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Matter of L-A-L-T-, Respondent
Decided September 26, 2025
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) Perceived or imputed membership in a proposed particular social group will only
satisfy the particular social group requirements if the underlying group of which the
respondent is perceived to be a member is, standing alone, sufficiently cognizable.
(2) The respondent’s proposed particular social group, defined as “perceived Salvadoran
gang members,” is not cognizable within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 591 (BIA 2008), reaffirmed.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Alaina M. Taylor, Esquire, Fairfax, Virginia
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Aidan Anderson, Assistant
Chief Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board Panel: 	MULLANE, HUNSUCKER, and GOODWIN, Appellate
Immigration Judges.
GOODWIN, Appellate Immigration Judge:
In a decision dated December 16, 2024, an Immigration Judge granted
the respondent’s application for asylum under section 208(b)(1)(A) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2018).
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has appealed from that
decision, arguing that the Immigration Judge erred in concluding that the
respondent is a member of a cognizable particular social group. The appeal
will be sustained, and the record will be remanded.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The respondent is a native and citizen of El Salvador. He testified that he
is not a gang member, but that he has been harmed by police in El Salvador
who believed he was a gang member. 	In 2018, six uniformed, armed
Salvadoran police officers stopped and questioned the respondent and then
proceeded to assault him for around 2 hours, insisting that he was a gang
member. The police officers repeatedly demanded the respondent give them
information about gang members and threatened to kill him.

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In 2019 approximately five or six uniformed police officers stopped the
respondent and his uncle, accusing them of being members of MS-13
because of the neighborhood where they lived. When the respondent told the
police he was not a gang member, the police officers accused him of lying
before assaulting him for approximately 1 hour. 	When they later dropped
him off at his grandmother’s house, they told the respondent’s grandmother
that the respondent was a watchman for MS-13 and that they would kill him
the next time.
The respondent also described a separate incident in 2019 in which some
of his classmates who were members of the 18th Street gang chased him,
calling him an MS-13 member and accusing him of spying. The respondent
did not report that incident to Salvadoran authorities because of his prior
experiences and his fear that the police would harm him.
The respondent entered the United States without being admitted or
paroled in 2021 and was placed in removal proceedings. Since his arrival in
the United States, the respondent has been arrested for multiple offenses and
has been convicted of drug possession. 	In support of his application for
asylum and related relief, he testified that he fears returning to El Salvador
because of his criminal history and because the Salvadoran police have his
picture, name, and address, and have registered him as a gang member.
Finding the respondent and his expert witness credible, the Immigration
Judge found that the respondent had established past persecution on account
of his membership in the cognizable particular social group of “perceived
Salvadoran gang members.” The Immigration Judge found DHS had not met
its burden to rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear of future
persecution and, as the respondent merited a favorable exercise of discretion,
she 	granted 	the 	respondent 	asylum 	and 	declined 	to 	reach 	the 	other
applications. 	On appeal, DHS only challenges the Immigration Judge’s
finding that the proposed particular social group of perceived gang members
is cognizable.
II. ANALYSIS
An applicant seeking asylum or withholding of removal based on his or
her membership in a particular social group must “establish that the group is
(1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic,
(2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in
question.” Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014); accord
Amaya v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 424, 427 (4th Cir. 2021). The question of whether
a group is a “particular social group” within the meaning of the INA is a

