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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: January 5, 2026

S25A1044. SELLERS v. THE STATE.

COLVIN, Justice.

Appellant Christopher Sellers was convicted of malice murder

and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of

Thedarious Mitchell and sentenced to life in prison without the

possibility of parole, plus a term of years.1 On appeal, Appellant

1 The crimes occurred on April 2, 2019. On December 1, 2020, a DeKalb

County grand jury returned an indictment charging Appellant with malice
murder (Count 1), two counts of felony murder (Counts 2 and 3), aggravated
assault (Count 4), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 5), and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 6). At the
conclusion of a jury trial held from October 9 to October 11, 2023, the jury
returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Appellant
to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder (Count 1)
and issued consecutive sentences of 10 years in prison for possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon (Count 5) and five years in prison for possession of
a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 6). Appellant’s remaining
charges were either merged or vacated by operation of law. Appellant filed a
motion for new trial on November 2, 2023, which he amended through new
counsel on August 9, 2024. Appellant’s motion was heard on November 25,
2024, and denied by written order on January 3, 2025. On January 21, 2025,
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. His case was docketed
to the August 2025 term of court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient as a

matter of constitutional due process to support his conviction for

malice murder, the trial court plainly erred by charging the jury on

parties to a crime, and his sentence of life without parole constitutes

cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and

“similar provisions” of the Georgia Constitution. 2 As explained

below, Appellant’s arguments fail, and we accordingly affirm his

conviction for malice murder and sentence of life without parole.3

1. The evidence at trial showed the following. At about 8:45

2 Appellant’s brief cites “Article I, Par. XVIII” of the Georgia
Constitution, but there is no such provision. Appellant appears to be referring
to Article I, Section I, Paragraph XVII, which provides that “[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted[.]” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVII. See US
Const. Amend. VIII (same). We therefore construe his brief as raising his
sentencing claim under that provision. But we decline to consider his claim
under the Georgia Constitution because Appellant does not argue that the
federal Constitution and the Georgia Constitution apply differently to his
sentence. See Regan v. State, 317 Ga. 612, 612 n.2 (2023) (declining to consider
the appellant’s equal protection claim under the Georgia Constitution because
the appellant failed to argue that the Georgia Constitution applied differently
to his equal protection claim than the federal Constitution).
3 Appellant does not challenge on appeal his convictions for possession of

a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 5) and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (Count 6).
2
p.m. on April 2, 2019, law enforcement officers received a shots-fired

call regarding an incident at a motel in DeKalb County. By the time

the first detective arrived at the scene, first responders had already

transported the victim, who was later identified as Mitchell, to the

hospital. Despite an emergency surgery and other resuscitative

efforts, Mitchell died from a single gunshot wound to his back.

Detectives recovered a single shell casing and a small bag of

suspected marijuana from the scene. They also obtained security

camera footage from the motel. This footage, which was entered into

evidence and played for the jury, showed that at 8:43 p.m., two men

entered Mitchell’s hotel room. Then, at 8:44 p.m., Mitchell ran out

of his room and into the hotel’s breezeway, followed by the two men

and a third person. One of the men then shot Mitchell before the

three fled the scene. 4

R. W. was in the motel room with Mitchell when the men

entered. R. W. testified that “there was a knock at the door,” and

4 The security footage captured the incident from a distance and was of

insufficient quality to identify the assailants.
3
when Mitchell answered it, “two people ... pushed their way in, and

