Sheffield v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0514
Timothy LaRue Sheffield
v.
The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Coffee County
No. SUF2019000006

Decided: June 2, 2026

WARREN, Presiding Justice.
In October 2021, Timothy LaRue Sheffield was convicted of
malice murder related to the shooting death of his wife of almost
30 years, Edith Sheffield. 1 He appeals his conviction, arguing
that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction and
that his case should have been dismissed on the ground that his
constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. We conclude
that the evidence was sufficient to support Sheffield’s conviction,
but because the trial court erred in its analysis of Sheffield’s
speedy trial claim, we vacate the order denying Sheffield’s motion

1 Edith was killed in January 2013. In October 2018, a Coffee County
grand jury indicted Sheffield for malice murder. At a jury trial in October
2021, the jury found Sheffield guilty. Sheffield was sentenced to serve life in
prison. Sheffield timely filed a motion for new trial in November 2021 and
amended it with new counsel in November 2023 and April 2024. After eviden-
tiary hearings, the trial court denied Sheffield’s motion in July 2025. Sheffield
filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the
case to this Court. The appeal was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in
December 2025 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
to dismiss and remand the case for the trial court to properly ad-
dress the speedy-trial claim. 2
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
evidence presented at trial showed the following. At 6:04 p.m. on
January 18, 2013, Edith, who was on her way home from work,
called her cousin, and they spoke briefly. Based on Edith’s loca-
tion when she made the call, she would have arrived home by 6:19
or 6:20 p.m. The cousin called Edith back at 6:30 p.m.; Edith did
not answer. At no later than 6:36 p.m., two people driving by
Edith and Sheffield’s house saw that the house was on fire. They
stopped and called 911. When they went into the carport, they
saw Edith’s keys in the door that opened from the carport into the
kitchen. They did not hear anyone in the house.
At the time of the fire, Edith and Sheffield’s next-door
neighbor, who was Sheffield’s mother, and their “across the road”
neighbors, who were Sheffield’s sister and brother-in-law, were
vacationing in Hawaii. However, two other neighbors, who lived
two houses down from the Sheffields, saw the fire and came to the
house. The neighbors looked into the back window of the house
and could see “the entire bottom floor of the house.” They did not
see anyone or anything “out of place” or “messed up.” Eventually,
25 to 30 people gathered at the house while the fire was burning;
no one went inside the house. 3
The first neighbor on the scene called Sheffield, who said

2 Sheffield has raised several other claims on appeal that we do not
consider. Sheffield may raise them again in a renewed appeal if the trial court
rejects the speedy-trial claim on remand. See Kitchens v. State, 322 Ga. 169,
169 n.2 (2025).
3 At least two men the neighbors did not know stopped after seeing the
fire. And there were “multiple people in the woods behind the property” at the
time of the fire.

2
he had been doing sheetrock work at the mobile home he and
Edith had on their property, which was about 450 feet away from
the house, connected by a dirt path through woods. The neighbor
told Sheffield that his house was on fire, and “immediately” there-
after, Sheffield “rolled out of the woods,” driving his truck “real
slow.” Sheffield then got out, “knelt down” or “leaned on the hood”
of the truck, and “lit a cigarette.” Sheffield did not ask about
Edith upon his arrival.
The gathered witnesses asked Sheffield where Edith was,
and he said he did not know. They told Sheffield to call Edith.
Sheffield “turned his back” to the group of neighbors, walked “four
or five feet” away, and made a call. Although one of the neighbors
heard him “mumbl[ing]” on the phone, when he hung up and the
group asked what Edith said, Sheffield said that Edith did not
answer and he did not know where she was. Sheffield did not say
anything more but continued to stand by his truck. After emer-
gency services arrived, Sheffield was taken into the back of the
ambulance and treated for “extremely high blood pressure,”
which the treating doctor said could be caused by “extreme stress”
or “emotional pain.”
The fire in the house caused the second floor to collapse
onto the first floor. 4 Once firefighters got the fire under control
and were able to enter the house, they began to search the debris,
which was “a foot to eighteen inches” deep. During the search,
Sheffield asked a GBI agent about “[a] jewelry box located in the
residence, a fireproof gun safe that was in the residence, and a

4 The fire chief could not determine if an accelerant was used to set the
fire, but he explained that the fire “consumed more in the time frame” than
ordinarily would be expected, which is evidence of an accelerant “the majority
of the time.” Sheffield and Edith kept a gas can in the carport for their lawn
mower.