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question of law that we review de novo. See Del Carmen Amaya-De Sicaran
v. Barr, 979 F.3d 210, 214 (4th Cir. 2020); Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-,
27 I&N Dec. 189, 191 (BIA 2018); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2025).
A. Perceived Salvadoran Gang Members
Upon de novo review, we hold that the respondent’s proposed particular
social group, defined as “perceived Salvadoran gang members,” is not
cognizable within the meaning of the INA. 	In doing so, we reaffirm our
precedent decision in Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 591 (BIA 2008), which
remains controlling in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this case arises. 	See Amaya, 986 F.3d at 436
(declining to analyze Matter of E-A-G-). In Matter of E-A-G-, we held that
“membership in a criminal gang cannot constitute a particular social group,
[so] the respondent cannot establish particular social group status based on
the incorrect perception by others that he is a gang member.” 24 I&N Dec.
at 596.
The alien in Matter of E-A-G-, like the respondent here, was not a member
of a gang, but we nonetheless concluded that perceived membership in a gang
could not support a claim for asylum or withholding of removal. 	See
Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I&N Dec. at 596. While we subsequently clarified that
our holding in Matter of E-A-G- “should not be read as a blanket rejection of
all factual scenarios involving gangs,” Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at
251, at no point have we altered our holding that perceived membership in a
gang cannot serve to constitute a cognizable particular social group.
Since we issued our decision in Matter of E-A-G-, at least two courts of
appeals, the First Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, have rejected our holding in
precedential opinions. 	See, e.g., Chavez v. Garland, 51 F.4th 424, 434
(1st Cir. 2022) (“[W]e are compelled to reject as impermissible Matter of
E-A-G-’s holding that a group made up of those who are incorrectly
perceived to be members of a gang is categorically barred from recognition
as a particular social group under the INA.”); Vasquez-Rodriguez v. Garland,
7 F.4th 888, 897–98 (9th Cir. 2021) (concluding that “the approach set forth
in Matter of E-A-G- is inconsistent with the requisite fact-based analysis of
proposed particular social groups” and distinguishing between groups of
actual gang members and those of persons incorrectly perceived to be gang
members).1 	The Immigration Judge relied on these cases as persuasive
authority in support of her grant of the respondent’s application for asylum.
1 	The Tenth Circuit has similarly rejected our holding in Matter of E-A-G-, albeit in a
nonprecedential opinion. See Escamilla v. Holder, 459 F. App’x 776, 786 (10th Cir. 2012).

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See generally Matter of U. Singh, 25 I&N Dec. 670, 672 (BIA 2012)
(“We apply the law of the circuit in cases arising in that jurisdiction, but we
are not bound by a decision of a court of appeals in a different circuit.”). In
each case, the court of appeals held that the Board could not categorically
find 	that 	perceived 	gang 	membership 	is 	not 	cognizable, 	but 	neither
considered the social groups before them, instead remanding for the Board
to consider the groups on a case-by-case basis. See Chavez, 51 F.4th at 434;
Vasquez-Rodriguez, 7 F.4th at 897–98. While neither the First nor the Ninth
Circuit definitively held in either opinion that a group based on perceived
gang membership was legally cognizable, both concluded that we had too
stringently applied our approach in Matter of E-A-G- and remanded for
further consideration of the specific facts of each claim presented. 	See
Chavez, 51 F.4th at 434; Vasquez-Rodriguez, 7 F.4th at 897–98.
Both the Fourth Circuit and the Board have concluded that gang members
do not constitute a cognizable particular social group. 	See Martinez v.
Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 912 (4th Cir. 2014); Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I&N Dec.
at 596. Thus, to warrant asylum, the respondent needs to demonstrate that a
group composed of perceived gang members satisfies the immutabilty,
particularity, and social distinction requirements for a cognizable group. See
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 237.
We are not persuaded that perceived membership in a gang satisfies the
immutability requirement for a cognizable particular social group. 	An
immutable characteristic is one that a person cannot change or should not be
required to change because it is fundamental to an individual’s identity or
consciousness. 	See Martinez, 740 F.3d at 910; Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I&N
Dec. at 593. 	Whether a person is perceived as a gang member can change
based on a variety of factors, including the person’s age, changes in
appearance, or changes in residence location.
A 	proposed 	group 	of 	perceived 	gang 	members 	also 	lacks 	social
distinction. 	“Social distinction refers to social recognition.” 	Matter of
M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 240. 	Thus, to satisfy the social distinction
requirement based on one’s perceived membership in a group, an alien would
need to demonstrate that those perceived as members are recognized as a
group separate and apart from those who are actually members of the group.
The respondent has not established here that Salvadoran society would view
individuals perceived to be gang members as a group separate from actual
gang members. In fact, we cannot imagine any situation in which a society
would recognize perceived members of a group as a distinct group.

