Damien Brooks v. Tatum Eichfeld

FIRST DIVISION
BARNES, P. J.,
MARKLE and HODGES, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

May 8, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A0075. BROOKS v. EICHFELD.

HODGES, Judge.

Damien Brooks filed this appeal from the trial court’s denial of his petition for

adoption, in which he sought to adopt his three minor stepchildren. The children’s

biological father is Tatum Eichfeld. Brooks argues on appeal that the trial court erred

in denying his adoption petition (1) by finding that Eichfeld’s failure to communicate

with the children or make bona fide efforts to do so was justified, and by providing

insufficient findings about whether Eichfeld’s failure to pay child support was

justified; and (2) by determining that adoption was not in the children’s best interest.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

In matters of adoption the trial court has a very broad discretion which
will not be controlled by the appellate courts except in cases of plain
abuse. Thus, if there is any evidence to support the judgment entered in
an adoption proceeding, it must be affirmed by this Court. Furthermore,
in cases concerning termination of parental rights, we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee and defer to the trial
court in the area of factfinding.

Price v. Grehofsky, 349 Ga. App. 214, 215 (825 SE2d 594) (2019) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

So viewed, the record shows that Eichfeld and the children’s biological mother,

Jannah Brooks, married in 2015. Jannah gave birth to twin girls that same year, and to

a son in 2018. The biological parents’ relationship was tumultuous. Jannah testified

that after the twins were born, Eichfeld became abusive and controlling. Eichfeld

admitted that he had thrown Jannah off the porch during their marriage, but testified

that he did so because she kicked him in the testicles. Jannah testified that four or five

restraining orders had been issued against Eichfeld. She also testified, and Eichfeld

admitted, that he made false claims in order to get a restraining order against her,

causing her to be arrested and jailed for about a month while she was still breastfeeding

their youngest child. Eichfeld took care of the children while she was incarcerated, and

also during three instances where Jannah had “taken off[,]” leaving the marital home

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for, in one of the instances, “a month or so.” Jannah’s mother testified that she had

no concerns about the children being alone with Eichfeld, and there is no evidence

that Eichfeld abused the children. Jannah testified that when Eichfeld cared for the

children, he did not provide them with medical care, and the youngest child got an ear

infection which led to several surgeries. The child’s nurse practitioner, however,

testified that the fault could not definitively be attributed to Eichfeld.

After Eichfeld pled guilty to counts of making the false report that led to

Jannah’s arrest and to the aggravated stalking of Jannah in violation of a temporary

protective order, he was sentenced to serve five years in confinement.

Jannah and Eichfeld divorced in 2021, while he was still incarcerated. She

married Brooks the same year. Jannah and Eichfeld entered into a consent final order

and incorporated parenting plan that, among other things, gave Eichfeld visitation and

provided that he pay child support. The consent final order gave the parties joint legal

custody of the children. Jannah received primary physical custody.

About a month before Eichfeld was due to be released, Jannah sought and was

granted a temporary protective order against Eichfeld which prevented him from

visiting the children after his June 2024 release. Jannah later successfully moved for

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a modification of custody, and in September 2024, the trial court granted her sole

physical and legal custody of the children and suspended Eichfeld’s visitation because

of the protective order.

Brooks petitioned to adopt all three children around the same time pursuant to

OCGA §§ 19-8-6 and 19-8-10(b)(1), (2), alleging that Eichfeld had failed, for a period

of one year or more, to communicate or make bona fide attempts to communicate with

the children, and had failed to provide for their care and support. Following a hearing,

the trial court denied the petition, finding that Brooks had failed to produce clear and

convincing evidence that Eichfeld lacked justifiable cause for his failures to

communicate with the children or to pay child support, and had failed to show by clear

and convincing evidence that adoption would be in the children’s best interest. Brooks

appealed.

1. Brooks first argues that the trial court erred in finding that Eichfeld had

justifiable cause for his failures to communicate with the children and to provide child

support.1 We find no error.

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We note at the outset that both parties have failed to provide adequate
citations to the record. While both parties include record citations, Brooks’ brief
presents some factual arguments without offering supporting record citations, and
Eichfeld’s brief presents some record citations that are inaccurate. Further, neither
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As the petitioner, Brooks bears the burden of proving that the termination of

parental rights is warranted, including the lack of justifiable cause, because of

Eichfeld’s failure to communicate with or support the children. Ray v. Hann, 323 Ga.

