Gravitt v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: October 21, 2025

S25A0633. GRAVITT v. THE STATE.

COLVIN, Justice.

Appellant Cameron Marshall Gravitt was charged with malice

murder and other crimes in relation to the stabbing death of Glenn

Fraser. At trial, Appellant conceded through counsel that he killed

Fraser, but argued that the jury should find him not guilty by reason

of insanity. The jury instead found him guilty but mentally ill of

malice murder and guilty of possession of a knife during the

commission of a felony. 1 On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial

1 The crimes occurred on August 31, 2021. On December 8, 2021, a
Catoosa County grand jury returned a four-count indictment, charging
Appellant with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), aggravated
assault (Count 3), and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony
(Count 4). Following a trial from March 20 to March 24, 2023, a jury found
Appellant guilty but mentally ill of malice murder, felony murder, and
aggravated assault, and guilty of possession of a knife during the commission
of a felony. On March 27, 2023, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life with
court erred by admitting into evidence his statement to law

enforcement officers, which Appellant made while receiving

treatment at Highland Rivers, a behavioral health facility in Dalton.

Appellant further argues that the trial court erred by refusing to

give several jury instructions requested by Appellant’s trial counsel

relating to Appellant’s insanity defense. As explained below,

Appellant’s arguments fail, and we accordingly affirm his

convictions.

1. (a) The evidence presented at trial showed the following. On

August 31, 2021, Appellant reported for his shift at a metal

fabrication shop in Ringgold. “[A] little before” 7:00 a.m., his

supervisor arrived and observed Appellant “texting ... or playing

with his phone.” When his supervisor asked Appellant to get to

the possibility of parole for Count 1 (malice murder), vacated Count 2 (felony
murder) by operation of law, and merged Count 3 (aggravated assault) into
Count 1. The court further sentenced Appellant to five years in prison for
Count 4 (possession of a knife during the commission of a felony), to run
consecutively to his sentence for Count 1. Appellant filed a timely motion for
new trial on April 13, 2023, which he amended through new counsel on October
8, 2024. On October 9, 2024, the trial court heard Appellant’s motion, which it
denied by written order entered on November 6, 2024. Appellant timely
appealed to this Court on December 2, 2024. His appeal was docketed to this
Court’s April 2025 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
2
work, Appellant told his supervisor that he needed to download

“CashApp” to send money to someone Appellant claimed not to

know. When it became clear that Appellant would not resume his

work tasks, the supervisor told him to punch out, finish his personal

business, and then return to work. Appellant agreed. According to

the supervisor, Appellant did not look up from his phone during

their conversation.

Security camera footage, which was entered into evidence and

played for the jury, showed that Appellant clocked out at 7:23 a.m.,

but remained at the shop for approximately 45 more minutes.

During that time, he went outside and began pressing buttons on

the shop’s burglar alarm. He also entered a co-worker’s car without

permission, where he sat until his supervisor told him to get out.

Security footage shows that Appellant later got into his Black Chevy

S10 pickup truck and exited the parking lot at approximately 8:09

a.m.

There were no eye-witness accounts of Appellant’s activities

from the time he left work until about 1:00 p.m., when he entered a

3
local bank, but it is undisputed on appeal that at some point during

this time Appellant traveled to Fraser’s office and stabbed him to

death.

According to a teller at the bank, Appellant was wearing a

black shirt, a black hat, “dark pants that looked like they had grease

stains on them,” and had a pocketknife. She further testified that

Appellant did not have an account with the bank; that he “was very

fidgety,” and “confused”; that he was mumbling and not talking in

complete sentences; that he kept pulling out his phone, looking at it,

and returning it to his back pocket; and that he did not appear to

know what he was doing there. When Appellant told her that “the

voices in his head had told him to come in” and that “they were

yelling at him and calling him really bad names,” the teller

expressed her sympathy, gave him a credit card application to fill

out, and asked him to go to his truck and complete it.

When Appellant went to the parking lot, the teller “flipped the

switch” that locked the doors and called 911. The teller observed

Appellant pace outside before getting into his truck. According to the

4
teller, Appellant then “backed up and pulled back in the parking

spot probably three times before he finally pulled out and went to

leave[.]”

Captain Bryan Goresh of the Ringgold Police Department

arrived while this was happening. Captain Goresh followed

Appellant’s vehicle out of the parking lot, and when Appellant later

turned without using a turn signal, Captain Goresh initiated a

traffic stop.

Captain Goresh’s dashboard camera and body-worn camera

recorded the traffic stop. The footage from those cameras was

entered into evidence and played for the jury. The footage from

Captain Goresh’s body-worn camera shows that after initiating the

stop, Captain Goresh informed Appellant that he had pulled

Appellant over both because he had failed to use a turn signal and

because Captain Goresh had received a call that made him

“concerned about [Appellant’s] health.” Captain Goresh then ran

Appellant’s driver’s license, which was from Tennessee, and asked

him to step outside because, as Captain Goresh noted audibly on the

5
recording, Appellant had a knife on his person and there appeared

to be another knife in his vehicle. Appellant agreed to step out, and

Captain Goresh patted him down with his consent.

