P-A-C-

P-A-C-, 29 I&N Dec. 708 (BIA 2026)Bia22 juin 2026

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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 708 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4208
Matter of P-A-C-, Respondent
Decided June 22, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
The fact that a respondent is granted withholding of removal under the Immigration and
Nationality Act is an important consideration in whether the respondent may be denied
asylum as a matter of discretion based on a weighing of the favorable and adverse factors,
considering the mitigating impact a grant of withholding of removal has on the risk of
future persecution. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357, 367 (BIA 1996); and Matter of
H-, 21 I&N Dec. 337, 347 (BIA 1996), distinguished.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Lisa S. Anderson, Esquire, Hollywood, California
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Trent Fucci, Assistant Chief
Counsel
BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge; CHABAN,
Appellate Immigration Judge; MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge:
In 	a 	May 	8, 	2023, 	decision, 	the 	Immigration 	Judge 	granted 	the
respondent’s application for withholding of removal to Cameroon under
section 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3) (2018), but denied, as a matter of discretion, the respondent’s
applications for asylum under section 208(b)(1)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(A) (2018), adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2018), and cancellation of removal for certain
nonpermanent residents under section 240A(b)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1) (2018).1 	The respondent appeals the discretionary denial of
the foregoing applications for relief from removal. 	The appeal will be
dismissed.
1 	The 	respondent 	withdrew his 	application for 	protection under 	the 	regulations
implementing the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
(entered into force for United States Nov. 20, 1994). 	8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17
(2026); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18 (2020).
Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 708 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4208
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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The respondent, a native and citizen of Cameroon, arrived in the
United States in April 2001 as a non-immigrant but has since remained in the
United States without authorization. The respondent was placed in removal
proceedings in 2016 and conceded his removability as charged.2
The respondent filed applications for adjustment of status, cancellation of
removal, asylum, and withholding of removal. 	From 2016 to 2021, the
respondent’s proceedings were continued for various reasons. 	At the 2022
and 2023 merits hearings, the respondent testified and presented as witnesses
his examining psychologist, wife, sister, adult stepson, uncle, a longtime
friend, and an expert on country conditions in Cameroon. The Immigration
Judge found the respondent credible and determined that he satisfied his
burden of establishing eligibility for withholding of removal to Cameroon.
The 	parties 	do 	not 	appeal 	the 	Immigration 	Judge’s 	findings 	and
determination in this regard.
The Immigration Judge held that, while the respondent satisfied the
statutory requirements for asylum, the respondent did not show that he
warrants a grant of asylum as a matter of discretion. 	See INA § 208(b)(1),
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (providing that “the Attorney General may grant
asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum”) (emphasis added); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.14(a) (2026). 	Likewise, the Immigration Judge found that, while
there were no statutory bars to adjustment of status or cancellation of
removal, the respondent did not establish that he merits a grant of these
applications as a matter of discretion.
The respondent argues on appeal that the Immigration Judge abused his
discretion in denying the foregoing applications for relief. 	We review the
Immigration Judge’s exercise of discretion de novo, and we affirm the
Immigration Judge’s decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2026).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Discretionary Considerations in Asylum
As 	we 	have 	long 	held, 	“[s]tatutory 	and 	regulatory 	eligibility 	for
asylum . . . does not necessarily compel a grant of asylum.” 	Matter of H-,
21 I&N Dec. 337, 347 (BIA 1996); see also Matter of Jean, 23 I&N Dec.
2 	The record indicates that the respondent was in prior removal proceedings that were
terminated in 2008. No issues have been raised regarding the prior proceedings.
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373, 384 (A.G. 2002) (“[E]ven if asylum eligibility is established, the
decision whether to grant an application is committed to the Attorney
General’s discretion.”); Matter of Pula, 19 I&N Dec. 467, 473–74 (BIA
1987) (addressing the exercise of discretion with respect to asylum). 	The
asylum applicant bears the burden of establishing that a favorable exercise
of discretion is warranted. 	Matter of H-, 21 I&N Dec. at 347–48; accord
Kalubi v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Asylum is a
two-step process, requiring the applicant first to establish his eligibility for
asylum by demonstrating that he meets the statutory definition of a ‘refugee,’
and second to show that he is entitled to asylum as a matter of discretion.”).
In a discretionary analysis, favorable and adverse factors are weighed and
considered in light of the totality of the circumstances. Matter of H-, 21 I&N
Dec. at 347–48. 	In the seminal case of Matter of Pula, 19 I&N Dec. at
473–74, the Board specified that favorable factors involve humanitarian
considerations, including the applicant’s age, health, and family ties. 	We
also 	emphasized 	the 	importance 	of 	considering 	the 	circumstances
surrounding the applicant’s entry or attempted entry into the United States
before asylum may be warranted, including whether the alien followed
orderly refugee procedures that were available in countries the alien passed
through, whether the alien engaged in fraudulent conduct to circumvent
them, and whether the alien has a safe haven in a third country. Id. Where
past persecution is found, humanitarian considerations if the applicant were
to return to the country of persecution may play an important role in the
discretionary analysis. 	Matter of H-, 21 I&N Dec. at 347–48; see also
generally 	Gulla 	v. 	Gonzales, 	498 	F.3d 	911, 	916–19 	(9th 	Cir. 	2007)
(considering 	factors 	such 	as 	persecution, 	health 	concerns, 	strong 	ties,
absence of fraud against the government, and absence of criminal history).