3
jug … of coins,” wanting “to see if anything had been moved or
taken.” Sheffield did not ask the agent about Edith. The day after
the fire, Edith’s burned body was found in the carport. 5 Edith
was still wearing her jewelry—a necklace, earrings, and three
rings—and her purse—with $1463.71 inside—was found under
her body. Edith had “four pieces of … plastic straws,” the kind
used “for soft drinks and things of that sort,” “grasped” in her left
hand.
A later autopsy showed that Edith had been shot three
times by a 12-gauge shotgun: once in her hand, arm, and the front
of her chest at a “more distant-range” and twice at “close range”
in the back of her head and neck. The head shots “would have
caused her to die immediately.” Based on the lack of smoke in her
lungs, the medical examiner determined that Edith died before
being burned in the fire. The burned “barrel” and “receiver” of a
12-gauge shotgun were found in the debris in “the general area”
between the kitchen and the living room. Edith and Sheffield
kept a shotgun in their bedroom. 6
After almost six years of investigation, law enforcement of-
ficers arrested Sheffield for Edith’s murder in December 2018.
During his trial, evidence was presented that at some point be-
tween the summer of 2008 and the summer of 2009, Sheffield had
an extra-marital affair with Amy Stephens. Stephens testified

5 The two witnesses who had been in the carport at the beginning of
the fire had not seen a body.
6 Because the recovered shotgun was so badly damaged, it could not be
determined through testing if it was the murder weapon or was the Sheffields’
shotgun. No other shotgun was found in the debris in the house. Sheffield told
a GBI investigator that he kept a .32-caliber weapon in his nightstand; this
gun was not found. Other guns were kept in a gun safe in the Sheffields’ son’s
room. According to the Sheffields’ son, after the fire, the safe was located
“about six to eight feet from where it should have been.”

4
that their sexual relationship happened “one time” and was “a
mistake,” but after that, she and Sheffield remained good friends.
Although she moved away from Georgia in the summer of 2009,
she remained in contact with Sheffield, calling him for help with
a “car problem” or “a project or something like that.” Sheffield
sent Stephens money on a “few occasions,” including $500 one
time. Sheffield and Stephens would tell each other they loved
each other, and “at times” Stephens “got the feeling” that Shef-
field wanted a romantic relationship with her, but she “would just
always reassure him … this was a friendship.” Sometime during
2009 or 2010, after she had moved away from Georgia, Sheffield
“requested” that Stephens send him photographs that were “sex-
ual in nature” for his birthday. Stephens “reluctantly sent
them.” 7
Before Edith’s death, Sheffield would talk to Stephens
“about his marriage,” and at some point, Sheffield told Stephens
that he and Edith “had talked about” getting a divorce; that Edith
did not “believe[] in” divorce; and that he was “afraid” that if he
got a divorce, Edith would “take everything.” The week before
Edith’s death on January 18, Sheffield and Stephens exchanged
two phone calls, speaking for 14 minutes on January 14 and 8
minutes on January 16. Stephens testified that she did not re-
member the topic of those phone calls.
After Edith’s death, Stephens saw Sheffield on two occa-
sions, both “probably” in 2014. On one occasion, Stephens stopped
in Georgia on her way to her daughter’s home in Alabama. In

7 These photographs were recovered from a cell phone that was found
in Sheffield’s truck and admitted into evidence. The parties stipulated that
Sheffield had not used this phone since September 2011 and at that point had
transferred his number to a different phone.

5
Georgia, Sheffield went with Stephens to her high school reunion
and then they traveled together to Alabama to work on her daugh-
ter’s house. They worked on the house for about two days, but
they did not sleep together. On another occasion, Sheffield, who
bought a Mustang convertible in 2014, drove the car to Colorado,
where Stephens was living at the time. He did not stay with her,
but he visited and gave Stephens a ring he bought for her on his
recent vacation to the Caribbean, and he gave her son a rifle
scope. 8 Additionally, at some point after Stephens moved to Col-
orado in 2010, Sheffield asked Stephens, “What if I move out
there, could we do a business together, would you move in with
me? Would you be interested?” Stephens answered, “No, of
course not.”
At trial, the State argued that Sheffield killed Edith so he
could be with Stephens because, although Stephens thought the
sexual relationship between her and Sheffield was over, to Shef-
field, Stephens was “the trophy person he wanted to build a life
with” and their continued communication made Sheffield “think
he had a chance.” For his part, Sheffield argued that the murder
was the result of Edith surprising burglars, contending that the
burglars did not steal Edith’s jewelry and purse because they “got
out of there as quickly as they c[ould]” after shooting her and set-
ting the fire to cover it up. 9 The jury found Sheffield guilty of
malice murder.
1. Sheffield contends that the evidence presented at trial
was not sufficient to support his conviction for malice murder as
a matter of constitutional due process and Georgia statutory law.

8 Sheffield went to the Caribbean with Edith and their friends “several
times” before Edith’s death, and he went once after Edith’s death.
9 Sheffield also pointed to evidence that the .32-caliber gun was never
found and that the gun safe was moved as evidence of a burglary.

