City of Doral, Etc. v. Pedro Cabrera

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida

Opinion filed June 17, 2026.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D25-0363
Lower Tribunal No. 23-18115-CA-01
________________

City of Doral, City of Doral City Elected Officials Retirement
Plan, and Administrative Committee, City of Doral City
Elected Officials Retirement Plan,
Appellants,

vs.

Pedro Cabrera, Sandra Ruiz, Juan Carlos Bermudez, and
Michael DiPietro,
Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, William
Thomas, Judge.

Johnson, Anselmo, Murdoch, Burke, Piper & Hochman, P.A., and
Hudson C. Gill and Christopher J. Stearns (Fort Lauderdale), for appellants.

Sugarman, Susskind, Braswell & Herrera, P.A., and D. Marcus
Braswell, Jr., Pedro A. Herrera, and Veronica Ucros, for appellees.

Before FERNANDEZ, GORDO and GOODEN, JJ.
GOODEN, J.

This appeal stems from the City of Doral’s decision to enact, and

subsequently repeal, a retirement system for its elected officials. When the

City terminated the program, four former officials—who were already

receiving benefits—filed a legal challenge. The trial court sided with the

officials, concluding that the City lacked the authority to terminate those

vested benefits. While the City has raised several issues, we write to

address only the merits claim. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the

judgment in part and reverse in part.

I.

In 2021, the City of Doral adopted Ordinance 2021-02 by a four to one

vote. Its title provided:

AN ORDINANCE OF THE MAYOR AND THE CITY COUNCIL
OF THE CITY OF DORAL, FLORIDA, ESTABLISHING A
RETIREMENT SYSTEM FOR ELECTED OFFICIALS OF THE
CITY OF DORAL THAT HAVE SERVED A MINIMUM OF
EIGHT YEARS; PROVIDING FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE
COMMITTEE; PROVIDING FOR A SEVERABILITY CLAUSE;
PROVIDING FOR CONFLICTS AND PROVIDING FOR AN
EFFECTIVE DATE

In addition to life and health insurance, the retirement system provided the

following pension benefits:

(i) Any elected official who has served two full terms of office
or for a period of eight years and who has reached the
Retirement age and no longer serves as an elected official

2
in the City of Doral and applies for benefits, shall be entitled
during the remainder of his/her natural life to an annual
pension benefit equal to fifty percent (50%) of the elected
official’s compensation. The Elected Official compensation
shall equal the average of the last three years of
compensation or his/her term of office. Upon vesting and
each year of service as an elected officer thereafter, the
retirement benefit shall increase by twelve and one-half
percent (12.5%) for each additional year of service.

It further established an administrative committee to administer the plan. The

ordinance became effective immediately after the second reading on

February 10, 2021.

Thereafter, the City established a pension fund from general revenue

and made an initial contribution to the fund. It further entered into a custodial

agreement with Regions Bank to hold plan assets in trust and make monthly

pension payments to beneficiaries. The City Council adopted an investment

policy and made additional contributions in the following years. See Art. X,

§ 14, Fla. Const. (1976).

But in 2023, members of the council questioned the soundness of the

retirement plan. So the City retained an outside law firm to evaluate the

validity of the ordinance, its funding, and its administration. 1 Outside counsel

1
The resolution to retain outside counsel stated: “on February 10, 2021, the
City of Doral (the ‘City’) adopted Ordinance 2021-02, establishing a
retirement system for former, current, and future elected officials (the
‘Ordinance’) . . . .” See City of Doral Resolution, 23-4983 (Feb. 8, 2023).

3
identified compliance issues and recommended engaging a new actuary and

obtaining an opinion from the Department of Management Services.

Although the City could have brought the plan into compliance and could

have sought other guidance, it chose not to.

Rather, on May 1, 2023, in a seven-minute meeting, the administrative

committee voted to stop disbursing pension payments and benefits under

the plan. About a week later, the City enacted Ordinance 2023-15 by a three

to two vote. Its title stated:

AN ORDINANCE OF THE MAYOR AND THE CITY COUNCIL
OF THE CITY OF DORAL, FLORIDA, REPEALING
ORDINANCE No. 2021-02 RETROACTIVE TO THE DATE OF
ITS ADOPTION; REPEALING ARTICLE IX, “RETIREMENT
SYSTEM FOR ELECTED OFFICIALS,” OF CHAPTER 2, OF
THE CITY OF DORAL CODE OF ORDINANCES; PROVIDING
FOR SEVERABILITY; REPEALING ALL ORDINANCES OR
PARTS OF ORDINANCES IN CONFLICT; AND PROVIDING
FOR AN EFFECTIVE DATE

The Whereas clauses were incorporated into the ordinance. Pertinent here

are:

WHEREAS, the Ordinance provides lifetime pension, health, and
life insurance benefits for elected officials who have served at
least 8 years or 2 full terms in office, are no longer serving as an
elected official and attain age 60, and
...

WHEREAS, the Report further concluded that the payment of
benefits under the Plan to former elected officials who left office
before the Plan was in effect violates Section 215.425(1), Florida
Statutes, which provides that “[n]o extra compensation shall be

4
made to any officer, agent, employee, or contractor after the
service has been rendered or the contract made”; and

The ordinance repealed the initial ordinance “retroactive to the date of its

adoption, to-wit: February 10, 2021.” It was to become effective ten days

after the second reading on June 14, 2023. All beneficiaries were notified

that they would no longer receive benefits.

But the day before repeal, four former elected officials who had been

receiving benefits under the retirement plan filed suit for declaratory relief.

The four former elected officials are:

• Appellee Pete Cabrera: served on the council from 2003 to 2012 and

again from 2014 to 2022. Cabrera was vice mayor when the initial

ordinance was enacted and voted for the ordinance. He left service

after the ordinance went into effect. He began receiving benefits in

February 2023.

