Juan Javier Oquendo v. State of Florida

Supreme Court of Florida
____________

No. SC2023-0807
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JUAN JAVIER OQUENDO,
Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.

October 9, 2025

FRANCIS, J.

This case concerns Florida’s self-defense standard and

whether evidence of a defendant’s post-traumatic stress disorder

(PTSD) is relevant to his claim of self-defense. The Second District

Court of Appeal certified conflict between its decision in Oquendo v.

State, 357 So. 3d 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023), and the First District

Court of Appeal’s decision in State v. Mizell, 773 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2000), on the question of whether expert testimony about a

defendant’s PTSD is ever legally relevant to a self-defense theory.

The Second District held that evidence of PTSD is categorically
irrelevant given that self-defense turns on a reasonably prudent

person standard, i.e., what a reasonably prudent person would do

under the circumstances. Oquendo, 357 So. 3d at 221. The First

District, on the other hand, approved the admission of expert PTSD

testimony in support of a self-defense theory where the trial court

placed strict limitations on the use of such evidence, similar to

those imposed upon the use of expert testimony concerning

battered spouse syndrome. Mizell, 773 So. 2d at 620 (citing State v.

Hickson, 630 So. 2d 172, 173 (Fla. 1993)). The First District based

its decision on the language in the standard jury instruction on

self-defense requiring the jury to find that the defendant “actually

believed that the danger was real.” Id. at 621 (citing Fla. Std. Jury

Instr. (Crim.) 3.04(d)). 1

We have jurisdiction to resolve this conflict. See art. V,

§ 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 2 In doing so, we recognize that a showing of

1. Between the time Mizell was decided in 2000 and Oquendo
was decided in 2023, the standard criminal jury instruction on self-
defense was renumbered from 3.04(d) to 3.6(f). See Fla. Std. Jury
Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f).

2. Though we may reach extra issues when appropriate, see
Fla. R. App. P. 9.120(f); State v. Ivey, 285 So. 3d 281, 284 (Fla.
2019), we decline to reach the second issue raised by Oquendo

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self-defense legally involves both an objective component, to which

the reasonable person standard applies, and a subjective

component, which leaves room for the admission of other relevant

evidence establishing the overall circumstances. As to the objective

component, we agree with the Second District that evidence of

PTSD is categorically irrelevant. But to the extent PTSD evidence

may be relevant to the subjective component of a defendant’s self-

defense theory, we disapprove the Second District’s decision in

Oquendo and approve the First District’s decision in Mizell.

However, because we find no reversible error in the outcome of this

case, we ultimately approve the result in Oquendo and uphold

Oquendo’s conviction and sentence.

I. Background

Juan Javier Oquendo was charged with first-degree murder for

the fatal shooting of James Cason in 2015 outside a bar in Pinellas

regarding jury instructions because it is outside the scope of the
conflict issue and was not expressly addressed by the Second
District’s decision, see Agatheas v. State, 77 So. 3d 1232, 1236 n.1
(Fla. 2011) (“Because the Fourth District did not specifically
address this claim, and it is outside the scope of the conflict issue,
we decline to address it.”).

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County where Oquendo’s sister worked. Oquendo, a regular at the

bar, was playing pool and talking to his sister on the night of the

shooting. After he went into a restricted area of the bar, he was told

to leave. He left and did not seem upset as he did so.

The victim, Cason, had also been drinking at the bar that

night and was intoxicated. 3 Cason left a few minutes before

Oquendo came out, according to a former security guard outside

the club who described himself as an “associate[]” of Cason’s. That

security guard testified that when Oquendo exited the bar, Oquendo

grabbed him from behind in a bear hug and said, “You lucky I like

you.” After that, the security guard saw Oquendo pacing back and

forth at the side of the building and said he seemed agitated.

The security guard testified that a short time after his

encounter with Oquendo, Cason’s car pulled up, and Cason blew

his horn to signal to Oquendo to get out of the way. Oquendo went

to the driver’s side of Cason’s car and grabbed the door handle.

Cason let down the window and said, “What are you doing? This is

my car[.]” Oquendo said, “Oh, my bad. I thought this was my

3. The medical examiner testified that Cason’s blood alcohol
level was .118, above the legal limit of .08.

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friend[’s] car because he has a car like this.” The two exchanged

words. Oquendo then took a pool stick he had out of its case and

jabbed it into Cason’s window. Cason said, “Don’t worry about it. I

got something for you. I’ll be right back.”

