Richardson v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0083
George Richardson
v.
The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Crisp County
No. 17R481

Decided: May 19, 2026

LAND, Justice.
Appellant George Richardson challenges his 2021 convic-
tions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the
shooting death of Carnell Saintville.1 Richardson argues that the

1 Saintville was killed on or about September 5, 2015. On November 6,
2017, a Crisp County grand jury indicted Richardson, along with co-defendants
Arianna Hughes and Zankee Newsome, for malice murder (Count 1), felony
murder (Count 2), aggravated assault as to Saintville (Count 3), and aggra-
vated assault as to Montavious McCloud (Count 4). On July 29, 2021, the State
filed a notice of evidence to be used in aggravation of sentence pursuant to
OCGA § 17-10-7. At a trial in August 2021, the jury found Richardson guilty of
all charges. The trial court sentenced Richardson to serve life in prison without
the possibility of parole for Count 1 and a term of 20 years in prison without
the possibility of parole for Count 4, to run consecutively to Count 1. Count 2
was vacated by operation of law and Count 3 merged with Count 1 for sentenc-
ing purposes. On November 1, 2021, Richardson filed a motion for new trial,
which was amended by new counsel on April 19, 2024, July 5, 2024, and Octo-
ber 7, 2024. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on March 11, 2025, and
a fourth amended motion for new trial was filed on April 21, 2025. The trial
court entered a written order denying Richardson’s motion for new trial on July
evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions, that
the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial on the
general grounds and in denying his motion for directed verdict at
trial, and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the ev-
idence presented at trial shows as follows. In 2015, Montavious
McCloud was working as a supervisor at a check verification com-
pany in Cordele. At some point in 2015, McCloud, Carnell
Saintville, and Zankee Newsome began planning to engage in a
check cashing scheme. Newsome introduced McCloud and
Saintville to three people he knew as “Dre, George [Richardson],
and Red.” According to Newsome, Richardson “didn’t have a part
with the check cashing scheme” and the “only thing he did was
drive.”
On August 26, 2015, Newsome’s Facebook account mes-
saged McCloud’s Facebook account with photos of checks that he
and a group of people were going to try to cash in Tampa, Florida
later that day. Although the group was able to cash one of the fake
checks, McCloud was unable to “approve” the second check.
On September 4, Saintville, McCloud, and Newsome’s girl-
friend, Arianna Hughes, drove to Florida to pick up Newsome.
The group then met up with Dre and Richardson in a store park-
ing lot. Dre became upset with Saintville and McCloud and told
them that they owed him money, and Newsome gave Dre $400 to
calm things down. Saintville, McCloud, Newsome, and Hughes
then drove back from Florida to Cordele.

14, 2025. On August 4, 2025, Richardson filed a notice of appeal. The case was
docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2025 and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.

2
The next day, on September 5, Richardson rented a white
Dodge Charger in Tampa and drove Dre, Red, and a man named
Tommy to Cordele. All of the men were armed. That evening, Dre
called Newsome, and Newsome met up with Dre and the other
men at a gas station parking lot. Richardson later drove the group
to a house where Hughes was babysitting.
Dre told Newsome that he wanted to talk with Hughes, so
Newsome texted Hughes to come outside. After being told to
leave, Richardson drove Dre, Red, and Tommy away but returned
about twenty minutes later. Meanwhile, Newsome’s cousin and
another unidentified man arrived at the house. When Hughes
came outside, she saw the white Charger driven by Richardson,
Newsome, Newsome’s cousin, two men in masks, and Dre.
Hughes overheard Dre tell Newsome that the men would “have a
gun at [her],” but did not plan to shoot her. Hughes was forced
into the Charger’s front passenger seat. Newsome’s cousin also
got into the backseat of the Charger. Richardson drove Hughes
away while the two armed men held her at gun point. Dre and
Newsome stayed at the house. Eventually, the armed men told
Hughes to get out of the car and walk slowly in front of them.
Hughes was instructed to call and text Saintville and ask him to
pick her up; Hughes did so. The two armed men held Hughes at
gunpoint in bushes nearby while Richardson parked the Charger
in a nearby alley.
Meanwhile, Saintville and McCloud were at a restaurant
with a friend when Saintville began to receive Hughes’s calls and
messages. Saintville dropped off his friend at her home and drove
with McCloud to meet Hughes. As Saintville’s car approached
Hughes, the armed men told Hughes to walk up to his car slowly.
When Hughes tried to open the rear driver’s side door, the men
began shooting. Saintville attempted to drive away but was shot

