Curtis Windom v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2025-1179
____________

CURTIS WINDOM,
Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.

____________

No. SC2025-1182
____________

CURTIS WINDOM,
Petitioner,

vs.

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.

August 21, 2025

PER CURIAM.

Thirty-three years ago, in 1992, a jury convicted Curtis

Windom of three counts of first-degree murder and one count of

attempted first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced Windom
to death for the former convictions, and to twenty-two years’

imprisonment for the latter one. We upheld his convictions and

sentences in Windom v. State (Windom I), 656 So. 2d 432 (Fla.

1995).

On July 29, 2025, Governor DeSantis signed Windom’s death

warrant, with a scheduled execution date of August 28, 2025.

Windom then filed his fifth1 successive motion for postconviction

relief, raising two claims: (1) that he was unconstitutionally

deprived of his right to competent trial counsel, and (2) that he was

deprived of his right to due process by the postconviction court’s

scheduling order. The postconviction court summarily denied these

claims, as well as Windom’s “emergency motion for stay” in which

he raised an additional newly discovered evidence claim. Windom

timely appealed. We have jurisdiction, see art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.

Const., and affirm the postconviction court’s summary denial of

Windom’s successive postconviction motion. And we further deny

1. Though Windom filed multiple pro se postconviction
motions that were stricken, this appears to be his fifth successive
postconviction motion.

-2-
Windom’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, see id. § 3(b)(9), and

motions for stay and oral argument.

I.

We recounted the horrific facts of this case in great detail in

Windom’s direct appeal:

Jack Luckett testified that he had talked with the
Defendant the morning of the shootings. In their
discussion, the Defendant asked Jack if Johnnie Lee had
won money at the dog track and Jack said, “Yes, $114.”
The Defendant said Johnnie Lee owed him $2,000. When
the Defendant learned Johnnie had won money at the
track, he said to Jack, “My nigger, you’re gonna read
about me.” He further said that he was going to kill
Johnnie Lee. That same day at 11:51 a.m. (per the sales
slip and the sales clerk) the Defendant purchased a .38
caliber revolver and a box of fifty .38 caliber shells from
Abner Yonce at Walmart in Ocoee. Mr. Yonce
remembered the sale and recalled there was nothing
unusual about the Defendant and that he was “calm as
could be.”
Within minutes of that purchase, the Defendant
pulled up in his car next to where Johnnie Lee was
standing talking to two females and Jack Luckett on the
sidewalk. All three testified that the Defendant’s car was
close and the Defendant leaned across the passenger side
of the vehicle and shot Johnnie Lee twice in the back.
(Johnnie Lee’s back was towards the Defendant and
there was no evidence he even saw the Defendant.) . . .
After the victim fell to the ground, the Defendant got out
of the car, stood over the victim and shot him twice more
from the front at very close range. . . . The Defendant
then ran towards the apartment where Valerie Davis, his
girlfriend and mother of one of his children, lived. (The
Defendant lived with Valerie Davis off and on.) She was

-3-
on the phone, and her friend Cassandra Hall had just
arrived at the apartment and was present when the
Defendant shot Valerie once in the left chest area within
seconds of arriving in the apartment and with no
provocation. . . .
From the apartment, the Defendant went outside,
encountered Kenneth Williams on the street, and shot
him in the chest at very close range. Mr. Williams saw
the gun but did not think the Defendant would shoot
him. Right before he was shot, he turned slightly and
deflected the bullet somewhat. Although he was in the
hospital for about 30 days and the wound was serious,
he did not die. He said the Defendant did not look
normal—his eyes were “bugged out like he had clicked.”
...
From there, the Defendant ended up behind
Brown’s Bar where three guys, including the Defendant’s
brother, were trying to take the weapon from him. By
that time, Valerie’s mother [Mary Lubin] had learned that
her daughter had been shot, so she had left work in her
car and was driving down the street. The Defendant saw
her stop at the stop sign, went over to the car where he
said something to her and then fired at her, hitting her
twice, and killing her.