6
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 319 (1979); OCGA § 24-14-
6. When reviewing these claims, we view the evidence presented
in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Jackson, 443 US at
319; Montgomery v. State, 323 Ga. 188, 190–91 (2025).
(a) In considering Sheffield’s claim based on constitutional
due process, we “ask whether a rational trier of fact” could have
found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder,
and we leave “[q]uestions about the weight and credibility of evi-
dence, the inferences to be drawn from it, and the resolution of
any conflicts in the evidence” to the jury. Profet v. State, 322 Ga.
731, 737 (2025).
Here, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favora-
ble to the verdict, showed that Sheffield was near the crime scene
at the time of the murder. By Sheffield’s own account, he was a
mere 450 feet away from the house where Edith was shot, and
witness testimony indicated that he may have been even closer
than he admitted because although he was allegedly in the mobile
home 450 feet away when he was called to the fire and was driv-
ing “real slow” when he arrived, he arrived at the scene “immedi-
ately.” Sheffield knew where he and Edith kept a shotgun in the
house, and the murder weapon was a shotgun. The jury could
have reasonably inferred that the shotgun found in the house was
both the murder weapon and the gun owned by the Sheffields.
Also, the jury could have inferred from the testimony about
Sheffield’s reaction when he saw the fire that he was not con-
cerned about Edith. He did not attempt to approach the house,
instead smoking a cigarette by his truck, and he did not ask about
Edith. He called Edith only after witnesses told him to, and he
acted suspiciously when calling her, turning away from the group
and eventually reporting that he did not know where Edith was
but making no further efforts to locate her. Even when the house

7
was being searched, Sheffield did not ask about Edith, voicing
concern instead about possessions that were in the house. And
the jury could have inferred that Sheffield chose this day to mur-
der Edith because his closest neighbors, who were also his family,
were out of the state.
The jury also could have concluded that Sheffield was mo-
tivated to kill Edith because he wanted a relationship with Ste-
phens. Although Stephens testified that her affair with Sheffield
was short-lived, there was evidence from which the jury could in-
fer that Sheffield maintained romantic feelings toward Sheffield
and wanted a closer relationship. Specifically, Sheffield remained
in contact with Stephens after she moved away from Georgia, in-
cluding talking to her on the phone twice during the week of the
crimes; Sheffield requested, and Stephens sent him, pictures of a
sexual nature; Sheffield asked Stephens if he could move in with
her; and Sheffield drove to Colorado to visit Stephens and give
her a gift after Edith’s death. Also, Stephens testified that Shef-
field had told her Edith did not “believe[] in” divorce and that he
was “afraid” Edith would “take everything” if he got a divorce.
In light of the inferences the jury was permitted to draw
from this circumstantial evidence presented at trial, we conclude
that the evidence was sufficient to support Sheffield’s malice mur-
der conviction as a matter of constitutional due process. See, e.g.,
Smith v. State, S26A0140, 2026 WL 1072767, at *3 (Ga. Apr. 21,
2026) (holding that the evidence supporting the appellant’s con-
victions was constitutionally sufficient where the appellant had a
motive to shoot the victim and was near the area of the crimes at
the time of the crimes, and gunshot residue was found on clothing
the appellant had been seen wearing on the day of the shooting);
Merritt v. State, 323 Ga. 23, 27 (2025) (holding that the evidence

8
was constitutionally sufficient to support the appellant’s convic-
tions where the evidence showed that he was present at the scene
of the crimes, he had a motive to kill the victim, and after the
crimes he fled the state and went into hiding); Brown v. State, 301
Ga. 728, 731 (2017) (holding that the evidence was constitution-
ally sufficient to support the appellant’s convictions where the ev-
idence supported a finding that the appellant was at the crime
scene at the time of the death, she had a motive to kill the victim,
she “attempted to have persons other than the police check on”
the victim, and “she appeared to know specific information about
the death before the police knew it”); Barnes v. State, 245 Ga. 609,
609 (1980) (holding that the evidence was constitutionally suffi-
cient to support the appellant’s convictions where the appellant
had a motive for the shooting, testimony “placed the appellant in
the general area of the crime at approximately the time of its oc-
currence,” the appellant “had easy access to the trailer where the
murder weapon had been kept,” and the appellant was seen with
the weapon 10 minutes before the shooting occurred).
(b) Georgia law requires that when a conviction is based
entirely on circumstantial evidence, as it was here, the State must
present sufficient evidence to “exclude every other reasonable hy-
pothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” OCGA § 24-14-6.
“Whether an alternative hypothesis is reasonable, and whether
the circumstantial evidence excludes any such hypotheses, are
questions for the jury, and we will not disturb the jury’s findings
unless they are insupportable as a matter of law.” Profet, 322 Ga.
at 737 (quotation marks omitted).
(i) Sheffield argues that the evidence was not sufficient to
exclude the hypothesis that Edith was killed by one of the other
people near the scene at the time of the fire and that Edith was
killed because she interrupted a burglary in progress. However,