The testimony of the trial witnesses differed as to what

happened next, which the Second District summarized as follows:

Oquendo testified that he saw the victim reach over
and produce a gun. He tried to knock the gun from the
victim’s hand with his pool stick. Oquendo grabbed the
victim’s arm. He took the gun from the victim, then the
gun went off inside the vehicle once or twice. He did not
know that the victim had been shot; the victim’s vehicle
began moving forward, and Oquendo thought that he was
going to be shot or run over. So, Oquendo said that he
fired the weapon several times toward the vehicle.
Other witnesses recounted the events differently.
One witness who claimed to be nearby heard someone
say, “I got mine.” Another heard the victim say: “Don’t
worry about it. I got something for you. I’ll be right
back.” One witness testified that he saw Oquendo punch
into the car and hit the driver. Then Oquendo pulled out
a gun and started shooting. Another witness testified
that he saw Oquendo poke his pool stick into the vehicle;
no gun was in his hand when that occurred. However,
the witness said that he was sure that Oquendo did not
pull a gun from the victim’s hand and that there was no
struggle over a gun at any point; the gun came from
Oquendo’s person. The witness saw Oquendo pull the
trigger and fire a shot at the victim. Another witness
testified that after the first shot was fired, the victim’s
vehicle moved forward and hit a parked car.

Oquendo, 357 So. 3d at 216.

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According to the Second District, the physical evidence showed

the gun was fired from a short distance and there were multiple

bullet holes in Cason’s vehicle:

The medical examiner testified that the victim died
after sustaining a single gunshot wound to the head,
above his left ear. The gun was fired from one and a half
to two feet away from the victim. Crime scene
technicians located multiple bullet holes in the victim’s
vehicle as well as twelve shell casings.

Id. Additionally, according to the testimony of Horace Lee, Oquendo

admitted that he also had a gun:

After the shooting, Oquendo fled. He went to the
home of Horace Lee, who dated Oquendo’s mother when
Oquendo was young. Lee testified that Oquendo told him
“[t]hat he shot someone.” Oquendo also told Lee, “His
gun didn’t go off, mine did.”

Id. (alteration in original).

Though Oquendo maintained that the gun accidentally went

off during the struggle with Cason, the jury was instructed on self-

defense. Ultimately, the jury acquitted Oquendo of first-degree

murder and convicted him of the lesser included offense of

manslaughter. The jury also found that Oquendo carried, used, or

displayed a firearm during commission of the offense. The Second

District affirmed Oquendo’s manslaughter conviction on appeal.

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A. Unadmitted Expert Testimony on PTSD

One of the major issues raised by Oquendo on appeal was

whether the trial court properly denied his request to present expert

testimony from clinical and forensic psychologist Dr. Jethro

Toomer, who would have opined that Oquendo suffered from PTSD.

During a pretrial proffer, Dr. Toomer testified that he reached this

conclusion after interviewing Oquendo and evaluating him using a

number of tests, in addition to observing Oquendo’s behavior and

examining his personal history, which included familial

abandonment in childhood, having witnessed three people he knew

being killed, having been kidnapped, and having been mugged at

least twice. Dr. Toomer opined that Oquendo had suffered from

PTSD “for some time,” including the night of the shooting.

Dr. Toomer also explained that PTSD results when an

individual is exposed to stressors, situations, or an environment

“that is threatening and that may, at times, create[] risk and the

threat of harm and loss of life.” PTSD causes an individual’s overall

functioning to be impaired “cognitively, behaviorally, [and]

emotionally,” so these individuals “don’t weigh alternatives,”

“project consequences,” “manage conflicted data,” or “learn from

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past experiences.” This means that behaviorally, these individuals

are “impulsive” and “unable to . . . assess situations appropriately

and come to rational conclusions,” and their “instinct for survival

remains elevated and is easily triggered.” Dr. Toomer explained

that, under substantial stress, an individual suffering from PTSD is

more likely to perceive a situation as threatening and to act on

impulse and without thinking.

Dr. Toomer agreed that Oquendo had only reported his version

of events: that Cason produced a gun, that Oquendo gained control

of the gun, and that the car started moving. Also, Oquendo did not

admit to Dr. Toomer that he intentionally pulled the trigger and

shot Cason.

The trial court denied Oquendo’s request to admit Dr.