• Appellee Sandra Ruiz: served on the council from 2003 to 2010 and

again from 2012 to 2016. She is a former vice mayor. She left service

before the ordinance went into effect. She began receiving benefits in

February 2022.

• Appellee Juan Carlos Bermudez: served as mayor from 2003 to

2012 and again from 2016 to 2022. He was mayor when the initial

ordinance was enacted and voted for the ordinance. He left service

5
after the ordinance went into effect. He started receiving benefits in

February 2023.

• Appellee Michael DiPietro: served on the council from 2003 to 2012.

He is a former vice mayor. He left service before the ordinance went

into effect. He started receiving benefits in December 2021.

The former officials sought a declaration that they have vested rights

protected by Art. I, section 10, Florida Constitution, and the City infringed on

those vested rights. They sought continuation of benefits payments, along

with unpaid benefits due with interest.

The City maintained that it had legal authority to repeal the pension

ordinance. It also asserted that the four former officials had not vested

because they did not serve eight years after the adoption of the ordinance.

Lastly, it argued that providing the benefits would constitute extra

compensation under section 215.425, Florida Statutes, which the City is

prohibited from providing.

Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the

former officials’ motion, and denied the City’s. The trial court declared that

the former officials had vested rights to retirement benefits under the

6
ordinance.2 Any repeal violated Art. I, section 10, Florida Constitution. It

ruled that the City was equitably estopped from terminating those vested

benefits. It then explained that the former officials were entitled to

continuation of vested benefits, payment of unpaid benefits with interest,

costs, and attorney’s fees. The trial court entered final judgment accordingly.

This appeal follows.

II.

Our review of the issues before us is de novo. See Bionetics Corp. v.

Kenniasty, 69 So. 3d 943, 947 (Fla. 2011) (applying a de novo standard to

“[t]he question of whether a statute applies retroactively or prospectively”);

Siegel v. Tower Hill Signature Ins. Co., 225 So. 3d 974, 976 (Fla. 3d DCA

2017) (“We review the trial court’s orders granting final summary judgment

de novo.”); Martinez v. Hernandez, 227 So. 3d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 3d DCA

2017) (“Additionally, the standard of appellate review with respect to the

interpretation of a charter or ordinance is de novo.”).

III.

2
The order noted that the “parties both agreed that while the City does have
the authority to properly repeal an ordinance or amend a pension plan
prospectively for non-vested benefits, the City’s authority does not extend to
legislative actions which infringe upon vested pension rights, as vested
pension rights are constitutionally protected under Article I, Section 10, of the
Florida Constitution.”

7
The Constitution of our State was ordained and established to ensure

ordered liberty. Boynton v. State, 64 So. 2d 536, 552 (Fla. 1953); Whitaker

v. Parsons, 86 So. 247, 250 (Fla. 1920). It begins “with a Declaration of

Rights—a series of rights so basic that the framers of our Constitution

accorded them a place of special privilege.” Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957,

963 (Fla. 1992). See also State v. City of Stuart, 120 So. 335, 347 (Fla.

1929) (“Primacy of position in our State Constitution is accorded to the

Declaration of Rights. . . . These Declarations of Rights . . . have cost much,

and breathe the spirit of that sturdy and self-reliant philosophy of

individualism which underlies and supports our entire system of

government.”). “Each right is, in fact, a distinct freedom guaranteed to each

Floridian against government intrusion. Each right operates in favor of the

individual, against government.” Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 963.

The liberty of contract is one such right. Citrus Cnty. Hosp. Bd. v.

Citrus Mem’l Health Found., Inc., 150 So. 3d 1102, 1106 (Fla. 2014). It is

“one of the most sacrosanct rights guaranteed by our fundamental law.”

Chiles v. United Fac. of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 1993). See also In

re Advisory Op. to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292, 314 (Fla. 1987) (“It is

equally indisputable . . . that rights existing under a valid contract enjoy

protection under the Florida Constitution.”). Indeed, Floridians have exalted

8
this right and continuously placed it in their Constitutions since 1838. See

Art. I, § 19, Fla. Const. (1838); Art. I, § 19, Fla. Const. (1861); Art. I, § 19,

Fla. Const. (1865); Decl. of Rights, § 16, Fla. Const. (1868); Decl. of Rights,

§ 17, Fla. Const. (1885); Art. I, § 10, Fla. Const. (1968). Our present

Constitution provides that no “law impairing the obligation of contracts shall

be passed.” Art. I, § 10, Fla. Const. (1968).

“To impair a preexisting contract, a law must have the effect of rewriting

antecedent contracts in a manner that changes the substantive rights of the

parties to existing contracts.” Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley,

etc. v. State, 209 So. 3d 1181, 1191 (Fla. 2017) (citation modified). Total

obliteration of contractual rights is unnecessary. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v.

Dep’t of Ins., 453 So. 2d 1355, 1360 (Fla. 1984). Rather, “[t]o ‘impair’ has

been defined as meaning to make worse; to diminish in quantity, value,

excellency, or strength; to lessen in power; to weaken. Whatever legislation

lessens the efficacy of the means of enforcement of the obligation is an

impairment.” State ex rel. Woman’s Ben. Ass’n v. Port of Palm Beach Dist.,

164 So. 851, 856 (Fla. 1935). And so, “[v]irtually no degree of contract

impairment has been tolerated in this state.” Yamaha Parts Distribs. Inc. v.

Ehrman, 316 So. 2d 557, 559 (Fla. 1975). See also Pomponio v. Claridge

of Pompano Condo., Inc., 378 So. 2d 774, 780 (Fla. 1979).

