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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: February 3, 2026

S25A1094. WELSCH v. THE STATE.

BETHEL, Justice.

Following trial, Ronald Welsch was convicted of murder and

related crimes in connection with the shooting deaths of Jamar

Walton and Sherrod Gore. 1 On appeal, Welsch argues that the

1The crimes were committed on May 28, 2021. On April 8, 2022, a
Lowndes County grand jury indicted Welsch for the malice murder of Walton
(Count 1), two counts of felony murder based on the aggravated assaults of
Walton and Gore (Counts 2 and 3), two counts of aggravated assault (Counts 4
and 5), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 6),
and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 7). The grand jury also
indicted Kent Gillard on the first six counts; Gillard entered a non-negotiated
guilty plea, testified against Welsch at trial, and is not a party to this appeal.
At a bench trial held from September 12 to 16, 2022, the trial court found
Welsch guilty on all seven counts. The trial court sentenced Welsch to serve
life in prison without parole for the malice murder of Walton, a consecutive
term of life without parole for the felony murder of Gore, a consecutive term of
five years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and a
consecutive term of ten years for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
The remaining counts merged or were vacated by operation of law.
Welsch filed a timely motion for new trial, which he subsequently
amended twice. The trial court held a February 2024 hearing on that motion
and then denied it on March 24, 2025. Welsch timely filed a notice of appeal,
evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial

court erroneously denied his motion for new trial on the “general

grounds” under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21. Welsch also argues that

the trial court erroneously admitted testimony in violation of the

rule against hearsay and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. These claims fail, so

we affirm.

1. Construed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the

evidence at trial showed the following. Sometime in the late hours

of May 27, 2021, or the early hours of the next day, Welsch called

his friend, Kent Gillard, and asked him to drive Welsch to a bar in

Valdosta. Gillard picked up Welsch and Gillard’s cousin, Shaivon

Edwards, in a silver Nissan sedan. Gillard drove, Edwards sat in the

front passenger seat, and Welsch sat in the back seat. Upon arriving

at the bar, the trio did not go inside. They instead turned into the

parking lot of the adjacent bank and backed into a parking space,

and his case was docketed to the Court’s August 2025 term and submitted for
a decision on the briefs.
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leaving the car running but turning its headlights off. Gillard texted

his girlfriend, who was inside the bar, to tell her: “I’m not going in

I’m laying,” and “I’m here … finna flip a n***a.”

Around 1:30 a.m., Welsch, Gillard, and Edwards saw a group

of men outside the bar. The group included Brian Martinez, Gore

(nicknamed “Greek”), and Walton (nicknamed “D-Rose”), with whom

Welsch had an ongoing “beef” over a woman named Shaniya Brooks.

The group walked toward the bank, where their cars were parked,

and Welsch told Gillard to pull out of the bank’s parking lot. Gillard

then drove to a restaurant parking lot adjacent to the bank. Welsch

told Gillard to wait, exited the car, and headed back toward the bank

on foot.

Around the same time, Martinez and Walton got into

Martinez’s car. Walton exited the car shortly after, and Martinez

heard gunshots. Walton, who had been shot and was bleeding

profusely, then jumped back into Martinez’s car and told Martinez

to get him to a hospital. According to Martinez, Walton identified

Welsch as the shooter.

3
Shortly after Welsch left his car, Gillard also heard gunshots,

and Welsch soon ran back to the car. Welsch had a black gun—

“probably a Glock”—and Welsch said, “I got them, I got them

n*****s.” Gillard immediately drove away.

Restaurant surveillance footage played at trial showed a silver

Nissan sedan entering the parking lot in the minutes before the

shooting. A person appeared to exit the Nissan’s back seat, walk

around the car, and walk in the direction of the bank while the

Nissan moved to the rear of the lot. Bank surveillance footage played

at trial showed a person walking across the bank’s parking lot from

the direction of the restaurant. The restaurant and bank cameras

both captured a bright flash of light followed by a person running

from the bank toward the restaurant. The Nissan left the parking

lot shortly after.

