EEOC Appeal 2026002235

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Sector
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Isabelle G,1
Complainant,
v.
Marco Rubio,
Secretary,
Department of State,
Agency.
Appeal No. 2026002235
Agency No. DOS-125-26
DECISION
Complainant 	filed 	a timely 	appeal with the Equal Employment 	Opportunity
Commission (EEOC or Commission) from a final decision (FAD) by the Agency
dated March 30, 2026, finding that it was in compliance with the terms of the
settlement agreement into which the parties entered. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.402; 29
C.F.R. § 1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405.
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a
Language and Culture Instructor at the Agency’s Directorate of Language Studies,
George P. Schultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center facility in Arlington,
Virginia. 	Believing that the Agency subjected her to unlawful discrimination,
Complainant contacted an Agency EEO Counselor to initiate the EEO complaint
process. 	On February 3, 2022, Complainant and the Agency entered into a
settlement agreement to resolve the matter. The settlement agreement provided, in
pertinent part, that:
1 	This 	case 	has 	been 	randomly 	assigned 	a 	pseudonym 	which 	will 	replace
Complainant’s 	name 	when 	the 	decision 	is 	published 	to 	non-parties 	and 	the
Commission’s website.

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(4)d. 	The Department agrees to permit Complainant to enter into a
core telework agreement permitting telework for up to four
days 	per 	pay 	period 	(or 	forty 	percent), 	consistent 	with
applicable 	laws, 	OPM 	guidance, 	any 	applicable 	collective
bargaining agreement, and Department policies as set forth in 3
FAM 2360. The Department agrees to renew the telework
agreement annually so long as Complainant remains in their
current 	position 	of 	record 	and 	is 	performing 	substantially
similar duties to those currently performed, and so long as a full
time telework agreement remains consistent with applicable
laws, 	OPM 	guidance, 	any 	applicable 	collective 	bargaining
agreement, and Department policy as set forth in 3 FAM 2360.
Complainant understands that they must continue to meet the
telework eligibility requirements set forth in 3 FAM 2362.2.
By email to the Agency dated February 23, 2026, Complainant alleged that the
Agency was in breach of the settlement agreement (Agreement) and requested that
the Agency specifically implement its terms. 	The record showed that pursuant to
the Agreement, Complainant had been teleworking on Tuesdays and Wednesdays
for a full day each day, with the remainder of workweek spent in-person at the
facility, amounting to four days of telework every ten-day pay-period. On February
17, 2026, Complainant was issued a memorandum (Memorandum) that eliminated
the full days of telework and required that she provide all classroom instruction in-
person at the facility from 8:14 a.m. to 12:45 p.m., while being allowed to return
home and telework the rest of the day to complete any other work other than
classroom instruction so as to satisfy the 40% telework requirement. Complainant
alleged that by requiring mandatory daily in-person instruction every workday and
limiting her telework to partial-day use instead of four full days per two-week pay-
period, the Memorandum violates the Agreement. 	Complainant further alleged
that the Memorandum: eliminates the full telework days contemplated by the
Agreement; converts telework previously measured in days per pay period into
partial-day segments; and reduces the substantive telework benefit Complainant
had negotiated as part of the Agreement, this putting the Agency in breach.

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In its March 30, 2026, FAD, the Agency concluded there was no breach of the
Agreement. Specifically, the FAD found that the Agreement does not specify that
telework had to always be taken in full-day increments, that it had to occur on
specific days of the week, or that telework could not be combined with in-person
work on the same day. 	Therefore, the FAD concluded, changing such terms did
not result in a breach of the Agreement. In addition, the FAD found that the
Agreement expressly conditioned Complainant’s telework arrangement on its
consistency 	“with 	applicable laws, OPM 	guidance, 	any 	applicable 	collective
bargaining 	agreement, 	and 	Department 	policy” 	and 	that 	the 	changes 	to
Complainant’s telework schedule “reflects your office’s application of updated
government-wide and Department-wide telework requirements to your position.”
Finally, the FAD noted that, to the extent Complainant was alleging that the
changed telework schedule denied her a reasonable accommodation, the FAD
noted 	that 	Complainant 	could 	request 	such 	an 	accommodation 	through 	the
reasonable accommodation process, but that the matter at issue was whether or not
the Agreement had been breached.
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement agreement
knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at any stage of the
complaint process, shall be binding on both parties. The Commission has held that
a settlement agreement constitutes a contract between the employee and the
Agency, to which ordinary rules of contract construction apply. See Herrington v.
Dep’t 	of 	Def., 	EEOC 	Request 	No. 	05960032 	(December 	9, 	1996). 	The
Commission has further held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the
contract, not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract’s construction.
Eggleston v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795 (August 23,
1990). 	In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard to the terms of a
settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied on the plain meaning
rule. 	See Hyon O v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December
2, 1991). 	This rule states that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous
on its face, its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. 	See Montgomery Elevator Co.
v. Building Eng’g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
In the instant case, we find no breach of the Agreement. We agree with the
Agency’s 	argument 	that 	the 	Agreement 	does 	not 	specifically 	mandate 	that
Complainant’s telework be taken in full-day increments.