9
To make that determination here, we must examine whether the former

officials have vested rights in the pension. Trs. of Internal Improvement Fund

v. Bailey, 10 Fla. 112, 130 (Fla. 1862) (“When then, a law is in its nature a

contract, when absolute rights have vested under that contract, a repeal of

the law cannot divest those rights.”) (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 135

(1810)); State ex rel. O’Donald v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 142 So. 2d 349,

351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962), aff’d, 151 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1963) (“The controlling

question presented for our decision is whether under the facts of this case

appellant widow acquired a vested right of contract to pension benefits

provided by the law in effect at the time of her husband’s retirement, and if

so, whether the amendatory act of 1951 impairs the obligations of that

contract.”). See generally Douglas W. Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The

Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding, 14 Hastings Const.

L.Q. 525, 526 (1987) (“Correctly interpreted, the Contract Clause prohibits

all retrospective, redistributive legislation which violates vested contractual

rights by transferring all or part of the benefit of a bargain from one

contracting party to another.”). “A vested right has been defined as an

immediate, fixed right of present or future enjoyment and also as an

immediate right of present enjoyment, or a present, fixed right of future

enjoyment.” City of Sanford v. McClelland, 163 So. 513, 514–15 (Fla. 1935)

10
(citation modified). “To be vested a right must be more than a mere

expectation based on an anticipation of the continuance of an existing law; it

must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future

enforcement of a demand.” Clausell v. Hobart Corp., 515 So. 2d 1275, 1276

(Fla. 1987) (citing Div. of Workers’ Comp. v. Brevda, 420 So. 2d 887, 891

(Fla. 1st DCA 1982)) (emphasis omitted). If vested, “[t]he contractual

relationship may not thereafter be affected or adversely altered by

subsequent statutory enactments.” Fla. Sheriffs Ass’n v. Dep’t of Admin.,

Div. of Ret., 408 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Fla. 1981). See also State ex rel.

Stringer v. Lee, 2 So. 2d 127, 132 (Fla. 1941) (“The inchoate right becomes

a complete vested right when the conditions connected with the particular

retirement system are complied with. This right cannot be thereafter

disturbed by legislation.”).

The parties disagree as to whether the former officials have vested

rights. The former officials maintain that they do. They point to the language

of the ordinance and the fact that they have been receiving benefits. By

contrast, without engaging in the language of the ordinance, the City claims

such a finding is precluded by principles against retroactive application of the

law and section 215.425, Florida Statutes. In sum, its position is that the

former officials’ service must occur after enactment to qualify.

11
A.

In our quest to arrive at a fair reading, we start our analysis with the

text of Ordinance 2021-02. Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308

So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020). Starting with its title, it established “a retirement

system for elected officials of the City of Doral that have served a minimum

of eight years.” See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts 221 (2012) (“The . . . headings are permissible

indicators of meaning.”). The ordinance contained a definition section. It

defined beneficiary as “any person receiving a benefit from the retirement

system provided by this article.” Elected official meant “any person who was

elected in a general or special election to serve as mayor or as a city council

member.” Service signified “the period of time served as the mayor or city

council member.” Retirement age meant “the first day of the month

coincident with or next following the 60th anniversary of birth.” Vesting was

defined as “the vesting of rights to future benefits after eight years of Service

. . . .”

In the section setting forth what benefits the elected official receive, it

stated: “Any elected official who has served two full terms of office or for a

period of eight years and who has reached the Retirement age and no longer

serves as an elected official in the City of Doral and applies for benefits, shall

12
be entitled during the remainder of his/her natural life to an annual pension

benefit equal to fifty percent (50%) of the elected official’s compensation.” It

further provides: “A vested elected official, that no longer serves as an

elected official in the City of Doral who has served for a period of eight years

and who has reached the Retirement age and no longer serves as an elected

official in the City of Doral shall be entitled during the remainder of his/her

natural life to a credit towards the health insurance premium . . . .” It provided

certain death benefits: “The City will maintain a life insurance policy for

elected officials in the same amount as the policy maintained during their last

year of service who have served for a period of eight years in the City of

Doral.”

In the next section, the ordinance sets out how the system will be

administered. It established an administrative committee who determines

“all questions relating to eligibility and participation,” and “receive[s] and

process[es] all applications for participation and benefits,” among other

duties. The ordinance became effective immediately after the second

reading on February 10, 2021.

The City’s verb tense throughout the ordinance is significant. See

United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992). Different tenses are used

to distinguish between what is (i.e., present tense for definitions), what has

13
happened (i.e., present perfect tense for eligibility), and what must happen

(i.e., future tense for mandates and administration). This shows “its

knowledge of the significance and meaning of the language it employed.”

Dean Wish, LLC v. Lee Cnty., 326 So. 3d 840, 847 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)

(citation omitted).

A key consideration here is the use of the present perfect tense to

determine eligibility—have served, was elected, has served, has reached,

has vested. See Brito v. Salas, 51 Fla. L. Weekly S12, at *6 (Fla. Dec. 30,

2025) (“Courts are to interpret statutes consistent with rules of grammar.”);

Scalia & Garner, supra, at 140 (“Words are to be given the meaning that

proper grammar and usage would assign them.”). Use of the present perfect

tense in this context describes actions that must be completed before a right

is granted. See The Chicago Manual of Style § 5.132, at 268 (17th ed. 2017)

(“The present-perfect tense . . . denotes an act, state, or condition that is now

completed or continues up to the present.”); Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s

Modern English Usage 896–97 (4th ed. 2016) (denoting “an action having

been completed at some indefinite time in the past,” and signifies

“imprecision of time”); Rodney Huddleston & Geoffrey K. Pullum, The

Cambridge Grammar of the English Language 143 (2002) (confirming

present-perfect tense addresses “a time-span beginning in the past and

14
extending up to now”); Present perfect, American Heritage Dictionary of the

English Language (5th ed. 2018) (“The verb tense expressing action

completed at the present time, formed in English by combining the present

tense of have with a past participle”). It serves as a condition precedent.