Police responded to the shooting and found Gore on the ground

next to his car in the bank parking lot, unresponsive and with an

apparent gunshot wound. He had apparently been in or near his own

car, also parked in the bank lot, at the time of the shooting and was

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pronounced dead on scene. At the hospital, Walton was declared

dead from his wounds. Police processing the scene collected

numerous bullet fragments, bullet jackets, and 9mm cartridge

casings. A firearms examiner determined that the cartridge casings

and bullet jackets from the scene, along with bullets collected during

the victims’ autopsies, were fired from the same 9mm Glock pistol.

Later on the morning of the shooting, Welsch called his brother

and told him that he had been out late in the Valdosta area, got into

an altercation, and that Walton pulled a gun on Welsch. Welsch also

told his brother that he and Brooks were going to Florida.

Roughly a day later, Martinez spoke with Walton’s mother

about her son’s death. Martinez told her that, on the way to the

hospital, Walton said he saw his shooter. Walton’s mother asked

whether “it was that dude Murda Ron,” and Martinez replied, “Yes

it was, I seen him.” Martinez later confirmed his account of the

crimes to investigators, including that he saw Welsch run past his

car immediately after the shooting and that Walton said the shooter

was “Murda Ron.”

5
Several days after the shooting, officers arrested Welsch and

Brooks during a traffic stop. The subsequent investigation led

officers to obtain Welsch’s phone records, which showed that

Welsch’s phone was in the Valdosta area on the night of the shooting

and then in Florida the following day. A text received by Welsch’s

phone the day after the shooting asked if Welsch had killed

somebody, and a text from Welsch’s phone responded, “shhh,”

“delete that, it was two people.” Multiple other text messages sent

from Welsch’s phone referred to and introduced the sender as

“Murda Ron”—Welsch’s nickname, Instagram handle, and Snapchat

display name. And Welsch’s social media records included a video of

Welsch rapping, “You can ask D-Rose and Little Greek how that

sh** sprays and that b**** got hit in the face. … How about this,

let’s go to the Club … , and I’ll kill y’all inside the club this time.”

2. Welsch first argues that the evidence was constitutionally

insufficient to support his murder convictions.2 We review this claim

2 Welsch’s argument is difficult to pin down. He appears to have
conflated his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence with his claim that

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by “view[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the …

verdicts and consider[ing] whether any rational trier of fact could

have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bostic v. State,

322 Ga. 688, 690 (2025) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 319

(1979)). That review is limited and “leaves to the [trier of fact] the

resolution of conflicts in the testimony, the weight of the evidence,

the credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be made

from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Welsch was convicted of malice murder for killing Walton and

felony murder predicated on aggravated assault for killing Gore.

Malice murder required the State to prove that Welsch “unlawfully

and with malice aforethought caused” Walton’s death. Whittaker v.

State, 317 Ga. 127, 130 (2023) (cleaned up). Malice “incorporates the

the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial on the general grounds.
We address the claims separately because the general grounds and a challenge
to the legal sufficiency of the evidence are “two distinct legal arguments.” King
v. State, 316 Ga. 611, 616 n.8 (2023) (quotation marks omitted). And while
Welsch challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his “convictions”
generally, his argument focuses solely on the evidence supporting his malice
murder and felony murder convictions. So we limit our sufficiency review to
Welsch’s murder convictions. See Holloway v. State, 320 Ga. 668, 669 n.2
(2025).
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intent to kill.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Felony murder

predicated on aggravated assault required the State to prove that

Welsch caused Gore’s death while “attempting to commit a violent

injury to the person of another with a deadly weapon.” Whisnant v.

State, 322 Ga. 253, 258 (2025) (cleaned up).

We have no trouble concluding that the trial evidence was

constitutionally sufficient to support Welsch’s convictions.