then they started beating him.” According to R. W., Mitchell

“managed to get away ... and went down the hall, and one [of the

men] stepped out and shot him in the back.” 5

R. W. also told a detective that she knew the man who had shot

Mitchell by his nickname, “Baldhead,” and that she had heard

people call him “Chris.” She gave detectives the hotel and room

number where he stayed. And after a detective obtained a copy of

the driver’s license of the man staying in that hotel room, which

showed that the occupant was Appellant (Christopher Sellers),

R. W. identified Appellant in a photo lineup as the shooter.6 The

detective testified at trial that additional statements from R. W. led

him to believe that R. W. engaged in sex work; that Appellant had

5 In a written statement, which a detective described at trial, R. W.
reported that during the fight in the hotel room, one of the men pistol-whipped
Mitchell in his head or his face, and it was this man who subsequently shot
Mitchell. Mitchell’s autopsy did not reveal any injuries consistent with him
being pistol-whipped, but the medical examiner testified that because Mitchell
had been shot soon thereafter, “his body would not react the same way that
yours or ours [would].” Mitchell would take longer to bruise, the medical
examiner explained, “because he ha[d] low blood pressure and then he ha[d]
no blood pressure.”
6 R. W. also identified Appellant at trial.

4
been her procurer; that she had switched to working for Mitchell;

and that Mitchell was now her procurer.

The jury also heard the testimony of Calvin Leslie, who met

Appellant while they were both incarcerated on unrelated charges

in Nevada. According to Leslie, Appellant relayed that he had shot

a man in the head in a motel in Georgia; that the man owed him

money; that a “girl” was there; but that he would “beat the case”

because the “girl ... [was] strung out on drugs.” Appellant claimed

that “it was like a drug deal went bad.” And according to Leslie,

Appellant was “laughing and joking” when he described what had

happened. Leslie claimed the conversation left him feeling so

“disturbed” that he decided to report it to the DeKalb County

District Attorney’s Office.

2. In his first enumeration of error, Appellant argues that the

evidence was insufficient as a matter of constitutional due process

to support his conviction for murder because R. W. and Leslie were

not credible and because Leslie’s testimony was inconsistent with

R. W.’s and inconsistent with the physical evidence. This argument

5
fails, however, as explained below.

“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of

constitutional due process, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict and inquire whether a rational trier of fact

could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Collins v. State, 321 Ga. 215, 218 (2025) (citing Jackson v. Virginia,

443 US 307, 319 (1979)).

R. W. testified that Appellant, assisted by an unidentified man,

entered Mitchell’s motel room, beat him, and shot him when he tried

to flee. She identified Appellant in a photo lineup and again at trial,

and the events she described were partially captured on the motel’s

security cameras. Additionally, Leslie testified that Appellant

admitted he shot a man in a Georgia motel in the presence of a

female witness. This evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational

jury to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice

murder. See Collins, 321 Ga. at 219 (holding that the evidence was

constitutionally sufficient to support the appellant’s convictions for

malice murder and other crimes where a witness identified the

6
appellant as one of the two men who participated in the shooting

and where another witness overheard the appellant admit his

involvement in the shooting to a third person); Young v. State, 292

Ga. 443, 443–44 (2013) (holding the evidence was constitutionally

sufficient to support the appellant’s convictions for malice murder

where the appellant’s fingerprint was found at the scene and a

jailhouse informant testified that the appellant admitted to the

informant that he shot the victim). Though, on appeal, Appellant

attacks the witnesses’ credibility and contends that there were

conflicts in the evidence, questions of credibility and the resolution

of such conflicts are left to the jury under the Jackson standard and

the resolution of such issues “adversely to the defendant does not

render the evidence insufficient.” Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 400, 406

(2022) (quotation marks omitted)).

3. Next, Appellant claims that the trial court plainly erred by

charging the jury on parties to a crime. Appellant argues that this

instruction was erroneous because the State claimed that Appellant

was the shooter and because no one other than Appellant was ever

7
charged or arrested in relation to Mitchell’s killing. Appellant’s

argument is difficult to parse, but he appears to further claim that

the parties-to-a-crime instruction affected his substantial rights by

relieving the State of its burden to prove each element of the crime

charged beyond a reasonable doubt. As explained below, Appellant’s

claim fails.