Toomer’s testimony. In so doing, the court rejected Oquendo’s

argument that a defendant’s perceptions are relevant to the issue of

self-defense under the First District’s holding in Mizell, and found

that Dr. Toomer actually gave no opinion on the issue of self-

defense. The trial court found that Oquendo offered Dr. Toomer’s

testimony only to show that Oquendo had PTSD and that this

would carry a risk of confusing the jury about the significance of

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diminished capacity. 4 The trial court also noted that the language

of the self-defense instruction in Florida Standard Criminal Jury

Instruction 3.6(f) refers to what a defendant “reasonably believed”

and what “the reasonabl[y] cautious and prudent person” would

have done. Finally, the court noted that Oquendo never admitted to

intentionally shooting Cason, which is generally required to claim

self-defense. Thus, the court refused to admit Dr. Toomer’s opinion

about Oquendo’s PTSD, reasoning that the testimony would not

assist the jury in making its decision.

B. The Conflict Opinions

Oquendo challenged the trial court’s ruling on the

admissibility of Dr. Toomer’s testimony on appeal. The Second

District found no error in the exclusion of Oquendo’s proffered

expert testimony on PTSD because it determined that such evidence

4. The trial judge cited to State v. Storer, 920 So. 2d 754 (Fla.
2d DCA 2006), as the basis for this conclusion. The court appears
to have focused on Storer’s description of Mizell as the First District
“declin[ing] to quash the [pretrial] order [admitting PTSD evidence
under specific conditions] despite the risk that the evidence might
confuse the jury about the significance of diminished capacity.” Id.
at 759 (emphasis added).

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is not relevant to the reasonable person standard required by

Florida’s jury instruction on self-defense:

Use of evidence of a disorder affecting a defendant’s
perceptions would necessarily be—as it was here—in
support of a theory that the defendant’s belief was more
reasonable to him than it might have been to one not
suffering from such a disorder. Such use, premised as it is
on the defendant’s subjective comprehension of the
situation, is incompatible with the objective standard of
reasonableness required to support the justification of
self[-]defense.

Oquendo, 357 So. 3d at 217.5 In doing so, the Second District

certified conflict with the First District’s decision in Mizell and

thoroughly examined that case. Thus, we find it helpful to first

thoroughly discuss Mizell to clarify Oquendo’s disagreement with it.

5. The Second District also noted that “[a] theory of defense
that the firearm discharged accidentally is not necessarily
inconsistent with a theory of self[-]defense (and therefore does not
categorically preclude a self[-]defense instruction).” Oquendo, 357
So. 3d at 217 (citing Williams v. State, 588 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1991)); see also Williams, 588 So. 2d at 45 (“[W]here there is
evidence indicating that the accidental infliction of an injury and
the defense of self[-]defense or defense of another are so intertwined
that the jury could reasonably find that the accident resulted from
the justifiable use of force, an instruction on self[-]defense or
defense of another is not logically precluded.”).

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1. Mizell

In Mizell, the First District denied the State’s petition for writ

of certiorari seeking review of a pretrial order allowing Mizell, a

Vietnam veteran, to present evidence of PTSD “under certain limited

conditions” in his trial for attempted second-degree murder, in

which he was claiming self-defense. 773 So. 2d at 619.6 Mizell

quarreled with the victim, Benny Hayes, at the nearby home of a

mutual friend, and Hayes made threats and derogatory comments

to Mizell. Id. Mizell attempted to avoid Hayes and left several times

when Hayes reappeared at the home. Id. Eventually, Mizell, who

had been drinking, fell asleep on the couch near the home’s open

front door; he “awoke to find Hayes standing over the couch saying,

‘You son-of-a-bitch, I’m going to cut your throat.’ ” Id. At that

point,

Hayes then placed a hand into his pocket. Seeing this,
Mizell picked up a stick and hit Hayes. Mizell claims
he then went blank, and the next thing he remembers is
seeing Hayes very bloody. The arrest report indicates that
Mizell hit Hayes several times. Hayes was rendered
unconscious by the attack, and he also lost several teeth.

6. Mizell “experienc[ed] several disturbing incidents” while in
Vietnam, which led to a diagnosis and treatment for PTSD. Id.

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Id. at 619-20.

Mizell intended to offer expert testimony from Dr. Harry Krop,

a clinical psychologist, to explain (a) that Mizell has PTSD, (b) what

PTSD is, and (c) how it affects a person’s perceptions. Id. at 620.