9
the evidence presented at trial supported the jury’s rejection of
this hypothesis.
As discussed above, the evidence supported a finding that
Sheffield was near his house at the time of the crime and was
motivated to kill Edith so he could be with Stephens. Although
there was some evidence that other people were near the Shef-
fields’ house around the time of the murder, there was no evidence
that any of those people had any motive to kill Edith. The only
motive Sheffield postulated was that an unknown assailant was
committing a burglary. The burglary theory, however, was un-
dermined by the witnesses’ testimony that nothing seemed “out
of place” or “messed up” when they looked in the house and the
fact that Edith’s jewelry and purse (with more than one thousand
dollars inside) were found with her body. Moreover, the jury could
have inferred that the murder weapon was the shotgun the Shef-
fields owned rather than a different one brought to the scene by a
would-be burglar, and jurors could have rejected as unreasonable
the hypothesis that a burglar located and then used the shotgun
the Sheffields kept in their bedroom after Edith surprised the per-
petrator mid-burglary. Thus, the evidence was sufficient for the
jury to reject as unreasonable the hypothesis that an unknown
person killed Edith during a burglary gone wrong. See Smith,
S26A0140, 2026 WL 1072767, at *4 (“[T]he jury could have con-
cluded that it would be unreasonable to think that someone else
shot [the victim] with no apparent motive, without leaving any
trace of their presence, at the same time that [the appellant]—
who did have a motive—was at the scene of the shooting[.]”); Mer-
ritt, 323 Ga. at 27 (concluding that the jury was authorized to re-
ject as unreasonable the appellant’s hypothesis that unknown
men broke into the victim’s house and killed her, where “the evi-
dence showed that there were no signs of struggle in [the victim’s]
house and [the appellant’s] story required the jury to believe that

10
although the men brought guns to the house, they used household
items to kill [the victim]”).
(ii) Sheffield also argues that we must reverse his convic-
tion based on Carter v. State, 239 Ga. 509 (1977), in which this
Court held that the circumstantial evidence presented in that
case was not sufficient to support the appellant’s convictions un-
der the former, substantially similar, version of OCGA § 24-14-6.
Even assuming Carter was correctly decided, it is distinguishable
from this case and does not mandate that we reverse Sheffield’s
conviction.
Similar to this case, the victim and appellant in Carter
were married, the murder weapon might have been a shotgun the
couple owned, the appellant was close to the crime scene and had
the opportunity to commit the murder, the appellant seemed un-
concerned upon finding the victim after he had been shot, and the
victim’s watch, wallet, and money were found with the body. See
Carter, 239 Ga. at 509–11. And in both cases, there was evidence
that the appellant had an affair that ended before the murder. In
Carter, the appellant’s paramour testified that the affair ended
three to four weeks before the murder, and another witness testi-
fied that the appellant “begged” her paramour to meet her “about
two weeks before the murder.” Id. at 511–12.
But there are important differences between the evidence
presented in Carter and the evidence presented in this case. Ste-
phens’s testimony that she maintained contact with Sheffield—
including sharing two phone calls the week of the murder—is ev-
idence that Stephens and Sheffield were in contact mere days be-
fore the crimes, whereas the appellant and her paramour in
Carter were last in contact two weeks before the murder in that
case. Also, there was no evidence in Carter that the appellant and
her paramour continued to have contact after the murder,

11
whereas the evidence in this case showed that Sheffield spent
time with Stephens in Alabama and Georgia and drove to Colo-
rado to visit Stephens after Edith’s death. Finally, we empha-
sized in our analysis in Carter that the evidence of the appellant’s
motive was particularly weak because there was no evidence
“that appellant wanted a divorce” or that her husband “refused
her a divorce.” Id. at 515. Here, by contrast, Stephens testified
that Sheffield “had talked about” divorce and said Edith did not
“believe[] in” divorce and that he was “afraid” Edith would “take
everything” if he got a divorce. Thus, the evidence of Sheffield’s
motive was different and stronger than the evidence in Carter;
Carter is distinguishable; and Carter does not require that we re-
verse Sheffield’s conviction.
(iii) Based on the above analysis, we reject Sheffield’s ar-
gument that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to
support his malice murder conviction under OCGA § 24-24-6.
2. Sheffield next asserts that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion when it concluded that his right to a speedy trial had not
been violated and denied his motion to dismiss. Sheffield was ar-
rested on December 21, 2018. His trial began slightly over 34
months later, on October 25, 2021. Sheffield remained incarcer-
ated throughout that time. After his first motion for bond was
denied, he filed a motion for reconsideration of bond. At the Sep-
tember 18, 2019 hearing on that motion, the trial court asked the
State what it was “waiting on to get this case tried,” and the State
answered, “Just the order of the cases,” explaining that there
were “other murder cases that have been pending longer.” The
court again denied Sheffield’s bond request but said, “[T]his case
just needs to be scheduled and tried.”
On October 21, 2021 (one day before a scheduled hearing
on pretrial motions and four days before trial started), Sheffield

