In THE INTEREST OF R. J. A., a Child

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA
Case No. S23C0133

July 5, 2023

The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment.

The following order was passed:

IN THE INTEREST OF R. J. A., a child.

The Supreme Court today denied the petition for certiorari in
this case.

All the Justices concur.

Court of Appeals Case No. A22A1062

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA
Clerk’s Office, Atlanta

I certify that the above is a true extract from the
minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto
affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk
PINSON, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari.

I agree that we should not grant review of the Court of Appeals’

decision in this case. I write separately to flag a narrow issue having

to do with how to understand and apply the holdings of an appellate

court, which may warrant review in an appropriate case.

The question presented in this case is whether a superior court

or a juvenile court had jurisdiction over the underlying prosecution

against R. J. A., a juvenile. A juvenile charged with a crime within

the jurisdiction of the superior court “who is detained” is entitled to

have the charge presented to the grand jury “within 180 days of the

date of detention.” OCGA § 17-7-50.1 (a). If the charge hasn’t been

presented after 180 days of detention, the case must be transferred

to juvenile court. Id. at § 17-7-50.1 (b). In this case, R. J. A. was

arrested and detained on March 1, 2019, then released on bond just

over a month later, but on the special conditions that he wear an

ankle monitor that reported his location, and that he remain at

home except to attend school, work, necessary legal and medical

appointments, and one religious service per week. He was then

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indicted on October 23, 2019, more than 180 days after he was

arrested and initially detained. So which court has jurisdiction turns

on whether R. J. A. was “detained” during his period of monitored

home confinement. If so, the juvenile court should have exercised

jurisdiction. If not, jurisdiction rested with the superior court.

In addressing this jurisdictional question, the Court of Appeals

properly looked to our decision in State v. Coleman, 306 Ga. 529 (832

SE2d 389) (2019). In Coleman, the juvenile defendant was likewise

arrested and detained, and then released on bond just over a month

later. Almost two years later, he was indicted, and the defendant

moved to transfer his case to juvenile court under the same statute

at issue here, OCGA § 17-7-50.1. The superior court granted the

motion, but we reversed. We explained that this statute did not

require transfer to juvenile court unless the defendant was detained

for the 180-day period, and “if a child is released on bond or

otherwise, they are no longer ‘detained’ within the meaning of the

statute.” Coleman, 306 Ga. at 531. Applying Coleman, the Court of

Appeals held that, “because R. J. A. was released and remained on

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bond prior to the running of 180 days, he was not detained within

the meaning of OCGA § 17-7-50.1.” Interest of R. J. A., 365 Ga. App.

118, 123 (3) (b) (877 SE2d 673) (2022). So, the court held, “the case

did not run afoul of the time limitation set by that Code section,” and

“the superior court continued to have exclusive jurisdiction over the

case.” Id.

I agree with all of this. But along the way to this decision—

which, by itself, seems to me a faithful and reasonable application

of Coleman—the Court of Appeals took an extra step that gives me

pause. In explaining why “Coleman forecloses R. J. A.’s argument,”

the court noted, “Although that decision does not speak directly to

the question that the Supreme Court left open in Johnson, the

archival records of Coleman reveal that, like R. J. A., the defendant

in that case was released from bond with conditions including home

confinement.” Id. at 122 (3) (b) (emphasis added). In other words,

the court looked beyond the Coleman opinion itself to the record of

the case to determine the breadth of its holding. In explaining this

step, the court noted that both the Court of Appeals and our Court

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“occasionally look to archived records to distinguish authority.” See

id. at 122 (3) (b) n.1 (citing in support Prophecy Corp. v. Charles

Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27 (343 SE2d 680) (1986) and Little

Ocmulgee Elec. Membership Corp. v. Lockhart, 212 Ga. App. 282

(441 SE2d 796) (1994)).

The Court of Appeals was not wrong about that: our courts

have sometimes looked to a case’s archival records to help determine

the scope of a holding in past decisions. See also, e.g, Ware v. State,

305 Ga. 457, 460 (2) (826 SE2d 56) (2019). But I have real doubts

about whether that practice is appropriate. Speaking broadly, a

holding in an appellate opinion is a determination on a matter of law

that is necessary to the decision in question. See Bryan A. Garner,

et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 44 (2016) (“A holding consists

of the ‘court’s determination of a matter of law pivotal to its

decision.’” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 849 (Bryan A. Garner

ed., 10th ed. 2014))). It is not always easy to figure out what parts of

an appellate decision make up its holding. Questions about whether

particular facts or reasoning are important or necessary to a

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decision, or just how necessary something must be to count as part

of the holding, can be hard to answer. See, e.g., Mercer Univ. v.

Stofer, 306 Ga. 191, 191-192, 200-201 (4) (830 SE2d 169) (2019)

(explaining that the Court of Appeals was “led astray” by an “acute

problem from our case law” arising out of language in Atlanta

Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc. v. Hawthorne, 278 Ga. 116 (598

SE2d 471) (2004), that was not necessary to the holding in that

case). See also Charles W. Tyler, “The Adjudicative Model of

Precedent,” 87 U. Chi. L.R. 1551, 1552-1553 (Sept. 2020) (noting

that it is “highly contestable” what it means for a statement of law

to be “necessary for the outcome” of a case). But it seems reasonably

clear to me that the universe of things that are potentially necessary

to an appellate court’s decision—and thus make up its holding—is

contained within that court’s opinion. If a court does not see fit to

mention a particular fact in its opinion and otherwise provides

reasoning for its decision, that seems like a conclusive sign that the

missing fact is not necessary to the decision and therefore is not part

of the court’s holding. See Garner, supra at 81 (noting that when an

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opinion does not lay out all the facts that went into the decision, “the

full facts”—that is, those not in the opinion—“aren’t likely to be

much help when the court hasn’t left any evidence that the missing

facts played a role in its decision”). In fact, other decisions of the

Court of Appeals are in accord with this understanding. See MOM

Corp. v. Chattahoochee Bank, 203 Ga. App. 847, 847-848 (2) (418

SE2d 74) (1992) (“The decisions of our appellate courts must speak

for themselves, and the archival records are not available to litigants

in other cases to raise questions about facts or issues not stated or

decided in them.”); Chan v. W-East Trading Corp., 199 Ga. App. 76,

77 (3) (403 SE2d 840) (1991) (“[I]t is the facts contained within an

officially reported case which have legal significance when applying

the case as precedent, not bare assertions of facts found within the

briefs of the parties and not contained in the text of the reported

case.”). See also Humphrey v. Wilson, 282 Ga. 520, 539 (652 SE2d

501) (2007) (Carley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(noting that when the majority opinion explained why a prior

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precedent did not control, one of the majority’s reasons was

grounded in a fact that was not stated in the prior opinion).

This conclusion makes practical sense, too. Appellate courts

issue opinions that explain our decisions because those decisions are

binding, and courts, litigants, and the public need to know the legal

rules that bind them. It would be both strange and unfortunate if

the public had to review not only our opinions, but also the archival

records of our cases, to know what the law is.

In short, I doubt it is necessary or proper for a court to review

the archival record of a case to determine whether the holding of an

appellate decision in that case controls a legal question currently

before the court. I do not think answering that question would make

a difference in this case in light of Coleman’s clear holding, so I agree

with the Court’s decision to deny certiorari. But we might consider

addressing the question, if it arises again, in an appropriate case.

I am authorized to state that Justice Warren joins in this

concurrence.

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