The State filed a motion in limine to prevent the introduction of this

expert testimony. Id. The trial court denied the motion but

provided five specific conditions that must be met in order for Mizell

to offer the testimony:

1. [Mizell] must lay a predicate by testifying[.]
2. Thereafter, Dr. Krop may testify as to the Post[-]
Traumatic Stress Disorder.
3. Dr. Krop may reveal [Mizell’s] alleged background but
may not vouch for it.
4. Dr. Krop may not refer to the Battered Wife’s Syndrome.
5. Dr. Krop may not offer an opinion as to the validity of
self-defense in this case.

Id.

On certiorari review, the State argued, first, that Mizell sought

to introduce the testimony as diminished capacity evidence to

negate the requisite criminal intent, and, second, that even if it was

not diminished capacity evidence, it was inadmissible because it

was irrelevant to the question of self-defense. Id. The First District

rejected the first argument, finding that the PTSD evidence was

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being offered by Mizell as “state-of-mind evidence, quite analogous

to battered spouse syndrome (BSS) testimony that has in fact been

approved many times.” Id. (citing Hickson, 630 So. 2d at 173). The

First District also rejected the State’s second argument, holding

instead that “PTSD evidence is relevant on the question of self-

defense.” Id. at 621. As the First District explained,

The standard jury instruction for self-defense, which the
trial judge quoted during the hearing, indicates that a
defendant’s perceptions are relevant when assessing
applicability of self-defense. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr.
(Crim.) [3.04(d)] (“Based upon appearances, the
defendant must have actually believed that the danger
was real.”). The cases that admit evidence of BSS do so
to help the jury understand why the victim would
subjectively fear increased aggression against
her. See Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806-07
(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (“The expert testimony would have
been in order to aid the jury in interpreting the
surrounding circumstances as they affected the
reasonableness of her belief . . . that because she
suffered from the syndrome, it was reasonable for her to
have remained in the home and at the pertinent time, to
have believed that her life and the lives of her children
were in imminent danger.”).

Id.

The First District also noted that the trial court’s five

conditions would avoid any danger of the psychologist’s testimony

presenting Mizell’s testimony “by the backdoor” to avoid cross-

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examination by the State. Id. The conditions also prohibited using

the psychologist’s testimony to improperly bolster Mizell’s version of

events. Id.

2. Oquendo

In Oquendo, the Second District took issue with the First

District’s conclusion in Mizell that the self-defense standard in

Florida includes a subjective component, explaining that

[t]he First District’s conclusion does not follow from its
premise, in part because its rationale was based on an
incomplete analysis of the self-defense jury instruction.
See id. (relying on the jury instruction’s admonition that
“[b]ased upon appearances, (defendant) must have
actually believed that the danger was real.” (quoting Fla.
Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) [3.04(d)]). Of course, it is true
that a defendant’s perceptions are relevant—what he
ascertained with his senses constitutes the
circumstances under which he was required to assess
whether the threat justified the use of force he exerted.
However, that does not make the self-defense test a
subjective one, and it does not follow that a defendant’s
misperceptions—his misunderstanding of reality as
altered by a disorder such as PTSD—are relevant. The
self-defense jury instruction not only requires that the
defendant have “actually believed that the danger was
real” but also that his belief was objectively reasonable:
“The danger need not have been actual; however, . . . the
appearance of danger must have been so real that a
reasonably cautious and prudent person under the same
circumstances would have believed that the danger could
be avoided only through the use of that [force] [or] [threat
of force].” Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.6(f) (brackets in
original) (emphasis added). Evidence that a defendant’s

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perceptions might have been altered by a condition such
as PTSD—or that his tendency to perceive danger was
uniquely heightened compared to others who do not
suffer from such a condition—is not probative of what a
reasonably cautious and prudent person under the same
circumstances would have believed to be the extent of the
danger or lack thereof. Cf. § 90.401, Fla. Stat. (2015)
(“Relevant evidence is evidence tending to prove or
disprove a material fact.” (emphasis added)).
Evidence of Oquendo’s PTSD would only go to show
that his reaction was objectively unreasonable by virtue
of a potential misperception of the dangerousness of the
situation—i.e., that something others would not deem to
be dangerous appeared to him to be so. Cf. § 776.012(2)
(providing a justification for a defendant’s use of force “if
he or she reasonably believes” his or her use of force was
necessary (emphasis added)).

