DORSEY v. THE STATE

In the
Supreme Court of Georgia
No. S26A0733
Cordarius Dorsey
v.
The State
On Appeal from the Superior Court of DeKalb County
No. 20CR11713
Decided: October 14, 2026
ELLINGTON, Justice.
A DeKalb County jury found Cordarius Dorsey guilty of
malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting
death of Sulaiman Jalloh. 1 Dorsey contends that the trial court
1 The crimes occurred on October 15, 2019. A DeKalb County grand
jury returned an indictment on January 23, 2020, charging Dorsey and his co-
defendant, Quintavious Jackson, with malice murder (Count 1), two counts of
felony 	murder 	predicated 	on 	armed 	robbery 	and 	aggravated 	assault,
respectively (Counts 2 and 3), armed robbery (Count 5), aggravated assault
(Count 6), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count
8). Dorsey was separately charged with one count of felony murder predicated
on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 4) and for the underlying
firearm offense (Count 7). During a trial that began on December 5, 2022, the
jury found Dorsey guilty on all counts. (The jury found Jackson not guilty of
malice murder but guilty on the remaining counts. This Court affirmed
Jackson’s convictions in Jackson v. State, 324 Ga. 75 (2026).) On December 9,
2022, the trial court sentenced Dorsey to life in prison without the possibility
of parole for malice murder and to five consecutive years in prison for
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 8). The
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

2
abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence, that his trial
counsel was ineffective, and that he is entitled to a new trial due
to the collective prejudicial effect of the errors alleged. Because
we 	discern 	no 	reversible 	error, 	we 	affirm 	the 	judgment 	of
conviction for the reasons set forth below.
The evidence presented at trial shows that, on October 15,
2019, Dorsey and Quintavious Jackson met at a gas station in
DeKalb County and waited there together for about half an hour.
After Jalloh drove his car into the gas station’s parking lot and
stopped near the door to the convenience store, Dorsey fatally
shot Jalloh while Jackson took a bag from Jalloh’s possession.
These events were recorded from various angles on the gas
station’s surveillance video cameras.
The surveillance video recordings, which were viewed by
the jury, show Jackson and Dorsey interacting with each other for
about 30 minutes prior to the shooting. The video recordings show
that Dorsey wore black clothing, orange Nike shoes, and a
burgundy Polo-branded bucket hat. At one point, Jackson tried on
remaining counts either merged for purposes of sentencing or were vacated by
operation of law. As to Count 7 (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon),
we note that the trial court improperly merged Count 7 into Count 4 (felony
murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon) because
Count 4 was vacated by operation of law. While the trial court should have
sentenced Dorsey on Count 7, the issue was not raised below or on appeal, and
we have said that, “when a merger error benefits a defendant,” we “exercise
our discretion to correct the error upon our own initiative only in exceptional
circumstances,” which do not exist here. Brown v. State, 303 Ga. 617, 618
(2018) (quotation marks omitted).
Dorsey filed a motion for new trial on December 13, 2022, which he
subsequently amended. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on
November 13, 2025, and denied it on November 24, 2025. On December 3, 2025,
Dorsey filed a notice of appeal. This case was docketed in this Court to the
April 2026 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

3
Dorsey’s hat. When Jackson entered the convenience store, the
surveillance camera recorded clear, color images of his face, two-
toned “twists” hair style, and clothing.
At about 10:15 p.m., Jalloh drove his car into the gas
station parking lot. Dorsey, who was standing outside alone at the
time, tapped on the glass window to get Jackson, who was inside,
to 	join him. 	A video 	recording 	shows 	that 	Dorsey 	pulled 	a
handgun from his clothing as he walked to Jalloh’s car. As Jalloh
opened his car door, Jackson went to the rear of the car and
glanced around the parking lot, as if looking for someone. Dorsey
stood beside Jalloh’s open car door pointing his gun toward Jalloh.
Upon seeing Dorsey, Jalloh tried to close the car door, but Dorsey
pulled it open. As Dorsey struggled with Jalloh, Jackson ran to
Dorsey’s side. Jackson took a blue bag from Jalloh, and Dorsey
shot Jalloh in the chest. As Jalloh fell from his car onto the
pavement, Jackson sprinted away and Dorsey slowly walked off
in a different direction. Jalloh died as a result of the gunshot
wound to his chest.
A witness, Dwayne Williams, testified that a person he
knew as “Polo” had been at the gas station “all day” on October
15, 2019. He noticed that Polo was wearing a burgundy bucket
hat. Williams, who was working across the street at a car wash
when the shooting occurred, testified that, immediately after
hearing gunshots, he saw Polo walking away from the gas station.
Williams identified Dorsey as the person he knew as “Polo” from
a photographic line-up as well as at trial.
Acting on information gathered from Williams and other
witnesses to the shooting, as well as from an anonymous tip,
investigators determined that an individual known as “Polo” or
“Juicy 	Boy” 	had been 	involved in 	the shooting. 	One of 	the
investigators, Detective Brown, was familiar with “Juicy Boy,”