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Finally, a perceived group is not particular. 	It would be difficult, if not
impossible, to explain what elements bring a person into the ambit of
perceived group membership, as this would likely be defined by the opinion
of the persecutor. 	Other than stating that he was once perceived as a gang
member because of the neighborhood in which he lived, the respondent has
not shown what traits would cause a person to be included in this perceived
group. If living in a particular neighborhood caused the misperceptions the
respondent encountered, then the group to which he belongs would more
accurately be defined as persons living in his neighborhood. In other words,
the misperception cannot be the defining characteristic of a cognizable
particular social group, as the misperception must be based upon some other
defining characteristic or characteristics.
For the reasons discussed, perceived membership in a group cannot itself
be a cognizable particular social group. Rather, the underlying group is the
true particular social group, and where that underlying group as defined is
not cognizable, the perceived group is also not cognizable.
Our approach in Matter of E-A-G-, and our reaffirmance of it here, is
consistent with recent Fourth Circuit cases that address the specific elements
of 	the 	cognizability 	analysis. 	For 	example, 	in 	Nolasco 	v. 	Garland,
7 F.4th 180, 189–90 (4th Cir. 2021), the Fourth Circuit detailed the
difficulties in discerning whether “former” gang membership is socially
distinct from “active” gang membership, given the record evidence in the
case suggested the relevant country’s society did not necessarily perceive the
two groups as distinct. 	A similar concern applies here. 	The crux of the
respondent’s proposed group in this case inherently relies on a perception
that the affected individuals are gang members, raising the question of
whether a society perceives them as part of a group of gang members instead
of perceiving them as part of a group of perceived gang members. 	This
essentially obviates the distinction between the perceived group and the
underlying group of gang members, which is not cognizable. For this reason,
among others, to establish eligibility for relief based on a group of individuals
perceived to be members of an underlying group, a respondent must show
that the underlying group can stand alone as a cognizable particular social
group.
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has cautioned against conflating the analyses
for particularity and an individual’s ability to establish membership in the
proposed group. See Amaya, 986 F.3d at 435. In doing so, the Fourth Circuit
drew 	a 	distinction 	between 	a 	defining 	characteristic 	that 	may 	have
gradations, such as former membership in a gang, and other “amorphous”
defining characteristics such as “wealth” or “opposition to gangs,” with the

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latter category lacking cognizability. 	Id. 	In its analysis in Amaya, the
Fourth Circuit utilized an instructive tennis analogy to explain that the
guiding question for adjudicators in the particularity inquiry was merely to
determine whether there are “clear lines that indicate when a ball is in or out.”
Id. Whether a line can be drawn to gauge if a person is within the boundaries
of a group is therefore perhaps best characterized as a litmus test of
amorphousness.
Applied here, there exist few, if any, “objective goalposts” to draw a
boundary line between actual gang members and perceived gang members
such that the latter group is no longer subjective and amorphous but is instead
sufficiently particular. Id. The respondent’s proposed group cannot satisfy
the 	particularity 	requirement 	largely 	because 	it 	is 	dependent 	on 	the
persecutor’s perception, such that its boundary lines are subjective and
essentially undefinable.
Finally, we note that neither the INA nor the regulations contain a
protected category for “imputed” or “perceived” particular social groups as
protected grounds. 	See INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
(2018). 	In fact, the plain language of the INA does not include the term
“imputed” as a modifier for any of the protected grounds. 	See id. 	The
addition of “perceived” or “imputed” has no statutory authority and does not
create a cognizable group from a noncognizable one.
We ultimately reaffirm our holding in Matter of E-A-G- that perceived
gang membership cannot serve as a cognizable protected ground. 	In
reaffirming 	that holding, we also emphasize that the 	cognizability of
perceived groups is dependent on the existence of an underlying group that
is legally cognizable. This is especially true given the intertwined nature of
the particularity and social distinction elements between the perceived group
and the underlying group. As such, we now hold that perceived or imputed
membership in a proposed particular social group will only satisfy the
particular social group requirements if the underlying group of which the
respondent is perceived to be a member is, standing alone, sufficiently
cognizable.
Both 	the 	courts 	of 	appeals 	and 	the 	Board 	have 	issued 	decisions
categorically rejecting certain proposed groups. See, e.g., Martinez, 740 F.3d
at 912 (explaining that current gang members will not constitute a cognizable
particular social group); Toussaint v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 455 F.3d 409, 418
(3d Cir. 2006) (“[F]or purposes of the INA, criminal deportees are not
recognized as a social group.”); Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1132
(7th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e have no doubt that drug traffickers are not the sort of