Adverse factors can include criminal and fraudulent conduct that falls
short of the grounds for mandatory asylum denial.3 	Matter of H-, 21 I&N
Dec. at 347–48; see also, e.g., Htun v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 1111, 1120–21 (8th
Cir. 2016) (considering the adverse factors of a fraudulent marriage, criminal
history, and lack of credibility); Kouljinski v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 534, 543 (6th
Cir. 2007) (holding that three DUI convictions supported the agency’s denial
of asylum in discretion); Hosseini v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir.
2006) (considering immigration fraud throughout immigration proceedings);
Ibrahim v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 1074, 1079 (8th Cir. 2006) (considering
3 	While the use of fraudulent documents to escape persecution is generally not a basis for
a discretionary denial of asylum, fraudulent conduct that is not directly related to escaping
persecution is a proper consideration. See Matter of D-X- & Y-Z-, 25 I&N Dec. 664, 666
(BIA 2012).
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history of submitting falsehoods to immigration and law enforcement);
Matter of Jean, 23 I&N Dec. 373, 385 (A.G. 2002) (holding that criminal
conviction warranted denial of asylum in discretion). Gang membership and
involvement are also proper considerations. 	Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589
F.3d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that a member of a violent criminal
gang who committed violent acts “may be barred from the relief [of asylum]”
in discretion).4
The Board has previously stated that the danger of future persecution is a
discretionary factor that may outweigh most adverse factors, such as those
arising from actions during the applicant’s flight from the country of
persecution or those adverse factors that are not among the “most egregious.”
Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357, 367 (BIA 1996); accord Matter of H-,
21 I&N Dec. at 347–48. However, the respondent’s grant of withholding of
removal to Cameroon distinguishes this case from the facts of Matter of
Kasinga and Matter of H-. Moreover, these prior cases failed to incorporate
the foundational basis for according greater discretionary weight to the
danger of persecution. As discussed in Matter of Pula, the heightened weight
given to the danger of persecution arose from what we have recognized as a
“situation of particular concern [for] an alien who has established his
statutory eligibility for asylum but cannot meet the higher burden required
for withholding of deportation.” Matter of Pula, 19 I&N Dec. at 474. This
concern is obviated where the alien is able to satisfy the higher burden for
withholding of removal. Matter of Kasinga and Matter of H- failed to note
the significance of a grant of withholding of removal, and we distinguish
those decisions on this basis.
The fact that a respondent is granted withholding of removal is an
important consideration in whether the respondent may be denied asylum as
a matter of discretion based on a weighing of the favorable and adverse
factors, considering the mitigating impact a grant of withholding of removal
has on the risk of future persecution. 	Consistent with Matter of Pula, we
clarify that in cases where, as here, a respondent is granted withholding of
removal under the INA, asylum can be denied as a matter of discretion
despite the danger of future persecution even if the relevant adverse factors
are not among the “most egregious,” as removal to the country where the
respondent may experience persecution is prohibited.
4 	The evidence of gang membership and involvement must be reliable to be a proper
consideration. Diaz Ortiz v. Garland, 23 F.4th 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2022).
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In this case, the Immigration Judge properly considered the favorable and
adverse factors under the totality of the circumstances when exercising
discretion. The Immigration Judge’s decision identifies a number of equities,
including the respondent’s close and meaningful family ties in the United
States, his lengthy residence in the United States, business ownership, church
attendance, tax payment history, medical and psychological diagnoses,
efforts at alcohol rehabilitation, as well as the persecution the respondent
suffered and fears in Cameroon. 	While these equities are substantial, they
are 	outweighed 	by 	the 	significant 	adverse 	factors 	arising 	from 	the
respondent’s criminal history, which consists of four convictions for driving
while under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”) between 2004 and 2011. Some
of the respondent’s DUIs occurred with aggravating factors. 	For example,
one 	incident 	involved 	an 	automobile 	accident, 	and 	another 	included
accompanying behavior that resulted in a conviction for mischief for
damaging a police car. 	The respondent also has multiple other infractions
stemming from his choice to continue to drive without a valid license or
while his license was suspended as a result of his DUI convictions. Finally,
there is evidence suggesting that the respondent worked with a towing
company and as a delivery person in some capacity throughout the time that
his driver’s license was suspended.
In Matter of Castillo-Perez, 27 I&N Dec. 664, 671 (A.G. 2019), the
Attorney General observed that “aliens with multiple DUI convictions are
likely undeserving of . . . discretionary relief.” 	While Matter of Castillo-
Perez involves an application for cancellation of removal, multiple DUI
convictions are similarly relevant and significant adverse factors that weigh
against a favorable exercise of discretion generally, including in the asylum
context. We acknowledge and commend the respondent’s efforts at recovery
from his reported alcoholism and avoiding further encounters with law
enforcement, but his “[m]ultiple DUI convictions are a serious blemish on
[his] record and reflect disregard for the safety of others and for the law,”
and weigh heavily as an adverse discretionary factor. Id. at 670.