See Bryan A. Garner, The Art of Boiling Down: James Fitzjames Stephen As

Drafter & Lexicographer, 9 Green Bag 2d 27, 31 (2005) (“Hence the wise

drafter uses the present tense for all facts and conditions required to be

concurrent with the operation of the legal action, and the present perfect

tense to express all facts and conditions required as being precedent to a

legal action.”); see also George Coode, On Legislative Expression: Or, The

Language of The Written Law 63–64 (1845). It bridges the past (i.e., service)

with the present (i.e., eligibility).

A fair reading of the ordinance simply does not require the service to

occur after the ordinance was enacted. By using present perfect tense, the

City omitted any temporal restriction to the service requirements. See

Murphy v. Murphy, 342 So. 3d 799, 804–05 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (“If the

Legislature had intended to allow prior conduct (i.e., activity that started and

ended in the past) to support jurisdiction over a nonresident, it would have

used a past tense of the being verb (i.e., ‘was engaged’) or a perfect tense

15
(i.e., ‘has engaged’ or ‘had engaged’).”). Thus, prior service supports

present eligibility.

This conclusion is reinforced by other contextual clues. Alachua Cnty.

v. Watson, 333 So. 3d 162, 169 (Fla. 2022). For instance, the City passed

a resolution to retain outside counsel in 2023. That resolution incorporated

a whereas clause stating: “on February 10, 2021, the City of Doral (the ‘City’)

adopted Ordinance 2021-02, establishing a retirement system for former,

current, and future elected officials (the ‘Ordinance’) . . . .” See City of Doral

Resolution, 23-4983 (Feb. 8, 2023). This was done two years after the

enactment of the original ordinance and expressly references “former”

officials. Since the ordinance requires eight years of service, the “former”

officials in question would have necessarily served before the act was

passed. This undercuts the City’s interpretation—that all service must occur

after enactment of the initial ordnance.

Likewise, the retirement system’s administrative committee

determines who is vested and eligible to receive pension benefits. This

committee processed the applications of these former officials and

determined that they were eligible to receive benefits. And the former

officials started to receive those benefits. To that end, the committee found

prior service fell within the text of the ordinance.

16
The City claims that this results in a retroactive application of the

ordinance. Not so. This is because “[r]etroactivity ought to be judged with

regard to the act or event that the [ordinance] is meant to regulate.” Scalia

& Garner, supra, at 263. That event here is creation of the retirement

system—not regulation of prior public service. Thus, the ordinance is

prospective in nature. It made law for the future.

B.

Next, the City turns to section 215.425, Florida Statutes. It asserts that

awarding pension benefits to the former officials violates this statute as it is

extra compensation for services already rendered. 3 Yet the former officials

contend that pensions are not “extra compensation.” According to them, only

bonuses and severance payments qualify. We must determine what “extra

compensation” means.

The language of this statute was first found in our 1885 Constitution.

Art. XVI, § 11, Fla. Const. (1885). It provided: “No extra compensation shall

be made to any officer, agent, employee, or contractor after the service shall

have been rendered, or the contract made; nor shall any money be

appropriated or paid on any claim, the subject matter of which shall not have

3
The City further argues on appeal that violation of the statute renders the
ordinance void. Still, that argument was not made below and therefore, not
preserved for appeal. We will not address it in the first instance.

17
been provided for by pre-existing laws, unless such compensation or claim

be allowed by bill passed by two-thirds of the members elected to each

house of the Legislature.” Id.

In 1968, Florida moved several provisions from its Constitution into

general law. Art. XII, § 10, Fla. Const. (1968). This is one such provision.

Kirk v. Brantley, 228 So. 2d 278, 279–80 (Fla. 1969).

While the statute went through a series of amendments, this language

remained largely untouched. See Ch. 79-190, § 27, Laws of Fla.; Ch. 80-

114, § 1, Laws of Fla.; Ch. 84-336, § 35, Laws of Fla.; Ch. 92-90, § 3, Laws

of Fla.; Ch. 92-279, § 83, Laws of Fla.; Ch. 92-326, § 55, Laws of Fla.; Ch.

95-169, § 2, Laws of Fla.; Ch. 98-320, § 5, Laws of Fla.; Ch. 99-259, § 8,

Laws of Fla.; Ch. 2011-143, § 1, Laws of Fla.; Ch. 2012-5, § 24, Laws of Fla.;

Ch. 2014-218, § 44, Laws of Fla. Except for minor grammatical changes,

the only change to this specific language was in 1995 when the Legislature

changed “bill passed” to “a law enacted.” Ch. 95-169, § 2, Laws of Fla.

Accordingly, the present language reads:

No extra compensation shall be made to any officer, agent,
employee, or contractor after the service has been rendered or
the contract made; nor shall any money be appropriated or paid
on any claim the subject matter of which has not been provided
for by preexisting laws, unless such compensation or claim is
allowed by a law enacted by two-thirds of the members elected
to each house of the Legislature.

18
§ 215.425(1), Fla. Stat. (2021). The other provisions address bonuses and

severance pay and nondisclosure agreements. Id. at (2)–(5).

To discern the meaning of language, we must analyze the original

public meaning of the text from when it was adopted. Planned Parenthood

of Sw. & Cent. Fla. v. State, 384 So. 3d 67, 77 (Fla. 2024); City of

Jacksonville v. Cont’l Can Co., 151 So. 488, 489–90 (Fla. 1933). “This

task—to arrive at the terms of the bargain by looking to the meaning ascribed

to the words that embody the deal at the time it was struck—keeps us from

pouring new wine into old wineskins, with predictable results.” Tomlinson v.