3
in the back. McCloud reached over and stopped the car, pulled
Saintville into the backseat, and drove to the hospital. Saintville
died from his wounds, and the medical examiner who conducted
his autopsy testified that the cause of death was a single gunshot
wound to his torso.
After the shooting started, Hughes tried to run away. How-
ever, Richardson drove up next to her and the armed men in-
structed her to get back into the car. As Richardson drove Hughes
away from the scene, the men told her that if she said anything
she would be killed. Richardson dropped Hughes off in another
neighborhood and drove Newsome’s cousin and the armed men
back to Dre’s location. Newsome’s cousin exited the car, and Dre,
who was holding Newsome at gunpoint, forced Newsome into the
car; Richardson drove the group back to Tampa. Newsome testi-
fied that everyone in the car was armed, including Richardson,
and that as Richardson drove, the men discussed Saintville’s
shooting. One of the men stated that when they got to Tampa,
they would “have to kill” Newsome because he “knew too much.”
Newsome testified that he was able to escape when the group
stopped at a motel and that he turned himself into police.
2. Richardson argues that the evidence was constitution-
ally insufficient to support his convictions. Specifically, Richard-
son argues that his convictions rely solely on uncorroborated ac-
complice testimony and that he was merely present for the
crimes. We disagree.
In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of
constitutional due process, we view all of the evidence presented
at trial in the light most favorable to the verdicts and consider
whether any rational juror could have found the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was con-
victed. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 319 (1979); Perkins

4
v. State, 313 Ga. 885, 891 (2022). “We leave to the jury ‘the reso-
lution of conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility of
witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be derived from the
facts.’” Perkins, 313 Ga. at 891 (citation omitted).
“It is well established that a person who does not directly
commit a crime may be convicted upon proof that the crime was
committed and that person was a party to it.’” Clark v. State, 315
Ga. 423, 427 (2023) (cleaned up). See also Crawford v. State, 312
Ga. 452, 455–56 (2021) (“Even where it is undisputed that the vic-
tim was shot by another person, every person concerned in the
commission of the crime may be convicted of the crime.” (citation
and punctuation omitted)); White v. State, 298 Ga. 416, 418 (2016)
(“The fact that [the defendant] was merely the driver and did not
actually fire the gun does not undermine the legal sufficiency of
the evidence against him.”). “Conviction as a party to a crime re-
quires proof of a common criminal intent, which the jury may in-
fer from the defendant’s presence, companionship, and conduct
with another perpetrator before, during, and after the crimes.”
Clark, 315 Ga. at 427. “However, mere presence at the crime
scene is insufficient to make someone a party to a crime.” Id. at
427–28.
Although the evidence presented at trial indicated that
Richardson did not personally shoot at Saintville or McCloud,
there was ample evidence of Richardson’s conduct before, during,
and after the crimes to support his convictions for aggravated as-
sault as to McCloud and malice murder as to Saintville. Richard-
son drove Dre to confront Saintville about owing him money. He
then rented a car to drive Dre and other armed men to Cordele;
drove the car as the group tracked down Newsome and Hughes;
drove the car as the group forced Hughes in at gunpoint and
picked a location to ambush Saintville. Richardson then parked

5
the car and waited until the ambush was complete before driving
away from the scene of the shooting as the group forced Hughes
and then Newsome into the car. Richardson also stayed with the
group as they discussed the murder and after they reached
Tampa, even after Newsome escaped. This evidence was suffi-
cient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reason-
able doubt that Richardson was a party to the crimes of which he
was convicted. See White, 298 Ga. at 418 (evidence sufficient to
convict appellant as party to the crime where evidence showed
that appellant drove his two passengers “slowly past the crime
scene, circled back, returned to the scene a second time, stopped
before the shooting, rapidly drove [the passengers] away from the
scene after the shooting, dropped them off before going to work,
and lied about his presence when questioned by police”).
As for Richardson’s argument that the accomplice testi-
mony against him by other members of the check-cashing scheme
was uncorroborated, “OCGA § 24-14-8 provides that corroboration
is required to support a guilty verdict in felony cases where the
only witness is an accomplice.” Clements v. State, 317 Ga. 772,
789 (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2 However,
“[w]hether accomplice testimony has been sufficiently corrobo-
rated is a question for the jury, and even slight corroborating ev-
idence of a defendant’s participation in a crime is sufficient.” Id.
at 790 (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, two of Richard-
son’s co-indictees, Hughes and Newsome, testified at trial and
sufficiently corroborated one another’s testimony about Richard-

