disability.
1 	This 	case 	has 	been 	randomly 	assigned 	a 	pseudonym 	which 	will 	replace
Complainant’s 	name 	when 	the 	decision 	is 	published 	to 	non-parties 	and 	the
Commission’s website.

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BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Nuclear
Security Officer at the Agency’s Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in Decatur, Alabama.
On December 16, 2022, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the
Agency discriminated against him on the basis of disability (pseudofolliculitis
barbae) 	when 	on 	December 	1, 	2022, 	the 	Agency 	denied 	his 	reasonable
accommodation request.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a
copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before
an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). 	In accordance with Complainant’s request,
the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). 	The
decision 	concluded that 	Complainant 	proved 	that 	the Agency 	denied 	him a
reasonable accommodation when it revoked his security clearance due to his
inability to shave because the Agency changed the gas masks it used to one that
required a person not to have any facial hair. Complainant was placed in non-pay
status on December 1, 2022, and ultimately resigned on October 18, 2023, which
Complainant characterized as a constructive discharge. 	The decision therefore
ordered that the Agency reinstate Complainant to his previous position as a Nuclear
Security Officer and provide him with reasonable accommodation; conduct a
supplemental investigation into compensatory damages; expunge any discipline
related to Complainant’s failure to be clean-shaven from his personnel record;
provide training to the responsible management officials; and post a notice regarding
the discrimination finding.
Complainant requested backpay, pecuniary compensatory damages in the total
amount of $33,778.31 (comprising $13,055.94 for his lost Agency contribution to
his TSP and the tax penalty for early withdrawal of his TSP benefits; $5,722.37 in
mileage to his new employment; and $15,000.00 in death benefits for his late
daughter). 	Complainant also sought nonpecuniary compensatory damages up to
$300,000.00 for the weight loss and insomnia he suffered due to the Agency’s denial
of his reasonable accommodation, severe irritable bowel syndrome, depression and
anxiety for which he is on medication; and withdrawal from his friendships, which
were all exacerbated by his grief over the loss of his daughter on October 28, 2023.

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In support of his request, Complainant submitted medical documentation of his
diagnoses, an affidavit from himself and his wife; documentation of his early
withdrawal from his retirement fund; and documentation of his mileage costs to his
new employment. 	Complainant also sought attorney’s fees in the total amount of
$26,395.40 (comprising 48.7 hours of work at an hourly rate of $542).
The Agency issued a decision on damages, denying Complainant’s request for
pecuniary damages for his tax penalty for early withdrawal from his retirement
funds, 	mileage 	reimbursement, 	and 	a 	death 	benefit 	because 	it 	found 	that
Complainant had not provided sufficient documentation to support the amount or to
establish that the losses were due to the Agency’s discrimination. 	The Agency
awarded Complainant backpay in the amount of $85,766.97 and $6,264.72 for lost
retirement contributions and $10,000.00 in nonpecuniary compensatory damages.
The Agency further awarded Complainant an attorney’s fee award in the amount of
$19,480.00, comprising 48.7 hours of work at an hourly rate of $400.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Complainant argues that the Agency erred in not awarding pecuniary
compensatory damages as requested because Complainant established that he was
entitled to them. Complainant also contends that the Agency’s award of $10,000.00
was inadequate to compensate Complainant for the extent and severity of the
physical and emotional harm he suffered. 	Lastly, Complainant argues that the
Agency erred in determining the appropriate hourly rate for Complainant’s counsel
was $400 rather than $542.
In response, the Agency argued that its award of damages was supported by the
record and case law and should be affirmed. 	Specifically, the Agency noted that
Complainant was not entitled to a death benefit for the loss of his daughter because
it would not have been paid by the Agency even if Complainant had still been
employed at the time of his daughter’s death but rather would have been payable by
Complainant’s insurance, MetLife. The Agency also contends that Complainant has
not established that he is entitled to nonpecuniary compensatory damages greater
than $30,000.00 at most.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW
As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.110(b), 	the 	Agency's 	decision 	is 	subject 	to 	de 	novo 	review 	by 	the
Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). 	See Equal Employment Opportunity
Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015)
(explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission
examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the
previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and
testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties,
and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record
and its interpretation of the law”).
ANALYSIS
Pecuniary Compensatory Damages
When discrimination is found, an agency must provide the complainant with a
remedy that constitutes full, make-whole relief to restore him as nearly as possible
to the position she would have occupied absent the discrimination. See, e.g., Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975); Adesanya v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No.
01933395 (July 21, 1994). Pursuant to section 102(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
a complainant who establishes unlawful intentional discrimination under Title VII
and the Rehabilitation Act may receive compensatory damages for past and future
pecuniary losses (i.e., out-of-pocket expenses) and nonpecuniary losses (e.g., pain
and 	suffering, 	mental 	anguish) 	as 	part 	of 	make-whole 	relief. 	42 	U.S.C. 	§
1981a(b)(3). Compensatory damages do not include back pay, interest on back pay,
or any other type of equitable relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2). In West v. Gibson,
527 	U.S. 	212 	(1999), 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	held 	that 	Congress 	afforded 	the
Commission the authority to award compensatory damages in the administrative
process.
Pecuniary losses are out-of-pocket expenses incurred because of the agency's
unlawful 	action, 	including 	job-hunting 	expenses, 	moving 	expenses, 	medical
expenses, psychiatric expenses, physical therapy expenses, and other quantifiable
out-of-pocket expenses.