App. 45, 49(2) (746 SE2d 600) (2013).

Pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-6(a)(1)

A child whose legal father and legal mother are both living but are
not still married to each other may be adopted by the spouse of either
parent only when the other parent voluntarily and in writing surrenders
all of his or her rights to the child to that spouse for the purpose of
enabling that spouse to adopt the child and the other parent consents to
the adoption[.]

party has complied with the record citation format provided in Court of Appeals Rule
25(d)(2) (“Reference to an electronic record should be indicated by the volume
number of the electronic record and the PDF page number within that volume (Vol.
Number – PDF Page Number; for example, V2-46).”). It is not this Court’s
responsibility to cull the record on behalf of any party, and if we have failed to locate
evidence in the record, the responsibility lies with counsel. See In the Interest of C. T.,
286 Ga. App. 186, 187(1) (648 SE2d 708) (2007). See also Rolleston v. Estate of Sims,
253 Ga. App. 182, 185(2) (558 SE2d 411) (2001) (finding that “[a]ppellate judges
should not be expected to take pilgrimages into the records”).

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When, as here, a biological father will not surrender his parental rights to allow

a stepparent adoption, the trial court may terminate the biological father’s rights and

grant the stepparent’s petition to adopt the children

when the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the
parent, for a period of one year or longer immediately prior to the filing
of the petition for adoption, without justifiable cause, has significantly
failed:

(1) To communicate or to make a bona fide attempt to communicate with
that child in a meaningful, supportive, parental manner; or

(2) To provide for the care and support of that child as required by law
or judicial decree,

and the court is of the opinion that the adoption is in the best interests of
that child, after considering the physical, mental, emotional, and moral
condition and needs of the child who is the subject of the proceeding,
including the need for a secure and stable home.

OCGA § 19-8-10(b) (emphasis supplied).

As explained by the Supreme Court of Georgia, the words “without
justifiable cause” as used in [OCGA] § 19-8-10(b) are constitutionally
significant. The Due Process Clause gives a parent substantial protection
of his or her parental rights requiring that clear and convincing evidence

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of unfitness be shown before a natural parent’s rights in his child may be
terminated.

Smallwood v. Davis, 292 Ga. App. 173, 175(1) (664 SE2d 254) (2008) (citation and

punctuation omitted). Accord Thorne v. Padgett, 259 Ga. 650, 651-52 (386 SE2d 155)

(1989). “[T]his Court does not weigh the evidence or assess witness credibility, but

we defer to the trial court’s factual findings and affirm unless this standard is not

met.” Price, 349 Ga. App. at 218(1) (citation and punctuation omitted).

(a) Justifiable cause for Eichfeld’s failure to communicate. Brooks argues that the

trial court erred in finding Eichfeld communicated or made bona fide attempts to

communicate with the children.

Brooks contends during the more than five years that Eichfeld was incarcerated

and until the adoption hearing in 2025, Eichfeld had no meaningful communication

with the children, only sending an inappropriate letter that they were too young to

read. Although the trial court’s order acknowledged that Eichfeld’s attempted

communications with his children included an inappropriate letter, it nonetheless

found that he also attempted to communicate by “leaving toys and stuffed animals and

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sending letters from prison, indicat[ing] a desp[e]rate attempt to maintain contact

with his children[.]”

Jannah testified that Eichfeld sent multiple other letters, which she turned over

to law enforcement or sent back without opening. She testified that he sent the letters

in an attempt to maintain contact with the children. The record appears to contain no

evidence of the content of these letters, other than the one Jannah testified was

inappropriate. The record does show that prior to his incarceration, Eichfeld left four-

wheelers for the twins, although Jannah testified he took them back, and Eichfeld

testified that he left the children a stuffed animal, but that this item and a Mother’s

Day card were the basis of an aggravated stalking conviction because his actions were

deemed a violation of a temporary protective order.

According to Eichfeld, prior to his incarceration, he had a daily relationship

with the children, taking them to parks and on rides in a trailer he pulled behind his

bicycle, and building them a playground in the backyard. He did not visit with the

children while he was incarcerated, although he testified that he wanted them to visit.