2 We assume without deciding for purposes of our analysis that the
accomplice-corroboration requirement is properly part of the federal constitu-
tional sufficiency analysis. Compare Johnson v. State, 311 Ga. 221, 223 n.2
(2021) with Baker v. State, 320 Ga. 156, 165 n.3 (2024).

6
son’s involvement in the crimes. See id. at 790 (holding that re-
quirement under OCGA § 24-14-8 was satisfied where two accom-
plices testified at trial about appellant’s involvement in the
crimes and “sufficiently corroborated one another’s testimony”).
Both Hughes and Newsome testified that Richardson was driving
the white Charger before and after Saintville’s murder. Accord-
ingly, the evidence presented at trial satisfied the statutory re-
quirement under OCGA § 24-14-8 and was sufficient for the jury,
which was instructed on accomplice corroboration, to conclude be-
yond a reasonable doubt that Richardson was a party to the
crimes of malice murder of Saintville and aggravated assault of
McCloud. 3
3. Richardson argues that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in denying his motion for new trial on the general grounds.
This enumeration is without merit.
Sitting as the thirteenth juror “requires the judge to con-
sider matters typically reserved to the jury, including conflicts in
the evidence, witness credibility, and the weight of the evi-
dence.” Ridley v. State, 315 Ga. 452, 456 (2023). “[T]he merits of
the trial court’s decision on the general grounds are not subject to
our review,” id., and the decision to grant a new trial on the gen-
eral grounds “is vested solely in the trial court.” Ward v. State,
316 Ga. 295, 299 (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).
In its order denying Richardson’s motion for new trial, the
trial court stated the following:
Based on a thorough review of the trial transcripts,

3 To the extent Richardson also argues that the evidence was insuffi-
cient under OCGA § 24-14-6, that statute does not apply where, as here, the
State presented direct evidence of Richardson’s guilt as a party to the crimes.
See Montgomery v. State, 323 Ga. 188, 191 (2025).

7
as well as this Court’s recollection of the testimony
and evidence presented at trial, this Court finds that
any rational trier of fact could have found the essen-
tial elements of the crimes for which the Defendant
was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt as a party
to the crime. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 318–
19 (1979). The verdicts were not contrary to the evi-
dence nor without evidence to support them. Id. Fur-
ther, the verdicts were not decidedly nor strongly
against the weight of the evidence, the law, nor the
principles of justice and equity.

This Court finds that the State proved the Defend-
ant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and this
Court, in exercising its discretion as a “13th juror,”
finds that the evidence was not sufficiently close to
warrant a new trial. Both OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-
21 afford the trial court broad discretion to sit as a
thirteenth juror. When reviewing a motion for new
trial, the trial court has the duty to exercise its dis-
cretion, weigh the evidence, and consider the credi-
bility of the witnesses. Choisnet v. State, 292 Ga.
860, 861 (2013). In exercising its discretion, the trial
judge must consider some of the things that he can-
not when assessing the legal sufficiency of the evi-
dence, including any conflicts in the evidence, the
credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evi-
dence, meaning that the trial judge may grant a new
trial on the general grounds even when the evidence
is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction. State v.
Denson, 306 Ga. 795, 798–99 (2019). However, this
discretion is not boundless; it should be exercised

8
with caution and invoked only in exceptional cases
in which the evidence preponderates heavily against
the verdict. Id. This Court has taken seriously its
substantial discretion, and weighing the particular
facts and overall circumstances of this case, declines
to grant a new trial.