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Past pecuniary losses are losses incurred prior to the resolution of a complaint
through a finding of discrimination, or a voluntary settlement. EEO MD-110, at
Chap. 11, VII.B.2 (internal citations omitted).
In a claim for pecuniary, compensatory damages, a complainant must demonstrate,
through appropriate evidence and documentation, the harm suffered because of the
agency’s discriminatory action. See Sheila O. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Srvcs.,
EEOC Appeal No. 2021001250 (June 7, 2022). Objective evidence in support of a
claim for pecuniary damages includes documentation showing actual out-of-pocket
expenses with an explanation of the expenditure. The agency is only responsible for
those damages that are clearly shown to be caused by the Agency’s discriminatory
conduct. To recover damages, a complainant must prove that the employer's
discriminatory actions were the cause of the pecuniary loss. Id. (citations omitted).
The Commission has held that an award of pecuniary damages is proper to
compensate a complainant for tax penalties which result from early withdrawals
from a retirement plan. 	Gonzales v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No.
0720080027 (May 30, 2008). 	Complainant requested that the Agency award him
$5,027.60 for the tax liability as a result of his early withdrawal from the TVA
retirement system. We agree with Complainant that he is entitled to compensation
for the tax penalty he incurred as a result of his early withdrawal from his retirement
account. Contrary to the Agency’s argument on appeal, we do not find that the mere
fact that Complainant made the withdrawal in January 2024, almost a year after he
stopped 	receiving 	payments 	from 	the 	Agency, 	is 	dispositive 	as 	to 	whether
Complainant established that the early withdrawal was due to the Agency’s actions.
Complainant’s affidavit in support of his request explained that he withdrew from
his retirement account in order to pay off the debts he had incurred in the previous
months due to his loss of income.
We find that Complainant submitted sufficient documentation to support his request.
On appeal, Complainant submitted a copy of the TVA retirement system Benefit
Cashout Application which noted that a 20% tax penalty would be incurred for an
early withdrawal. 	In his request for pecuniary damages, Complainant submitted a
copy of an email from the TVA retirement system confirming that he had made a
pension cashout on January 16, 2024, of $25,138.00, “less taxes,” in the amount of
$5,027.60. 	We therefore find that Complainant is entitled to the amount of
$5,027.60 to compensate him for the tax penalty from his early withdrawal from his
retirement account and modify the Agency’s final order accordingly.

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Complainant 	also 	argues 	that 	the 	Agency 	erred 	in 	denying 	his 	request 	for
compensation for the mileage he incurred for his commute to his new employment,
stating that due to the loss of his job with the Agency, Complainant was forced to
accept another job 16.5 miles away for a total commuting distance of 33 miles.
Complainant contends that he is entitled to $6,696.20 for the mileage he incurred
through the last day of his employment at the other job. We agree with Complainant
that he is entitled to be reimbursed for the mileage he incurred for his commute to
the new employment he took when he lost his job at the Agency due to its failure to
accommodate him. 	Contrary to the Agency’s argument on appeal, we find that
Complainant 	has 	provided 	sufficient 	documentation 	to 	support 	his 	request.
Complainant submitted a copy of one of his pay stubs from his new employer,
indicating that in one week, he worked 40 hours, which is consistent with 5 working
days. 	Complainant also submitted a chart documenting the number of days he
worked in any given period. Under the circumstances, we find that this is sufficient
documentation of his entitlement to mileage. 	See Marybeth C. v. Dep’t of Health
and Human Srvcs., EEOC Appeal No. 0120170811 (June 11, 2019) (affirming an
Agency’s award of mileage reimbursement where it was supported only by the
complainant’s own statement). 	We therefore find that Complainant is entitled to
mileage damages in the amount of $6,696.20.
Lastly, Complainant argues that he is entitled to death benefits in the amount of
$15,000.00 for the amount the Agency would have paid him on the event of his
insured daughter’s death if Complainant had still been employed by the Agency.
The Agency argues that the death benefit is a type of optional dependent insurance
administered by MetLife, not the Agency, and therefore, Complainant must make
any claim to MetLife. We agree with the Agency that Complainant is not entitled to
damages in the form of death benefits for his late daughter because the evidence
indicates that Complainant’s entitlement to such a benefit needs to be adjudicated
by MetLife as the insurer. 	Moreover, because it is a form of optional insurance,
contrary to Complainant’s argument on appeal, it is not among the employment
benefits that Complainant would automatically have been entitled to had he still been
employed by the Agency. 	We therefore deny Complainant’s request for death
benefits as a form of pecuniary damages.