4
and knew him as Dorsey. He testified that Dorsey was also known
as “Polo” or “J. B.” Detective Brown identified Dorsey in court as
the person he knew as “Juicy Boy.” He watched the surveillance
video recording of the shooting as it was played for the jury, and
he identified Dorsey as the person in the burgundy bucket hat
and dark clothing.
The State introduced through the testimony of Investigator
J. B. Williams images from Facebook accounts for persons using
the names “Ike Tina” and “Polo Rollack.” The accounts displayed
images of Dorsey, including one showing tattoos on his arms, as
well as posts where Dorsey was referred to as “Polo.” 	In a video
recording posted to an account on October 14, 2019, the day before
the shooting, Dorsey wore orange Nike shoes like those worn by
the shooter. Dorsey’s social media accounts contained information
that led investigators to Jackson’s Instagram account. Using data
from Jackson’s social media, the investigators were able to obtain
Jackson’s email address and driver’s license information. They
learned that Jackson got a driver’s license two days after the
shooting. The photograph of Jackson’s driver’s license showed the
same 	two-toned 	“twists” 	hairstyle 	worn 	by 	the 	shooter’s
accomplice 	in 	the 	gas 	station 	surveillance 	video 	recordings.
Images from Jackson’s social media page and Jackson’s driver’s
license both show that he had “21” tattooed on his face.
Investigators 	went 	to 	Jackson’s 	home 	where 	they
interviewed his mother. They showed her a still image taken from
the surveillance video recordings, and she identified the person in
the still image as Jackson. In the still image, Jackson wore a
navy-blue 	shirt 	and 	had 	a 	two-toned 	“twists” 	hairstyle. 	On
October 24, the investigators obtained an arrest warrant for
Jackson, and he was taken into custody the following day. Shortly
thereafter, 	Jackson 	was 	interviewed. 	When 	an 	investigator

5
showed him a still image taken from the video recording of
Dorsey’s accomplice, Jackson identified it as an image of himself.
During 	a 	subsequent 	search 	of 	Jackson’s 	home,
investigators saw a pile of clothing that included a navy-blue shirt
like that worn by Jackson and a burgundy Polo-branded bucket
hat matching the hat worn by Dorsey during the shooting. The
hat was swabbed for DNA. Subsequent testing showed that the
DNA on the hat matched DNA samples taken from both Jackson
and Dorsey. Investigators searched Jalloh’s car and found blue
bags beneath Jalloh’s passenger seat like the one taken by
Jackson. The bags contained more than $30,000 in cash.
Investigator Williams testified that Dorsey obtained a new
cell phone on October 16, 2019, the day after the shooting. He also
testified about the text messages and social media accounts on
the phone. One of the first Instagram messages sent from the new
phone stated: “I whacked a n***a the other day.” The phone also
showed internet searches on October 17, 2019, for news reports
involving a man killed at a gas station. In all, there were 22
searches related to the shooting. On October 24, 2019, Dorsey
sent an Instagram message stating that he was “on the run”
because of an “armed robbery in Fulton County.”
An arrest warrant for Dorsey was taken out on October 29,
2019, and he was apprehended on January 16, 2020. After his
arrest, Dorsey made several phone calls from jail. In one of those
calls, he identified himself as “Polo.” In another, he said that he
“did something to get some money” and “Google me and you will
see it.”
1. 	Dorsey 	contends 	that 	his 	trial 	counsel 	provided
constitutionally 	ineffective 	assistance 	in 	several 	respects. 	In
order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Dorsey must show “both that counsel’s performance was deficient,