Windom I, 656 So. 2d at 435 (omissions in original).

After convicting Windom of the crimes indicated above, the

jury unanimously recommended sentences of death. And in

sentencing Windom as recommended by the jury for the first-degree

murders, the trial court specifically found two aggravators for each

murder conviction: (1) the cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP)

aggravator, and (2) the prior violent felony conviction aggravator.

-4-
While we affirmed the judgments and sentences on direct

appeal, see Windom I, 656 So. 2d at 440, cert. denied, 516 U.S.

1012 (1995), we struck the circuit court’s finding that the CCP

aggravator was applicable to the murders of Valerie Davis and Mary

Lubin.

Windom then filed his initial postconviction motion, followed

by an amended motion, raising twenty-one claims. Following an

evidentiary hearing on multiple claims, the postconviction court

denied relief. We affirmed, and we also denied an accompanying

petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Windom v. State (Windom II),

886 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 2004).

Of particular relevance here, we affirmed the postconviction

court’s conclusion that trial counsel’s decision not to present

mental health evidence was not prejudicial because it foreclosed the

prosecution from presenting highly prejudicial evidence of

Windom’s drug dealing and motive to murder Davis and Lubin, both

of whom may have been police informants. Id. at 922-24, 928.

Additionally, we affirmed the summary denial of Windom’s claim

that Florida’s lack of standards for capital counsel led to the trial

court’s tolerance of an incompetent attorney. Id. at 920 n.5.

-5-
Later, and also relevant to the instant proceeding, we affirmed

the denial of a successive postconviction motion in which Windom

raised an untimely and procedurally barred Brady2 claim

concerning his discovery that State’s witness Jack Luckett had a

pending felony charge when he testified. Windom v. State (Windom

III), No. SC16-1371, 2017 WL 3205278, at *2 (Fla. July 28, 2017).

A flurry of other state and federal challenges by Windom

ensued over the years. See Windom v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No.

6:04-cv-1378-ORL-28KRS, 2007 WL 9725062 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 1,

2007) (denying federal habeas relief, including ineffective assistance

of trial counsel claims considered in Windom II); Windom v. Sec’y,

Dep’t of Corr., 578 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming denial of

habeas following oral argument), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1051 (2010);

Windom v. State, 160 So. 3d 901 (Fla. 2015) (dismissing pro se

appeal); Windom v. State, 234 So. 3d 556 (Fla.) (denying Hurst3

claim), cert. denied, 586 U.S. 860 (2018); Windom v. State, No.

2. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

3. Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), receded from in
part by State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020).

-6-
SC18-1923, 2018 WL 6326237 (Fla. Dec. 4, 2018) (dismissing pro

se appeal); In re Curtis L. Windom, Sr., No. 13-12004-P (11th Cir.

June 3, 2013) (denying permission to file successive habeas to raise

the Brady claim considered in Windom III); In re Curtis L. Windom,

Sr., No. 14-12411-P (11th Cir. June 26, 2014) (same); In re Curtis L.

Windom, Sr., No. 19-11357-P (11th Cir. May 1, 2019) (same). Each

time, his challenges failed.

The instant appeal follows.

II.

We review de novo the postconviction court’s summary denial

of Windom’s successive Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851

motion. “Summary denial of a successive rule 3.851 motion is

appropriate if ‘the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively

show that the movant is entitled to no relief.’ ” Rogers v. State, 409

So. 3d 1257, 1262 (Fla. 2025) (citation omitted), cert. denied, No.

24-7169, 2025 WL 1387828 (U.S. May 14, 2025). We will affirm the

denial of successive claims that are procedurally barred, untimely,

legally insufficient, or refuted by the record. See Hutchinson v.

State, No. SC2025-0517, 50 Fla. L. Weekly S71, S72, 2025 WL

-7-
1198037, at *3 (Fla. Apr. 25, 2025), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1980

(2025).