12
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his constitutional
right to a speedy trial had been violated. No hearing was held on
the motion, and no written order was issued on the motion before
trial. However, at the hearing on Sheffield’s motion for new trial,
the trial court concluded that it had verbally denied the motion to
dismiss, but not on the record. 10 The court then issued a written
order denying Sheffield’s motion to dismiss, dating it nunc pro
tunc to October 25, 2021.

(a) Legal Framework
In ruling on a constitutional speedy trial claim, a trial court
must first consider “whether the interval from the accused’s ar-
rest, indictment, or other formal accusation to the trial is suffi-
ciently long to be considered presumptively prejudicial.” Hender-
son v. State, 310 Ga. 231, 234–35 (2020) (quotation marks omit-
ted).
If the delay is long enough to invoke the presump-
tion of prejudice, the trial court must balance four
factors: (1) whether the delay before trial was un-
commonly long, (2) whether the government or the
criminal defendant is more to blame for the delay,
(3) whether, in due course, the defendant asserted
his right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether he suf-
fered prejudice as the delay’s result.

Id. (cleaned up). See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514, 530

10 The motion to dismiss was discussed at the motion for new trial
hearing because Sheffield argued in his motion for new trial that the trial court
should have granted Sheffield’s motion to dismiss and that his counsel pro-
vided ineffective assistance by “elect[ing] to have the Court rule on the motion
[to dismiss] without evidence.”

13
(1972); Doggett v. United States, 505 US 647, 652 (1992).
The application of the Barker test is committed to the
sound discretion of the trial courts, so this Court “accepts the trial
court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous,” and re-
views “the trial court’s evaluation of each factor and its balancing
of the factors—its ultimate judgment—only for abuse of discre-
tion.” Nelson v. State, 321 Ga. 460, 463 (2025). “[I]t is imperative
that the trial court enter findings of fact and conclusions of law
consistent with Barker,” and “it is not the role of an appellate
court to weigh the Barker factors in the first instance.” Kitchens
v. State, 322 Ga. 169, 178 (2025).
If the trial court’s factual findings are clearly erro-
neous or the trial court significantly misapplies the
law, we will affirm the trial court’s exercise of dis-
cretion only if we can conclude that, had the trial
court used the correct factual and legal analysis, it
would have had no discretion to reach a different
judgment. If the trial court would still have discre-
tion to reach a different judgment, we remand for
the trial court to reweigh the factors and exercise its
discretion using the correct factual and legal analy-
sis.

Nelson, 321 Ga. at 463 (cleaned up).

(b) The Trial Court’s Order
In the order denying Sheffield’s motion to dismiss, the trial
court first noted that Sheffield was arrested on December 21,
2018, was indicted on January 30, 2019, waived arraignment on
February 4, 2019, filed his motion to dismiss on October 21, 2021,
and was tried beginning on October 25, 2021. The court then

14
stated that “[t]he delay of over 34 months is a presumptively prej-
udicial delay requiring the four-factor analysis of Barker v.
Wingo.”
(i) As to the first factor, which the court recognized is “the
length of the delay,” the trial court held only: “‘The presumptive
prejudice arising from delay cannot alone carry a Sixth Amend-
ment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria. Instead,
it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases
with the length of delay.’” (quoting State v. Sutton, 273 Ga. App.
84, 86 (2005)).
(ii) As to the second factor—the reason for the delay—the
trial court held that it “weighs neither for or against the State.”
The court first noted that there were several status conferences
held on the case after Sheffield was arrested, including three in
2019, three in 2020, and one in 2021. The court then found that
“[j]ury trials were prohibited by Emergency Orders of the Su-
preme Court of Georgia” from March 14, 2020 to October 10, 2020
and from December 23, 2020 to March 9, 2021.11 The court found
that during the brief period when jury trials were allowed be-
tween October 2020 and December 2020, “the court attempted a

11 On March 14, 2020, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Geor-
gia issued an order declaring a Statewide Judicial Emergency due to the Covid-
19 pandemic. The order instructed courts to “remain open to address essential
functions” “[t]o the extent feasible” and stated that jury trials that had already
begun should “continue to conclusion, unless good cause exists to suspend the
trial or declare a mistrial.” The order set the state of emergency to terminate
on April 13, 2020, unless extended. Later orders extended the Statewide Ju-
dicial Emergency until June 30, 2021. During this time, jury trials were ex-
pressly prohibited by order from May 11, 2020, to October 10, 2020, and from
December 23, 2020, to March 9, 2021. See https://www.gasupreme.us/court-
information/court_corona_info/.

