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Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 839 (BIA 2026) 	Interim Decision #4234
Matter of A-K-R-, Respondent
Decided August 14, 2026
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
(1) The Immigration Judge properly denied the respondent’s request for a further
continuance to seek legal counsel based on a lack of good cause, consistent with the
governing statutes and regulations.
(2) The only statutory or regulatory time requirement that is necessary to safeguard an
alien’s privilege of legal counsel is that the first hearing may not be scheduled earlier
than 10 days after service of the notice to appear as set forth in section 239(b)(1) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1). Matter of C-B-, 25 I&N Dec.
888 (BIA 2012), modified.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Pro se
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Jae Il Lee, Counsel
BEFORE: 	Board 	Panel: 	MALPHRUS, 	Chief 	Appellate 	Immigration 	Judge;
HUNSUCKER and CHABAN, Appellate Immigration Judges.
MALPHRUS, Chief Appellate Immigration Judge:
The respondent, a native and citizen of India, appeals the March 18, 2026,
decision of the Immigration Judge denying his request for a continuance,
deeming his opportunity to apply for relief abandoned, and entering an order
of removal. We will dismiss the appeal.
The respondent illegally entered the United States and, on January 8,
2026, was issued a notice to appear and detained. On February 3, 2026, he
appeared at an initial master calendar hearing, was provided with standard
advisals, and was granted 2 weeks to find counsel or file an application for
relief. At the next hearing on February 17, 2026, the respondent requested
additional time to find an attorney and was granted 2 more weeks. However,
the Immigration Judge warned the respondent that he needed to have counsel
by the next hearing or be prepared to represent himself, because no further
continuances for counsel would be granted.
At the next hearing on March 2, 2026, the respondent appeared without
counsel 	and 	admitted 	the 	allegations 	in 	the 	notice 	to 	appear. 	The
Immigration Judge sustained the charge of removability and, after the

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respondent expressed a fear of return to India, informed him that he could be
eligible for withholding of removal or protection under the Convention
Against Torture. The Immigration Judge ordered him to file an application
for relief on or before March 18, 2026, or he would be ordered removed.
On March 18, 2026, the respondent appeared without an application,
explained that he was unable to get any documents, and requested an
additional continuance. 	The Immigration Judge denied the request for a
continuance and ordered the respondent removed from the United States.
On appeal, the respondent states that he was unable to contact an attorney
or obtain documents to support his claim due to a lack of funds or people
outside detention who could assist him. Further, the respondent asserts that
he lacked the education necessary to complete an application for relief by
himself. 	He has still not filed a completed application for relief from
removal.
An Immigration Judge may grant a continuance in his or her discretion
“for good cause shown.” 	8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2020); see also Matter of
Sibrun, 18 I&N Dec. 354, 355–57 (BIA 1983). 	An alien in removal
proceedings has the statutory and regulatory privilege of being represented
by counsel of their choice at no expense to the Government. 	See sections
240(b)(4)(A) and 292 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),
8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(4)(A), 1362 (2024); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.16(b), 1240.3,
1240.11(c)(1)(iii) (2026). 	To secure this privilege, Congress has provided
that: (1) the notice to appear for removal proceedings shall indicate that the
alien may be represented by counsel and include a list of attorneys available
to represent the alien pro bono; and (2) the first hearing date shall not be
scheduled earlier than 10 days after service of the notice to appear. 	INA
§ 239(a)(1)(E), (b)(1)–(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(E), (b)(1)–(3) (2024). The
statute further provides that “[n]othing in this subsection may be construed
to prevent the Attorney General from proceeding against an alien pursuant to
section 240 if the [10-day] time period described in paragraph (1) has elapsed
and the alien has failed to secure counsel.” 	INA § 239(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229(b)(3).
We recognize that in Matter of C-B-, 25 I&N Dec. 888, 889 (BIA 2012),
we stated that to “meaningfully effectuate the statutory and regulatory
privilege of legal representation,” an Immigration Judge “must grant a
reasonable and realistic period of time to provide a fair opportunity for a
respondent to seek, speak with, and retain counsel.” 	However, we did not
cite any authority for this proposition, and the language in Matter of C-B-
departs from the clear statutory text. 	The respondent in Matter of C-B-