He sent their birth certificates to the appropriate authorities so that they were added

to his visitation list. They could have visited him at a nursery set up for that purpose

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at the prison. Eichfeld’s sister testified that although the children were on the

visitation list, she was “not allowed” to take them to the prison for visits because

Jannah had reported that Eichfeld was trying to contact her through the sister.

Eichfeld himself was unable to visit the children after he was released from prison

because of the protective order Jannah put in place a month prior to his release.

As outlined above, some of the evidence regarding Eichfeld’s attempts to

communicate with or spend time with the children is conflicting. However, we are

mindful that “[i]t was for the trial court, and not for the appellate court, to assess the

credibility of the witnesses and resolve contested factual issues.” Price, 349 Ga. App.

at 220(1)(b) (citation and punctuation omitted) (upholding trial court’s decision to

deny petition for stepparent adoption where trial court found that biological mother’s

“testimony alone was sufficient” to determine whether she attempted to

communicate with child, even where the stepparent pointed to a lack of tangible

evidence).

We recognize that “incarceration does not establish justification per se; each

case must be decided on its own circumstances.” Johnson v. Taylor, 292 Ga. App. 354,

357(1) (665 SE2d 49) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). Although Brooks

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points to Johnson, arguing that in that case the Court determined that the biological

father failed to show justifiable cause for his lack of communication because he could

have sent his child cards or telephoned while he was in prison and failed to do so,

Johnson is distinguishable because the mother asserted that she accepted the father’s

calls from prison and tried to keep him involved in the child’s life. Id. Here, there was

evidence that Jannah returned Eichfeld’s letters or gave them to police, and that her

actions blocked Eichfeld’s sister’s ability to take the children to the prison for visits.

Under our standard of review, there was evidence to support the trial court’s

findings of justifiable cause for Eichfeld’s lack of communication with the children.

Because “[t]he trial court is vested with significant discretion in making the

determination as to whether the parent’s failure to communicate with the child[ren]

is excusable[, w]e will not disturb the exercise of that discretion here.” Price, 349 Ga.

App. at 221(1)(b) (citation and punctuation omitted).

(b) Justifiable cause for Eichfeld’s failure to pay child support. Brooks contends

that the trial court erred by “making no appropriate findings” regarding whether

Eichfeld’s failure to pay child support was justifiable.

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As an initial matter, our Court has recognized that a trial court is not required

to articulate specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in an adoption proceeding

order where, as here, the court does not enter a decree of adoption or terminate the

legal father’s parental rights. Thaggard v. Willard, 285 Ga. App. 384, 389-90(3) (646

SE2d 479) (2007).

In assessing whether justifiable cause for failure to pay child support exists, this

Court has examined “situations where the parent has been unable to earn income due

to incarceration, mental illness, mental incapacity, hospitalization, or other

circumstances beyond their control.” Price, 349 Ga. App. at 219(1)(a) (citations and

punctuation omitted). “[I]ncarceration is merely one relevant factor to be considered

by the trial court and does not per se give rise to justifiable cause[.]” Bateman v. Futch,

232 Ga. App. 271, 272(1) (501 SE2d 615) (1998) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Whether a parent lacks justifiable cause for failing to support a child is a “threshold

matter of discretion with the trial court who has the opportunity to observe the parties

and hear the evidence.” Price, 349 Ga. App. at 219(1)(a) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

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Here, contrary to Brooks’ contentions, the trial court sufficiently outlined the

facts and the rationale underlying the exercise of its discretion in finding justifiable

cause for Eichfeld’s failure to pay child support. There is evidence that several

months after Eichfeld’s release, he became employed and began sending child support

payments to Jannah. Eichfeld testified that several of the payments were cashed, but

later payments were refused. Jannah testified that she never cashed any of the

payments. There was also evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that Jannah

attempted to use Eichfeld’s payments to argue that he was violating a restraining order

and engaging in aggravated stalking.

As noted above, any issues of witness credibility are for the trial court, not this

Court. Price, 349 Ga. App. at 220(1)(b). “Given this evidence, and given the trial

court’s very broad discretion in this area, the trial court was authorized to find

[Eichfeld] had justifiable cause for [his] failure to support the child[ren].” Id. at

219(1)(a).

2. Finally, Brooks asserts that the trial court erred in determining that adoption

was not in the children’s best interest. We find no error.