357 So. 3d at 218.

The Second District also held that Oquendo’s proffered PTSD

evidence was properly excluded as inadmissible diminished

capacity evidence, since “[a]llowing admission of evidence of the

defendant’s unique mental state when it is not relevant to a

permissible defense or justification could invite confusion and

potentially mislead the jury to excuse acts for which a defendant is

culpable under the law.” Id. at 219.

Finally, the Second District rejected the reasoning in Mizell

that the admissibility of battered spouse syndrome evidence

supports finding that PTSD evidence is relevant to self-defense. Id.

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The Second District reasoned that the admissibility of battered

spouse syndrome to support a theory of self-defense is “not for the

purpose of justifying a defendant’s misperception of reality or to

explain why an unreasonable belief was nonetheless justifiable due

to her condition,” but rather

to show why the defendant’s actions were reasonable—to
show that in spite of a reasonable perception of danger
from the battering spouse, the battered defendant would
remain in the home with her batterer where she may
resort to the exertion of force against him to prevent
imminent death or great bodily harm.
Thus, unlike PTSD evidence, battered-spouse
syndrome evidence does not tend to show that a
sufferer’s perceptions were impaired or altered by the
condition; rather, it goes to show that while a defendant’s
perception of the danger was reasonable, her choice to
remain in the dangerous situation—despite the risk she
would have to exert force to protect herself—was also
reasonable.

Id. at 219-20 (citations omitted).

Thus, the Second District in Oquendo certified conflict with the

First District’s decision in Mizell.

II. Analysis

Whether Florida’s self-defense standard is solely governed by

the objective reasonable person standard or also encompasses a

subjective component that may allow evidence of PTSD is a pure

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question of law that we review de novo. Cf. State v. Floyd, 186 So.

3d 1013, 1019 (Fla. 2016) (noting that whether a standard criminal

jury instruction on self-defense is misleading with respect to the

duty to retreat is a pure question of law subject to de novo review).

To the extent we consider the correctness of the trial court’s ruling

that Oquendo’s expert testimony on PTSD was inadmissible, we

review for an abuse of discretion. See Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d

177, 194 (Fla. 2010) (“As a general rule, a trial court’s ruling

concerning the admissibility of evidence will be sustained on review

absent an abuse of discretion.”).

In resolving the interdistrict conflict, we first examine the

statutory definition of self-defense in section 776.012(2), Florida

Statutes (2015). We then examine the text of Florida Standard

Criminal Jury Instruction 3.6(f) governing self-defense and cases

interpreting that language. Based on this review, we conclude that

the self-defense standard in Florida includes a subjective

component as well as an objective component and approve the First

District’s conclusion in Mizell. 7 However, because the trial court

7. The State argues that the defense waived this issue. We
reject the State’s waiver argument without further discussion.

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did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the expert PTSD

testimony, we conclude that the Second District was nevertheless

correct to affirm Oquendo’s conviction.

A. Section 776.012(2)

Section 776.012(2), Florida Statutes (2015), provides the

following requirements for self-defense:

A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly
force if he or she reasonably believes that using or
threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent
imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself
or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a
forcible felony.

(Emphasis added.)

Section 776.012(2) provides that a person’s use of deadly force

is justified as self-defense “if he or she reasonably believes” that the

use of that force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great

bodily harm. The plain text of the statute requires both that “he or

she . . . believe[d]” that the use of force was necessary (actual

subjective belief of the defendant) and that the belief was

“reasonabl[e]” (objective reasonable person standard). 40 C.J.S.

Homicide § 214 (2014) (“[W]hen self-defense has been asserted, the

defendant is entitled to have the jury consider the facts and

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circumstances known to the defendant (i.e., his or her subjective

belief), but those facts and circumstances must be balanced against

what a reasonable person would believe under the same or similar

circumstances, the ultimate test of ‘reasonableness’ being

objective.” (footnote omitted)). Thus, the First District was correct

in Mizell that there is both a subjective and objective component to

the self-defense standard.

B. Florida Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 3.6(f)

The language of the standard jury instruction on self-defense

also supports this conclusion. Florida Standard Criminal Jury

Instruction 3.6(f), which was included in the jury instructions at

Oquendo’s trial, provides that “[t]he use of deadly force is justifiable

if [the defendant] reasonably believed that the force was necessary

to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to [himself].”