Captain Goresh then asked Appellant whether he had been

hearing any voices. Appellant responded affirmatively but said “no”

when Captain Goresh asked him if he “want[ed] to get checked out.”

Captain Goresh then asked Appellant about his driver’s license,

which Appellant admitted was not currently valid. Captain Goresh

stated that they had “to solve this issue one of two ways.” Captain

Goresh explained that Appellant could go to the hospital, which

Captain Goresh characterized as “the better option,” if Appellant

needed “help” and “stability.” But “if not,” Captain Goresh

explained, “I’ve kind of got this license issue.”

Appellant agreed to go to the hospital, and an ambulance was

called to take him. As Appellant and Captain Goresh waited for the

ambulance, they continued to converse, and Appellant explained

that he was “good with numbers”; that they “come together”; and

that he could “see patterns” in them. In response to Captain

6
Goresh’s questions, Appellant explained that he had started hearing

voices “recently,” and that certain words and numbers just “st[u]ck

out” to him. Appellant was subsequently taken to CHI Memorial

Hospital (“CHI Memorial”) in Chattanooga, Tennessee.

According to the testimony of a deputy who assisted in the

traffic stop, “both sides of [Appellant’s] pants were stained.” The

deputy testified that “one leg” had “what appeared to be a blood

stain,” but that the deputy “didn’t know that for sure at the time.”

Later that afternoon, Detective Chris Lyons of the Catoosa

County Sheriff’s Office responded to a call about a stabbing at a

small, one-story office building with three or four offices that could

each be entered directly from the parking lot. When Detective Lyons

arrived, he found Fraser deceased in his office. Fraser’s subsequent

autopsy revealed multiple stab wounds to his neck and torso

consistent with a non-serrated blade, as well as defensive injuries to

his right hand.

A breakthrough in the investigation occurred when a patrol

officer told Detective Lyons about Appellant’s incident at the bank

7
and his subsequent traffic stop. Detective Lyons tasked Detectives

Josh Moore, J.C. Cunningham, and Brittany Gilleland with

investigating this lead.

Officers obtained a search warrant for Appellant’s truck, which

was initially stored in a private tow-yard before being brought into

a police impound lot. A search of Appellant’s vehicle revealed several

knives, including one that tested positive for blood; hypodermic

needles; a glass pipe; and multiple liquor bottles.

Officers also obtained search warrants for Appellant’s DNA

and the clothes he was wearing on the day of the killing. Detectives

learned that Appellant had been transported to Highland Rivers, a

behavioral health facility, and they traveled there to execute the

warrants.

(b) When the detectives arrived at Highland Rivers on

September 3, 2021, they informed the staff that they wanted to

question Appellant, and the staff provided an intake room for them.

The detectives went into the room first, and Appellant was then

brought in by the facility’s staff.

8
During the interview, an audio-recording of which was entered

into evidence and played for the jury, Appellant told detectives that

he had “recently” begun hearing a male voice and a female voice.

Appellant described the female voice as “real nice,” but the male

voice was “an a**hole.” Appellant also explained that there are “two

different types of people.” Some are “regular, normal human beings.”

But others, who Appellant sometimes referred to as “draco,” are

“reptilian” and “have the ability to shapeshift and change their

skin.” According to Appellant, some normal humans, like him, have

the ability to tell who is a draco and who is not. Appellant told the

detectives that some of the draco were “doing bad” and were

“actually the ones that are putting the . . . COVID virus . . . into the

drinking water supply using bottled water[.]”

According to Appellant, the voices in his mind told him “to head

[a] certain way;” he followed those instructions; and he “met with”

someone, but he was “not sure if [he was] supposed to talk about it.”

Appellant explained that he was not sure if it was “going to implicate

[him]” and if the detectives were “part of the group that knows[.]”

9
After some additional questions, Appellant relayed that the voices

told him to “kill a certain person that was a pedophile” and a

“cannibal[ ].”

According to Appellant, the voices told him “where to go” to find

this man, whose name he did not know. When Appellant found him,

Appellant “took [a knife] and stuck it in his side” and then “into the

side of his neck and drug it across that way and let him bleed out

some for everything.”

Appellant said that he “felt normal” afterwards, and that “[i]t

didn’t affect [him] in any other way. It felt like [he] did something

that [he] had to do.” After killing the man, Appellant “just left.” The

voices told him that he was “supposed to go do another one” and he

“was going to do it,” but he “started struggling with that because it

was [his] first time.”