Appellant was charged individually and as a party to a crime

with malice murder, two counts of felony murder, and aggravated

assault. Prior to trial, the State submitted its requested jury

instructions, which included a request for the pattern charge on

parties to a crime. Defense counsel did not object to this charge at

the charge conference. Accordingly, consistent with the State’s

request, the trial court charged the jury that:

Every party to a crime may be charged with and convicted
of commission of a crime. A person is a party to a crime
only if that person[:]

(a) directly commits the crime;
(b) intentionally helps in the commission of the
crime;
(c) intentionally advises, encourages, hires,
counsels, or procures another to commit the crime;

8
or
(d) intentionally causes some other person to commit
the crime under such circumstances that the other
person is not guilty of any crime either in fact or
because of legal incapacity.

Defense counsel did not object to the charge after it was given.

Because Appellant’s trial counsel did not object to the parties-

to-a-crime charge, we review Appellant’s claim for plain error only.

See OCGA § 17-8-58(b). See also Williams v. State, 321 Ga. 390, 393

(2025). When determining whether a jury instruction constitutes

plain error, the Court applies the following test:

First, there must be an error or defect — some sort of
deviation from a legal rule — that has not been
intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e.,
affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal
error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected
the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary
case means he must demonstrate that it affected the
outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally,
if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court
has the discretion to remedy the error — discretion which
ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.

Id. at 393–94. “If one prong of the plain error test is not satisfied, we

9
need not address the other prongs of the test.” Id. at 394. Plain error

presents a high standard, and establishing it is “difficult, as it

should be.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Appellant’s claim fails because it is not error — let alone clear

or obvious error — for the trial court to give the parties-to-a-crime

instruction where the State contends that the appellant was the

shooter, so long as there was slight evidence to support the charge.

See Leeks v. State, 303 Ga. 104, 107 (2018) (holding that the trial

court did not err in charging the jury on party to a crime because

there was slight evidence supporting the theory, even though the

State maintained that the appellant was the shooter). This rule

remains applicable, where, as here, “the party requesting a charge

on a particular theory did not advance that theory” at trial.

Nunnally v. State, 319 Ga. 701, 710 (2024). See also Bowman v.

State, 317 Ga. 457, 460–61 (2023) (“[A]s we have repeatedly held,

the State need not charge or even argue a theory of party to a crime

or conspiracy for a crime to be proven in that manner.… So even if

the party requesting a charge on a particular theory did not advance

10
that theory, that instruction is authorized as long as slight evidence

… support[s] the theory of the charge.” (citation and punctuation

omitted)).

Here, the instruction was supported by at least slight evidence:

R. W. testified that two men broke into their room; that the men beat

Mitchell; and that Appellant shot Mitchell as he fled. This evidence

supported the State’s theory that Appellant was the shooter. But

even if the jury only partially credited R. W.’s testimony — such that

it believed Appellant was one of the two men, but not necessarily the

shooter — R. W.’s testimony authorized a murder conviction on the

theory that Appellant was a party to the crime. See Bowman, 317

Ga. at 462 (holding that there was at least slight evidence to support

the parties-to-a-crime instruction where a witness testified that he

was “[a] hundred percent” sure that the defendant was the shooter

because the jury could have disbelieved the witness’s testimony and

because the evidence also authorized the jury to accept a party-to-

the-crime theory in which the defendant’s associate was the

shooter). R. W. testified that two men entered Mitchell’s room

11
together, that both participated in the beating, and that both fled

after the shooting. And the assailants’ entrance into the room, the

shooting, and their flight was captured on security footage. A jury

could infer from this evidence that both men were a party to

Mitchell’s murder, even if Appellant was not the shooter. See id.

(explaining that “[w]hether a person was a party to a crime can be

inferred from his presence, companionship, and conduct before and

after the crime was committed” (quoting Dublin v. State, 302 Ga. 60,

65 (2017))). Because the trial court’s instruction was supported by

at least slight evidence, Appellant has failed to establish that the

court made a clear or obvious legal error by giving it. And because

Appellant has failed to establish one of the elements of plain error,

his plain error claim fails. Williams, 321 Ga. at 394.