6
and 	that 	the 	deficient 	performance 	was 	prejudicial 	to 	his
defense.” Lockhart v. State, 298 Ga. 384, 385 (2016). See also
Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984). To establish
deficient 	performance, 	Dorsey 	must 	“overcome 	the 	strong
presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range
of reasonable professional conduct, and that counsel’s decisions
were made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”
Lockhart, 298 Ga. at 385 (quotation marks omitted). To meet the
prejudice prong, Dorsey must establish “a reasonable probability
that, absent any unprofessional errors on counsel’s part, the
result of his trial would have been different.” Id. And, “[i]f the
defendant fails to satisfy either the ‘deficient performance’ or the
‘prejudice’ prong of the Strickland test, this Court is not required
to examine the other.” Redding v. State, 297 Ga. 845, 850–51
(2015).
(a) Dorsey argues that trial counsel was deficient for failing
to object to the in-life photograph of Jalloh introduced by the State
through Jalloh’s daughter on the ground that its “relevancy is
tenuous.” 	He contends that the photograph had scant probative
value because the forensic pathologist had already established
that Jalloh was deceased and that law-enforcement witnesses
could 	have 	identified 	Jalloh 	instead. 	He 	argues 	that 	the
admission of the photograph prejudiced his defense because it
aroused sympathy in the jury. For the following reasons, this
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
Pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-402 (“Rule 402”), “[a]ll relevant
evidence shall be admissible[.]” To evaluate relevancy, this Court
relies on OCGA § 24-4-401, which defines “relevant evidence” as
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”

7
However, relevant evidence may be excluded under OCGA § 24-
4-403 	(“Rule 	403”) 	“if 	its 	probative 	value 	is 	substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
This Court has held that in-life photographs of murder victims
constitute 	relevant 	evidence 	but 	that 	they 	have 	“tenuous
probative value”; therefore, “every effort 	should be made to
proffer a photograph of the victim alone,” instead of, for example,
standing with his family, and the “better practice” is not to have
a family member identify the victim. Ragan v. State, 299 Ga. 828,
832–33 (2016).
But the “better practice” noted in Ragan did not
establish a categorical rule that a victim’s relative
can 	never 	identify 	an 	in-life 	photograph 	of 	the
victim. 	Indeed, 	… 	we 	distinguished 	Ragan 	and
concluded 	that 	a 	trial 	court 	did 	not 	abuse 	its
discretion 	in 	allowing 	the 	victim’s 	[relative] 	to
identify a single photograph of the victim, alone in a
neutral background, where the [relative] did not
have 	a 	strong 	emotional 	reaction 	during 	her
identification testimony.
Tabb v. State, 324 Ga. 622, 627 (2026) (citations omitted).
Here, the record reflects that the State introduced only one
photograph of Jalloh. The photograph depicted him standing
alone against a neutral background. Although the photograph
was admitted through Jalloh’s daughter, there is nothing in the
record indicating that she had a “strong emotional reaction” when
she made the identification. See id. The identification was brief,
consisting only of her “yes” answer to a single question: “Is that a
photo 	of 	your 	father?” 	Because 	there 	was 	only 	a 	single

8
photograph of the victim admitted in this case, just as in Tabb,
Dorsey has not demonstrated that the photograph of Jalloh was
inadmissible and that an objection pursuant to Rules 402 and 403
would have been sustained. As a result, he has failed to show that
trial counsel’s failure to object constituted deficient performance.
See Tabb, 324 Ga. at 627. See also Watson v. State, 303 Ga. 758,
762–63 (2018) (holding that counsel is not deficient for failing to
make a meritless objection).
(b) 	Dorsey 	contends 	that 	trial 	counsel was 	ineffective
because he failed to object to the State’s line of questioning
eliciting 	inadmissible 	victim-impact 	evidence 	from 	Jalloh’s
daughter 	during 	the 	guilt/innocence 	phase 	of 	the 	trial. 	The
daughter’s testimony informed the jury that Jalloh was married,
had 	young 	children, 	and 	that 	several 	crying 	relatives 	were
present when the daughter learned of her father’s death. Dorsey
argues 	that 	the 	admission 	of 	this 	testimony 	was 	improper;
moreover, it was prejudicial, as it was likely to engender the jury’s
sympathy.
The record shows that Jalloh’s daughter briefly testified
about how she found out about her father’s death. She had been
asleep “and then basically [she] heard crying downstairs and
that’s what woke [her] up.” 	Her family told her that her father
had been killed. When the prosecutor asked her who was crying,
she responded that it was her mom, step-grandmother, aunt, and
uncles, and that “[i]t was very close family members at the house.”
At the hearing on Dorsey’s motion for new trial, defense counsel
testified that he “didn’t consider that [testimony] victim impact[,
a]nd considering that [the] strategy was that [Dorsey] was not the
person who shot Jalloh, [he] didn’t see a strategic reason to attack
[the daughter’s testimony].”
“[E]vidence about a crime victim’s personal characteristics