At this point in the interview, Detective Gilleland indicated to

a stain on Appellant’s pants, which were the same pair that he had

been wearing on the day of the killing, and initiated the following

exchange:

10
Detective Gilleland: What’s that? Him?
Appellant: Yeah.
Detective Gilleland: His blood?
Appellant: Yeah.

Based on Appellant’s responses during the interview, the

detectives determined that they had probable cause to arrest him.

Shortly after the exchange above, which occurred about 35 minutes

into the interview, Appellant was given a Miranda warning, he

invoked his right to an attorney, and the interview concluded.

Detective Gilleland then executed the search warrant for

Appellant’s clothes, which were collected. Subsequent testing

confirmed that the blood on Appellant’s pants matched Fraser’s

DNA. At no point in the investigation did law enforcement find any

evidence suggesting that Appellant and Fraser had met or knew of

each other prior to the killing, and it is undisputed that there had

never been any prior interaction between them.

(c) Three expert psychologists testified at trial regarding

Appellant’s mental state at the time of the crimes. Dr. Michael

Vitacco testified for the State; Dr. Robert Shaffer testified on behalf

11
of the defense; and Dr. Samuel Perri was appointed as a witness by

the trial court.

Dr. Vitacco testified that he reviewed Appellant’s records from

CHI Memorial and that lab results showed that Appellant had

tested positive for marijuana and amphetamines. According to Dr.

Vitacco, the records also showed that the hospital had diagnosed

Appellant with “drug induced psychosis.”

As part of his evaluation, Dr. Vitacco interviewed Appellant

while Appellant was awaiting trial in jail. According to Dr. Vitacco,

Appellant revealed during their interview that he had been injecting

himself with methamphetamine for several months prior to the

incident, including on the morning of the killing. Dr. Vitacco

testified that Appellant reported he had started experiencing

“perceptual disturbances” during the weekend before the killing,

including hearing voices that later told him to leave work and gave

him directions via his phone to find Fraser. Appellant further

reported to Dr. Vitacco that he was hearing voices at the time he

“confronted Mr. Fraser in the office and ended up stabbing” him.

12
According to Dr. Vitacco’s recounting of his interview, the voices told

Appellant “to go somewhere else, that he was going to do this again,”

but, at that point, Appellant “realized he shouldn’t” and “that it was

wrong,” and he went to the bank instead. Appellant reported to Dr.

Vitacco that when he was subsequently pulled over by police, “he

was going to ... tell [them] everything, but the voices told him not

to.”

During their interview, Appellant also relayed that he had not

experienced any psychotic symptoms since he had left the hospital

and that he had not heard voices while in jail. Dr. Vitacco diagnosed

Appellant with “amphetamine induced psychotic disorder.” He

based his diagnosis on the fact that Appellant’s symptoms coincided

with his injection of methamphetamine and stopped when he

stopped using the drug.

Dr. Vitacco opined that Appellant knew that killing Fraser was

wrong when he did it. Dr. Vitacco based his opinion on Appellant’s

remarks that he refused the voices’ instruction to kill again because

it was “wrong” and on Appellant’s decision not to tell police what had

13
happened during the traffic stop, which indicated to Dr. Vitacco that

Appellant knew “it could get him in some trouble.” Dr. Vitacco

further opined that Appellant was suffering from delusions at the

time of the killing, but that those delusions did not compel him to

kill. Dr. Vitacco explained that Appellant resisted the voices’

instructions to kill a second time, and that when Dr. Vitacco asked

Appellant what would have happened if he did not comply, he said,

“basically, I would have done something else.”

Dr. Schaffer also interviewed Appellant. He agreed that

Appellant’s methamphetamine use may have contributed to his

psychosis but testified that “it’s impossible to determine the relative

extent to which” his drug use had contributed. Dr. Schaffer

disagreed with Dr. Vitacco’s testimony that Appellant’s psychosis

ended when his drug use ended. Based on Dr. Schaffer’s experience

with other patients, Appellant’s continued treatment for psychosis

at the jail, and a recording of a jail call in which Appellant reported

seeing numbers or symbols in the sky, Dr. Schaffer opined that

Appellant’s psychosis had continued.

14
Dr. Schaffer further opined that Appellant was unable to tell

right from wrong at the time of the incident, and that his actions

were the result of a delusional compulsion. Dr. Schaffer explained

that “the evidence . . . demonstrated delusion and psychosis and

[Appellant’s] accounts of responding to delusional compulsion

during the act.” In Dr. Schaffer’s view, Appellant’s delusions were

compulsory because they were “very painful” and involved voices

that would berate him.

Dr. Perri met with Appellant on behalf of the Court, but

Appellant denied having committed the killing during their

meeting. According to Dr. Perri, Appellant’s denial prevented him

from performing an evaluation of Appellant’s mental state at the

time of the crime.

2. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by concluding

that he was not in custody during his interview at Highland Rivers

and that it abused its discretion by failing to exclude his pre-

Miranda statements on that basis. Specifically, Appellant contends

that he was in “custody” for purposes of Miranda because (1) he had

15
been involuntarily committed to Highland Rivers, and so was not

free to leave, and because (2) detectives already suspected Appellant

killed Fraser when they set out to question him, and their interview

was merely “a tactic to compel [Appellant] to implicate himself in a

crime.” In Appellant’s view, the trial court was therefore required to

suppress his pre-Miranda statements and erred by failing to do so.

As explained below, we disagree.

(a) Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the

statements he made to detectives at Highland Rivers on

September 3, 2021. The trial court conducted an evidentiary

hearing, during which Detectives Moore and Gilleland testified.

During the hearing, Detective Moore testified that Appellant was

not handcuffed or otherwise physically restrained during the

interview at any point. He further testified that detectives made no

promises to Appellant or threats of any kind. While Detective Moore

was unsure if the door to the intake room was locked during the

interview, he testified that Highland Rivers staff came into the room

at various times and that Appellant was not isolated. Detective

16
Moore further stated that the detectives told Appellant multiple

times that he did not have to talk to them. Consistent with Detective

Moore’s testimony, the recording of the interview shows that

Appellant was told, “You don’t have to tell us anything”; “I know you

don’t want to say. You don’t have to. We’re not going to force you”;

“You can tell me to shut up, go get bent”; “[Y]ou don’t have to talk to

us. You can tell us to get bent, you got rights just like everybody else

does”; and “I’m not going to force you to talk.”

Detective Moore testified that after Appellant admitted to

killing Fraser, the detectives had established probable cause to

arrest him and read Appellant his Miranda rights. Appellant then

invoked his right to an attorney, the interview ceased, and the

detectives executed the search warrant for Appellant’s clothing.

On cross-examination, Moore confirmed that Appellant did not

have access to his vehicle at the time of the interview. When asked

by defense counsel whether Appellant had been involuntarily

committed to Highland Rivers, Moore initially responded, “I believe

so.” But when asked on re-direct if he had any “idea what the status

17
of [Appellant’s] 10-13 was at the time you were talking to him,”

Moore responded, “No, sir.” 2

Shortly after the hearing, the trial court entered a written

order concluding without findings of fact or analysis that Appellant

“was not in custody and Miranda warnings did not apply” to

Appellant’s pre-Miranda statements during his September 3, 2021

interview. The court accordingly ruled that Appellant’s statements

were admissible at trial.

(b) A Miranda warning “must be given when an individual is

in custody and subject to interrogation, or its functional equivalent.”

Hayes v. State, 320 Ga. 505, 513 (2024). “A person is considered in

custody, for Miranda purposes, when he is (1) formally arrested or

(2) restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Id.

2 The phrase “10-13” is a reference to Form 1013, which is issued by the

Georgia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities
(“DBHDD”). This form is “utilized to initiate an involuntary mental health
evaluation of a mentally ill person which presents a substantial risk of
imminent harm to self or others.” Georgia DBHDD,
https://gadbhdd.policystat.com/policy/10155434/latest/ (last accessed October
6, 2025). As such, the phrase “10-13” is sometimes used as a shorthand or
reference to an involuntary commitment.
18
(internal quotation marks omitted). Accord California v. Beheler,

463 US 1121, 1125 (1983). When determining whether a defendant

was in custody for purposes of Miranda, courts “must consider the

totality of the circumstances,” State v. Walden, 311 Ga. 389, 390

(2021), and “given those circumstances,” whether “a reasonable

person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the

interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 US 99, 112

(1995). “Relevant factors” for this analysis “include the location of

the questioning, its duration, statements made during the

interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the

questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the

questioning.” Howes v. Fields, 565 US 499, 509 (2012) (internal

citations omitted). Importantly, a defendant is not necessarily in

custody for purposes of Miranda merely because he was

interrogated while held in state custody for unrelated reasons, such

as when a prisoner is questioned regarding a crime unrelated to his

prison sentence. See Howes, 565 US at 514 (holding that deputies’

interview with a prisoner was not custodial for purposes of Miranda

19
where the prisoner was brought by corrections officers from one area

of the jail to an interview room and asked about events that may

have occurred before the prisoner was sentenced).

Whether a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda is a

mixed question of fact and law. Thompson, 516 US at 112-13. When

reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, “[w]e apply de

novo the relevant legal principles to the facts, and we accept the trial

court’s findings on disputed facts and credibility of witnesses

unless clearly erroneous, and construe the evidence most favorably

to uphold the findings and judgment of the trial court.” Walden, 311

Ga. at 390. “Where, as here, the trial court was not required to make

explicit factual findings or credibility determinations on the record,

and in fact did not do so, we assume that the trial court implicitly

resolved all disputes of fact and credibility in favor of its ruling, and

we generally accept such implicit factual findings unless clearly

erroneous.” Id. “In so construing the evidence, this Court can

consider the pretrial testimony adduced at the suppression hearing,

as well as the trial transcript.” Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 605, 609

20
(2022).

