Lewis v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: September 30, 2025

S25A0776. LEWIS v. THE STATE.

LAGRUA, Justice.

Appellant Dwight Lewis challenges his convictions for malice

murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of

Keosha Tinch. 1 Lewis contends that the evidence was legally

1 The crimes occurred on February 2, 2017. On November 14, 2017, a

Fulton County grand jury indicted Lewis for malice murder (Count 1), six
counts of felony murder (Counts 2-7), four counts of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon (Counts 8-11), criminal damage to property (Count 12),
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 13), and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 14). At a trial from
November 5 to 8, 2018, the jury found Lewis guilty of all charges. The trial
court sentenced Lewis to life in prison with the possibility of parole for malice
murder, plus a consecutive term of 25 years in prison. Specifically, the trial
court sentenced Lewis to 20 years in prison on three of the aggravated assault
counts, with Count 9 running consecutively to Count 1, and Counts 10 and 11
running concurrently with Count 9; a consecutive term of five years for
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; and a concurrent
term of five years for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The felony
murder verdicts were vacated by operation of law, and one aggravated assault
count (Count 8) merged with the malice murder conviction. Lewis filed a timely
motion for new trial, which he twice amended through new counsel. After an
evidentiary hearing on July 9, 2024, the trial court entered an order denying
insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court plainly

erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of voluntary

manslaughter. However, the evidence was very strong and included

testimony from an eyewitness who knew Lewis. Additionally, there

can be no plain error for the trial court’s failure to charge on a lesser

offense without a written request. Accordingly, Lewis’s claims fail,

and we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence

presented at trial showed that late in the evening of February 1,

2017, and into the morning of February 2, Lewis argued several

times with his former girlfriend, Dyreaka Tucker, about childcare

for their two children. A security guard in the apartment complex

where Tucker lived was familiar with Tucker and saw her frequently

with Lewis, whom he believed to be Tucker’s boyfriend. Around

midnight on February 1, the security guard observed Lewis and

Tucker arguing and asked Tucker if she was “okay.” Tucker said she

the motion on October 31, 2024. Lewis filed a timely notice of appeal, and the
case was docketed in this Court to the April 2025 term and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
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was fine. About 15 minutes later, the security guard saw Lewis and

Tucker arguing again and asked her, “You sure everything okay?”

Tucker said loudly, “I keep telling him I don’t want to be with him

anymore.” Lewis asked her to repeat what she said, and when she

did, Lewis responded, “Okay, I got something for you.” About 30

minutes later, as Tucker got into the backseat of a car to go out with

friends, she said, in a laughing manner, that her “baby daddy” or

“boyfriend” “say he was going to kill me.” Tucker was in the backseat

with the victim, Tinch. In the front seat were two men, Mark

Caldwell and Bara Samb. As Samb started to back out of the parking

space, Lewis walked to the front of the car with a handgun and

began shooting. Tinch was struck in the head by a single bullet and

died immediately as a result. Tucker jumped out of the car and

began running. As she approached the security guard, who had

heard the shots, she yelled, “He’s trying to kill me! He’s trying to kill

me!” After Tucker said the shooter was “Dwight,” the security guard

asked whether it was her “boyfriend,” and Tucker said, “Yeah!

Yeah!”

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Tucker was not questioned by officers at the scene, but she

spoke to officers on February 2. In her statement to officers, Tucker

initially said she did not know who the shooter was. However, she

later identified Lewis as the man who shot into the car, and on a

photo of Lewis provided by the officers, she wrote “Walk in front of

the car with gun fired a shot” and then wrote under that statement

and next to Lewis’s picture, “D. Lewis.” She also told the officers that

Lewis had choked her and slammed her on a car and that these

actions were witnessed by the security guard, but at trial, she

admitted this allegation was not true.

Sometime later, Tucker made a post on Instagram, stating,

“These … Tryna Act Like Im Just a Big Ole Snitch But Why Would

You shoot At A Car Wit 4 Innocent People In It.. [wondering emoji]?

All Because I Left You Alone!!” She added the comment, “This A Free

World I Can Go Wherever Whenever And I Was Cool Wit Them

Folks Now I Gotta Be Beefing With Folks All Over Atlanta All

Because A [person] Was In His Feelings.” A friend of Lewis’s

responded on the same post, “Man if u don’t f**kin delete this s**t

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NOW!!” Another friend of Lewis’s commented, “Snitch ass hoe.” In

her next post, Tucker wrote, “And When It Comes To That Dwight

Situation I Promise You That’s Something You Do Not Wanna Talk

About … I’ll Show You A Police Now Keep Talking [police officer

emoji]!!” Also on that post, Tucker “tagged” a friend of Lewis’s and

commented, “YOU WANNA GIVE INSTAGRAM A SHOW OR

WHAT [wondering emoji] ??”

On August 3, 2017, Lewis was apprehended on a fugitive

warrant in Detroit, Michigan, and gave a false name and false

birthdate to the law enforcement officer. When the information he

provided to the officer came back as “no record,” the officer asked

Lewis if he would be willing to submit to a digital fingerprint

analysis. Lewis responded, “You guys got me,” and after his identity

was established through the fingerprint analysis, he stated that he

“knew this day was coming.” Lewis did not have a weapon on him at

the time of his arrest, and the murder weapon was never located.