With limited exceptions, rule 3.851(d)(1) imposes a one-year

time limitation on any motion to vacate a final judgment and

sentence of death.

Windom attempts to avail himself of two exceptions to this

one-year limitation: the new, retroactive constitutional right

exception—“the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not

established within the period provided for in subdivision (d)(1) and

has been held to apply retroactively,” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(B);

and the newly discovered evidence exception—“the facts on which

the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant or the

movant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by the

exercise of due diligence,” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A). The

postconviction court correctly summarily denied the successive

motion.

A.

(1)

First, Windom argues that evolving standards of decency

should have been applied to his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

-8-
He asserts that his trial counsel lacked the competence to represent

him because, unlike the more exacting standards today, back then,

the only standards counsel had to satisfy were the minimums of

being licensed and in good standing with The Florida Bar to

represent a capital defendant. Windom specifically cites to the

adoption of rule 3.112 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure in

1999, which sets forth minimum standards for attorneys in capital

cases. See In re Amend. to Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc.-Rule 3.112 Min.

Stds. for Att’ys in Cap. Cases, 759 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1999). Rule

3.112 was extended to apply to privately retained counsel4 in 2002.

In re Amend. to Fla. Rules of Crim Proc.-Rule 3.112 Min. Stds. for

Att’ys in Cap. Cases, 820 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 2002).

But as the postconviction court properly determined, this

claim is untimely.5 Windom cannot avail himself of the benefit of

rule 3.851(d)(2)(B)’s new, retroactive constitutional right exception

to the one-year time limit. Any argument that constitutional

4. Windom’s trial counsel, Ed Leinster, was privately retained.

5. Windom does not challenge the postconviction court’s
conclusion that this claim does not satisfy the newly discovered
evidence exception in rule 3.851(d)(2)(A).

-9-
provisions should be construed based on “evolving standards of

decency” is unavailing because, as acknowledged by Windom, that

reasoning has never been applied to the Sixth Amendment right to

counsel. It has only been applied to the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition on the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments.

See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (“The [Eighth]

Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of

decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”); Atkins v.

Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002) (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at

100-01). And Windom cannot use the timeliness exception in rule

3.851(d)(2)(B) to affirmatively establish a new and retroactive

constitutional right. See Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883, 886 (Fla.

2013) (“What Carroll is seeking is the recognition of a new

fundamental constitutional right, which is not properly pled under

rule 3.851(d)(2)(B).” (citing Waterhouse v. State, 82 So. 3d 84, 97

(Fla. 2012))).

We thus affirm the postconviction court’s finding that

Windom’s first claim is untimely.

- 10 -
(2)

Windom’s arguments are also procedurally barred. In 2004, in

his first postconviction motion, he raised the claim that Florida

lacks standards for counsel in capital cases, violating the Fifth,

Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See Windom II, 886

So. 2d at 920 n.5. We affirmed the postconviction court’s 2001

summary denial of this argument in its entirety on appeal. See id.

at 926, 931. We also addressed, and rejected, other claims Windom

now raises again—that trial counsel, Ed Leinster, rendered

ineffective assistance for failing to investigate mental health experts

and fact witnesses for both the guilt and penalty phases, and that

Leinster was allegedly intoxicated at trial. Id. at 921-29.

The postconviction court properly characterized Windom’s

current arguments as a “repacking of claims.” We agree. As we

recently reiterated in Barwick v. State, “using ‘a different argument

to relitigate the same issue’ . . . is inappropriate.” 361 So. 3d 785,

793 (Fla. 2023) (quoting Medina v. State, 573 So. 2d 293, 295 (Fla.

1990)). So, this claim was properly denied as procedurally barred.