9
and the emotional impact of the crime on the victim, the victim’s
family, and the victim’s community generally is not admissible in
the guilt/innocence phase of a criminal trial.” Lofton v. State, 309
Ga. 349, 363 (2020). Although Jalloh’s daughter’s testimony may
have been inadmissible, it was brief. And trial counsel’s strategy
of not objecting — and risking being perceived as attacking a
sympathetic witness — was 	not objectively unreasonable given
that the witness’s testimony had little if any effect on the defense
strategy 	that 	someone 	other 	than 	Dorsey 	killed 	Jalloh.
Accordingly, this claim of error fails. See, e.g., Tabb v. State, 324
Ga. at 626–27 (holding that trial counsel’s decision not to object
to the witness’s victim-impact testimony was not unreasonable
where 	the 	testimony 	was 	brief 	and 	counsel 	believed 	that
interrupting a crying witness “would have a negative effect on the
jury, as the jury seemed to connect with her”); Cox v. State, 306
Ga. 736, 743 (2019) (holding that trial counsel’s decision not to
object to the State’s victim-impact argument was reasonable
where the argument was brief and counsel did not want to “draw
more attention” to it).
(c) Dorsey contends that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to Detective Brown’s identification of Dorsey in
the surveillance video recordings of the shooting. We disagree.
Lay opinion testimony identifying a defendant in surveillance
photographs and video recordings is admissible pursuant to
OCGA § 24-7-701 (“Rule 701”) where “there is some basis for
concluding that a witness is more likely [than is the jury] to
correctly 	identify 	a 	defendant 	as 	the 	individual 	depicted 	in
surveillance photographs [or video recordings].” Glenn v. State,
302 Ga. 276, 280 (2017) (citing United States v. Pierce, 136 F3d
770, 774 (11th Cir. 1998) (cleaned up)).
A number of factors may determine if a witness is better

10
suited than the jury to identify the defendant in such instances,
but perhaps the “most critical [factor] to this determination is the
witness’s level of familiarity with the defendant’s appearance.”
Glenn, 302 Ga. at 280 (noting that “in most cases, the opportunity
to 	observe 	a 	person’s 	mannerisms, 	gait, 	and 	similar
characteristics 	depicted 	in 	video 	footage 	will 	increase 	the
likelihood that a lay witness familiar with a defendant will be
better equipped than jurors to identify the defendant from such
images”). Here, Detective Brown knew what Dorsey looked like.
He 	was 	familiar 	with 	his 	appearance, 	tattoos, 	height, 	and
mannerisms because he had been around Dorsey and had seen
him before the shooting occurred. He also knew that Dorsey went
by 	the 	names 	“Juicy 	Boy,” 	“Polo,” 	and 	“J.B.” 	Moreover, 	he
correctly identified Dorsey at trial.
Detective Brown testified that he reviewed the surveillance
video from the shooting and was able to identify Dorsey as the
person wearing the burgundy bucket hat. This testimony was
based on the detective’s own perceptions and was helpful to the
jury in determining the identity of the shooter. Because Detective
Brown’s testimony was not improper lay opinion testimony, an
objection on this ground would have been overruled, and trial
counsel could not be ineffective for failing to make such meritless
objection. See Carter v. State, 310 Ga. 559, 564 (2020) (holding
that any “objection to Agent Smith’s testimony as improper lay
witness testimony would have been properly overruled, and
Appellant’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to
make a meritless objection,” citing Johnson v. State, 305 Ga. 475,
480 (2019)). 2
2 In Dorsey’s co-defendant’s appeal, we held the trial court did not