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Nonpecuniary Compensatory Damages
Nonpecuniary losses are losses that are not subject to precise quantification, i.e.,
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,
injury to professional standing, injury to character and reputation, injury to credit
standing, and loss of health. See EEOC Notice No. 915.302, Enforcement Guidance
on Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under Section 102 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, at 10 (July 14, 1992). There is no precise formula for
determining the amount of damages for nonpecuniary losses except that the award
should reflect the nature and severity of the harm and the duration or expected
duration of the harm. 	See Loving v. Dep’t of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No.
01955789 (Aug. 29, 1997). The Commission notes that nonpecuniary compensatory
damages are designed to remedy the harm caused by the discriminatory event rather
than punish the agency for the discriminatory action. 	Furthermore, compensatory
damages 	should 	not 	be 	motivated 	by 	passion 	or 	prejudice 	or 	“monstrously
excessive” standing alone but should be consistent with the amounts awarded in
similar cases. 	See Ward-Jenkins v. Dep’t of the Interior, EEOC Appeal No.
01961483 (Mar. 4, 1999).
Evidence from a health care provider or other expert is not a mandatory prerequisite
for recovery of compensatory damages for emotional harm. See Lawrence v. U.S.
Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01952288 (Apr. 18, 1996) (citing Carle v. Dep’t of
the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (Jan. 5, 1993)). 	Objective evidence of
compensatory damages can include statements from a complainant concerning his
emotional pain or suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of
life, injury to professional standing, injury to character or reputation, injury to credit
standing, loss of health, and any other nonpecuniary losses that are incurred as a
result of the discriminatory conduct. Id.
Statements from others including family members, friends, health care providers,
and other counselors (including clergy) could address the outward manifestations or
physical consequences of emotional distress, including sleeplessness, anxiety, stress,
depression, marital strain, humiliation, emotional distress, loss of self-esteem,
excessive fatigue, or a nervous breakdown. Id. Complainant’s own testimony, along
with the circumstances of a particular case, can suffice to sustain her burden in this
regard. Id.

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The more inherently degrading or humiliating the defendant's action is, the more
reasonable it is to infer that a person would suffer humiliation or distress from that
action. Id. The absence of supporting evidence, however, may affect the amount of
damages appropriate in specific cases. Id.
Complainant has the burden of proving the existence, nature and severity of the
alleged emotional harm. Man H. v. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec’y, EEOC Appeal No.
0120161218 (May 2, 2017). Complainant must also establish a causal relationship
between the alleged harm and the discrimination. Id. Absent such proof of harm and
causation, a complainant is not entitled to compensatory damages, even if there were
a finding of unlawful discrimination. 	Id.; Wilda M. v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC
Appeal No. 0120141087 (Jan. 12, 2017) (awards for emotional harm are warranted
only if complainant establishes a sufficient causal connection between the agency’s
illegal actions and her injury).
On appeal, Complainant disagrees with the Agency’s decision to award him only
$10,000.00 in nonpecuniary compensatory damages. Complainant maintains that he
suffered from severe irritable bowel syndrome, lost his appetite resulting in a loss of
20 pounds, suffered from insomnia and depression, and withdrew from his friends,
and that the new job he took when he was forced to resign from his position with the
Agency is more physically demanding and has caused ongoing joint and muscle
pain.
Here, while we find that the evidence in the record is not sufficient to support an
award of more than $100,000.00 as Complainant argues, we agree with Complainant
that the Agency’s award of $10,000.00 was insufficient to compensate Complainant
for the harm he suffered as a result of the Agency’s failure to accommodate his
disability. While the medical documentation Complainant submitted indicates that
Complainant had suffered from anxiety and insomnia even prior to the Agency’s
discrimination, we find that the medical documentation, as well as Complainant’s
own testimony 	and that of his wife, establish 	that 	Complainant’s insomnia,
depression, 	and 	anxiety 	were 	significantly 	exacerbated 	due to 	the Agency’s
discrimination because the medical notes mentioned the primary stressors in
Complainant’s life as being the loss of his previous job at the Agency and the effect
of his daughter’s suicide.