But even if Windom’s current argument regarding counsel’s

lack of competency based on “evolving standards of decency” could

- 11 -
overcome the re-litigation bar, it is nonetheless still procedurally

barred because he could have raised this claim as early as 2002,

when rule 3.112 was extended to privately retained counsel and

required greater capital counsel qualifications. See id. at 795

(“Even if this claim had not been raised in a prior proceeding, it is

still procedurally barred because it could have been raised

previously.” (citations omitted)).

For all these reasons, we affirm the postconviction court’s

finding that Windom’s first claim is procedurally barred.

(3)

Finally, Windom’s claim is meritless. The committee’s

comments to the standards announced in rule 3.112 reflect that the

rule is “not intended to establish any independent legal rights” and

that the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), standard

would still apply to claims of inadequacy of representation by

counsel. In re Amend. to Fla. Rules of Crim. Proc.-Rule 3.112, 820

So. 2d at 198. And we have since relied on this language in

rejecting a claim of per se ineffectiveness. See Cox v. State, 966 So.

2d 337, 358 n.10 (Fla. 2007) (“Cox asserts that defense counsel

failed to meet the minimum requirements for death penalty co-

- 12 -
counsel outlined in . . . [rule] 3.112 . . . . Although it is true that

one attorney did not meet the minimum standards . . . this does not

amount to per se ineffective assistance of counsel. The comment to

rule 3.112 demonstrates that the rule was not intended to create an

independent cause of action . . . .”).

In this case, Windom’s ineffective assistance claims were fully

litigated in Windom II and found meritless under the Strickland

standard. Nothing else is required.6

The postconviction court also properly rejected Windom’s

argument that rule 3.112 should be retroactively applied.

Windom’s retroactivity argument is contrary to the text of rule

3.112, which states that it applies to “all defense counsel handling

capital trials and capital appeals, who are appointed or retained on

or after July 1, 2002.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.112(c) (emphasis added).

The requirements in rule 3.112 were not extended to privately

6. We also reject Windom’s invitation to extend the
application of the “evolving standards of decency” doctrine. Trop
made it clear that the doctrine applies to the Eighth Amendment,
and no other court, to our knowledge, has yet extended the doctrine
to interpret the Sixth Amendment. Windom candidly acknowledges
this as well. We decline to be the first.

- 13 -
retained counsel until 2002. See In re Amend. to Fla. Rules of Crim.

Proc.-Rule 3.112, 820 So. 2d at 195. Thus, the rule was clearly

intended to have prospective application.

Windom counters that fundamental fairness supports the

retroactive application of the rule’s standards to his trial

representation, citing Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980)

(“Considerations of fairness and uniformity make it very ‘difficult to

justify depriving a person of his liberty or his life, under process no

longer considered acceptable and no longer applied to

indistinguishable cases.’ ” (citation omitted)). But his fundamental

fairness argument fails because, as we said above, the rule 3.112

standards were not intended to establish any independent legal

rights.

Framing Leinster’s alleged deficiencies as resulting from lack

of proper qualifications to represent a capital defendant, Windom

again argues, as he did in previous cases before this Court, that the

outcome of his trial and penalty phase would have been different

had Leinster developed and presented additional witnesses and

evidence to show that Windom had brain damage and was legally

insane at the time of the shootings.

- 14 -
But as we held in Windom II, had Leinster put on evidence in

the guilt phase to support an insanity defense, he would have

opened the door to highly damaging testimony and evidence that

Windom was a drug dealer and that his drug operations may have

motivated at least two of the murders, as some or all of his victims

were police informants. 886 So. 2d at 923. Also, evidence of

Windom’s conduct and planning on the day of the murders refuted

rather than supported the argument that the acts were the product

of brain damage or delusion. Id. at 926. Windom also was not

prejudiced by Leinster’s failure to put on additional mental health

mitigation in the penalty phase because this evidence would have

opened the door to, and been overwhelmingly rebutted by, the

State’s evidence of Windom’s drug enterprise. Id. at 928.7

Finally, Windom again claims that the outcome would have

been different had the jury heard about Luckett’s undisclosed

pending felony given the State’s allegedly weak case for

7. The postconviction court’s order does not address
Windom’s argument that Leinster was “actually incompetent” under
the standards now embodied in rule 3.112. However, Windom has
not shown that he suffered prejudice from the alleged deficiencies
he identifies in Leinster’s performance.