15
jury trial in another case, but a mistrial occurred because of pen-
etration of Covid-19 infection into the Coffee County District At-
torney’s Office.” 12 The court found that “[o]nce jury trials re-
sumed in May, 2021, there was a considerable backlog of cases to
work through” and that “courtroom space was limited” because
the Coffee County Courthouse “was undergoing extensive renova-
tions during the second half of 2021.”
The court found that Sheffield’s case “was tried less than
six months after jury trials became practicable” and concluded
that the trial was held “as soon as was practicable given the public
health emergency, ensuing backlog, and available facilities.” The
court held that the “State was not responsible for the delays occa-
sioned by the Covid-19 pandemic” and ultimately concluded: “The
length of the delay in this case, given the above timeline, public
health emergency, and related complications is not attributable
to either the State or Defendant.” 13
(iii) As to the third factor, the court found that Sheffield
“did not at any point assert his Constitutional right to a speedy
trial until the evening of October 21, 2021, which was the day be-
fore the hearing on pretrial motions,” so the court weighed this

12 The trial court order says that this other trial began on December 7,
2019, and a mistrial was declared on December 9, 2019. The 2019 in both dates
appears to be a scrivener’s error because the record strongly suggests that the
trial at issue began in 2020. Specifically, the rest of the paragraph discussing
the timing of this trial implies that it happened between October 10, 2020, and
December 23, 2020, and the timeline submitted into evidence by the State at
the motion for new trial hearing states that this trial was held from December
7 to December 9, 2020.
13 As noted in footnote 16 below, Sheffield does not challenge the trial
court’s decision not to weigh the delays attributable to the Covid-19 emergency
orders against either party, so we do not decide whether that conclusion was
correct. As discussed further below, however, we conclude that the trial court
made other errors in its analysis of this factor.

16
factor “heavily against” Sheffield.
(iv) As to prejudice from the delay, the court found “no ev-
idence of oppressive pretrial incarceration,” concluding that be-
cause Sheffield did not present any evidence in support of his mo-
tion to dismiss, there was no evidence “regarding anxiety and con-
cern of the accused” or of any “hypothetical witnesses whose mem-
ories waned with time” or “physical evidence no longer able to be
obtained.” Thus, the court found “no prejudice” to Sheffield “as a
result of the delay” and held that “this factor does not weigh in
favor of dismissal.”
(v) In conclusion, the court stated:
The Court finds that, while there is a presumptively
prejudicial delay of between 24 to 34 months, that
presumption was overcome as the factors taken as a
whole, weigh against the Defendant, particularly in
light of the reason for the delay, Defendant’s lengthy
delay in asserting his right to a speedy trial, and the
absence of any prejudice to his defense.

The court then denied Sheffield’s motion to dismiss.

(c) Analysis
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the trial
court significantly misapplied the law as to the first two factors of
the Barker test, and we vacate the trial court’s order denying
Sheffield’s motion to dismiss and remand for the trial court to
properly weigh those factors in the first instance.
(i) To address the first factor, trial courts must calculate
the length of the delay, which begins at “the time of arrest or for-
mal accusation or indictment, whichever occurs first,” and “runs
until the date on which the defendant’s trial begins.” Henderson,

17
310 Ga. at 235. A delay of 12 months or more is generally pre-
sumed to be prejudicial. Id. at 236.
There is ambiguity in the trial court’s order as to its deter-
mination of the length of the delay here. As laid out above, in the
order, the trial court initially identified the relevant dates and
then correctly stated that a delay of 34 months is presumptively
prejudicial. However, when the trial court balanced the Barker
factors in its conclusion, the trial court “f[ound] that … there is a
presumptively prejudicial delay of between 24 to 34 months.”
Thus, it is not clear if the trial court found that the length of the
delay was 24 months, 34 months, or some amount of time between
24 and 34 months. 14 This failure “to expressly calculate the
length of the delay” is a “significant misapplication[] of the law.”
Kitchens v. State, 322 Ga. 169, 171 (2025) (holding that the trial
court significantly misapplied the law when, “in reviewing the
length of the delay,” the court noted when Kitchens was arrested,
indicted, reindicted, and tried, and said “the time span of this de-
lay was presumptively prejudicial,” but failed to “expressly calcu-
late the length of the delay”).
Clearly determining the length of the delay is important
for the first Barker factor because in weighing this factor, the trial
court must consider whether the delay before trial was uncom-
monly long and should assign weight to this factor. See Nelson,
321 Ga. at 464. Here, however, the trial court failed to weigh the
length of the delay as part of its consideration of the first Barker

14 The reason for the ten-month discrepancy is not clear from the face
of the order. We observe that the amount of time the trial court found that
jury trials were prohibited was about nine and a half months, so the trial court
may have been deducting that time from its ultimate calculation of the delay.
If so, that would be a legal error. See Henderson, 310 Ga. at 235 (explaining
that once the right to a speedy trial attaches, the “time then runs until the date
on which the defendant’s trial begins”).