(Brackets in original.) The standard instruction further provides:

In deciding whether [the defendant] was justified in
the use or threatened use of deadly force, you must
consider the circumstances by which he was surrounded
at the time the force or threat of force was used. The
danger need not have been actual; however, to justify the
use or threatened use of deadly force, the appearance of
danger must have been so real that a reasonably
cautious and prudent person under the same
circumstances would have believed that the danger could

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be avoided only through the use of that force or threat of
force. Based upon appearances, [the defendant] must
have actually believed that the danger was real.

(Brackets removed; emphasis added.) Thus, the standard

instruction supports that the jury must find that the defendant had

an actual subjective belief that deadly force was necessary in self-

defense in addition to finding that that belief was reasonable. 8

Apart from Mizell, other Florida appellate opinions have

recognized that Florida’s self-defense standard includes both a

subjective and an objective component. In Raneri v. State, the First

District noted that in order to qualify as self-defense, “the slayer

must actually and reasonably believe that it is necessary to act in

order to save his own life or that of a member of his family from

death or great bodily harm in order to constitute justification.” 255

So. 2d 291, 294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971) (citing Harris v. State, 104 So.

2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)); see also Harris, 104 So. 2d at 743

(explaining that a person has a right to act in self-defense, “even to

8. This hybrid test, including both a subjective and objective
component, is the most common among U.S. jurisdictions. 40
C.J.S. Homicide § 214 (2014) (“Generally, the standard of self-
defense is a hybrid test, combining both an objective and subjective
standard.”).

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the extent of taking life if he actually believes, and the

circumstances and surrounding conditions are such that a

reasonably cautious and prudent person would believe, danger of

death or great personal injury to be imminent, at the hands of

assailant”).

Likewise, in Filomeno v. State, the Fifth District Court of

Appeal held that the trial court erred in ruling inadmissible expert

testimony concerning the “fight or flight” response that the

defendant sought to introduce to show that “in some highly

stressful situations, an individual’s perception of danger may impel

them to ‘fight,’ when they perceive that they are being prevented

from ‘flight.’ ” 930 So. 2d 821, 822 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). The Fifth

District found that at least some of the proffered evidence was not

diminished capacity evidence but rather “state-of-mind evidence,

analogous to battered spouse syndrome testimony that has been

approved many times.” Id. (citing Mizell, 773 So. 2d at 620). The

Fifth District noted that “[t]he standard jury instruction for self-

defense recognizes that a defendant’s perceptions of the

surrounding events are relevant when assessing the reasonableness

of the use of force in self-defense.” Id.

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In addition to Mizell and its progeny, the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 9 in reviewing the habeas petition of a

defendant sentenced to life in prison in Florida noted that “to

establish self-defense under Florida law a person must show that

there existed reasonable grounds for him to believe that ‘he (was) in

imminent danger of death or great bodily injury’ and that he

actually held that belief when he acted.” Phillips v. Wainwright, 624

F.2d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Raneri, 255 So. 2d at 294).

Even the Second District’s opinion below recognized that “a

defendant’s perceptions are relevant” in that “what he ascertained

with his senses constitutes the circumstances under which he was

required to assess” whether the use of force in self-defense was

necessary. Oquendo, 357 So. 3d at 218. However, the Second

District attempted to characterize this evidence as relevant only in

the context of the reasonable person standard—i.e., a reasonable

person in the circumstances as known to the defendant—while

denying the existence of a subjective component in the self-defense

9. Prior to the creation of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit in 1981, the territorial jurisdiction of the
Fifth Circuit included Florida.

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standard and determining that “a defendant’s misperceptions—[i.e.,]

his misunderstanding of reality as altered by a disorder such as

PTSD”—could not be relevant to determining the issue of self-

defense. Id. On the contrary, we find that because section

776.012(2) identifies both an objective reasonable person

component and a subjective component to self-defense, state-of-

mind evidence 10 such as PTSD evidence can be relevant to the

subjective component, even though it is irrelevant to the objective

component. Such evidence may tend to show that a defendant with

PTSD actually believed that he was in imminent danger. Our

finding is also supported by Florida Standard Criminal Jury

10. As noted in Mizell, evidence of battered spouse syndrome
is also state-of-mind evidence that Florida courts have deemed
admissible in self-defense cases. 773 So. 2d at 620. The Mizell
opinion indicates that this evidence is relevant to what the
defendant actually believed was necessary under the circumstances
(the subjective component of self-defense), see id., while the Second
District’s opinion below argues that battered spouse syndrome
evidence shows what a reasonable person would believe was
necessary under the circumstances of the battered spouse (the
objective reasonable person test), Oquendo, 357 So. 3d at 219-20.
Such evidence may be relevant to both the subjective and objective
components of self-defense, but as the instant case does not
concern battered spouse syndrome, further discussion of it is
unnecessary to our determination here.