- 15 -
premeditation. Again, this information had no reasonable

likelihood of changing the outcome. As we said in Windom III,

Luckett’s testimony was largely corroborated by other witnesses

and evidence, and Windom did, in fact, impeach him with three

other prior felonies. 2017 WL 3205278, at *1-2. Additionally, had

the evidence of Luckett’s pending charge been introduced, the State

could have rehabilitated Luckett with prior consistent statements.

Id.

Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of

Windom’s “evolving standards of decency” claim as untimely,

procedurally barred, and meritless.

B.

Windom next argues that the postconviction court’s

abbreviated scheduling order—and now, this Court’s scheduling

order, too—violates his right to due process. As evidence of this

due process violation, Windom argues that he only learned of

“newly discovered evidence” at the Huff8 hearing—to wit, statements

from some of the victims’ family members from his 2013 clemency

8. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).

- 16 -
hearing that they opposed Windom’s death sentence—and had to

raise this claim in an emergency motion for stay below. The

postconviction court was right to summarily deny this claim.

(1)

The crux of Windom’s argument on this issue is that he was

denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Over his counsel’s

objection and request for one more day, the postconviction court

required the successive postconviction motion to be filed by August

3, 2025, at 11:00 a.m., less than five days after notice of the death

warrant. Noting that visits to inmates awaiting execution were

partially curtailed by the upcoming execution of another inmate,

counsel argued that the proposed deadline would not allow her

enough time to interview Windom or to review pleadings with him

after their August 1 meeting at the prison.9

The postconviction court denied this claim on the merits,

explaining that Windom was given notice of the schedule, had an

9. Below, counsel also argued that this time would be
insufficient to allow mental health expert Dr. Hyman Eisenstein to
interview Windom and provide an affidavit of his findings. However,
this argument has not been raised on appeal.

- 17 -
opportunity to respond, and, in fact, did so by objecting. Further,

the postconviction court found that the expedited schedule did not

violate Windom’s right to due process by obstructing his ability to

present evidence. We agree. In warrant proceedings, “[d]ue process

requires that a defendant be given notice and an opportunity to be

heard on a matter before it is decided.” Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1,

27 (Fla. 2016) (citing Huff, 622 So. 2d at 983). Windom was given

notice and a full opportunity to be heard regarding the deadlines in

the scheduling order.

Importantly, we have rejected similar claims to this one and

found that an expedited warrant litigation schedule does not

deprive a defendant of his right to due process. See Zakrzewski v.

State, No. SC2025-1009, 50 Fla. L. Weekly S218, S220, 2025 WL

2047404, at *5 (Fla. July 22, 2025) (rejecting claim that expedited

process of warrant litigation deprived defendant of his due process

rights), cert. denied, No. 25-5194, 2025 WL 2155601 (U.S. July 30,

2025); Bell v. State, No. SC2025-0891, 50 Fla. L. Weekly S155,

S163, 2025 WL 1874574, at *17 (Fla. July 8, 2025), cert. denied,

No. 25-5083, 2025 WL 1942498 (U.S. July 15, 2025); Tanzi v. State,

407 So. 3d 385, 393 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1914 (2025).

- 18 -
After over thirty years of litigation, Windom has been heard

and his case has been thoroughly and conscientiously reviewed at

every stage, including this one. Thus, we reject his claim.

