Robinson v. State

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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 12, 2025

S25A0783. ROBINSON v. THE STATE.

PETERSON, Chief Justice.

Yohansea Yusef Robinson appeals from the denial of his motion

to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that his plea was not knowing

or voluntary because he suffered a seizure about an hour before the

plea colloquy. The record evidence supports the trial court’s

conclusion that at the time Robinson entered his plea, he did so

freely and with a full understanding of the nature of the charges

against him and the consequences of his plea. We affirm.

According to the factual basis presented by the State at the

plea hearing, Robinson was driving a car on a highway with Felicia

Putney as his passenger. A police officer noticed Robinson driving

erratically and attempted to initiate a traffic stop. Robinson led the

police on a high-speed chase, traveling at speeds more than 100
miles per hour, exiting and entering the highway multiple times,

and driving through a red light. As he drove through one

intersection, Robinson lost control of the vehicle and crashed into a

utility pole, splitting his car in two. The passenger side continued

traveling across the highway and crashed into another vehicle.

Putney was ejected from the car and died.

Robinson was charged with two counts of felony murder

predicated on fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer (Counts

1 and 3), two counts of fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer

(Counts 2 and 4), homicide by vehicle in the first degree (Count 5),

criminal damage to property in the first degree (Count 6), driving

while license suspended (Count 7), reckless driving (Count 8),

speeding (Count 8), improper driving on divided highway (Count 10),

and disregarding traffic control device (Count 11). Prior to trial, the

State filed a notice of evidence in aggravation of sentence, as well as

notice of its intent to seek a recidivist sentence of life without the

possibility of parole.

According to plea counsel, on the day Robinson’s trial was

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scheduled to begin, Robinson informed counsel that he did not want

to go to trial and was willing to plead guilty if the State withdrew

the recidivist notice and would agree to a life sentence with the

possibility of parole. The State announced to the court that it had

agreed to withdraw the recidivist notice, move to nolle pross Counts

2-4 and 7-11, and recommend a life sentence on Count 1 and

concurrent sentences on Counts 5 and 6, if Robinson pleaded guilty

to those counts. At the start of the plea colloquy, Robinson stated

under oath that he heard and understood the court. When asked if

he was under the influence of any medication, drugs, or alcohol,

Robinson responded that he took “Keppra for petit mal seizures,” but

confirmed that he understood what was happening. During the plea

colloquy, Robinson also confirmed that he had had sufficient time to

review his case with plea counsel; he was satisfied with counsel’s

performance; no one had threatened or coerced him into pleading

guilty; he was aware of the maximum sentences for the relevant

counts; he was aware of the rights he would be waiving by pleading

guilty; and he was entering into the plea freely and voluntarily.

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The trial court accepted Robinson’s plea and sentenced him to life in

prison with the possibility of parole on Count 1, a 15-year concurrent

term in prison on Count 5, and a 10-year concurrent term in prison

on Count 6.

Represented by new counsel, Robinson moved to withdraw his

plea, arguing that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently entered based on Robinson having had a seizure on the

day he entered his plea. 1 At the hearing on the motion, plea counsel

testified as follows. In preparing for trial, Robinson had informed

plea counsel of his seizure disorder and provided medical

documentation in support. Robinson indicated that he wanted his

seizure disorder to be a part of his defense, but after having his

records reviewed by a medical expert, plea counsel did not believe

this was a viable defense because it was “unlikely he would be able

to bob and weave out of traffic in excess of 100 miles an hour” if he

had been experiencing a seizure.

1 Although Robinson raised several grounds in his motion, new counsel

stated that he was pursuing only the knowing and voluntary claim.
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Plea counsel did not observe Robinson have any seizures until

the day he entered his guilty plea. She stated that while she was

reviewing the waiver-of-rights form with Robinson in advance of his

guilty plea, he “kind of froze” with his head down and arms limp at

his sides. Robinson remained in this state for about two minutes

before he “seemed to kind of come back” and began to speak slowly.

Robinson told counsel that the “freezing” incident was consistent

with the seizures he experienced. Plea counsel informed the district

attorney and the judge about the incident. As a result of working in

mental health courts, plea counsel said she knew she had to orient

Robinson by asking a series of questions to ensure that he was “there

and aware of what [he was] doing.” After about an hour of orienting

Robinson as to time and place, plea counsel felt comfortable

continuing with the review of the waiver of rights form because

Robinson appeared to be okay.

During that review, plea counsel did not observe any signs that

Robinson did not understand all the rights that were discussed, and

she stated that she would not have completed the plea paperwork

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with Robinson or submitted it if she did not believe he understood

his rights or understood what he was doing. Plea counsel also said

that Robinson was coherent and appeared to understand everything

during the plea colloquy and that he did not indicate he had any

issues understanding the court. Plea counsel said that she would

have intervened if she had any doubts in this respect.

Robinson also testified at the hearing, generally describing his

history of seizures. Robinson said that he did not remember having

had a seizure on the day of his plea hearing. He said he learned

about it from another inmate who was in the courtroom and had

witnessed the events. Robinson stated that plea counsel’s

description was consistent with some of his seizures. He

acknowledged answering questions during the plea proceeding, but

did not recall details of the proceeding and testified that he had not

known that he was pleading guilty. Robinson said that he asked

counsel to withdraw his plea after he learned he had a seizure

during the proceeding.

