Miami Beach Healthcare Group, Ltd. v. Robert Bruce Donoway, M.D.

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT

MIAMI BEACH HEALTHCARE GROUP, LTD., et al.,
Appellants,

v.

ROBERT BRUCE DONOWAY, M.D.,
Appellee.

No. 4D2025-3177

[June 24, 2026]

Appeal of a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Michael A. Robinson, Judge; L.T. Case
No. 062024CA014846AXXXCE.

Martin Barry Goldberg, Jonathan Eric Siegelaub, and Clark Sigman
Splichal of Lash Goldberg Fineberg LLP, Miami, for appellants.

David Di Pietro and Lisandra Estevez of Di Pietro Partners, PLLC, Fort
Lauderdale, for appellee.

SHAW, J.

This appeal arises from the circuit court’s denial of the defendants’
motion to transfer. This matter boils down to one issue: where the cause
of action accrued for venue purposes. The parties dispute that location –
the plaintiff says Broward County, where his medical practice is located;
the defendants say Miami-Dade County, where the plaintiff lost his
medical staff privileges. The defendants are correct. For the reasons
discussed more fully below, we reverse the denial of the defendants’ motion
to transfer, and remand for the circuit court to transfer the case to the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County.

I. BACKGROUND

The plaintiff is a surgical oncologist. This litigation arises from the
suspension and eventual revocation of his medical staff privileges at
Aventura Hospital, which occurred after a peer review investigation.
Aventura Hospital is located in Miami-Dade County.
Upon revocation of the plaintiff’s medical privileges, he was no longer
able to perform surgeries for patients at Aventura Hospital. The amended
complaint alleges eight counts, involving injunctive relief to prevent the
hospital from reporting any suspension or revocation of the plaintiff’s
privileges, declaratory relief regarding the hospital’s bylaws and
credentials policy, breach of contract, constructive fraud, and common law
fraud.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

On a motion to transfer for improper venue, “[a] trial court’s factual
decisions . . . are reviewed to determine whether [those decisions] are
supported by competent, substantial evidence or … are clearly erroneous.
The trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.” Drucker v. Duvall,
61 So. 3d 468, 471 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (quoting PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP v. Cedar Res., Inc., 761 So. 2d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)).

III. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to section 47.011, Florida Statutes (2024), actions can be
brought “only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause
of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.” While the
plaintiff bears the initial burden of alleging facts in the complaint sufficient
to support venue, the party contesting venue “has the burden of clearly
proving that the plaintiff’s venue selection is improper.” McDaniel Reserve
Realty Holdings, LLC v. B.S.E. Consultants, Inc., 39 So. 3d 504, 508 (Fla.
4th DCA 2010) (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Nat’l
Bank of Melbourne & Trust Co., 238 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)).
“When a defendant challenges the plaintiff’s chosen venue ‘by filing an
affidavit controverting the plaintiff’s venue allegations, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to establish the propriety of the venue selection.’” Drucker,
61 So. 3d at 471 (quoting Am. Vehicle Ins. Co. v. Goheagan, 35 So. 3d 1001,
1003 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)). If the plaintiff filed the action in the wrong
venue, the court may transfer the case to a county where venue is proper.
See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.060(b).

Here, the parties agree that the dispositive venue question is where the
cause of action accrued. Venue is proper in the plaintiff’s chosen forum
of Broward County only if one of the causes of action in the amended
complaint accrued in that jurisdiction. We find none did. Instead, each
cause of action accrued in Miami-Dade County.

The parties dispute where the tort claims accrued, though they agree
the remaining claims accrued in Miami-Dade County. “For purposes of

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venue, a tort claim is deemed to have accrued ‘where the last event
necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place.’ Stated
another way, a tort accrues in the county where the plaintiff first suffers
injury.” Drucker, 61 So. 3d at 471 (quoting McDaniel, 39 So. 3d at 509).
The defendants argue that Miami-Dade County is the proper venue
because the alleged torts center around the plaintiff’s loss of his medical
staff privileges at Aventura Hospital, following a peer review investigation
at that hospital. The plaintiff contends that Broward County is the proper
venue because the actual injury alleged is not the loss of hospital privileges
in Miami-Dade County, but the economic and professional damage that
followed—lost income, lost patients, and damage to his medical practice in
Broward County.

We have reviewed the amended complaint. Ultimately, the allegations
establish that the plaintiff’s injuries stem from the hospital’s investigation
of the plaintiff’s treatment of his patients at the hospital, the peer review
process that followed at the hospital, and the eventual revocation of his
privileges at the hospital, when the alleged tortious conduct was complete.

All this conduct occurred in Miami-Dade County. In challenging the
plaintiff’s venue choice, the defendants presented the affidavit of David
LeMonte, Aventura Hospital’s CEO (the “LeMonte Declaration”). Therein,
LeMonte stated that given his firsthand knowledge of the peer review
process involving the plaintiff and the allegations included in the amended
complaint, he could attest that all the events triggering the peer review
process, and all aspects of the process itself, occurred exclusively at the
hospital in Miami-Dade County. LeMonte further attested that the
initiation, investigations, decisions, attendant activities, and hearing
related to the peer review process involving the plaintiff occurred at the
hospital in Miami-Dade County. Notably, the plaintiff did not submit any
evidence, nor testify at the hearing, on the motion to transfer. The record
is devoid of any facts that would refute the LeMonte Declaration.

Accordingly, we find that the tort claims accrued in Miami-Dade
County. See Fontana v. Hugo Int’l, Inc., 781 So. 2d 433, 435 (Fla. 3d DCA
2001) (“The alleged overt tortious acts were all committed in California.
The tortious conduct was complete at that time. The fact that Hugo
suffered loss of income in its headquarters in Miami–Dade County is
immaterial.”). The circuit court erred in finding connections to Broward
that would support venue in that jurisdiction.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s order denying
the motion to transfer. We remand with instructions for the circuit court
to transfer this case to the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade
County.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

CONNER and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.

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