(2)

Undeterred, Windom asserts that he established a due process

violation in his scheduling order by virtue of his “motion for

emergency stay of execution,” in which he raised claims based on

mitigating information presented at his 2013 clemency hearing10—

that the victims’ families wished for Windom’s life to be spared from

the death penalty.11 He alleges he only learned of this information

for the first time at the Huff hearing, and, thus, this is newly

10. Windom raised three claims below: (1) the information
from the three victims’ families is newly discovered evidence; (2) the
State violated its obligations under Brady during postconviction by
failing to disclose the victims’ family members’ wishes; and (3) the
newly discovered evidence establishes that the death penalty as
applied to Windom is unconstitutional. On appeal, Windom does
not challenge the postconviction court’s conclusion on claim (2),
that the State has no obligation under Brady in postconviction
proceedings. See Dailey v. State, 279 So. 3d 1208, 1217 (Fla. 2019)
(citing Dist. Att’y Off. for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52,
68-69 (2009), for the proposition that the Supreme Court rejected
“Brady’s applicability at the postconviction stage”).

11. These statements are video recordings and letters that
were prepared in support of Windom’s bid for clemency.

- 19 -
discovered evidence requiring additional time. The State argued

below that Windom’s newly discovered evidence claim is untimely.

Recognizing the motion is controlled by rule 3.851, the

postconviction court analyzed it as a newly discovered evidence

claim under the two-factor test reiterated in Dailey v. State, 279 So.

3d 1208, 1212-13 (Fla. 2019) (“In order to set aside a conviction

based on newly discovered evidence . . . [1] the evidence must have

been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the

time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his counsel could

not have known [of it] by the use of diligence . . . [and 2] the

evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an

acquittal on retrial.” (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted)). Based on caselaw, the postconviction court agreed with

Windom that this evidence was “new” under the first prong because

it could not have been known at the time of trial, but found it would

probably not produce an acquittal on retrial under the second

prong because the evidence was probably inadmissible. Id.

(“However . . . ‘no relief is warranted’ unless the evidence would be

admissible at trial.” (quoting Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 660

(Fla. 2000))).

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From our de novo review of the record, we conclude that

Windom’s claim is untimely because the allegedly “new” information

was ascertainable long ago by the exercise of due diligence. See

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A). Windom offers no convincing

argument why either he or his attorney could not have attempted to

ascertain those views at least a decade before his death warrant

was signed.

But even assuming this claim were timely and that this

“evidence” is “new,” Windom argues that the postconviction court

failed to consider that it would be admissible as mitigation at the

penalty phase and, thus, be “of such a nature that it would . . .

probably yield a less severe sentence.” Davis v. State, No. SC2024-

1128, 2025 WL 1970014, at *5 (Fla. July 17, 2025) (citations

omitted).

We disagree. The facts as firmly established at Windom’s guilt

phase were that Windom went on a shooting spree, shooting four

people and killing three. Thus, at the penalty phase, the prior

violent felony aggravator—which is “one of the most weighty

aggravating circumstances in Florida’s statutory sentencing

scheme,” Bright v. State, 299 So. 3d 985, 1011 (Fla. 2020) (citations

- 21 -
omitted)—was more than supported in regard to each of the three

murder victims. Further, the evidence also showed that Windom

planned the murder of the first victim, Lee, because Lee owed

Windom money, thus supporting the finding of the CCP aggravator.

Given this significant aggravation, even adding the victims’

families’ preferences to Windom’s mitigation presented during his

original penalty phase,12 we reject the argument that it would

probably have produced a less severe sentence. As we said in

Windom I, “we conclude that the existence of the one aggravator of

the conviction of two other capital offenses and one violent felony

against a person in each instance is sufficient to outweigh the little

weight given to the mitigating factors set forth in the sentencing

order.” 656 So. 2d at 440 (citations omitted). “It is well settled that

12. See Windom I, 656 So. 2d at 435 n.3 (“In mitigation the
[sentencing] court found the following statutory factors: (1) Windom
had no significant history of prior criminal activity . . . ; (2) the
capital felony was committed while Windom was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance . . . ; and (3)
Windom acted under extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another person . . . . The following nonstatutory
mitigators were considered: (1) Windom assisted people in the
community; (2) Windom was a good father; (3) Windom saved his
sister from drowning; and (4) Windom saved another individual
from being shot during a dispute over $20.”).