11
2. Dorsey contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by allowing a State’s witness, over defense counsel’s objection, to
recount hearsay statements from witnesses and an anonymous
tipster on the ground that the statements were admissible non-
hearsay offered for the purpose of “explaining conduct” rather
than for the truth of the matter asserted. He also contends that
the admission of the anonymous tipster’s statement violated his
right 	to 	confront 	and 	cross-examine 	witnesses 	under 	the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Specifically, he contends that the court
allowed Investigator Williams to testify that he learned from
three sources — a witness on the scene, detectives who spoke to
witnesses on the scene, and an anonymous tip — that a person
called “Polo” or “Juicy Boy” was present at the scene of the
shooting. Counsel objected on hearsay grounds and requested a
curative instruction. Counsel also challenged the admission of the
information gleaned from the tipster on Confrontation Clause
grounds. The court overruled the objections and gave no curative
instruction. For the following reasons, we discern no reversible
error.
(a) With respect to Dorsey’s hearsay argument, it is not
necessary to consider whether the admission of the statements
was an abuse of discretion because, assuming without deciding
that the statements were inadmissible hearsay, we conclude that
any error in admitting them was harmless.
In determining whether an error was harmless, we
plainly err in allowing the detective to identify Jackson in the surveillance
video: “Based on the record before us, even if Jackson had objected, the trial
court would not have abused its discretion in admitting the detective’s
testimony identifying Jackson on the surveillance video recordings.” Jackson,
324 Ga. at 81.

12
review the record de novo and weigh the evidence as
we would expect reasonable jurors to have done so.
The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless
error is whether it is highly probable that the error
did not contribute to the verdict.
Perez v. State, 303 Ga. 188, 191 (2018). See also OCGA § 24-1-103
(a) (“Error shall not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected[.]”). The record, viewed in this way, shows that, with
respect to the name “Polo,” a witness had previously testified that
he had seen a man he knew as Polo walking away from the gas
station immediately after the shooting. The transcript also shows
that Detective Brown, who was familiar with Dorsey, identified
him in the gas station’s surveillance video recordings and knew
him by a number of aliases, including “Polo” and “Juicy Boy.”
Further, Dorsey identified himself in a recorded phone call as
“Polo.” And Dorsey’s social media accounts contained numerous
references to his aliases. Thus, the statements Dorsey complains
about were cumulative of other properly admitted evidence.
“[T]he 	erroneous 	admission 	of 	hearsay 	is 	harmless 	where
substantial, cumulative, legally admissible evidence of the same
fact is introduced.” Anglin v. State, 302 Ga. 333, 336 (2017).
Additionally, the evidence against Dorsey was overwhelming. It
included eyewitness identification, surveillance video recordings
of the crimes, inculpatory social media and text messages, and
DNA evidence. For these reasons, any error in admitting the out-
of-court statements was harmless as it was highly probable that
they did not contribute to the verdict. See Perez, 303 Ga. at 91.
(b) 	Dorsey 	also 	contends 	that 	the 	admission 	of 	the
investigator’s testimony concerning the anonymous tip violated
his right to confront and cross-examine a witness against him.

13
The 	Confrontation 	Clause 	provides 	that 	“[i]n 	all 	criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted
with the witnesses against him[.]” US Const. Amend. VI. The
Confrontation Clause generally prohibits the admission of out-of-
court 	testimonial 	statements 	made 	by 	a 	declarant 	who 	is
unavailable for cross-examination. See Johnson v. State, 289 Ga.
22, 26 (2011). “A statement is testimonial if its primary purpose
was 	to 	establish 	evidence 	that 	could 	be 	used 	in 	a 	future
prosecution.” Favors v. State, 296 Ga. 842, 845 (2015) (quotation
marks omitted). Assuming, without deciding, that Investigator
Williams’s testimony recounting an anonymous tip implying that
“Juicy 	Boy” 	was 	involved 	in 	the 	shooting 	violates 	the
Confrontation Clause, based on the evidence outlined in Division
2 (b), the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
admission of the investigator’s testimony about the anonymous
tip did not contribute to the verdict. See Kingdom v. State, 321
Ga. 363, 367 (2025) (“A constitutional error is harmless when the
State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to the verdict, such as when the evidence at issue is
cumulative of other properly-admitted evidence or when the
evidence against the defendant is overwhelming.”).
3. 	Dorsey 	contends 	that 	the 	“trial 	court 	abused 	its
discretion in allowing the State to introduce improper character
evidence regarding [Dorsey’s] involvement in an unrelated armed
robbery in Fulton County, over defense objection.” 	Specifically,
he argues that the trial court should have excluded a statement
from Dorsey’s Instagram messaging account that he was “on the
run” because of an “armed robbery in Fulton County.” He argues
that the statement constituted “wholly irrelevant” evidence of
another crime and the trial court should have concluded that it
was inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”).