After the hearing, the trial court denied Robinson’s motion to

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withdraw his plea. Although the court suggested some skepticism

as to whether Robinson actually had a seizure, 2 it nevertheless

credited plea counsel’s testimony that Robinson recovered from the

claimed seizure and appeared to understand what he was doing

during the colloquy. It also referred to the transcript of the plea

colloquy, which demonstrated that Robinson understood the nature

of the proceeding and the consequences for pleading guilty. The

court further found that Robinson’s testimony regarding his plea

was not credible and was inconsistent with plea counsel’s testimony

and with his own testimony during the plea colloquy.

1. On appeal, Robinson argues that the trial court erred in

denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the record

shows that he suffered a seizure about an hour before pleading

guilty. We see no error in the trial court’s denial of his motion.

2 Plea counsel stated that she was not sure that Robinson actually had a

seizure that day and felt like he may have been “faking” it. She then qualified
her opinion, stating that she was not a seizure expert, the symptoms she saw
were not the type of seizure symptoms she had experience with, and she may
have been thinking of grand mal seizures instead of the petit mal seizures
Robinson indicated he experienced.

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“After sentencing, the decision on a motion to withdraw a

guilty plea is within the trial court’s discretion, and withdrawal of

the plea is allowed only when necessary to correct a manifest

injustice.” Powell v. State, 309 Ga. 523, 524 (2020). Although what

constitutes a manifest injustice will vary from case to case, it exists

when, for example, “the guilty plea was entered involuntarily or

without an understanding of the nature of the charges.” Id. (citation

and punctuation omitted).

When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea on the basis

that it was not knowing and voluntary, the State bears the burden

of showing that it was knowing and voluntary based on the record.

See Johnson v. State, 303 Ga. 704, 706–07 (2018). “To determine

whether a guilty plea is valid, the record must show that the

defendant understood the plea, the nature of the charges, and the

constitutional rights that he is relinquishing.” Powell, 309 Ga. at 524

(1) (citations omitted). When reviewing a trial court’s determination

that a defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary, we accept the

court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, defer to its

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credibility determinations, and review its ultimate conclusion de

novo. See Harris v. State, 319 Ga. 133, 137 (2024); Powell, 309 Ga.

at 524–25 (1).

Robinson challenges the trial court’s skepticism that he

actually suffered a seizure. But despite its doubts, the trial court did

not base its determination on that skepticism. Instead, the trial

court focused on Robinson’s behavior and condition at the time of the

colloquy, which was about an hour after the seizure. The record from

the plea hearing and testimony from his plea counsel show that

Robinson understood everything that was going on during the

colloquy. He confirmed under oath that he understood his rights, the

nature of the charges, and the consequences of pleading guilty. He

also stated that no one pressured or coerced him into pleading guilty.

Despite his testimony at the motion to withdraw hearing that he did

not know he was pleading guilty, the trial court was not required to

find him credible.

Robinson recognizes that the record shows that he answered

questions appropriately during the plea colloquy, but argues that

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the record “is just a cold, hard transcript.” True enough, but our

review on appeal is necessarily limited to the record on appeal,

which is why we afford so much deference to the trial court’s findings

of fact and credibility determinations. See State v. Franklin, 318 Ga.

39, 39 (2024) (it is the “prerogative of the trial court to resolve

disputes of material fact”); State v. Abbott, 303 Ga. 297, 302 (2018)

(“[W]e [generally] owe substantial deference to the way in which the

trial court resolved disputed questions of material fact[.]”); see also

Damani v. State, 284 Ga. 372, 373 (2008) (“If an appellate court is to

review and correct any enumerated errors, it must do so based on

the record sent from the trial court[.]”). And that record belies

Robinson’s claim that his plea was not knowing or voluntary.

Robinson alternatively argues that the better practice would

have been to secure a doctor to examine him before continuing with

the guilty plea. Robinson points to no legal authority mandating this

practice. More importantly, the trial court credited the testimony of

plea counsel, who said that Robinson appeared fine and she would

not have proceeded with the plea had she thought otherwise. The

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failure to obtain a medical consultation, by itself, does not upset the

trial court’s conclusion that Robinson was aware of the consequences

of his plea and voluntarily pled guilty. The trial court therefore did

not err in denying Robinson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

2. Although not raised by Robinson, in our review of his appeal,

we noticed a sentencing error with respect to Count 5, which charged

him with vehicular homicide, that harms Robinson and should be

corrected. See Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 696–98 (2017) (this Court

has the authority to sua sponte correct merger errors and that

authority is most commonly exercised with errors that harm a

defendant). Count 5 was vacated as a matter of law as a result of his

felony murder conviction on Count 1, because it involved the same

single homicide victim. See Diamond v. State, 267 Ga. 249, 251

(1996) (because the defendant was convicted of felony murder, the

vehicular homicide count had to be vacated; a defendant “can be

convicted only once for the death of each victim”); see also Starks v.

State, 320 Ga. 300, 306 (2024). We therefore vacate the sentence on

Count 5. Because Robinson’s sentence was otherwise proper, we

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need not remand this case to the trial court for resentencing. See

Atkinson v. State, 301 Ga. 518, 521 (2017).

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. All the Justices
concur, except Land, J., not participating.

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