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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 61 (BIA 2025) 	Interim Decision #4094
Matter of M-S-I-, Respondent
Decided by Board March 27, 20251
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
The acquiescence standard for protection under the regulations implementing the
Convention Against Torture differs from the unable-or-unwilling standard for asylum and
withholding of removal; the potential for private actor violence coupled with a speculation
that police cannot or will not help is insufficient to prove acquiescence.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Khagendra Gharti Chhetry, Esquire, New York, New York
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	MALPHRUS, Deputy Chief Appellate Immigration Judge,
CREPPY and PETTY, Appellate Immigration Judges.
PETTY, Appellate Immigration Judge:
This case is before the Board pursuant to the June 13, 2024, order of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granting the parties’ joint
motion to remand for further proceedings. The respondent has filed a brief
following remand. The appeal will be dismissed.
This case was last before us on February 20, 2024. 	The respondent, a
native and citizen of Nepal, appealed from the Immigration Judge’s decision
dated 	November 	6, 	2023, 	denying 	his 	applications 	for 	asylum 	and
withholding of removal under sections 208(b)(1)(A) and 241(b)(3)(A) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A),
1231(b)(3)(A) (2018), and protection under the regulations implementing the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).2 In our February 20, 2024, decision,
we agreed with the Immigration Judge’s conclusion that the respondent had
not suffered past persecution, and we concluded that the respondent had not
1 	Pursuant to Order No. 6263-2025, dated May 12, 2025, the Attorney General designated
the Board’s decision in Matter of M-S-I- (BIA Mar. 27, 2025), as precedent in all
proceedings involving the same issue or issues. 	See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(3) (2025).
Editorial changes have been made consistent with the designation of the case as a
precedent.
2 	The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States on Nov. 20, 1994).

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shown a fear of future persecution independent of the past harm. 	We also
determined that the respondent had waived any challenge to the Immigration
Judge’s finding that he had not satisfied the government acquiescence
requirement for protection under the CAT.
On June 13, 2024, the Fifth Circuit granted the parties’ joint motion to
remand, requesting that we revisit or clarify our determination regarding the
respondent’s fears of future harm and reassess whether the respondent had
waived his challenge to the Immigration Judge’s determination as to the state
action requirement of CAT.
The respondent’s claim centers on his fear of individuals affiliated with
the Maoist Party, who he alleges assaulted, threatened, and searched for him
because of his political opinion. 	The Immigration Judge found, inter alia,
that the respondent had not suffered harm constituting past persecution, had
not established that the Nepalese government would be unable or unwilling
to protect him, and had not shown that officials would acquiesce to his torture
in Nepal.
Consistent with the motion underlying the Fifth Circuit’s remand order,
we will only address the issue of future persecution and the application for
protection under the CAT.3 As the respondent is seeking relief from removal,
he bears the burden to establish that he satisfies the eligibility requirements
for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. See INA
§ 240(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4) (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d); see also
INA 	§§ 	208(b)(1)(B)(i), 	241(b)(3)(C), 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1158(b)(1)(B)(i),
1231(b)(3)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2025). We review de novo whether
the 	respondent 	has 	satisfied 	his 	burdens 	of 	proof. 	See 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2025).
We affirm the Immigration Judge’s determination that the respondent did
not meet his burden for asylum or withholding of removal under the INA.
The Immigration Judge found that the respondent, who did not show that he
was targeted by anyone other than private actors, did not demonstrate that
the Nepalese government was or would be unable or unwilling to protect him.
We affirm this finding on the basis it is not clearly erroneous. See Matter of
C-G-T-, 28 I&N Dec. 740, 743 (BIA 2023) (explaining that whether the
government is or was unable or unwilling to protect a respondent from harm
is a question of fact the Board review for clear error).
3 	To the extent the respondent renews his argument that the harm alleged constitutes past
persecution, we decline to disturb our prior analysis of this issue.