State, 369 So. 3d 1142, 1146 (Fla. 2023). But this textual history presents

an interesting question. Which period governs the original public meaning

of the term “extra compensation”: 1885 or 1968?

We believe the 1885 original public meaning controls unless there is

some indication to the contrary. 4 See generally In re Advisory Op. to the

Governor, 112 So. 2d 843, 847 (Fla. 1959) (“[T]he construction of an old

Constitution still applies to a new Constitution if the wording is the same . . .

.”); Swartz v. State, 316 So. 2d 618, 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (“It is generally

presumed that the construction of an old constitution continues to be

4
See generally Nels S.D. Peterson, Principles of Georgia Constitutional
Interpretation, 75 Mercer L. Rev. 1, 12–14 (2023) (discussing the
presumption of constitutional continuity).

19
applicable to a new one if the language is the same . . . .”); Scalia & Garner,

supra, at 78 (“Words must be given the meaning they had when the text was

adopted.”); Jason Mazzone & Cem Tecimer, Interconstitutionalism, 132 Yale

L.J. 326, 339 (2022) (“[M]eaning is fixed at the time a provision first appeared

in a polity’s charter. On this view, evidence from the moment of repetition

matters relatively little.”). And so, we must analyze both time periods here.

i.

To understand the 1885 Constitution, we need to first discuss the 1868

Constitution. In 1867, Congress declared that no legal government existed

in Florida and placed it under military control. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153,

14 Stat. 428 (1867). To be readmitted, Florida was required to establish a

Constitution that conformed to the U.S. Constitution and to adopt the

Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The 1868 Constitution was the result of these

efforts. Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 70, 15 Stat. 73 (1868).

This Constitution centralized authority and gave the Governor

immense power. He was authorized to appoint most state and local officials,

which reduced any local control over county government. Art. V, § 19, Fla.

Const. (1868). This led to intense political opposition, allegations of political

corruption and misuse of public funds, and even attempts to impeach

20
Governor Harrison Reed. 5 See generally Op. of Justices, 12 Fla. 653, 653

(1868); In re Op. of Justices, 14 Fla. 289, 289 (1872).

Our 1885 Constitution was a direct reaction to the 1868 Constitution.

It “created a new system with a weak Governor.” Talbot “Sandy”

D’Alemberte, The 1997-98 Constitution Revision Commission: Reflections

and Commentary from the Commission’s First Chairman, 25 Fla. St. U.L.

Rev. 19, 20 (1997). See also Deborah K. Kearney, The Florida Cabinet in

the Age of Aquarius, 52 Fla. L. Rev. 425, 434 (2000) (“The Constitution of

1885 was a clear response to the carpetbag constitution and its disarming

level of executive power which, to add to the insult of military control, had all

too often been exercised in an incompetent and corrupt manner.”); Thomas

Graham, The First Developers, in The History of Florida 283–84 (Michael

Gannon ed., 1996). It emphasized fiscal responsibility, placing many

restrictions on “fiscal powers.” Manning J. Dauer & William C. Havard, The

5
See also Richard Keith Call, 1868-1872: Pages Concerning the
Impeachment of Governor Harrison Reed, State Archives of Florida, Florida
Memory, https://www.floridamemory.com/items/show/267522 (last visited
May 3, 2026); Letters Relating to the Efforts to Impeach Governor Harrison
Reed During the Reconstruction Era, The Florida Memory Project,
https://web.archive.org/web/20051018171639/http://www.floridamemory.co
m/FloridaHighlights/governorharrison/governorharrison.cfm (last visited
May 2, 2026); Cortez A. M. Ewing, Florida Reconstruction Impeachments: 1.
Impeachment of Governor Harrison, 36 Fla. Hist. Q. no. 4, at 299–318 (Apr.
1958).

21
Florida Constitution of 1885—A Critique, 8 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1955). These

fiscal restrictions are tied to the desire to curb that corruption and safeguard

public funds. See State ex rel. W. v. Gray, 74 So. 2d 114, 117 (Fla. 1954)

(“But it is known that, at that time, the people were just emerging from the

reconstruction period following the War Between the States; they still bore

the scars of the Carpetbag Rule; the memories of the political abuses

suffered thereunder were still fresh in their minds; and we can well surmise

that they intended to prohibit the ‘trafficking’ in public offices, both elective

and appointive, from which they had suffered during that regime.”).

The language in the 1885 Constitution does not specify what qualifies

as “extra compensation.” Art. XVI, § 11, Fla. Const. (1885). At the 1885

Constitutional Convention, it does not appear there was much discussion

about this provision. This section was read and simply passed without

amendment. See Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional

Convention of the State of Florida 370, 452–59, 482 (1885).

Yet this was a common provision in state constitutions of this era. See,

e.g., Art. 4, § 21, Mich. Const. (1850) (“The legislature shall not grant nor

authorize extra compensation to any public officer, agent or contractor, after

the service has been rendered or the contract entered into.”); Art. III, § 28,

N.Y. Const. (1894) (“The Legislature shall not, nor shall the common council

22
of any city, nor any board of supervisors, grant any extra compensation to

any public officer, servant, agent or contractor.”); Art. 3, § 11, Pa. Const.

(1874) (“No bill shall be passed giving any extra compensation to any public

officer, servant, employee, agent or contractor, after services shall have

been rendered or contract made, nor providing for the payment of any claim

against the commonwealth without previous authority of law.”); Art. III, § 30,

S.C. Const. (1895) (“The General Assembly shall never grant extra

compensation, fee or allowance to any public officer, agent, servant or

contractor after service rendered, or contract made, nor authorize payment

or part payment of any claim under any contract not authorized by law; but

appropriations may be made for expenditures in repelling invasion,

preventing or suppressing insurrection.”); Art. III, § 44, Tex. Const. (1876)

(“The Legislature shall provide by law for the compensation of all officers,

servants, agents and public contractors, not provided for in this Constitution,

but shall not grant extra compensation to any officer, agent, servant, or public

contractors, after such public service shall have been performed or contract

entered into, for the performance of the same;”); Art. II, § 25, Wash. Const.