14
As we have explained,
Rule 404(b) generally prohibits the admission of
evidence of the defendant’s “other crimes, wrongs, or
acts” 	to 	prove 	the 	defendant’s 	character, 	but 	it
allows such “other acts” evidence for certain limited
purposes. See OCGA § 24-4-404(b). ... [H]owever, ...
Rule 	404(b) applies only to other 	acts that are
extrinsic to the charged crime, and … other acts that
are intrinsic to the charged crime may be admissible
without respect to Rule 404(b).
Holloway v. State, 320 Ga. 653, 666 (2025). In this case, the State
contended that Dorsey’s statement, which was made on October
24, 2019, shortly after the shooting and the same day an arrest
warrant was issued for Jackson, constituted intrinsic evidence of
flight, and revealed Dorsey’s consciousness of guilt concerning the
armed robbery for which he was being tried, which occurred in
the 	City 	of 	Atlanta. 	The 	State 	agreed 	to 	contextualize 	the
admission of the evidence by having the testifying investigator
explain that he has encountered people who mistakenly assume
that the City of Atlanta is entirely within Fulton County. The
trial court agreed with the State and overruled the objection.
The evidence was properly admitted as evidence of flight,
which 	is 	generally 	considered intrinsic evidence 	that 	is 	not
subject to Rule 404(b). As we have explained,
[e]vidence is admissible as intrinsic evidence when
it is (1) an uncharged offense arising from the same
transaction or series of transactions as the charged
offense; (2) necessary to complete the story of the
crime; 	or 	(3) 	inextricably 	intertwined 	with 	the
evidence regarding the charged offense. Evidence

15
pertaining to the chain of events explaining the
context, motive, and set-up of the crime is properly
admitted if it is linked in time and circumstances
with the charged crime, or forms an integral and
natural 	part 	of 	an 	account 	of 	the 	crime, 	or 	is
necessary to complete the story of the crime for the
jury. 	Evidence 	of 	other 	acts 	is 	inextricably
intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged
offense if it forms an integral and natural part of the
witness’s accounts of the circumstances surrounding
the offenses for which the defendant was indicted.
And 	this 	sort 	of 	intrinsic 	evidence 	remains
admissible 	even 	if 	it 	incidentally 	places 	the
defendant’s character at issue.
Heade v. State, 312 Ga. 19, 24–25 (2021) (cleaned up). “Evidence
of flight is generally intrinsic, as the fact of an accused’s flight,
escape 	from 	custody, 	resistance 	to 	arrest, 	concealment,
assumption of a false name, and related conduct, is admissible as
evidence of consciousness of guilt for the charged offense, and
thus of guilt itself.” Jenkins v. State, 313 Ga. 81, 89 (2022)
(cleaned up). See also Rawls v. State, 310 Ga. 209, 218–19 (2020)
(holding 	that 	“evidence 	of 	flight 	may 	be 	admissible 	as
circumstantial 	evidence 	of 	guilt”). 	Therefore, 	because 	the
evidence was intrinsic, the “limitations and prohibition on ‘other
acts’ evidence set out in OCGA § 24-4-404(b) do not apply[.]”
Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 485 (2017).
For this reason, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the evidence. See Williams, 302 Ga. at 485. We are
unpersuaded by Dorsey’s argument that the jury would have
assumed from his statement that he had committed a separate,
unrelated crime in Fulton County. The State did not characterize