We weigh all of these favorable and adverse factors when exercising
discretion. 	We specifically acknowledge the persecution and trauma the
respondent suffered in Cameroon. 	We recognize, however, that he is
protected from removal to Cameroon by the grant of withholding of removal
absent a fundamental change in circumstances (or other reasons not shown
to be relevant to this case). 	See Kalubi, 364 F.3d at 1141 (stating that
“withholding of removal eliminates the chance of future persecution as [the
alien] cannot be returned to the country from which he fled”); see also
8 C.F.R. § 1208.24(b) (discussing termination of withholding of removal).
Considering the totality of the record, we agree with the Immigration Judge
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that the negative factors, including the repeated and dangerous nature of the
respondent’s criminal history, outweigh the equities in this case. 	See
generally Kouljinski, 505 F.3d at 543 (finding no abuse of discretion in
basing 	discretionary 	denial 	on 	applicant’s 	multiple 	drunk-driving
convictions). Thus, the Immigration Judge properly denied the respondent’s
asylum application as a matter of discretion.5
B. Other Applications for Relief
We consider and weigh the same positive and adverse factors identified
by the Immigration Judge and discussed in the foregoing when we evaluate
the respondent’s other applications for discretionary relief. 	See Matter of
Sotelo, 	23 	I&N 	Dec. 	201, 	203–04 	(BIA 	2001) 	(explaining 	balancing
analysis); Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. 7, 11–12 (BIA 1998) (setting forth
relevant 	factors 	for 	consideration 	and 	emphasizing 	that 	“applications
involving convicted aliens must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with
rehabilitation a factor to be considered in the exercise of discretion”); Matter
of Edwards, 20 I&N Dec. 191, 195–96 (BIA 1990) (observing that more
serious negative factors need to be offset by greater favorable factors); see
also Ridore v. Holder, 696 F.3d 907, 920–22 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing the
weighing of positive and negative discretionary factors). We conclude that
the respondent has not sufficiently demonstrated that he merits a favorable
exercise of discretion on his applications for adjustment of status and
cancellation 	of 	removal. 	See 	INA 	§ 	240(c)(4)(A)(ii), 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(4)(A)(ii) (2018). While not insignificant, the equities presented
by the respondent do not outweigh the substantial adverse discretionary
impact of his multiple convictions for drunk driving offenses. See Matter of
Castillo-Perez, 27 I&N Dec. at 671 (finding that aliens with multiple DUI
convictions are likely undeserving of discretionary relief due to the “reckless
and dangerous nature of the crime of DUI”).
We will, therefore, dismiss the respondent’s appeal of the denial of his
applications for asylum, adjustment of status, and cancellation of removal.
ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is dismissed.
5 	In granting withholding of removal under the INA but denying asylum solely as a matter
of discretion, the Immigration Judge did not reconsider the discretionary denial as provided
in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(e) (2020). 	However, the respondent did not present any family
reunification concerns at the hearing and has not raised the issue on appeal. We therefore
deem this issue waived. See Matter of P-B-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 43, 44 n.1 (BIA 2020) (stating
that arguments not raised on appeal are deemed waived).
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FURTHER ORDER: The Immigration Judge’s decision granting the
respondent’s request for withholding of removal under the Immigration and
Nationality Act is affirmed.
NOTICE TO RESPONDENT/APPLICANT TO CONTACT
DHS/USCIS: 	The Board of Immigration Appeals has issued a final
decision in your case. 	Depending on the type of relief or protection from
removal that you have been granted, you may be entitled to documents
evidencing your status allowing you to remain in the United States or you
may be eligible to work in this country. 	However, in order to receive any
documentation, you need to contact the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) of the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”), which is the agency responsible for the issuance of documents
evidencing your status and/or work authorization. Information regarding the
specific USCIS instructions can be found at www.uscis.gov (search “Post-
Order Instructions” or “Notice to Individuals Granted Immigration Benefits
by an Immigration Judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals”) on
procedures 	for 	obtaining 	status 	documentation 	or 	work 	authorization.
Additionally, 	the 	Executive 	Office 	for 	Immigration 	Review 	(“EOIR”)
website at www.justice.gov/eoir contains a link to the USCIS webpage which
in turn links to the “Post Order Instructions.” You may also call the USCIS
national customer service number at 1-800-375-5283.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by DHS, or conspires to or takes any
action designed to prevent or hamper the respondent’s departure pursuant to
the order of removal, the respondent shall be subject to a civil monetary
penalty of up to $998 for each day the respondent is in violation. 	See INA
§ 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2026). Further,
any respondent that has been denied admission to, removed from, or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding and thereafter enters, attempts to enter, or is at any
time found in the United States shall be fined or imprisoned not more than
2 years, or both. See INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2018).

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