(1889) (“The Legislature shall never grant any extra compensation to any

public officer, agent, servant, or contractor, after the services shall have been

rendered, or the contract entered into, nor shall the compensation of any

23
public officer be increased or diminished during his term of office.”); Art. IV,

§ 26, Wis. Const. (1848) (“The legislature shall never grant any extra

compensation to any public officer, agent, servant, or contractor after the

services shall have been rendered or the contract entered into. Nor shall the

compensation of any public officer be increased or diminished during his

term of office.”). See also Frederic Jesup Stimson, The Law of the Federal

and State Constitutions of the United States, § 214, p. 208 n.4 (1908)

(including list of states’ constitutional provisions). But these states, likewise,

did not have much debate on these provisions. See State ex rel. Thomson

v. Giessel, 53 N.W.2d 726, 734 (Wis. 1952) (Currie, J., dissenting).

There is one exception—Utah. At its constitutional convention in 1895,

the framers discussed that the provision is to prevent public officials and

public contractors from making a low bid or agreeing to a low salary to secure

the position, then afterward seeking more public monies for that service.

Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Utah Convention 890–

94 (1895). One explained,

the office is created by ordinance or by statute, the duties of the
office are defined, the man is elected or appointed to that
position. He enters upon the duties of the office, he agrees to
perform his duties, and after his term has expired or after a
certain period has expired and the work has been done, they
come in and pay him more than his salary or than was provided
by law for him to receive for this service. That is not right, and it
is just to prevent those things that this section is proposed.

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Id. at 892–93. In other words, these individuals should be bound by their

contracts. Id.

Next, we consult era-appropriate dictionaries. Conage v. United

States, 346 So. 3d 594, 599 (Fla. 2022). Our research shows that

dictionaries from that era are generally consistent in how extra and

compensation are defined. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “extra” as

“beyond, except, without, out of, outside.” Extra, Black’s Law Dictionary,

465 (1st ed. 1891). The Universal Dictionary of the English Language

similarly does so. Extra, 2 Universal Dictionary of the English Language

1998 (1898) (“on the outside,” “beyond, further than, except.”). It further

provides: “Beyond what is absolutely necessary; over and above what is

usual; supplemental, additional.” Id.

Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines compensation as “[a] reward for

services rendered.” Compensation, 1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 237 (rev. 6th

ed. 1856). The Universal Dictionary of the English Language states: “(1) Lit.:

That which is given or received as equivalent for services rendered, losses

sustained, sufferings endured, or in payment of a debt; amends,

remuneration, payment, recompense.” Compensation, I Universal

Dictionary of the English Language 1154 (1898). Black’s Law Dictionary also

includes this explanation: “The word also signifies the remuneration or

25
wages given to an employee or officer. But it is not exactly synonymous with

‘salary.’” Compensation, Black’s Law Dictionary 238 (1st ed. 1891). It further

provides: “EXTRA SERVICES, when used with reference to officers, means

services incident to the office in question, but for which compensation has

not been provided by law.” Extra Services, Black’s Law Dictionary 466 (1st

ed. 1891).

Since its initial enactment in 1885, this language has not been often

interpreted. The Florida Supreme Court did not do so until 1930 when it

explained:

An examination of section 11 of article 16 discloses that it applies
only to two classes of claims against the state, viz.: (1) Extra
compensation to officers, agents, employees, or contractors after
the service rendered or the contract made; and (2) claims against
the state, the subject-matter or basis for which were not provided
for or authorized by preexisting law. As to either or both such
claims they can be paid only by an appropriation approved by
two-thirds of the members elected to each house of the
Legislature. Both these classes of claims are personal; the first
for extra compensation on an authorized contract, and the
second for compensation on an unauthorized contract.

Amos v. Mathews, 126 So. 308, 334 (Fla. 1930). See also Crooks v. State

ex rel. Pierce, 194 So. 237, 240 (Fla. 1940).

In 1959, our sister Court addressed whether the constitutional

provision precluded the State from paying the estate of a deceased

employee for leave time accrued before his death. Green v. Galvin, 114 So.

26
2d 187, 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959). It defined “compensation” as “the

equivalent of something else; it is recompense or remuneration for services

as distinguished from a gift or gratuity.” Id. at 189. Keeping this in mind, the

Court held that annual leave provisions were part of the fixed compensation

for employees and became part of their contracts. Id. “This is not ‘extra

compensation’ made after the services are rendered. It is compensation

earned as the services were being rendered but not paid until severance of

the employment contract.” Id.

Based on this text, history, and precedent, we conclude that the 1885

original public meaning of “extra compensation” is additional remuneration

beyond what has been provided by law or contract.

ii.

In 1965, the Legislature created the Florida Constitutional Revision

Commission to conduct a “careful study of the constitution . . . for the purpose

of eliminating obsolete, conflicting and unnecessary provisions as well as for

framing an orderly and properly arranged constitution, based upon economic

and social changes . . . .” Ch. 65-561 (Preamble), Laws of Fla. In a report

prepared for this Commission, the clause at issue was flagged for

consideration. The report inquired whether “the subject matter of present

Section 11 be constitutionalized? If this limitation on the legislature is to be

27
retained, should it not be included in the Legislative Article with omission of

details?” David Dickson, James Craig, Jr., & Albert L. Strum, Issues for State

Constitution Revision, Florida Constitution of 1885 26 (Mar. 1966).