18
factor. Instead, the court conflated the threshold “presumption-
of-prejudice inquiry” and the “length-of-the-delay factor” and con-
cluded only that the length of the delay was “presumptively prej-
udicial”; in doing so, the court “significantly misapplied the law.”
See Nelson v. State, 321 Ga. 460, 464 (2025). Notably, in cases
where the trial court has correctly considered this length-of-the-
delay factor, we have held that the court did not abuse its discre-
tion by holding that a 30-month delay weighed to some extent
against the State. See, e.g., Leonard v. State, 316 Ga. 827, 839
(2023) (“[T]he trial court was correct to weigh the length of the
delay [of 30 months] against the State.”); Davis v. State, 315 Ga.
252, 256 (2022) (identifying no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s conclusion that a 30-month delay weighed “lightly”
against the State).
(ii) As to the reason-for-the-delay factor, “the trial court
must consider which party was responsible for the delay, whether
the delay was intentional, and, if it was intentional, what the mo-
tive was for seeking or causing the delay.” Nelson, 321 Ga. at 465
(quotation marks omitted). The trial court may assign different
weights for different reasons; for example “an unintentional de-
lay,” such as one caused by “the trial court’s overcrowded docket,
should be weighted less heavily against the government.” Id.
(cleaned up).
As explained above, when considering this factor, the trial
court focused on the Covid-19 emergency orders, concluded that
the State was not responsible for delays caused by Covid-19, and
weighed the factor neutrally, neither for or against either party.15

15 Although, in the section of the trial court’s order discussing the rea-
son-for-the-delay factor, the trial court concluded that this factor should be
weighed neutrally, when balancing the factors in the conclusion, the trial court

19
In so doing, the trial court misapplied the law because it failed to
consider who was responsible for the parts of the delay that were
not attributed to the Covid-19-related emergency orders and
failed to weigh the factor accordingly. 16
Based on the trial court’s findings about when the Covid-
19-related prohibition on jury trials began, Sheffield was incar-
cerated for about 14 months (from December 21, 2018, to March
14, 2020) before jury trials were first prohibited; about two
months when jury trials were briefly permitted from October 10,
2020, to December 23, 2020; and over seven months after jury tri-
als were allowed to resume (March 9, 2021, to October 25, 2021).

stated: “the factors taken as a whole, weigh against the defendant, particularly
in light of the reason for the delay, Defendant’s lengthy delay in asserting his
right to a speedy trial, and the absence of any prejudice to his defense.” Be-
cause the trial court listed all three factors after concluding that the factors “as
a whole, weigh against the defendant,” this sentence could be read as conclud-
ing that all of the factors weighed against Sheffield, even though the trial court
did not make any findings that Sheffield contributed to the reason for the de-
lay. In our analysis, we will assume that the trial court’s clearer conclusion—
that the reason-for-the-delay factor did not weigh against either party—was
what the trial court considered in balancing the factors in its ultimate conclu-
sion. However, we note that, in light of a lack of any findings that Sheffield
contributed to the delay, the court would have abused its discretion by weigh-
ing the reason-for-the-delay factor against Sheffield. See Nelson, 321 Ga. at
465–66 (holding that the trial court should not have attributed part of the delay
to the defendant where the court’s factual finding that the trial was delayed
due to defense counsel’s requests was clearly erroneous).
16 Sheffield argues only that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to consider the delays that were not attributed to Covid-19-related court
closures. He has never argued that the delays attributable to the Covid-19
emergency orders should be weighed against the State, so we do not decide that
question today. See Nelson, 321 Ga. at 465 n.4 (declining to decide whether
the Court of Appeals cases that have held that delays caused by Covid-19
should not be weighed against either party are correct because the appellant
conceded that point below and did not raise it on appeal).