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We believe that an award of nonpecuniary damages in the amount of $50,000.00 is
appropriate. We find that this amount is not motivated by passion or prejudice, is
not “monstrously excessive” standing alone, and is consistent with the amounts
awarded in other cases. 	See Chere S. v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No.
2023000107 (May 19, 2025) (affirming an AJ’s award of $60,000.00 where the
complainant suffered severe exacerbation of pre-existing migraines, depression, and
withdrawal from relationships but where the harms were caused partly due to the
deaths of some family members); Elsa O. v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No.
2022003509 (Aug. 4, 2023) (awarding the complainant $50,000.00 where the
Agency’s denial of reasonable accommodation caused exacerbation of her pre-
existing diabetes, weight loss, hair loss, depression, and anxiety); Dolores J. v. Dep’t
of Veterans Affs., EEOC Appeal No. 2022000405 (Mar. 29, 2023) (complainant
awarded $50,000.00 based on own testimony of sleeplessness, suicidal ideations,
and loss of relationships as a result of discrimination); Carol P. v. Small Business
Admin., EEOC Appeal No. 2021004687 (March 9, 2022) (affirming an AJ’s award
of $50,000.00 where the Agency’s failure to accommodate the complainant’s
disability caused the complainant to suffer mood swings, loss of joy, migraines,
emotional distress, exacerbation of high blood pressure, sleeplessness, marital
discord, and loss of self-esteem); Greg M. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., EEOC Appeal
No. 0120160345 (Jan. 31, 2018) (increasing an AJ’s award to $50,000.00 where the
complainant suffered sleep disruptions, weight gain, stomach pain, panic attacks and
withdrawal from his family but some of the harm was due to an unrelated accident).
Attorney’s Fees
The Commission’s regulations require federal agencies to award attorney’s fees and
costs for the successful processing of an EEO complaint in accordance with existing
case law and regulatory standards. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(1)(ii). Attorney’s fees
are calculated by determining the lodestar, which consists of the number of hours
reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. All hours reasonably
spent to process the complaint are compensable; however, the number of hours
should not include excessive, redundant, or otherwise expenditures of time.
The reasonable hourly rate for an attorney is determined by the prevailing market
rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably
comparable skill, experience and reputation. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895
(1984).

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Recent fees awarded by the courts or through settlement to attorneys of comparable
reputation and experience performing similar work are also useful guides in setting
an appropriate rate. Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def., 675 F.2d
319 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
In this case, the Agency determined that an hourly rate of $400 was appropriate
based on recent Commission decisions which recognized that an hourly rate of $400
was the prevailing market rate for attorneys in Birmingham, Alabama. On appeal,
Complainant argues that the Agency erred because it ignored that the Agency had
previously found that an hourly rate of $542 was appropriate and also because the
rate of $400 did not take into account the increase in cost of living. In this case, we
agree with Complainant that the Agency erred because it did not take into account
the increase in cost of living since the decisions on which the Agency relied. The
Commission has held that the attorneys are entitled to the reasonable hourly rate at
the time of the award. 	See Opfer v. Dep’t of Commerce, EEOC Appeal No.
01A44558 (Dec. 29, 2005), citing Mareno v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., EEOC Appeal
No. 01943104 (Feb. 14, 1996) (the Commission reaffirmed its position that the
proper customary hourly rate is the reasonable hourly rate in effect at the time of the
award and not at the time the services are provided). The cases on which the Agency
relied in establishing the hourly rate for attorneys in Birmingham, Alabama all date
from at least five years ago. 	See Colene M. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., EEOC
Appeal No. 2019005810 (July 19, 2021) (affirming an Agency’s award in 2019 of
attorney’s fees at an hourly rate of $400 for an attorney in Birmingham, AL); Janel
B. v. Dep’t of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120132683 (Nov. 4, 2015) (finding that
an hourly rate of $400 was the prevailing market rate in 2013 for an attorney with
more than 20 years of experience in civil rights). On appeal, Complainant points out
that an hourly rate of $400 in 2018 would be $516.96 in the present day when
adjusted for inflation using the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Price
Index (CPI). 	We therefore find that an hourly rate of $515 reflects a reasonable
estimation of the current prevailing market rate for experienced attorneys in
Birmingham, Alabama.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including
those not specifically addressed herein, we MODIFY the Agency’s final decision on
damages and order the Agency to take action in accordance with the Order below.