4. In his last enumeration, Appellant contends that his

sentence of life without the possibility of parole constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I,

12
Section I, Paragraph XVII of the Georgia Constitution. 7 Appellant’s

briefing is unclear, but he appears to advance three separate

arguments in support of his cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim:

first, sentences of life without parole are always unconstitutional, in

light of society’s “evolving standards of decency”; second, his

sentence of life without parole is unconstitutional because it is

disproportionate to his crime; and third, the trial court violated his

due process rights by sentencing him without assessing, on the

record, whether the sentence imposed was proportionate to the

particular circumstances of his crime. We examine each argument

below and conclude that one of these arguments is waived and that

the other two fail on the merits.

(a) Immediately following the verdict, the trial court conducted

a brief sentencing hearing in which the State argued that Appellant

should be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole,

and Appellant argued that he should be sentenced to life in prison

with the possibility of parole. Though Appellant’s counsel argued

7 See note 2, supra.

13
that his client should receive a more lenient sentence than the State

recommended, Appellant’s counsel did not argue that life without

parole was an unconstitutional or otherwise legally impermissible

sentence for malice murder. Following argument, the trial court

sentenced Appellant, who was 41 years old at the time of the offense,

to life without parole, and Appellant did not object.

(b) We begin by examining whether Appellant’s claims are

preserved for appellate review. As a general rule, to preserve a claim

for appellate review, an appellant must have raised it at the first

available opportunity. See Regan, 317 Ga. at 613. Because the first

opportunity to object to a sentencing statute does not usually arise

until after the jury has returned a guilty verdict, such claims must

typically be raised at or before sentencing. See id. We have

explained, however, that there is an exception to this general rule:

a void sentence — that is, a sentence that the law does not allow —

may be challenged at any time, and “the failure to object at trial does

not waive such a claim.” Marshall v. State, 309 Ga. 698, 702 (2020).

See Veal v. State, 298 Ga. 691, 699 (2016) (“[C]laims that a sentence

14
is void (i.e., illegal) are not subject to general waiver or procedural

default rules[.]”), disapproved of on other grounds by Jones v.

Mississippi, 593 US 98 (2021). By contrast, a claim that a sentence

is merely voidable — that is, erroneous — is waived if it is not raised

at the appropriate time. Veal, 298 Ga. at 699 (“[A] defendant ...

forfeit[s] a claim that his sentence was merely voidable (i.e.,

erroneous) if he does not raise the claim in timely and proper

fashion.”).

In Appellant’s first two arguments, he contends that his

sentence of life without parole is prohibited by the cruel and unusual

punishment clauses of the United States and Georgia constitutions.

In doing so, Appellant implicitly argues that his sentence of life

without parole is void. See Veal, 298 Ga. at 701 (“[A] sentence

imposed in violation of [a] substantive [constitutional] rule

[regarding the Eighth Amendment] ... is not just erroneous but

contrary to law and, as a result, void.” (quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, we may review these claims even though they are

raised for the first time on appeal. In his third argument, however,

15
Appellant appears to argue that the trial court erred by failing to

perform a procedure he contends was required when issuing a

sentence of life without parole. To the extent Appellant makes such

an argument, he merely advances a claim that his sentence is

voidable. See Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 670 (2004) (explaining that

“[a]ssertions taking issue with the procedure employed in imposing

a valid sentence or questioning the fairness of an imposed sentence”

present a claim that the sentence was voidable, rather than void).

And because Appellant raises that claim for the first time on appeal,

it is waived. See Marshall, 309 Ga. at 704 (holding that because the

appellant alleged that his sentence was voidable, rather than void,

he waived his claim by failing to raise it in the trial court). See also

Dougherty v. State, 321 Ga. 577, 585 (2025) (“[T]o the extent that

Dougherty now argues that the Georgia Constitution’s due process

clause required the trial court to sentence Dougherty

proportionately with [his co-indictee], Dougherty did not make any

such objection at sentencing, so this argument is not preserved on

appeal.”).