16
the statement as a separate offense, and the investigator testified
that people often mistakenly assume that the City of Atlanta is
entirely in Fulton County. Further, Dorsey’s phone records also
show that he conducted internet searches for a single armed
robbery 	involving 	a 	man 	shot 	at 	a 	gas 	station. 	Given 	this
evidence, the trial court had discretion to conclude that the jury
was unlikely to believe Dorsey had committed a separate armed
robbery in the days between the shooting and the day he wrote in
his new Instagram messaging account that he was “on the run.” 3
Consequently, this claim of error fails.
4. Dorsey contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by admitting through the testimony of Investigator Williams
screenshots from Dorsey’s Facebook account that had not been
properly authenticated. Specifically, he contends the State failed
to demonstrate that State’s Exhibits 154 through 163 were “true
and accurate reflections of the content of the Facebook page
viewed by the investigator during his investigation.”
The record shows, however, that the trial court properly
overruled Dorsey’s authentication objection and admitted the
3 We note that OCGA § 24-1-104(a) provides, in pertinent part, that
“[p]reliminary questions concerning … the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court,” and that those “questions shall be resolved by a
preponderance of the evidence standard.” And “[w]hen the relevancy of
evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall
admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support
a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.” OCGA § 24-1-104(b). See Gallegos-
Munoz v. State, 319 Ga. 803 (2024) (Pursuant to OCGA § 24-1-104(b), “when
the relevancy of evidence depends upon proof of a conditional fact, the trial
court examines all the evidence in the case and admits the evidence if a jury
could reasonably find the conditional fact by a preponderance of the
evidence.”). So, under the circumstances here, the trial court was permitted to
determine that the statement was made in connection with the same crime and
to admit it on that basis.

17
exhibits only after Investigator Williams had given testimony
that sufficiently authenticated them.
Evidence like a digital photograph may be authenticated
with evidence “sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims.” OCGA § 24-9-901 (a).
Indeed,
documents from electronic sources are subject to the
same 	rules 	of 	authentication 	as 	other 	more
traditional 	documentary 	evidence 	and 	may 	be
authenticated 	through 	circumstantial 	evidence,
which 	may 	include 	the 	appearance, 	contents,
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
characteristics 	of 	the 	documents, 	taken 	in
conjunction 	with 	circumstances. 	Once 	the 	party
seeking to authenticate evidence presents a prima
facie case that the evidence is what it purports to be,
the 	evidence 	is 	properly 	admitted, 	leaving 	the
ultimate question of authenticity to be decided by
the jury.
Nicholson v. State, 307 Ga. 466, 475 (2019) (cleaned up). In this
case, 	the 	investigator 	testified 	that 	he 	had 	watched 	the
surveillance videos from the gas station with Detective Brown,
who had previously identified Dorsey and linked him to several
aliases. Thereafter, the investigator searched for and ultimately
located Facebook accounts under the names “Ike Tina” and “Polo
Rollack” which contained still images and video recordings of
Dorsey. Investigator Williams testified that he recognized the
images of Dorsey because he had become familiar with Dorsey’s
appearance, his tattoos, and the sound of his voice. He then
personally took the screenshots of Dorsey’s images from these
Facebook pages. Thus, the investigator’s testimony established a

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prima 	facie 	case 	of 	authenticity 	that 	allowed 	the 	Facebook
screenshots to be admitted and for the jury to decide whether the
evidence was what the investigator claimed it was. See, e.g.,
Henderson v. State, 317 Ga. 66, 87 (2023) (“The photos here were
authenticated by Investigator Pinckney, who testified that he was
familiar with them and with the people in them.”); Hawkins v.
State, 304 Ga. 299, 304 (2018) (explaining that screenshots of
Facebook messages were sufficiently authenticated by a witness
who 	recognized 	the 	messages 	as 	coming 	from 	defendant’s
Facebook account, given that the witness was familiar with the
account and recognized a photograph of the defendant associated
with the user account). For these reasons, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits.
5. Dorsey contends that to the extent that any of the errors
alleged may be deemed harmless, he is entitled to a new trial “due
to the collective prejudicial effect of all trial court errors and any
deficient performance” on the part of Dorsey’s trial counsel. We
disagree.
Under State v. Lane, we must “consider collectively the
prejudicial effect, if any, of trial court errors, along with the
prejudice caused by any deficient performance of counsel.” 308
Ga. 10, 17 (2020). To establish cumulative error, a defendant
must show that “at least two errors were committed in the course
of the trial” and that “the multiple errors so infected the jury’s
deliberation that they denied the [defendant] a fundamentally
fair trial.” Id. at 21 (quotation marks omitted). Because we have
assumed only one evidentiary error — the admission of out-of-
court statements that a person called “Polo” or “Juicy Boy” was
present at the scene of the shooting (see Division 2) — and have
determined 	that 	Dorsey’s 	trial 	counsel 	did 	not 	perform
deficiently, 	cumulative 	error 	analysis 	under 	Lane 	is 	not

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applicable. See Tabor v. State, 315 Ga. 240, 251 n.16 (2022)
(holding that to show cumulative error, an appellant must show
that at least two errors were committed).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.