So viewed, the evidence shows that Appellant was led into the

intake room by Highland Rivers staff, rather than law enforcement

officers; he was not physically restrained in any way; he was not

isolated from medical staff or from the facility itself; he was told

multiple times that he did not have to speak to officers; and the

interview lasted only about 35 minutes. Under these circumstances,

a reasonable person would believe he was free to terminate the

interview and leave the intake room. As such, we conclude that the

trial court did not err when it concluded that Appellant was not in

custody during his interview and that no Miranda warning was

required. See Whittaker v. State, 317 Ga. 127, 135 (2023) (holding in

the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that a

hospitalized defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes

where he was being treated for injuries, there was no evidence that

he was restrained, and he was not isolated); Jennings v. State, 282

Ga. 679, 681 (2007) (holding that a hospitalized defendant was not

in custody for Miranda purposes where he had expressed that he

21
was suicidal and had not yet been released from medical treatment,

but was not restrained when questioned); Robinson v. State, 278 Ga.

299, 301 (2004) (holding that a hospitalized defendant was not in

custody for purposes of Miranda even though he “had not been

released from medical treatment”).

Appellant argues that he was in custody for two reasons. First,

he claims that he was “effectively in custody on a 10-13 involuntary

commitment at Highland Rivers.” Second, he avers that “officers

already suspected that [he] was responsible for Frasier’s killing” and

that his interview “was a tactic to compel [Appellant] to implicate

himself in a crime.” We note at the outset that the record does not

appear to support these contentions. But even assuming Appellant’s

factual claims are true for purposes of his argument, his claims still

fail. We consider each argument in turn.

Appellant claims that he was entitled to a Miranda warning

because he was “effectively in custody” on an “involuntary

commitment.” As we stated above, the relevant legal question when

determining custody for Miranda purposes is whether a reasonable

22
person in Appellant’s circumstances would have felt free to

terminate the interview and leave. See Thompson, 516 US at 112.

So viewed, Appellant’s purported inability to leave the facility is only

relevant to the extent it affects our objective assessment of whether

a reasonable person in Appellant’s circumstances would have felt

free to leave the interview. See Howes, 565 US at 515. And it does

not tip the balance of our analysis above. See Jennings, 282 Ga. at

681; Robinson, 278 Ga. at 301.3

We now turn to Appellant’s claim that he was in custody during

the interview because the detectives already suspected he

committed Fraser’s killing and because the interview “was a tactic

to compel [Appellant] to implicate himself.” Appellant does not

3 In denying Appellant’s claims, we note that Appellant cites no authority

to suggest that his case is distinct from the hospital interrogation cases cited
above. See Jennings, 282 Ga. at 681; Robinson, 278 Ga. at 301. Moreover,
Appellant makes no argument on appeal that his interview was involuntary as
a matter of due process due to his mental health at the time he was questioned.
Cf. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 US 199 (1960) (holding that because “the
evidence indisputably establishes the strongest probability that Blackburn
was insane and incompetent at the time he allegedly confessed” the admission
of such confession at trial, and his conviction thereon, was a violation of the
defendant’s rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
23
claim, however, that detectives ever communicated an intention to

arrest him during his questioning. Nor could he, as the record does

not establish any such communication. This “lack of communication

was crucial,” because “under Miranda ‘[a] policeman’s unarticulated

plan [to arrest a suspect] has no bearing on the question whether a

suspect was ‘in custody’ at a particular time[.]’” See Stansbury v.

California, 511 US 318, 322-24 (1994) (quoting Berkemer v.

McCarty, 468 US 420, 442 (1984)). See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465

US 420, 431 (1984) (“The mere fact that an investigation has focused

on a suspect does not trigger the need for Miranda warnings in

noncustodial settings, and the probation officer’s knowledge and

intent have no bearing on the outcome of this case.”); Jennings, 282

Ga. at 681 (“[I]t is irrelevant to the Miranda analysis that

investigators (1) might have focused their suspicions upon the

person being questioned, or (2) have already decided that they will

take the person into custody and charge [him] with an offense.”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Because custody

determinations are objective, and because the detectives never

24
indicated any plan to arrest Appellant during the interview, any

unarticulated plans they may have had to arrest him have no

bearing on our analysis. As such, Appellant’s claim fails.

3. In his remaining enumerations of error, Appellant argues

that the trial court erred by refusing to give four of his requested

jury charges. The first two of these charges concerned Appellant’s

defense of delusional insanity, and the last two concerned voluntary

intoxication. As explained below, we hold that the principles of law

found in the requested charges were contained in the charges given

by the trial court, and so it was not error for the court to refuse

Appellant’s requests. We consider each charge below.