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(c) We now turn to the merits of Appellant’s remaining two

claims. Both fail.

(i) In his first argument, Appellant appears to contend that

sentences of life without parole for murder are categorically

unconstitutional. His brief suggests that life-without-parole

sentences are unconstitutional under society’s “evolving standards

of decency” because such sentences are just as cruel as the death

penalty but lack the attendant “sentencing and appellate

protections.” We have previously rejected such claims, however. See

Mitchell v. State, 314 Ga. 566, 575–76 (2022) (rejecting a claim that

“evolving standards of decency” and recent Eighth Amendment

caselaw from the United States Supreme Court required this Court

to overturn past cases holding that the procedural requirements

found in OCGA § 17-10-30(b) are not applicable when the trial court

issues a sentence of life without parole on a charge for which the

State did not seek the death penalty). See also Williams v. State, 291

Ga. 19, 21 (2012) (“There is no state or federal constitutional

prohibition against sentencing an adult ... to a term of life in prison

17
without parole for the commission of a homicide.”), disapproved of

on other grounds by Kimbrough v. State, 300 Ga. 516, 520 n.6 (2017).

Because this claim is squarely foreclosed by applicable precedent, it

fails. 8

(ii) Next, Appellant contends that his sentence of life without

parole is unconstitutional because it is disproportionate to his crime.

We have explained that

[t]he Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution bans “cruel and unusual punishments,”
including those that are grossly disproportionate to the
crime committed. To determine whether a sentence is
grossly disproportionate, a court first compares the
gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.
When evaluating the gravity of the offense as part of the
threshold comparison, courts look not only at the
statutory elements of the offense, but also the particular
circumstances of the crime committed as shown by the
record. Moreover, courts must defer to the legislature in
determinations of sentencing parameters unless a
sentence is so overly severe or excessive in proportion to
the offense as to shock the conscience. In the rare case

8 As mentioned above in note 2, we decline to consider Appellant’s cruel-

and-unusual-punishment claim under the Georgia Constitution. Accordingly,
we express no view as to whether the “evolving standards of decency” test is
the proper standard for analyzing the state constitutional right. See Conley v.
Pate, 305 Ga. 333, 339–41 (2019) (Peterson, J., concurring) (arguing Georgia
cases applying that standard to the Georgia Constitution “cannot be squared
with the original public meaning of the Georgia Constitution”).
18
that this threshold comparison leads to an inference of
gross disproportionality, a court next compares the
defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other
offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences
imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. It is the
rare case in which the threshold inference of gross
disproportionality will be met and a rarer case still in
which that threshold inference stands after further
scrutiny.

Sillah v. State, 315 Ga. 741, 754–55 (2023) (citations and

punctuation omitted). Under this standard, Appellant’s claim fails

at the first stage of the analysis. The General Assembly has decreed

that murder “shall be punished by death, by imprisonment for life

without parole, or by imprisonment for life.” OCGA § 16-5-1(e)(1).

And, as stated above, “courts must defer to the legislature in

determinations of sentencing parameters unless a sentence is so

overly severe or excessive in proportion to the offense as to shock the

conscience.” Sillah, 315 Ga. at 755 (quotation marks omitted). The

evidence recounted above shows that Appellant broke into the

victim’s motel room, beat him, and shot him in the back when he

tried to flee, killing him. Under these circumstances, Appellant’s

sentence does not “shock the conscience” and therefore fails to raise

19
an inference of gross disproportionality. Id. (holding that the

defendant’s sentence of life without parole for malice murder failed

to raise an inference of gross disproportionality where the defendant

committed an armed robbery during which the victim was shot and

killed); Sosebee v. State, 317 Ga. 424, 432 (2023) (holding that the

defendant’s recidivist sentence of life without parole for felony

murder failed to raise an inference of gross disproportionality where

the defendant flipped his vehicle while fleeing from police, killing

the passenger). As such, we affirm Appellant’s sentence.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.