Thus, although Richardson argues that the trial court’s or-
der “simply denies relief and thus failed to meaningfully act as
the thirteenth juror,” the order reflects that the trial court exer-
cised its discretion as the thirteenth juror. See King v. State, 316
Ga. 611, 616 (2023) (trial court properly exercised its discretion
as the thirteenth juror when “[i]n its order denying [the defend-
ant]’s motion for new trial, the court expressly rejected [the de-
fendant]’s general grounds claim because it found that ‘the weight
of the evidence does not preponderate heavily against the verdict
and the verdict was not contrary to the evidence or the principles
of justice and equity’”).
4. Richardson argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for directed verdict. But because “[t]he standard of re-
view for the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal
is the same as for determining the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction,” this claim fails for the same reasons that
Richardson’s sufficiency claim fails, as discussed in Division 2.
See Smith v. State, 304 Ga. 752, 754 (2018).
5. Richardson argues that he received ineffective assis-
tance of counsel in multiple ways. These claims fail.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must prove both deficient performance by his counsel
and resulting prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 US
668, 687 (1984). To prove deficient performance, a defendant must

9
show that his attorney performed his duties in an objectively un-
reasonable way, considering all the circumstances and in the light
of prevailing professional norms. See id. at 687–88. The law rec-
ognizes a “strong presumption” that counsel performed reasona-
bly, which the defen-dant bears the burden of overcoming. Id. at
689. And “decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form
the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently
unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed
such a course.” Wells v. State, 295 Ga. 161, 164 (2014) (citation
omitted).
Even when a defendant has proved that his counsel’s per-
formance was constitutionally deficient, the defendant also must
prove resulting prejudice to prevail on a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. To do so, the defendant must establish that but
for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a “reasonable
probability” that the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different. Strickland, 466 US at 694. “It is not enough ‘to show
that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the
proceeding.’” Harrington v. Richter, 562 US 86, 104 (2011) (quot-
ing Strickland, 466 US at 693). Rather, the defendant must
demonstrate a “reasonable probability” of a different result,
which is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Strickland, 466 US at 694. “If either Strickland prong
is not met, this Court need not examine the other prong.” Palmer
v. State, 303 Ga. 810, 816 (2018). In all, the burden of proving a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a heavy one. See Har-
rington, 562 US at 105.
(a) Richardson argues that his trial counsel rendered inef-
fective assistance when he failed to meaningfully challenge a po-
tentially biased juror, M.C., or conduct adequate follow-up ques-
tioning of that juror.

10
During voir dire, the trial court asked jurors questions
listed in OCGA § 15-12-164(a) 4, and Juror M.C. did not indicate
that he had any bias for or against Richardson. In response to
other questions during voir dire, M.C. stated that he was retired
and had previously served on both a grand jury as well as a pre-
vious jury trial. M.C. revealed that his son had been murdered in
Atlanta several years prior to trial, but when asked whether his
son’s murder would impact his ability to be fair and impartial,
M.C. stated “no.” Trial counsel did not ask any additional follow-
up questions and M.C. served on the jury.
At the hearing on Richardson’s motion for new trial, trial
counsel testified that he believed M.C. could be fair and impartial

4 OCGA § 15-12-164(a) provides the following:
On voir dire examination in a felony trial, the jurors shall be
asked the following questions:
(1) “Have you, for any reason, formed and expressed any opin-
ion in regard to the guilt or innocence of the accused?” If the
juror answers in the negative, the question in paragraph (2) of
this subsection shall be propounded to him;
(2) “Have you any prejudice or bias resting on your mind either
for or against the accused?” If the juror answers in the nega-
tive, the question in paragraph (3) of this subsection shall be
propounded to him;
(3) “Is your mind perfectly impartial between the state and the
accused?” If the juror answers this question in the affirmative,
he shall be adjudged and held to be a competent juror in all
cases where the authorized penalty for the offense does not in-
volve the life of the accused; but when it does involve the life of
the accused, the question in paragraph (4) of this subsection
shall also be put to him;
(4) “Are you conscientiously opposed to capital punishment?” If
the juror answers this question in the negative, he shall be held
to be a competent juror.