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Under OCGA § 19-8-10(b), the trial court assesses whether “the adoption is

in the best interests of that child, after considering the physical, mental, emotional,

and moral condition and needs of the child who is the subject of the proceeding,

including the need for a secure and stable home.” Our Supreme Court has determined

that, “[i]n considering what is in the best interest of the child, the trial court may

consider the child’s historical relationship with the parent, the child’s relationship

with the third-party custodian, and the child’s special medical, emotional, or

educational needs.” Newlin v. Adamar, 363 Ga. App. 456, 459 (871 SE2d 458) (2022)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

“With regard to the best interest test in adoption cases, the trial court has very

broad discretion with which this Court will not interfere except in cases of plain

abuse.” In re Marks, 300 Ga. App. 239, 242 (684 SE2d 364) (2009). We have held that

a court may not

terminate a parent’s natural right because it has determined that the
child might have better financial, educational or even moral advantages
elsewhere. Only under compelling circumstances found to exist by clear
and convincing proof may a court sever the parent-child custodial
relationship. The requirements of Georgia’s adoption statutes are
mandatory and must be strictly construed in favor of the natural parents,

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because the application thereof results in the complete and permanent
severance of the parental relationship.

Id. at 243 (citations and punctuation omitted). “[E]ven slight evidence will support

a judgment denying the petition.” Owens v. Griggs, 151 Ga. App. 730, 731(2) (261

SE2d 463) (1979).

Here, the trial court’s order explicitly states that it considered the best interests

of the children, as well as the love, affection, bonding, and emotional ties between

them, Brooks, and Eichfeld. The trial court also considered Brooks’ and Eichfeld’s

capacity to give the children love and guidance. The trial court noted Brooks’

statement that his relationship with the children would not change even if the

adoption did not occur, and it determined that both Brooks and Eichfeld loved the

children and that the children had a strong bond with Eichfeld prior to his

incarceration.

The evidence showed that prior to his incarceration, Eichfeld had a strong bond

with the children, playing with them and caring for them by keeping them clean and

fed, including during the times when Jannah had left the home. The trial court also

determined that there was no evidence that Eichfeld abused the children, noting that

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although Jannah complained that the youngest child got an untreated ear infection

while in Eichfeld’s care, the nurse practitioner who examined the child testified that

fault could not be attributed to Eichfeld. There is evidence in the record to support

this finding. The nurse practitioner, who is the children’s primary care provider,

testified that the youngest child has had ongoing ear infections since he was about two

months old, and he has had several ruptures, necessitating the placement of tubes in

his ears. She testified that although some of the ruptures had not been well cared for,

the child’s ear problems could not be attributed to the fault of Jannah, Brooks, or

Eichfeld.

The trial court also cited to the evaluation of a licensed professional counselor.

The trial court determined that the counselor’s bonding assessment of the children

showed they were very comfortable with Brooks, but also determined that the children

could have a positive re-introduction to Eichfeld if a therapist assisted in the

transition. There is evidence supporting these findings. Although the counselor

testified that harm could occur if the children were re-introduced to Eichfeld without

therapy to aid the transition, he also recommended that, if the trial court declined to

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grant the adoption, Eichfeld have some level of visitation accompanied by counseling,

because doing so could assist in a smooth re-introduction.

In support of its findings regarding the bonding and affection between Eichfeld

and the children, the trial court cited to evidence presented at the hearing that

Eichfeld had been actively engaged in the children’s lives prior to his incarceration by

building them a playground and spending time with them, as outlined above. Eichfeld

testified that he missed his children very much, had expected to visit with them after

being released, and worried that he would not see them again. He also testified that he

was willing to comply with court-ordered counseling. As the trial court noted,

Eichfeld is not seeking custody and is only seeking visitation as contemplated by the

consent final order in his and Jannah’s divorce.

Because some evidence supports the trial court’s determination, “we conclude

that there is a lack of clear and convincing evidence” that granting the adoption is in

the children’s best interest and that Eichfeld’s parental rights should be terminated.

Price, 349 Ga. App. at 223(3). “Simply stated, under the facts here a finding either way

was not demanded. The matter is properly within the discretion of the trial judge, as

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the fact finder.” Hix v. Patton, 147 Ga. App. 14, 15 (248 SE2d 28) (1978).

Judgment affirmed. Barnes, P. J., and Markle, J., concur.

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