(a) “When evaluating claims of instructional error, we examine

the jury charge as a whole.” Craft v. State, 321 Ga. 638, 641 (2025).

“The refusal to give a requested charge, even though it is a correct

statement of law and pertinent and material to an issue in the case,

is error only if it contains information that is not substantially

covered by the charge actually given.” Thomas v. State, 297 Ga. 750,

754 (2015). And so “[w]hen a requested jury instruction adds no

25
essential point of law to the existing instructions, it is not error for

the trial court to decline to give it.” Eubanks, 317 Ga. at 580. See

also Allaben v. State, 299 Ga. 253, 259 (2016) (“A trial court’s refusal

to give a jury charge in the exact language requested by a defendant

is not error if the charge given by the trial court substantially covers

the applicable principles of law.”). When a party raises “a properly

preserved claim that a trial court erred in refusing to instruct the

jury on an applicable principle of law,” we apply de novo review.

Eubanks v. State, 317 Ga. 563, 581 (2023).

“In Georgia, a defendant is presumed to be sane and a

defendant asserting an insanity defense has the burden to prove by

a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time the

crime was committed.” Bowman v. State, 306 Ga. 97, 100 (2019)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “A defendant may prove

insanity by showing that, at the time of the incident, he lacked the

mental capacity to distinguish right from wrong or that he was

suffering from a delusional compulsion.” Id. See OCGA § 16-3-2 (“A

person shall not be found guilty of a crime if, at the time of the

26
act ... constituting the crime, the person did not have mental

capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such

act[.]”); OCGA § 16-3-3 (“A person shall not be found guilty of a crime

when, at the time of the act ... constituting the crime, the person,

because of mental disease, injury, or congenital deficiency, acted as

he did because of a delusional compulsion as to such act which

overmastered his will to resist committing the crime.”).

(b) At trial, Appellant requested jury instructions regarding

both forms of the insanity defense: the mental capacity defense and

the delusional compulsion defense.4 The court agreed to give the

standard pattern jury instructions on both defenses but refused to

make certain changes to the pattern charge on the delusional

compulsion defense requested by Appellant’s counsel. Specifically,

Appellant’s trial counsel requested that certain language found in

4 The pattern charge on the mental capacity defense provides, in relevant

part, that “[a] person shall not be found guilty of a crime if, at the time of the
act ... constituting the crime, that person did not have the mental capacity to
distinguish between right and wrong in relation to the act[.]” Georgia
Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II, Criminal Cases, § 3.80.30 (Jan.
2023) at 272-73.
27
paragraphs four and five of the pattern charge be omitted and that

language from Lawrence v. State, 265 Ga. 310 (1995) be substituted

in its place. The pattern charge is set forth in relevant portion below;

Appellant’s requested deletions are indicated using text that has

been struck through and Appellant’s requested additions are

indicated by text that has been italicized and underlined:

[¶4] In order for mental delusion or delusional compulsion
to constitute a defense, it must appear not only that the
accused was actually laboring under a delusion at the
time of the commission of the alleged criminal act but that
the alleged criminal act itself was connected with the
particular delusion under which the accused was then
laboring, and that the delusion was as to a fact that, if
true, would have justified the alleged act by the accused.
Defendant was compelled by that delusion to act in a
manner that would have been lawful and right if the facts
had been as the defendant imagined them to be. This is a
question of fact to be determined by you.

[¶5] If you believe this defendant committed the act
charged in this bill of indictment but, at that time, the
defendant was actually laboring under a mental delusion,
and that the act was connected with that delusion, and
that the delusion was as to a fact that, if true, would have
justified the alleged act by the accused been lawful and
right, then you should find the defendant not guilty
because of insanity. In this event, your deliberations will
cease and the form of your verdict would be, “We, the jury,
find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity.”

28
Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II, Criminal

Cases, § 3.80.30 (Jan. 2023) at 274-75 (as altered by Appellant’s

Request to Charge No. 17).

During the charge conference, Appellant’s trial counsel argued

that Appellant was under the delusion that the victim was a

shapeshifting lizard-person, rather than a human, and so killing

him would not be murder, which requires the death of a “human

being.” See OCGA § 16-5-1(a)-(b). Appellant’s trial counsel argued,

as Appellant now argues on appeal, that his requested changes were

necessary to make the law clear under the facts at issue in his case.

As mentioned above, the trial court disagreed, and it instructed the

jury using the pattern charge without implementing Appellant’s

requested changes. Appellant preserved his objection for ordinary

appellate review by renewing it after the charge was given. See

OCGA § 17-8-58(a). The same is true for Appellant’s other claims of

instructional error.