11
and noted that he would have discussed whether to strike M.C.
with Richardson before making a final decision.
Trial counsel’s strategic decision not to ask further follow-
up questions after M.C. stated that he would be fair and impartial
because he was satisfied with that answer was objectively reason-
able and therefore Richardson has not shown that trial counsel’s
performance was deficient. See Bright v. State, 292 Ga. 273, 275
(2013) (trial counsel’s questioning during voir dire was profession-
ally reasonable); see also Cade v. State, 289 Ga. 805, 808–09
(2011) (concluding trial counsel made reasonable strategic deci-
sions in declining to pursue further questioning of two jurors).
(b) Richardson argues that his trial counsel rendered inef-
fective assistance when he failed to review and share video dis-
covery with him or “use exculpatory/alternative-suspect mate-
rial.”
Trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing
that his defense strategy was to highlight that the State had been
unable to arrest any of the “actual shooter[s]” in this case and was
“focusing on Mr. Richardson, who was not the guilty party” and
was “just the driver” and a “scapegoat.” Trial counsel also testified
that he met with Richardson multiple times, reviewed discovery
with him, and that “anything [he] received, [he] would have
turned over discovery to Mr. Richardson.” With respect to one of
the videos “where officers said they had contact with Mr. Richard-
son,” trial counsel testified that although he “didn’t watch the
video” with Richardson, he “gave the summaries, as well as the
transcription best we could get it out” because the “audio was not
the greatest.”
As an initial matter, Richardson fails to identify the video
that he alleges his trial counsel did not show him beyond stating

12
that it showed “officers said they had contact with Mr. Richard-
son,” or the other discovery materials that allegedly pointed to
alternative suspects. He has therefore not carried his burden of
showing that his trial counsel performed deficiently. See, e.g.,
Wallace v. State, 296 Ga. 388, 392 (2015) (holding that the appel-
lant had not shown that his trial counsel performed deficiently by
failing to file a motion to suppress identification evidence, be-
cause he did not specify which witnesses gave objectionable testi-
mony or why it was inadmissible and explaining that “it is not
this Court’s job to cull the record on behalf of the [appellant] to
find alleged errors”) (citation omitted). See also Westmoreland v.
State, 287 Ga. 688, 696 (2010) (“[T]he burden is always on the
appellant in asserting error to show it affirmatively by the rec-
ord.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Moreover, “[t]here is no per se rule requiring counsel for
criminal defendants to provide them with copies of all discovery
materials.” Lee v. State, 318 Ga. 412, 430 (2024) (citation and
punctuation omitted), and Richardson has not explained how trial
counsel’s decision to provide a transcript for a video with poor au-
dio quality was objectively unreasonable or how he was preju-
diced by that decision. Richardson has also failed to support his
claim that trial counsel did not use “exculpatory/alternative sus-
pect material.” See Gittens v. State, 307 Ga. 841, 844 (2020) (“Un-
founded speculation about what additional investigation might
have uncovered or about what unnamed witnesses may have tes-
tified [to] cannot support a claim that trial counsel was profes-
sionally deficient, nor can it establish prejudice.”). Accordingly,
this claim fails.
(c) Richardson argues that his trial counsel rendered inef-
fective assistance when he failed to object to GBI Agent Robert
Cunningham’s “prejudicial and unsupported” testimony “t[ying]

13
other named individuals to the crime.” This claim fails.
Richardson does not explain how Agent Cunningham’s tes-
timony, which upon our review of the record was limited to estab-
lishing the chain of custody for items taken from the GBI regional
office to the crime lab, “tied other named individuals to the crime,”
nor does he identify the other named individuals. To the extent
Richardson meant to refer to GBI Agent Terry Howard, who tes-
tified that he met with two possible suspects, Andre “Dre” Smith
and Antonio Vulmer 5, during his investigation of the crimes,
“[t]he matter of when and how to raise objections is generally a
matter of trial strategy.” Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. 98, 105 (2015)
(citation and punctuation omitted). Here, trial counsel testified
that, as part of a defense strategy, he did not object to this testi-
mony because he wanted to highlight that the State had been un-
able to arrest the individuals who actually shot at Saintville and
McCloud and was instead using Richardson, who was merely pre-
sent as a driver, as a scapegoat. This decision to use Agent How-
ard’s testimony to support Richardson’s defense theory was objec-
tively reasonable, and Richardson has therefore not shown defi-
cient performance. See Sawyer v. State, 308 Ga. 375, 386
(2020) (failing to object to testimony was reasonable trial strat-
egy where the statement was used to support defendant’s overall
defense strategy).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren,
P.J., not participating.

5 Vulmer was another individual involved in the check-cashing
scheme.

14