Eyewitness testimony and Welsch’s cell phone location data placed

Welsch at the scene of the shooting. Security footage corroborated

witness accounts of the shooting. Welsch also made numerous

incriminating statements, as shown by his phone and social media

records. And Welsch fled the state hours after the crimes. Finally,

two eyewitnesses—including one of the victims—identified Welsch

as the shooter. Welsch’s objections to the credibility of certain

witnesses,3 the State’s failure to recover the murder weapon, and

3 As part of these credibility complaints, Welsch passingly asserts that

Gillard was an “untrustworthy accomplice” and that Gillard’s testimony that
“Welsch exited a vehicle before gunshots rang out and returned saying, ‘I got
them n*****s,’” was not sufficiently corroborated, as required by OCGA § 24-

8
the absence of DNA or fingerprint evidence concern only the weight

of or conflicts between pieces of evidence. It was for the trial court,

as factfinder, to resolve those questions. See, e.g., Beamon v. State,

314 Ga. 798, 800–01 (2022) (“[W]e do not reweigh the evidence.”

(quotation marks omitted)). And the State was not required to prove

Welsch’s guilt with any particular kind of evidence. See Rich v.

State, 307 Ga. 757, 759 (2020). From the evidence recounted above,

a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that

Welsch intentionally shot and killed Walton and that he caused

Gore’s death by repeatedly shooting at him. See, e.g., Howard v.

State, 318 Ga. 681, 684–85 (2024) (sufficient evidence to sustain

conviction for felony murder by aggravated assault when multiple

eyewitnesses identified defendant as shooter, ballistics evidence

confirmed witnesses’ testimony, and defendant admitted to shooting

14-8. This does not affect our sufficiency analysis because we consider all
evidence presented at trial. See Copeland v. State, 314 Ga. 44, 47 (2022). And
while we typically address accomplice corroboration issues separate from due
process sufficiency claims, see, e.g., Johnson v. State, 311 Ga. 221, 223 n.2
(2021), Welsch makes only passing reference to OCGA § 24-14-8 and instead
argues Gillard’s testimony was entitled to little weight. So we treat Welsch’s
reference to Gillard’s testimony as a sufficiency argument and reject it.
9
victim); Garay v. State, 314 Ga. 16, 19–21 (2022) (sufficient evidence

to sustain murder conviction, despite lack of forensic evidence

directly implicating defendant, when defendant confessed to crimes,

fled country after crimes were committed, and crime scene and

ballistic evidence corroborated inculpatory witness testimony);

Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 706, 708 (2019) (sufficient evidence to

sustain murder conviction when multiple witnesses identified

defendant as shooter, co-indictee testified that defendant had

handgun right before shooting, and victim died of gunshot wound

from handgun of same caliber).

3. Welsch also argues that the trial court abused its discretion

by refusing to grant him a new trial on the “general grounds.” Trial

courts have discretion to grant a new trial “when the verdict of a

jury is found contrary to evidence and the principles of justice and

equity,” OCGA § 5-5-20, or is “decidedly and strongly against the

weight of the evidence,” OCGA § 5-5-21. Those statutes—the

“general grounds”—direct the trial court to “consider certain

matters beyond the sufficiency of the evidence[,]” including “conflicts

10
in the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the

evidence.” Bostic, 322 Ga. at 696 (quotation marks omitted). A “trial

court’s decision” considering the general grounds is “left to the sole

discretion of the trial court”; our role on appeal is “limited to

determining whether the trial court exercised that discretion.”

Whisnant, 322 Ga. at 259.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the general grounds

statutes apply at a bench trial, this claim fails. In addition to

considering the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence, the trial

court cited OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 and expressly considered the

weight of certain pieces of evidence and the credibility of certain

witnesses before ultimately denying Welsch’s general-grounds

claim. The trial court’s order shows that it properly exercised its

discretion in denying Welsch’s motion for new trial on the general

grounds, so this claim presents nothing for us to review. See Bostic,

322 Ga. at 696–97; Whisnant, 322 Ga. at 259.

4. Finally, Welsch argues that the trial court erroneously

admitted a statement from Walton in violation of Georgia’s

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evidentiary rule against hearsay and the federal Confrontation