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‘particular social group’ to which the provision on asylum refers.”); Matter of
K-E-S-G-, 29 I&N Dec. 145, 151 (BIA 2025) (holding groups defined solely
by sex and nationality are not cognizable); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N
Dec. 208, 223 (BIA 2014) (holding that groups based on deportee status lack
cognizability), 	vacated 	on 	other 	grounds 	sub 	nom. 	Reyes 	v. 	Lynch,
842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016). Thus, while an adjudicator should normally
engage in a case-by-case determination of an alien’s proposed particular
social group, as we do here, it is not inappropriate to rely on established
precedent in concluding that certain proposed groups are categorically not
cognizable. 	See Gonzalez-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 232 (5th Cir. 2019)
(“As 	an 	adjudicatory 	body, 	the 	BIA 	necessarily 	relies 	on 	established
precedents to decide matters pending before it and to avoid re-inventing the
wheel every time.”).
B. Additional Protected Grounds
Given the grant of asylum, the Immigration Judge did not reach the
question of whether the respondent’s additional proposed particular social
groups, defined as “perceived Salvadoran members of the MS-13” and
“Salvadoran 	tattooed 	men” 	were 	cognizable. 	“Perceived 	Salvadoran
members of the MS-13” lacks cognizability for the same reasons, articulated
above, that the broader group of “perceived Salvadoran gang members” lacks
cognizability. 	We reiterate the point that, because the underlying group of
“Salvadoran gang members” is not cognizable, the perceived version of such
a group thus cannot be found legally cognizable. 	The added qualifying
characteristic of membership in a specific gang, i.e., MS-13, does not remedy
the deficiencies that preclude the cognizability of the broader group.
The second proposed group defined as “Salvadoran tattooed men” is also
not cognizable, as it lacks immutability. Tattoos are neither fundamental to
a person’s identity or conscience nor beyond one’s power to change. 	See
Romero v. Garland, No. 20-1417, 2022 WL 910912, at *4 (4th Cir. Mar. 29,
2022) (“We conclude that the tattoos are also not beyond his power to
change. . . . The presence of tattoos on one’s body is indisputably subject to
change, and as such a group defined on their presence cannot satisfy the
immutability 	requirement.”); 	see 	also 	Castellano-Chacon 	v. 	INS,
341 F.3d 533, 549 n.9 (6th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that tattoos may be
removable).

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The Immigration Judge also did not analyze the respondent’s claim
regarding 	an 	actual 	or 	imputed 	anti-gang 	political 	opinion.2 	The
respondent’s political opinion claim similarly fails as a matter of law. Mere
opposition to gangs and/or gang recruitment generally cannot establish
persecution on account of a protected ground. 	See Cortez-Mendez v.
Whitaker, 912 F.3d 205, 210 (4th Cir. 2019) (“Flight from gang recruitment
is not a protected ground under the INA.”); Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159,
166–67 (4th 	Cir. 2012) (rejecting a 	particular social group based on
opposition to gang recruitment). Likewise, the Board has repeatedly rejected
claims of persecution on account of an anti-gang political opinion where
there is no evidence that the gangs targeted the alien on account of his or her
political or ideological opposition to the gang or gang activity. See Matter of
J-J-G-, 27 I&N Dec. 808, 815 (BIA 2020); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N
Dec. 	579, 	589 	(BIA 	2008); 	see 	also 	Pacas-Renderos 	v. 	Sessions,
691 F. App’x 796, 802 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that the agency reasonably
concluded that gang members did not threaten the alien on account of any
imputed anti-gang political opinion). As we explained in Matter of E-A-G-,
24 I&N Dec. at 596–97, a refusal to join a gang, as well as any resulting harm
from such a refusal, will not, without more, constitute persecution on account
of a political opinion. 	We reaffirm that conclusion here. 	Ultimately, the
respondent cannot establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal
based on an actual or imputed anti-gang political opinion.
III. CONCLUSION
The respondent has not demonstrated that he is a member of a cognizable
particular social group or has otherwise experienced or fears harm on account
of a protected ground. 	He therefore cannot establish eligibility for asylum
based on past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution.
Moreover, because withholding of removal likewise requires fear of harm on
account of a protected ground, the respondent cannot establish eligibility for
withholding of removal under the INA. 	See Madrid-Montoya v. Garland,
52 F.4th 175, 179 (4th Cir. 2022).
Based on the foregoing, we will sustain DHS’ appeal and vacate the
Immigration Judge’s decision granting the respondent asylum. 	We will
remand the record solely for the Immigration Judge to determine whether the
2 	The respondent asserted in his pre-hearing brief before the Immigration Judge that he
feared persecution on account of his actual or imputed anti-gang political opinion, although
he did not expand upon this argument.

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respondent has established eligibility for protection under the regulations
implementing the Convention Against Torture.3
ORDER: DHS’ appeal is sustained.
FURTHER ORDER: The Immigration Judge’s December 16, 2024,
decision is vacated, and the record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for
further proceedings consistent with the foregoing order and for the entry of
a new decision.
3 	The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into
force for United States Nov. 20, 1994). 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c) (2025); 8 C.F.R.§ 1208.18(a)
(2020).