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correctly asserted that he was given only 8 days between the service of his
NTA and his first hearing, which was in violation of section 239(b)(1) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1), but Matter of C-B- does not reference the
statutory language. 	The statement in Matter of C-B- regarding the legal
standard it purported to create with respect to the right to counsel departed
from the text of the statute and is dicta.0F0F
1 We withdraw from this statement
in Matter of C-B- as setting forth a statutory or regulatory mandate. See INA
§ 239(a)(1)(E), (b)(1), (b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(E), (b)(1), (b)(3). Thus,
the only statutory or regulatory time requirement that is necessary to
safeguard an alien’s privilege of legal counsel is that the first hearing may
not be scheduled earlier than 10 days after service of the notice to appear.
INA § 239(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1).
The respondent’s first hearing occurred 26 days after the service of his
notice to appear, and the Immigration Judge granted him two continuances
to seek counsel. 	This clearly complied with any statutory and regulatory
mandates, and the respondent has not shown good cause for any further
continuance. The respondent asserts that he could not contact any attorneys
or his family. 	However, he also claims that he discussed his case with his
previous attorney, and that his family told him all the attorneys they
contacted 	required 	additional 	documents 	to 	complete 	and 	file 	his
application.1F1F
2 He states that he did not have the financial resources to hire a
new lawyer, but he was advised of the list of free or low-cost legal services
by the Immigration Judge. There is no indication that any of the respondent’s
efforts to obtain counsel would have been imminently successful. Also, he
1 	The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently relied on this
statement in Matter of C-B-, 25 I&N Dec. at 889, to conclude that an alien’s statutory right
to counsel was violated when she was denied a continuance to seek new counsel after her
attorney withdrew approximately a month before her hearing. Rodriguez-Solis v. Blanche,
177 F.4th 266, 273–75 (4th Cir. 2026). However, the language of Matter of C-B- is not
based on the statutory text and we have withdrawn from that language as a statutory and
regulatory standard. We agree with the dissent in Rodriguez-Solis that the alien was given
sufficient time to find new counsel based on the circumstances in that case. Id. at 285–87
(Quattlebaum, J., dissenting). We further agree with the dissent that “complying with these
[statutory] provisions is all that is necessary to safeguard an alien’s privilege of counsel”
and that “[b]y requiring more, the majority creates a right that doesn’t exist under the
statute’s text.” Id. at 283–284 (citation modified).
2 	The only documents a single applicant like the respondent must submit with the
application are a copy of all passports or other travel documents in the applicant’s
possession and a copy of any United States immigration documents, if the applicant has
such documents. 	See Instructions for Application for Asylum and for Withholding of
Removal, Part 1, VI (July 28, 2026).

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states that, due to a lack of education, he could not complete the application
himself and was trying to find help, but he does not include any specifics as
to what diligent steps he took, if any, to complete the application or find
assistance to do so. 	Under the factual circumstances of this case, the
Immigration 	Judge 	could 	have 	proceeded 	without 	granting 	a 	second
continuance for the respondent to obtain counsel.
The Fifth Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this cases arises, has assumed
without deciding that, while aliens do not have a Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, they may have a Fifth Amendment due process right to counsel. See
Mai v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 2006) (explaining that an alien
has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in removal proceedings but noting
that a claimed violation of the right to counsel “may implicate due process
concerns 	under 	the 	Fifth 	Amendment”). 	However, 	there 	can 	be 	no
reasonable argument that due process was not provided or that the privilege
to obtain counsel was otherwise violated under the facts of this case. 	See
Ogbemudia v. INS, 988 F.2d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 1993) (deeming 1 month
sufficient time for a detained alien to find counsel). The Immigration Judge
properly denied the respondent’s request for a further continuance to seek
legal counsel based on a lack of good cause, consistent with the governing
statutes and regulations. 	Accordingly, we will dismiss the respondent’s
appeal.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
NOTICE: 	If a respondent is subject to a final order of removal and
willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States pursuant to the
order, to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents
necessary to depart the United States, or to present himself or herself at the
time and place required for removal by the Department of Homeland
Security, or conspires to or takes any action designed to prevent or hamper
the respondent’s departure pursuant to the order of removal, the respondent
shall be subject to a civil monetary penalty of up to $998 for each day the
respondent is in violation. 	See INA § 274D, 8 U.S.C. § 1324d (2024);
8 C.F.R. § 280.53(b)(14) (2026). 	Further, any respondent that has been
denied admission to, removed from, or has departed the United States while
an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding and thereafter
enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in the United States shall be
fined or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. 	See INA § 276(a),
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2024).