Clause. At trial, the State played a recorded phone call between

Martinez and Walton’s mother, during which Martinez said that

Walton identified Welsch as the shooter to Martinez shortly after

Walton was shot. The State also played clips from a police interview

of Martinez, during which Martinez repeated that account. Welsch

did not object on Confrontation Clause or hearsay grounds, so we

review these claims for plain error only. See McKinney v. State, 307

Ga. 129, 133 (2019). To prevail on this claim, Welsch must therefore

identify a legal error “that was not affirmatively waived”; was “clear

and not open to reasonable dispute”; that “affected his substantial

rights”; and that “seriously affected the fairness, integrity[,] or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga.

233, 243 (2016) (cleaned up).

“A Confrontation Clause violation occurs when an out-of-court

‘testimonial’ statement is admitted into evidence and the declarant

is unavailable at trial and was not previously subjected to cross-

examination. A statement is testimonial if its primary purpose was

12
to establish evidence that could be used in a future prosecution.”

Denson v. State, 307 Ga. 545, 548 (2019) (cleaned up). Welsch claims

Walton’s identification “was testimonial and … was a deliberate

statement meant to identify a suspect in a criminal investigation.”

And Welsch says admitting this statement violated the

Confrontation Clause because he never confronted or cross-

examined Walton.

But Welsch has not shown that the trial court clearly and

obviously erred by not excluding Walton’s statement on

Confrontation Clause grounds. An error is clear and obvious when

it is “plain under controlling precedent or in view of the

unequivocally clear words of a statute or rule.” Burke v. State, 320

Ga. 706, 707–08 (2025). And beyond a bare assertion that Walton’s

identification was testimonial, Welsch makes no argument and cites

no record evidence or authority supporting his claim that, in making

the statement, Walton primarily intended to create evidence to be

13
used against Welsch.4 Walton made the statement to an

acquaintance of several years, shortly after being shot, and with no

apparent indication that he intended the statement to be used at

trial later. See Miller v. State, 289 Ga. 854, 855 (2011) (victim’s

statement to friend, which identified the defendant shortly after a

fight with the defendant, not testimonial because made to seek help

with ongoing emergency). Cf. Carter v. State, 315 Ga. 214, 223 (2022)

(telling a friend that, if anything happened to declarant, “[the

defendant] did it” was nontestimonial statement); Fitts v. State, 312

Ga. 134, 140 (2021) (statement not testimonial when made shortly

after shooting, before any arrests, and to one’s father rather than

police). But we need not decide whether Walton’s statement was in

fact testimonial because Welsch has identified no authority showing

that the trial court clearly and obviously erred by not concluding

that the statement was testimonial. And we have found no such

authority ourselves. So the trial court did not plainly err and

4 Welsch cites only Crawford v. Washington, 541 US 36 (2004), the case

establishing the standard for evaluating Confrontation Clause claims. And he
offers no analysis—only conclusory assertions—to support this claim.
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Welsch’s Confrontation Clause claim fails.

Nor did the trial court plainly err by failing to exclude Walton’s

identification of Welsch on hearsay grounds. Welsch argues that no

hearsay exception (particularly the excited utterance and dying

declaration exceptions, see OCGA §§ 24-8-803(2), 24-8-804(b)(2))

would have covered Walton’s statement. But even if Walton’s

statement fits no hearsay exception, Welsch did not object to that

statement on hearsay grounds. And it is not clear and obvious that

a trial court must “step in and exclude … hearsay absent an

objection.” Dees v. State, 322 Ga. 498, 502 (2025). See also OCGA

§ 24-8-802 (“[I]f a party does not properly object to hearsay, … the

hearsay evidence shall be legal evidence and admissible.”). So even

if it should have been excluded upon proper objection, “no controlling

authority made it clear that the trial court had to exclude the un-

objected-to” testimony, and this claim fails. Dees, 322 Ga. at 502.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.