After Lewis was arrested, Tucker began communicating with

him on a weekly basis. In late August 2017, Tucker posted photos of

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herself and Lewis smiling and embracing, with the comment,

“What’s Understood Ain’t Be Explained” and the “hashtags” “MCM”

and “Faeva,” which Tucker explained meant “Male Crush Monday”

and “Forever.” In early October 2017, Tucker posted a photo of a

computer screen showing Lewis on the telephone with her while he

was in jail, with the comment “Date Wit Her Twin/Boyfriend” and

the “hashtag,” “Free Him,” which Tucker testified referred to Lewis.

A few weeks later, Tucker posted a screenshot from a video of herself

and Lewis, in which Lewis said, “She never gone leave me y’all.” She

added the comment “Its Deeper Than Y’all Think [five heart

emojis].” In January and April 2018, Tucker wrote two notes

addressed, “To whom it may concern,” stating that Lewis had

nothing to do with the shooting.

In her trial testimony, Tucker first claimed that she did not

remember the shooting, testifying only that Lewis was “outside the

car.” As the State’s direct examination continued, the prosecutor

asked, “Who shot into the car with four people?,” and Tucker

responded, “Dwight.” As the direct examination continued, Tucker

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testified that she saw Lewis with a gun in his hand when he came

up to the car she was in, although she also said she did not see who

was shooting. She also explained that she wrote the notes absolving

Lewis of responsibility because “I was being threatened by people off

social media and the streets and I got kids and I don’t have time for

that.” Still later in her testimony, Tucker said that she did not see

the face of the shooter; that she lied and said it was Lewis because

she was mad at him; and that she lied in her testimony on direct

when she said Lewis was the shooter.

1. Lewis contends that the evidence was not sufficient as a

matter of constitutional due process to support his convictions under

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 319 (1979). Specifically, he argues

that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was

the shooter because Tucker’s testimony identifying him as the

shooter was not corroborated. He also argues that, because Tucker

provided inconsistent statements, “a reasonable jury should not

have been able to credit her testimony.”

As an initial matter, corroboration of an eyewitness’s testimony

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is not a requirement to sustain a conviction as a matter of federal

due process. See Sims v. State, 321 Ga. 627, 631 (2025). When we

evaluate “a due process challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,

we view the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable

to the verdicts and ask whether any rational trier of fact could have

found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes

of which he was convicted.” Shellman v. State, 318 Ga. 71, 74 (2024)

(cleaned up). And “[w]e defer to the jury’s resolution of any conflicts

in the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and the drawing of

reasonable inferences from the facts.” Hooks v. State, 318 Ga. 850,

852 (2024). See also Ridley v. State, 315 Ga. 452, 455 (2023) (“In

[assessing the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence], we do not

evaluate witness credibility, resolve inconsistencies in the evidence,

or assess the weight of the evidence; these tasks are left to the sole

discretion of the jury.”).

As set forth above, in statements to the security guard and

police and in her trial testimony, Tucker identified Lewis as the

shooter. The jury was authorized to credit her identifications of

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Lewis as the shooter and to reject her claims that she did not see

who the shooter was and that she lied about identifying him. See

Agee v. State, 311 Ga. 340, 343 (2021) (holding that the jury was

authorized to credit witnesses’ inculpatory statements over their

recantations). The fact that a jury resolves the conflicts in the

evidence or the credibility of the witnesses adversely to the

appellant does not render the evidence insufficient. See id. See also

OCGA § 24-14-8 (“The testimony of a single witness is generally

sufficient to establish a fact.”).

In addition to Tucker’s statements and testimony, the jury

heard the security guard’s testimony that he observed Lewis and

Tucker arguing, with Lewis threatening that he “had something for

her,” as well as Caldwell’s and Samb’s testimony that Tucker said

her “baby daddy” or “boyfriend” threatened to kill her. Additionally,

the testimony about Lewis’s flight — that Lewis fled to Detroit after

the shooting and gave a false name when he was arrested — was

further evidence of his guilt. See Harris v. State, 313 Ga. 225, 231

(2022) (explaining that it is “universally conceded that the fact of an

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accused’s flight, … assumption of a false name, and related conduct,

are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt

itself”). Thus, when properly viewed in the light most favorable to

the verdicts, the evidence presented at trial and summarized above

was sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to authorize

a rational jury to find Lewis guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the

crimes for which he was convicted. See Ivory v. State, ___ Ga. ___,

____ (2025), S250862, slip op. at 6-7 (Ga. Aug. 12, 2025) (concluding

that evidence was sufficient despite appellant’s challenges to the

credibility of eyewitnesses who identified him as one of two

perpetrators of the home invasion, robbery, and murder).

2. Next, Lewis argues, while acknowledging that he did not

request a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser

offense of malice murder, that the trial court committed plain error

by failing to instruct the jury on that lesser offense. To establish

plain error, an appellant must show that “(1) the alleged error was

not affirmatively waived, (2) it was obvious beyond reasonable

dispute, and (3) it affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which

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ordinarily means showing that it affected the outcome of the trial.”

Whittaker v. State, 317 Ga. 127, 133 (2023) (quotation marks

omitted). If the appellant establishes these three prerequisites, we

have “the discretion to remedy the error only if the error seriously

affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Lewis’s claim fails the

plain error test because “the failure to charge on a lesser crime than

the crime included in the indictment, without a written request by

the State or the accused, is not error.” Wipfel v. State, 320 Ga. 84, 91

(2024) (cleaned up). Because Lewis did not submit a written request

to charge on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter, he cannot

demonstrate legal error in the trial court’s failure to sua sponte give

such a charge, and thus the claim of plain error fails. See id.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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