We see no error in the trial court’s decision. In Lawrence, the

29
trial court instructed the jury that for a compulsive delusion to

constitute a defense to criminal liability, the delusion must have

been “as to a fact which, if true, would have justified the alleged acts

by the accused.” Lawrence, 265 Ga. at 312. In so instructing the jury,

the Lawrence trial court used the pattern jury instructions, just as

the trial court did here. See id. (citing Georgia Suggested Pattern

Jury Instructions, Vol II, Criminal Cases (2nd ed.) Pt. 3(EE)(3)

(Delusional Insanity)). And we explained in Lawrence that this

charge accurately “reflect[ed] the requirements for a delusional

compulsion insanity defense [as] recognized by Georgia case law

since 1898.” Id. (citations omitted).

But despite that being Lawrence’s holding, Appellant contends

that the trial court should have substituted other language drawn

from the Lawrence opinion in place of the language from the pattern

instruction. But as we held in Lawrence, the court’s charge — the

pattern charge — was an accurate statement of the law. See id.

Because the court’s charge was accurate, see id., and because

Appellant’s requested alterations added no essential point of law to

30
the existing instructions, it was not error for the trial court to decline

to make them. See Eubanks, 317 Ga. at 580.

(c) Appellant further argues that it was error for the court to

refuse to give a non-pattern charge drawn from the language of

Brown v. State, 228 Ga. 215 (1971), which read, “the act itself may

be so utterly senseless and abnormal as to furnish satisfactory proof

of a diseased mind.” See Brown, 288 Ga. at 219-220 (explaining that

such a charge had been requested and holding that the trial court

erred by failing to give it). We disagree. Though we held in Brown

that it was error for the court to refuse to give the requested

language, Brown is distinguishable. No charge was given on

delusional insanity in that case, even though the facts warranted

such a charge. See Brown, 228 Ga. at 220 (holding that the charge

was authorized by the evidence); id. at 221 (Felton, J. dissenting)

(explaining that the trial court had refused to charge the jury on

delusional insanity but disagreeing that such a charge was

warranted by the evidence). Here, the trial court provided the jury

with the pattern charge on the delusional compulsion defense, and

31
we have held that where such an insanity charge is given, it is

“proper” to refuse giving the charge used in Brown. See Bennett, 262

Ga. 149, 152 (1992) (holding that the trial court “properly refused”

to give the charge used in Brown where the court gave “a charge on

the insanity defense,” and that charge was “sufficient”). As such,

Appellant’s claim fails.

(d) We consider Appellant’s remaining two claims of error

together, which concern the court’s refusal to give Appellant’s

requested non-pattern instructions on voluntary intoxication. As

explained below, it was not error for the trial court to refuse

Appellant’s requests because the pattern charges it gave sufficiently

explained the relevant law.

(i) At trial, Appellant requested two pattern instructions on

voluntary intoxication. At the time of Appellant’s trial in March

2023, the first of these charges read:

Georgia law provides that voluntary intoxication shall not
be an excuse for any criminal act. It further provides that
if a person’s mind, when not affected by intoxicants, is
capable of distinguishing between right and wrong as well
as of reasoning and acting rationally, and the person

32
voluntarily deprives himself/herself of reason by
consuming intoxicants and commits a criminal act while
under the influence of such intoxicants, the person is
criminally responsible for such acts to the same extent as
if the person were sober. Whether or not the defendant in
this case was voluntarily intoxicated at or during the time
alleged in this indictment is a matter solely for you, the
jury, to determine.

Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II, Criminal

Cases, § 3.60.10 (Jan. 2023) at 269-70. 5 The second charge read:

If the influence of (alcohol) (drugs) (narcotics) impairs a
person’s mind to the extent that the person is not able to
form the intent to commit the act with which he/she is
charged, that person would not be criminally responsible
for the act. Whether that is true is a question for you, the
jury, to decide.

Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II, Criminal

Cases, § 3.60.40 (Jan. 2023) at 271. 6 During the charge conference,

5 This pattern charge was revised in July 2024. See Suggested Pattern

Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, § 3.60.10 (Jul. 2024). It now reads,
“Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a crime. If the Defendant, when
sober, could reason and distinguish between right and wrong, and he/she
voluntarily became intoxicated and then committed a crime while intoxicated,
he/she is responsible for the crime just as if he/she had been sober at the time
he/she committed the crime.” Id.
6 This pattern charge was also revised in July 2024. See Suggested

Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, § 3.60.40 (Jul. 2024). It now
reads, “A defendant who has permanently altered his brain function by
persistent, though voluntary, intoxication may not be culpable if he can show

33
the State, citing Hayes v. State, 262 Ga. 881 (1993), argued that this

second charge was only authorized where there was evidence “of an

alteration in brain functions due to intoxication that was more than

temporary.” See Hayes, 262 Ga. at 883 (holding that the trial court

had correctly charged the jury when explaining that alteration to

brain function arising from voluntary intoxication must be more

than temporary to negate criminal intent). In an apparent

acknowledgement of the State’s concern, the trial court ruled that it

would give the charge, but that it would add the word “continuous,”

to the first sentence, so that it read, “If the continuous influence of

alcohol, drugs, or narcotics impairs a person’s mind ....” The court

later charged the jury consistent with its ruling.