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The Immigration Judge noted the respondent’s testimony that he decided
not to report his assailants to police because the assailants threatened him and
because his party leaders told him it would be fruitless. 	However, the
Immigration Judge found these facts insufficient to form a basis for not
reporting the harm to police and noted that it did not allow the Nepalese
authorities any opportunity to take action against the perpetrators. 	In
reviewing the country conditions evidence, the Immigration Judge also found
that the record reflected that the respondent’s political party and the Maoist
Party had been working together on social justice issues.
In his post remand brief, the respondent asserts that authorities do not take
political cases seriously and explains that the Maoist Party is affiliated with
the Prime Minister and has influence. Those facts alone do not establish error
in the Immigration Judge’s finding that the Maoist Party has demonstrated a
willingness to work with the respondent’s political party. 	The respondent
cites to various out-of-circuit cases to argue that he was not required to report
the alleged harm to authorities to meet his burden, but those cases are not
binding. 	Nor is the respondent’s citation to Matter of S-A-, 22 I&N
Dec. 	1328 	(BIA 	2000), 	persuasive 	given 	that 	the 	particular 	societal
constraints imposed upon that respondent render the facts of her case
distinguishable from this respondent’s case. Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit has
stated that, “one would be hard-pressed to find that the authorities were
unable or unwilling to help [the respondent] if [he] never gave them the
opportunity to do so.” 	Sanchez Amador v. Garland, 30 F.4th 529, 534
(5th Cir. 2022).
In light of the record evidence showing the Maoist Party’s willingness to
work with others, including the respondent’s opposing political party, and
the respondent’s failure to report the alleged harm to authorities, we cannot
conclude that the Immigration Judge’s factual finding is clearly erroneous
and that the respondent has met his burden on this issue. As the respondent
has not shown that Nepalese authorities were or would be unable or unwilling
to protect him, we affirm the conclusion that the respondent has not met his
burden for asylum or withholding of removal under the INA. See Orellana
Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 518 (5th Cir. 2012).
Next, we acknowledge that the respondent has sufficiently challenged the
Immigration Judge’s determination that he did not show the requisite state
action 	for 	CAT. 	However, 	we 	will 	affirm 	the 	Immigration 	Judge’s
conclusion that the respondent did not establish that it is more likely than not
that he will be tortured by, at the instigation of, or with the consent or
acquiescence, to include willful blindness, of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. 	See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.18(a)(1);

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see also Tibakweitira v. Wilkinson, 986 F.3d 905, 911 (5th Cir. 2021)
(discussing a respondent’s burden of proof under the CAT). 	Acquiescence
to torture requires that public officials remain willfully blind to torturous
conduct 	and 	breach 	their 	legal 	responsibility 	to 	prevent 	it. 	See
Iruegas-Valdez v. Yates, 846 F.3d 806, 812 (5th Cir. 2017); Hakim v. Holder,
628 F.3d 151, 155 (5th Cir. 2010).
The respondent’s CAT claim relies upon stringing together a series of
suppositions. See Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I&N Dec. 912, 917–18 (A.G. 2006)
(explaining a respondent cannot establish eligibility for CAT protection
where the evidence “does not establish that any step in th[e] hypothetical
chain of events is more likely than not to happen, let alone that the entire
chain 	will 	come 	together 	to 	result 	in 	the 	probability 	of 	torture 	of
respondent”).
The respondent’s argument as to official acquiescence rests upon his
assertions that the Nepalese police are corrupt and act with impunity, and
Maoists are powerful and connected to the government. The respondent also
argues that “in the context of the Nepali Civil War, the Nepal government
was unable, unwilling or willfully blind to control the Maoists, and that filing
a police report would have been futile.”. To start, the acquiescence standard
for CAT protection differs from the unable-or-unwilling standard for asylum
and withholding of removal; the potential for private actor violence coupled
with a speculation that police cannot or will not help is insufficient to prove
acquiescence. See Garcia v. Holder, 756 F.3d 885, 892 (5th Cir. 2014). The
respondent’s citations to out-of-circuit cases do not persuade us otherwise.
In addition, to the extent the respondent’s argument is dependent upon the
context of the Nepali Civil War, we fail to see how the argument applies to
the present likelihood of torture and official acquiescence.
Moreover, as the Immigration Judge found, the respondent never reported
any past harm and thus there was no past official acquiescence, and the
respondent has not established that the assailants who harmed him were
anything more than private actors. 	The Immigration Judge also found that
the respondent’s political party has more members in Parliament than the
Maoist Party. 	While the respondent’s argument hinges on a series of
suppositions that culminate in a conclusion that Nepalese officials would
acquiesce to his torture, the evidence reflecting corruption and impunity in
the Nepalese police force or that Maoists hold power does not inherently
mean that authorities would be willfully blind to private actors torturing this
respondent, whose political party also wields notable political control. 	We
agree that the facts of this case, coupled with the respondent’s failure to
connect generalized assertions of corruption and impunity to the details of

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his particular circumstances, do not establish that public officials in Nepal
are more likely than not to acquiesce to his torture. 	See Tamara-Gomez v.
Gonzales, 447 F.3d 343, 351 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Tabora Gutierrez v.
Garland, 12 F.4th 496, 504 (5th Cir. 2021). 	Based on the foregoing, we
affirm the Immigration Judge’s conclusion that the respondent has not met
his burden for protection under the CAT.
As the issues discussed above are dispositive, we decline to address the
other arguments raised. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per
curiam) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make
findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they
reach.”).
Accordingly, the following order will be entered.
ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is dismissed.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by the Department of Homeland
Security, or conspires to or takes any action designed to prevent or hamper
the respondent’s departure pursuant to the order of removal, the respondent
shall be subject to a civil monetary penalty of up to $998 for each day the
respondent is in violation. 	See INA § 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2018);
8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2025).