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ORDER (D0617)
The Agency is ordered to take the following remedial actions, to the extent it has not
already done so:
I. 	Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the
Agency shall pay Complainant a total of $11,723.80 in pecuniary
compensatory damages ($5,027.60 in tax penalty + $$6,696.20 in
mileage reimbursement) = $11,723.80).
II. 	Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the
Agency shall pay Complainant a total of $50,000.00 in nonpecuniary,
compensatory damages.
III. 	Within sixty (60) calendar days of the date this decision is issued, the
Agency shall pay an attorney’s fee award in the amount of $25,080.50
($515 x 48.7 hours = $25,080.50).
The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance in digital format as
provided in the statement entitled “Implementation of the Commission’s Decision.”
The report shall be submitted via the Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). 	See 29
C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Further, the report must include supporting documentation of
the Agency's calculation of backpay and other benefits due Complainant, including
evidence that the corrective action has been implemented.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION’S DECISION (K0719)
Under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(c) and §1614.502, compliance with the Commission’s
corrective action is mandatory. Within seven (7) calendar days of the completion of
each ordered corrective action, the Agency shall submit via the Federal Sector EEO
Portal (FedSEP) supporting documents in the digital format required by the
Commission, referencing the compliance docket number under which compliance
was being monitored. Once all compliance is complete, the Agency shall submit via
FedSEP a final compliance report in the digital format required by the Commission.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). 	The Agency’s final report must contain supporting
documentation when previously not uploaded, and the Agency must send a copy of
all submissions to the Complainant and his/her representative.

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If the Agency does not comply with the Commission’s order, the Complainant may
petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 	29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(a).
The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with
the Commission’s order prior to or following 	an 	administrative petition 	for
enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(g).
Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying
complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled “Right to File a Civil
Action.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a
civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C.
2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the
administrative 	processing 	of 	the 	complaint, 	including 	any 	petition 	for
enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.409.
Failure by an agency to either file a compliance report or implement any of the orders
set forth in this decision, without good cause shown, may result in the referral of this
matter to the Office of Special Counsel pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.503(f) for
enforcement by that agency.
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0124)
If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. §
1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), they are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees
incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e). The award of
attorney's fees shall be paid by the Agency. The attorney shall submit a verified
statement of fees to the Agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of
receipt of this decision. The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees
in accordance with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1125)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if
Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or
evidence that tend to establish that:
1. 	The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of
material fact or law; or

2025002567	13
2. 	The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Sector
(OFS) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. 	If the party
requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request,
that 	statement 	or 	brief 	must 	be 	filed 	together 	with 	the 	request 	for
reconsideration. 	A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of
another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or
statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity
Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B
(Aug. 5, 2015).
Complainant should submit their request for reconsideration, and any statement or
brief in support of their request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at
https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx. 	Alternatively, Complainant can
submit their request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Sector, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box
77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE,
Washington, DC 20507. 	In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFS receives it by mail within
five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604.
An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the
EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either
party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of
service on the other party, unless Complainant files their request via the EEOC
Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required.
Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented
the timely filing of the request. 	Any supporting documentation must be
submitted together with the request for reconsideration. 	The Commission will
consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(f).

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COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0124)
This decision affirms the Agency’s final decision/action in part, but it also requires
the Agency to continue its administrative processing of a portion of your complaint.
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court
within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision on
both that portion of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed and that
portion of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative
processing. 	In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and
eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency,
or your appeal with the Commission, until such time as the Agency issues its final
decision on your complaint. 	If you file a civil action, you must name as the
defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department
head, identifying that person by their full name and official title. 	Failure to do so
may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means
the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which
you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so,
you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without
paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent
you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You
must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an
attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests.

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Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the
paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time
limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
_________________________Gul Chaudhry’s signature
Gul Chaudhry, Acting Director
Office of Federal Sector
August 31, 2026
Date