In addition to these pattern charges, Appellant also requested

two related non-pattern charges, the first of which read:

However, if you determine that a person is legally insane
when sober, that person remains legally insane when
intoxicated, even if the insanity is intensified by drugs or
alcohol. One who is legally insane is not responsible for
acts committed in their insanity, regardless of whether

that due to his permanent brain damage, he was no longer able to form intent
to commit the crime charged. (i.e., is no longer of sound mind).” Id.
34
that person is intoxicated or sober.

During the charge conference, Appellant’s counsel explained that he

had “crafted this charge based on the language found in Choice [v.

State, 31 Ga. 424 (1860)],” which he had “modernized.” See Choice,

31 Ga. at 472 (“[I]f a man is insane when sober, the fact that he

increased the insanity, by the superadded excitement of liquor,

makes no difference. An insane person is irresponsible, whether

drunk or sober.”). Counsel argued at the charge conference, as he

does now on appeal, that the custom charge was a “correct statement

of the law” and would “clarify” for the jury “that one can be insane

and then be intoxicated and that intoxication doesn’t destroy the

pre-existing insanity.” The trial court disagreed with the need for

the non-pattern charge, reasoning that the issue would be “covered

in the general charge on insanity.”

Appellant also requested that the trial court give the following

non-pattern charge:

If you find that the Defendant’s voluntary use of drugs or
alcohol produced an immediate but temporary madness,
insanity, or unsoundness of mind, this is no defense and

35
you would be authorized to find the Defendant guilty for
any criminal act allegedly committed while under the
voluntarily induced influence of such immediate,
temporary intoxication.

However, if you find that through the prolonged and
excessive use of alcohol or drugs, the madness, insanity,
or unsoundness of mind of the Defendant has become
permanent and fixed, then the Defendant is no longer
acting under the immediate and temporary influence of
intoxicants. If you find that the Defendant committed a
criminal act while laboring under a permanent and fixed
madness, insanity, or unsoundness of mind caused by
prolonged excessive use of intoxicants, and that madness,
insanity, or unsoundness of mind rendered the Defendant
insane as I have previously defined it, then you would be
obligated to find the Defendant Not Guilty by Reason of
Insanity.

At the charge conference, Appellant argued that his requested

charge “goes into a little greater detail [than the pattern charge] and

flushes these issues out for the jury ... in a less stilted way than the

pattern does.” The trial judge declined to give the non-pattern

charge, stating that she would not “charge the same thing three or

four times.”

(ii) Collectively, the pattern charges on voluntary intoxication

correctly explain that “voluntary intoxication shall not be an excuse

36
for any criminal act or omission, except in the extreme situation

where the intoxication has resulted in the alteration of brain

function so as to negate intent, and even then, the brain function

alteration must be more than temporary.” Guyes v. State, 286 Ga.

574, 578 (2010) (cleaned up). See also Scott v. State, 275 Ga. 305, 307

(2002) (explaining that a “more than temporary” alteration in brain

function is an “implied” condition of the pattern charge on voluntary

intoxication resulting from permanent impairment).

Appellant claims that the first of his requested charges was

needed to clarify that a person who is insane when sober remains

insane when intoxicated and is therefore “not responsible for acts

committed in their insanity, regardless of whether that person is

intoxicated or sober.” And Appellant claims that his second charge

provides more detail about when prolonged intoxication negates

criminal liability. But Appellant fails to explain why it was error for

the court to refuse these charges. The trial court charged the jury

using the pattern charges on the mental capacity and delusional

compulsion defenses, and in so doing, explained to the jurors the

37
conditions under which a defendant is excused from criminal

liability by reason of insanity, as explained above. And the court

further instructed the jury on when a defendant is excused — and

when a defendant is not excused — from criminal liability by reason

of voluntary intoxication. The pattern charges made clear that a

person who is voluntarily intoxicated “is criminally responsible for

[his or her] acts to the same extent as if the person were sober.”

Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II, Criminal

Cases, § 3.60.10 (Jan. 2023) at 269-70 (emphasis added). Thus, the

trial court correctly instructed the jury that a person who is insane

when sober does not lose the benefit of that defense when

temporarily voluntarily intoxicated. Because the court correctly

instructed the jury on the legal principles in Appellant’s requested

charges, and because neither of those charges “add[ed]” an “essential

point of law to the existing instructions,” it was not error for the

court to refuse Appellant’s requests. Eubanks, 317 Ga. at 580.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

38