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In addition, we note that the Agreement expressly states that Complainant’s
telework arrangement must be “consistent with applicable laws, OPM guidance,
any applicable collective bargaining agreement and Department policy” and the
Agency’s telework policy changed after the completion of the Agreement to
require in-person instruction. Even assuming the Agreement did not contain a
clause specifying that it must be consistent with Department policy, we note that
the Commission has long held that when, as here, a settlement agreement does not
contain a specific term for an assigned position, tour of duty, or other benefit or
term of employment, it is reasonable to assume that the parties did not intend that
the position, term, or tour would last forever. See Parker v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Request No. 05910576 (August 30, 1991) (transfer after two years in
position did not constitute breach of settlement agreement where no specific time-
period was included in agreement); See also Holley v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs,
EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997); Hamilton v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A22268 (July 5, 2002).
A review of the record establishes that the Agency substantially complied with the
terms of provision (4)d. Although that provision is silent as to the length of time
that Complainant would be entitled to telework, the Agency appears to have
complied 	with 	that 	arrangement 	for 	four 	years 	and 	is 	not 	obligated 	to 	let
Complainant telework for a full day every Tuesday and Wednesday forever. With
regard 	to 	Complainant’s 	argument 	that 	at 	the 	same 	time 	she 	received 	the
Memorandum 	requiring 	in-person 	instruction, 	she 	and 	all 	other 	Portuguese
language instructors at the facility, and their students, were required to conduct
classes virtually for one day due to adverse weather conditions, thus demonstrating
that 	remote 	teaching 	“is 	operationally 	feasible,” 	we 	are 	unpersuaded 	by
Complainant’s argument. 	The Agency is entitled to find that a policy that best
meets operational needs during normal weather conditions may not do so during
severe weather conditions, and the Commission has long held that an Agency has
broad discretion to set policies and carry out personnel decisions and should not be
second-guessed 	by 	the 	reviewing 	authority 	absent 	evidence 	of 	unlawful
motivation. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981);
Vanek v. Dep't of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05940906 (Jan. 16, 1997). In
this 	case, 	while 	Complainant 	contends 	that 	the 	Memorandum 	was 	issued
“approximately 34 days after the failure of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
on January 14, 2026,” and this supports an inference of retaliatory motive, we note
that Complainant has not specified the nature of any January 14, 2026, ADR

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session and specifically whether it raised matters of discrimination, and we find
that Complainant fails to raise an inference of retaliatory motive.
With regard to Complainant’s argument that “under federal contract principles
applied by [this office], ‘days’ means full workdays” we note that Complainant
provides no citation to support such an interpretation and we further note that the
plain language of the Agreement entitles Complainant to “four days per pay period
(or forty percent)” and the changes required by the Memorandum still permitted
Complainant to telework for 40 percent of each pay period, albeit while still
requiring her to come in to the facility each work day for in-person instruction.
We note that the instant decision addresses Complainant's claim of breach only. To
the extent Complainant is alleging denial of reasonable accommodation, we note
that the FAD states that Complainant may request a reasonable accommodation but
that there has been no breach of the Agreement. Finally, we note that the
Commission does not generally allow parties to submit multiple briefs. See Joellyn
L. v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Appeal No 0120170274 (Apr. 5, 2019), citing 29
C.F.R. § 1614.403(d). 	We therefore decline to 	accept 	any submissions by
Complainant dated after her April 29, 2026, first appeal brief, or by the Agency
dated after its June 20, 2026, response brief.
The FAD is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1125)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if
Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or
evidence that tend to establish that:
1. 	The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of
material fact or law; or
2. 	The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Sector
(OFS) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. 	If the party
requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the
request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for

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reconsideration. 	A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of
another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or
statement 	in 	opposition. 	See 	29 	C.F.R. 	§ 	1614.405; 	Equal 	Employment
Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at
Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015).
Complainant should submit their request for reconsideration, and any statement or
brief in support of their request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at
https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx. 	Alternatively, Complainant can
submit their request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Sector, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box
77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street,
NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFS receives it by mail within
five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. 	See 29 C.F.R. §
1614.604.
An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the
EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). 	See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g).
Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files their request via the
EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required.
Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s
request 	for 	reconsideration 	as 	untimely, 	unless 	extenuating 	circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. 	Any supporting documentation must
be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. 	The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(f).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0124)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District
Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this
decision. 	If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the
complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head,
identifying that person by their full name and official title. 	Failure to do so may
result in the dismissal of your case in court.

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“Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local
office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider
and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative
processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so,
you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without
paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent
you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you.
You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an
attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the
time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s
Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
T. Gimbrere __________ 	Acting Director's signature
T. Gimbrere, Acting Director
Office of Federal Sector
September 23, 2026
Date