The commission minutes reflect:

Discussion followed on Section 11 of Article XVI, pertaining to
extra compensation claims. The Committee felt that the process
whereby claims were paid by the State was very inadequate.
The members agreed that the intent of this section should be
retained, but that it should be redrafted to enumerate the right of
the Legislature to prescribe the procedures by which claims bills
could be investigated before being recommended for payment.

Const. Revision Comm’n, Comm’n Minutes, Committee Minutes and

Proposals 58, 61 (Feb. 11, 1966). And so, an initial draft moved the provision

to the legislative article. Id. at 76. But we have located no further debate

about removing this provision from the Constitution or discussion as to the

meaning of “extra compensation.”

The Constitutional Revision Commission submitted its report to the

Legislature in January 1967. See Albert L. Strum, The Procedure of State

Constitutional Change - with Special Emphasis on the South and Florida, 5

Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 569, 592 (1977). The Legislature then reworked the

proposal during a special session. Id. The redesignation of the clause to

general law was part of House Joint Resolution No. 1-2X. See H.R.J. Res.

1-2X, 573-574 (Fla. 1968). See also Art. XII, § 10, Fla. Const. (1968).

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Turning to era-appropriate dictionaries, the definitions are consistent

with the prior period. But now, in some dictionaries, “extra compensation” is

a defined term. For instance, Ballentine’s Law Dictionary defines “extra

compensation” as “Compensation over and above that fixed by contract for

work agreed to be done. Money paid out of public funds to a public officer

or servant in excess of his regular salary for performance of services that are

within the scope of his official duties.” Extra Compensation, Ballentine’s Law

Dictionary 445 (3d ed. 1969) (internal citations omitted). Black’s Law

explains: “Within constitutional provision prohibiting Legislature from

granting extra compensation to contractor, is compensation over and above

that fixed by contract for agreed work, and is in nature of gratuity.” Extra

Compensation, Black’s Law Dictionary 697 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Likewise,

“extra services” is “when used with reference to officers, means services

incident to the office in question, but for which compensation has not been

provided by law.” Id.

American Heritage Dictionary defines “extra” as “[m]ore than usual,

expected, etc.; additional.” Extra, American Heritage Dictionary of the

English Language 254 (1968). Compensate is to “recompensate or

reimburse.” Id. at 147. Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary is

similar. It defined “extra” as “more, larger, or better than what is stipulated,

29
normal, expected, necessary, or usual; additional, supplementary; as, extra

compensation.” Extra, Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary of The

English Language, 650 (2d ed. 1968). “Compensation” is “that which is given

or received as an equivalent for services, debt, want, loss, suffering, etc.;

amends; remuneration; recompense.” Id. at 370.

Next, we analyze any subsequent opinions and decisions. Throughout

the 1970s into the 1990s, there was a renewed focus on section 215.425,

Florida Statutes. The Attorney General issued several opinions addressing

different scenarios. See, e.g., Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 75-279 (1975); Op. Att’y

Gen. Fla. 81-98 (1981); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 82-28 (1982); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla.

85-87 (1985); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 86-53 (1986); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 86-102

(1986); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 89-53 (1989); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 97-21 (1997).

Quite a few address providing benefits to someone who has already retired.

See Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 89-53 (1989) (opining purchase of annuity for retiree

constituted extra compensation); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 91-37 (1992) (opining

that providing retiree with monetary value of leave time, contrary to city

system, violated statute); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 92-49 (1992) (opining cost of

living adjustment to someone already retired violated the statute).

Then, in 1997, our sister Court again had the occasion to address the

statute. In Brown v. City of Jacksonville Beach, Brown appealed an order

30
granting the City’s motion for summary judgment, finding his retirement

contract violated section 215.425, Florida Statutes. 696 So. 2d 946, 946

(Fla. 1st DCA 1997). But Brown was still rendering services when the parties

executed the contract providing for additional retirement income. Id. As a

result, the Court held that the contract did not violate the statute. Id.

In the end, the meaning of “extra compensation” during this time

reflects the language maintained the same meaning. See generally

Mazzone & Tecimer, supra, 332 (2022). There is no evidence that a different

meaning was ever intended.

iii.

The original public meaning of “extra compensation” is additional

remuneration beyond what has been provided by law or contract. The term

is not limited to bonuses and severance payments. Instead, it is broader and

encompasses any additional remuneration over and above the amount set

by law or contract.

Taking that original public meaning into account and viewing it within

the context of the statute, this provision prohibits public officers, agents,

employees, and contractors from receiving additional remuneration—over

and above what was contracted for or fixed by law—for services rendered.

Cf. Rawls v. State, 122 So. 222, 222 (Fla. 1929) (“Public officers have no

31
legal claim for official services rendered, except when, and to the extent that,

compensation is provided by law, and when no compensation is so provided,

the rendition of such services is deemed to be gratuitous.”); Hanchey v. State

ex rel. Roberts, 52 So. 2d 429, 432 (Fla. 1951) (“The right of compensation

is an incident to the office as the person holding the office is entitled to its

compensation.”). In other words, it prohibits any additional payment where

the service has already been completed or made by contract.

This broad meaning of “extra compensation” is reinforced by the other

sections of the statute. See Scalia & Garner, supra, at 167. For example,

subsection (2) narrows the scope by excluding certain items, such as

“bonuses or severance pay” and “a clothing and maintenance allowance

given to plain clothes deputies.” § 215.425(2), Fla. Stat. Subsection (4)

provides guidelines for bonus schemes and severance pay. Id. at (4). And,

lastly, subsection (5) states: “Any agreement or contract, executed on or

after July 1, 2011, which involves extra compensation between a unit of

government and an officer, agent, employee, or contractor may not include

provisions that limit the ability of any party to the agreement or contract to

discuss the agreement or contract.” Id. at (5). Collectively, these provisions

imply that “extra compensation” remains permissible so long as it is

negotiated before the service in question has been fully performed.