20
As to the 14-month delay, the trial court noted that some
status conferences were held on the case during this time, but the
court failed to make any findings as to the cause of that lengthy
delay. As noted above, there was some discussion about the pre-
trial delay at the September 2019 bond reconsideration hearing,
and the State said it was waiting to try Sheffield’s case because
“other murder cases [had] been pending longer.” As to the two
months at the end of 2020 when jury trials were allowed, the court
found that the State elected to try a different case and then there
was a “penetration of Covid-19 infection” in the District Attor-
ney’s office. As to the final seven-month delay after jury trials
were again allowed to resume, the trial court found that “there
was a considerable backlog of cases” and “courtroom space was
limited” due to renovations.
Delays caused by selection of cases, a backlog of cases, and
limited courtroom space are attributable to the State. See, e.g.,
Nelson, 321 Ga. at 465 (explaining that a delay caused by “the
trial court’s overcrowded docket” should be weighed against the
State, although not heavily); Redding v. State, 318 Ga. 225, 229
(2024) (holding that the reason-for-the-delay factor “should be
weighed against the State” where the 25-month delay was at-
tributed “to the need for the State to collect evidence” and “for the
court to provide timely trials to other cases”). However, the trial
court failed to attribute any of the delay to the State. Thus, the
trial court significantly misapplied the law as to this factor by
failing to determine who was responsible for the delay not at-
tributed to the Covid-19 emergency orders and failing to weigh
the factor accordingly. See Redding v. State, 313 Ga. 730, 733
(2022) (holding that the trial court improperly “failed to weigh”
the reason-for-the-delay factor where it “failed to address the
amount of time involved in each delay” that was part of the pre-
trial period and failed to attribute it to the appellant or the State).

21
(iii) As to the assertion-of-the-right factor, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by weighing this factor heavily against
Sheffield because Sheffield waited 34 months (from his arrest on
December 21, 2018, until October 21, 2021) to assert his right to
a speedy trial. See Rucker v. State, 315 Ga. 568, 581 (2023) (con-
cluding that the trial court “acted within its discretion in weigh-
ing this factor heavily against” the defendant, where the defend-
ant “waited 17 months to file his constitutional speedy trial mo-
tion”); Davis v. State, 315 Ga. 252, 258 (2022) (concluding that it
was not an abuse of discretion to conclude that the defendant’s
failure to file a timely statutory speedy trial motion and the “29-
month delay in asserting his constitutional speedy-trial right[]
weighed heavily against him”).
(iv) As to the prejudice factor, “[t]he prejudice associated
with unreasonable delay before trial includes oppressive pretrial
incarceration, anxiety and concern of the accused, and the possi-
bility that the accused’s defense will be impaired by dimming
memories and loss of exculpatory evidence.” Henderson, 310 Ga.
at 239 (cleaned up). Here, at the time the trial court considered
his motion to dismiss, Sheffield did not present any evidence that
his pretrial incarceration was oppressive, caused him anxiety, or
hindered his defense, and the trial court did not clearly err by
finding no other evidence of prejudice. Thus, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by not weighing this factor in Sheffield’s
favor. See id.17

17 At the motion for new trial hearing, Sheffield testified that during
his pretrial incarceration, he experienced “a lot of stress and anxiety … from
not being able to see the family”; that his anxiety medication had to be in-
creased; that he “had to sell off a lot of assets to help pay for stuff”; that the
“lack of sunshine” caused him to lose many of his teeth; and that he was not

22
(v) In sum, we have concluded that the trial court misap-
plied the law when considering the first two Barker factors by
failing to clearly calculate the length of the delay, failing to weigh
the length-of-the-delay factor, and failing to attribute responsibil-
ity for the period of the delay not related to the Covid-19 emer-
gency orders. We cannot conclude that if the trial court had
weighed these two factors appropriately, it “necessarily would
have ruled that there was no violation of the constitutional right
to a speedy trial.” Kitchens, 322 Ga. at 178. We therefore vacate
the trial court’s denial of Sheffield’s motion to dismiss on consti-
tutional speedy-trial grounds and remand for further considera-
tion of the motion. See id. See also Nelson, 321 Ga. at 469 (va-
cating the trial court’s order denying the appellant’s motion to
dismiss on constitutional speedy trial grounds “[b]ecause the trial
court would not have been compelled to deny Appellant’s motion
to dismiss if it had used the correct factual and legal analysis”).
Judgment vacated and case remanded. All the Justices
concur.

able to meet with his attorney as often as he wanted. In his reply brief to this
Court, Sheffield argues that the trial court should have considered this testi-
mony in ruling on his motion to dismiss (even though the order was dated nunc
pro tunc to a date before this evidence was presented). Even assuming the
trial court should have considered Sheffield’s testimony, it did not abuse its
discretion by declining to weigh the prejudice factor in Sheffield’s favor because
even considering that testimony, Sheffield did not present evidence of oppres-
sive pretrial incarceration or anxiety that was “unusual or extraordinary for a
criminal defendant awaiting trial.” Henderson, 310 Ga. at 239 (“Because the
trial court did not clearly err in finding that Henderson’s anxiety was not un-
usual or extraordinary for a criminal defendant awaiting trial, we see no abuse
of discretion in its determination that Henderson was not prejudiced in this
regard.”).

23