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it is not the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances

that is critical but the weight to be given each of them.” Id.

(citations omitted).

Thus, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Windom’s

newly discovered evidence claim raised in his “emergency motion to

stay,” and decline to find this to be “evidence” of a due process

violation in the postconviction court’s scheduling order. We

likewise affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Windom’s

piggyback claim, that Florida’s sentencing scheme is

unconstitutional as applied to him, as procedurally barred.

III.

Finally, Windom petitions this Court for a writ of habeas

corpus, raising two claims for equitable relief. First, he claims a

manifest injustice will occur if this Court does not reconsider

Windom II, 886 So. 2d 915, and conclude that he was deprived of

Sixth Amendment counsel at trial due to his counsel’s inexperience

and failure to investigate Windom’s mental health for possible

defenses and mitigation. Windom raises multiple subclaims as

well, including a Brady violation that appears to be materially the

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same claim as the one raised and rejected in his second successive

postconviction motion. See Windom III, 2017 WL 3205278, at *2.

We deny this claim and all subclaims as procedurally barred.

“[H]abeas corpus petitions are not to be used for additional appeals

on questions which could have been, should have been, or were

raised on appeal or in a rule 3.850 motion.” Mann v. State, 112 So.

3d 1158, 1164 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Wyatt v. State, 71 So. 3d 86,

112 n.20 (Fla. 2011)); Gaskin v. State, 361 So. 3d 300, 309 (Fla.

2023) (“Habeas corpus is not to be used to litigate or relitigate

issues which could have been, should have been, or were previously

raised.” (citing Breedlove v. Singletary, 595 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla.

1992))).

Furthermore, as explained above and in Windom II, because

Windom’s trial counsel did not present mental health evidence, the

State was ultimately foreclosed from presenting even more

prejudicial evidence of Windom’s drug dealing and motive to murder

his girlfriend and her mother, both of whom he suspected were

police informants. “Trial counsel is not deficient for failing to

present additional testimony that would have informed the jury of

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negative information about the defendant.” Windom II, 886 So. 2d

at 923 (citing Breedlove v. State, 692 So. 2d 874, 878 (Fla. 1997)).

Likewise, Windom’s second claim, that a manifest injustice will

occur because the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to

him, is procedurally barred. Windom asserts, among other things,

that the prior violent felony aggravator should not have been

applied to the murder of Johnnie Lee. But this claim was

previously raised and rejected on direct appeal. See Windom I, 656

So. 2d at 440 (rejecting Windom’s argument and reaffirming prior

holdings that “contemporaneous convictions prior to sentencing can

qualify as previous convictions in multiple conviction situations”

(citations omitted)); see also Gonzalez v. State, 136 So. 3d 1125,

1151 (Fla. 2014) (“Under Florida law, such contemporaneous

convictions can serve as an appropriate basis for the prior violent

felony aggravator.” (citations omitted)). Further, as already noted,

“the prior violent felony aggravator is one of the most weighty

aggravating circumstances in Florida’s statutory sentencing

scheme.” Bright, 299 So. 3d at 1011.

We thus remain confident in the outcome of Windom’s trial

and penalty phase and deny his petition as procedurally barred.

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IV.

We affirm the summary denial of Windom’s successive motion

for postconviction relief and deny his petition for writ of habeas

corpus. We also deny his motions for stay of execution and oral

argument. No petition for rehearing will be entertained by this

Court. The mandate shall issue immediately.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Orange County,
Michael Kraynick, Judge – Case No. 481992CF001305000AOX
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus

Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Ann Marie
Mirialakis, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and
Melody Jacquay-Acosta, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional
Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,

for Appellant/Petitioner

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Rick A.
Buchwalter, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Timothy A.
Freeland, Special Counsel, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa,
Florida,

for Appellee/Respondent

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