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Instruction 3.6(f), which instructs jurors to consider the “actual

belief” of the defendant.

Because we agree that the test for self-defense includes both a

subjective and objective component, we disapprove the Second

District’s holding in Oquendo that Florida’s self-defense law involves

only a reasonable person test and approve the First District’s

holding in Mizell.

C. Oquendo’s Conviction

Although we disapprove the Second District’s determination

that Florida’s self-defense law requires only an objective reasonable

person test and that evidence of a defendant’s subjective belief is

never relevant, we nevertheless approve the Second District’s

affirmance in this case. Here, Oquendo did not admit to

intentionally firing the gunshot that killed Cason. Instead, he

testified that the gun accidentally discharged as he was trying to

wrestle it away from Cason. Thus, his PTSD evidence would not be

relevant to whether he actually believed he needed to fire the gun to

defend himself since, according to his own testimony, the gun was

fired accidentally.

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Furthermore, although defense counsel stated that Oquendo

was not seeking to offer expert testimony concerning PTSD as

diminished capacity evidence, his explanation that it would be used

as “state-of-mind evidence” showing how “somebody that suffers

from that particular mental illness can react differently” sounds like

evidence of diminished capacity. For example, defense counsel at

one point argued that case law supported that, where PTSD is

involved, “the jury can get an instruction [o]n it because [the

defendant] may not react as well to a stressful situation as a normal

person.”

We also disapprove the Second District’s holding in Oquendo

that PTSD evidence is necessarily inadmissible diminished capacity

evidence, 357 So. 3d at 218-19, but we agree that defense counsel’s

arguments in this case indicate that the PTSD evidence was being

sought to establish diminished capacity. Diminished capacity

evidence is evidence of lowered mental capacity that is introduced

for the purpose of negating the specific intent requirement of a

particular charged offense. See Chestnut v. State, 538 So. 2d 820,

820 (Fla. 1989). Such evidence is generally inadmissible in Florida.

Id. at 824 (“To permit the defense of diminished capacity would

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invite arbitrary applications of the law because of the nebulous

distinction between specific and general intent crimes.”).

We reiterate that our holding today does not condone the use

of PTSD evidence to support an otherwise inadmissible claim of

diminished capacity. Where such state-of-mind evidence is relevant

to support a particular defense, the danger of a jury misapplying

the evidence as diminished capacity evidence may be prevented by

giving the jury “a limiting instruction that the expert testimony does

not tend to prove lack of specific intent but rather is relevant to

establish a particular defense.” Perry v. State, 256 So. 3d 888, 894

(Fla. 4th DCA 2018). The trial court in Mizell, for example, set forth

in its pretrial order five specific conditions that had to be met in

order for the defense to introduce the PTSD evidence, including the

defendant himself testifying and laying a predicate, the expert

witness being allowed only to lay out the defendant’s background

but not vouch for it, and the expert witness being prohibited from

offering an opinion on the validity of the defendant’s self-defense

claim. 773 So. 2d at 620.

However, here, the record supports the conclusion that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit expert

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testimony on PTSD given defense counsel’s arguments suggesting

the central purpose was to show diminished capacity, and given

that the defendant did not lay the predicate. Thus, we approve the

Second District’s affirmance in this case.

III. Conclusion

We approve the First District’s decision in Mizell and hold that

the test for self-defense includes both a subjective and objective

component. Although we disapprove the Second District’s holding

that self-defense does not involve a subjective component, we

approve the Second District’s affirmance and ultimate outcome in

this case.

It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
and SASSO, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal
Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions

Second District - Case No. 2D21-2408

(Pinellas County)

Blair Allen, Public Defender, and Tosha Cohen, Assistant Public
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, Bartow, Florida,

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for Petitioner

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Marilyn
Frances Muir, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Laurie Benoit-
Knox, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Jonathan P. Hurley,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,

for Respondent

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