32
With this in mind, we hold that two former officials—Pete Cabrera and

Juan Carlos Bermudez—do not fall within the statute’s prohibition. Both

were still serving when the initial ordinance was enacted. Their service was

not complete. They retired or left service while the ordinance was in effect.

The pension became part of their compensation—earned as the services

were being rendered and simply paid after that service was complete. As a

result, it was not “extra compensation” made after services were rendered.

Accordingly, section 215.425, Florida Statutes, does not prohibit their

pensions. And so, Cabrera and Bermudez have vested rights in the pension.

But this is not the case for the remaining two officials, Sandra Ruiz,

and Michael DiPietro. They were already retired and no longer serving on

the council at the time of enactment. The pension was created after they

had fully served their terms. It did not become part of their compensation.

Their pensions qualify as “extra compensation . . . made to any officer . . .

after the service has been rendered.” § 215.425(1), Fla. Stat. Thus, their

pensions violate section 215.425, Florida Statutes.

C.

But this does not end our inquiry. The trial court ruled that the City was

equitably estopped from denying benefits. The trial court wrote: “The [City]

cannot now claim that the plan was improperly enacted to erase their

33
financial obligations to Plaintiffs, penalizing only them, all without

consequence. The City’s conduct, as fiduciaries, and the [former officials]

reliance on that conduct, justify the invocation of equitable estoppel to

prevent the City from denying promised benefits.” The City maintains this

was error.

The doctrine of equitable estoppel was an established principle in the

English common law. See 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws

of England 307 (1768); Sir Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England,

Part I, § 667 (10th ed. 1703). Early on, Florida adopted the common law as

its own. See Fla. Terr. Acts 1822, p. 50; Fla. Terr. Acts 1823, p. 111; § 2.01,

Fla. Stat. (1829).

“Estoppel is . . . the preclusion of a person from asserting a fact by

previous conduct inconsistent therewith, on his own part, or the part of those

under whom be claims.” Coogler v. Rogers, 7 So. 391, 394 (Fla. 1889)

(citation omitted). See also State ex rel. Watson v. Gray, 48 So. 2d 84, 87–

88 (Fla. 1950). This doctrine “presupposes a legal shortcoming in a party’s

case that is directly attributable to the opposing party’s misconduct.” Major

League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1077 (Fla. 2001). It “bars the

wrongdoer from asserting that shortcoming and profiting from his or her own

34
misconduct. Equitable estoppel thus functions as a shield, not a sword, and

operates against the wrongdoer, not the victim.” Id.

“In order to demonstrate estoppel, the following elements must be

shown: 1) a representation as to a material fact that is contrary to a later-

asserted position; 2) reliance on that representation; and 3) a change in

position detrimental to the party claiming estoppel, caused by the

representation and reliance thereon.” State Dep’t of Revenue v. Anderson,

403 So. 2d 397, 400 (Fla. 1981). “As a general rule, estoppel will not apply

to mistaken statements of the law, but may be applied to erroneous

representations of fact.” Council Bros., Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 634 So.

2d 264, 266 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (internal citations omitted).

Estoppel will be invoked against the government only in rare and

exceptional circumstances. N. Am. Co. v. Green, 120 So. 2d 603, 610 (Fla.

1959). “Equitable estoppel has been most frequently invoked against

government [entities] in cases in which the government has either made

affirmative representations or knowingly acquiesced in plaintiff’s conduct.”

Associated Indus. Ins. Co., Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Lab. & Emp. Sec., 923 So.

2d 1252, 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). It has been applied in the pension

context. See Branca v. City of Miramar, 634 So. 2d 604, 606 (Fla. 1994);

Kuge v. State, Dep’t of Admin., Div. of Ret., 449 So. 2d 389, 392 (Fla. 3d

35
DCA 1984); Salz v. Dep’t of Admin., Div. of Ret., 432 So. 2d 1376, 1378 (Fla.

3d DCA 1983).

But these cases do not involve a situation where the beneficiary’s

pension violated a state statute. Estoppel simply does not “apply in

transactions that are forbidden by statute or that are contrary to public

policy.” Montsdoca v. Highlands Bank & Tr. Co., 95 So. 666, 668 (Fla. 1923).

See also State ex rel. Schwartz v. City of Hialeah, 156 So. 2d 675, 676 (Fla.

3d DCA 1963). Because “estoppel cannot be applied against a

governmental entity to accomplish an illegal result,” the trial court erred by

applying it to the claims of Sandra Ruiz and Michael DiPietro. Branca, 634

So. 2d at 607. We affirm the trial court’s application of estoppel as to Cabrera

and Bermudez. Id.

IV.

Since Cabrera and Bermudez satisfied the ordinance’s criteria without

violating section 215.425, Florida Statutes, their pension rights vested. For

that reason, the City’s subsequent repeal of the initial ordinance constitutes

an impermissible impairment of vested rights under Article I, Section 10 of

the Florida Constitution. See Whitaker, 86 So. at 250 (“All governmental

powers of the state are subject to the limitations imposed by the [Florida]

Constitution.”). The City is estopped from divesting them of these benefits.

36
Ruiz and DiPietro, however, stand on different footing. They have

acquired no such rights. Their pensions, while consistent with the ordinance,

run afoul of section 215.425, Florida Statutes. One cannot obtain a vested

right in an illegal payment. Because equity will not enforce an illegal act,

equitable estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the City to pay benefits that

the law forbids. So the City is not barred from denying their benefits.

Accordingly, we affirm the final judgment for Cabrera and Bermudez.

We reverse the final judgment for Ruiz and DiPietro.

Reversed in part, Affirmed in part.

37