Estate of Joseph Murphy v. State of Alaska, Department of Corrections et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ALASKA
ESTATE OF JOSEPH MURPHY, )
)
Plaintiff, ) 1:17-CV-00010 JWS
)
vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION
)
) [Re: Motion at docket 100]
STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT OF )
CORRECTIONS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
I. MOTION PRESENTED
At docket 100 plaintiff Estate of Joseph Murphy (the “Estate”) and Defendants
State of Alaska, Department of Corrections (“DOC”), Michael Schramm (Schramm), and
Robert Corcoran (Corcoran; collectively “the State”) jointly request court approval of
their settlement and for an order permitting immediate disbursement of the settlement
proceeds. Defendant Jill Robinson (“Robinson”), who was not a party to the settlement,
opposes the motion at docket 117. The Estate replies at docket 120, and the State
replies separately at docket 121. Oral argument was requested but would not be of
assistance to the court.
II. BACKGROUND
Joseph Murphy (“Murphy”) was sent to the Lemon Creek Correctional Center
(“Lemon Creek”) from Bartlett Regional Hospital on August 13, 2015, to be temporarily
detained for alcohol detoxification and suicide monitoring pursuant to AS 47.37.170.
Early the next morning he complained to Robinson, a nurse at Lemon Creek, of chest
pains and requested his medication. Plaintiff alleges that Robinson did not obtain
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Murphy’s medication and did not follow-up or monitor his condition. Plaintiff alleges that
Murphy made two subsequent requests for medication to other Lemon Creek staff
members but his requests went unheeded. According to Plaintiff, a Lemon Creek video
shows Murphy collapsing in his cell twenty-six minutes after he first requested his
medications from Robinson. He was declared dead about an hour later, after
resuscitation efforts failed.
The Estate filed suit, alleging various state law medical negligence claims and
negligent training and supervision claims against the DOC. It brought § 1983 claims
against Robinson, Schramm, and Corcoran individually, asserting they each violated
Murphy’s Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Due Process by acting with deliberate
indifference to his medical needs.
On January 17, 2020, the Estate and the State successfully mediated and settled
all of the Estate’s claims against the DOC, Schramm, and Corcoran—Counts 1-5 and
Counts 7-8—for and in consideration of the total sum of $550,000 to be paid by the
State to the Estate. This leaves only the § 1983 claim against Robinson, in Count 6, for
trial. The State argues that it has no further duty of indemnification as to the claim
against Robinson, because the Estate has conceded that this claim requires it to prove
deliberate indifference, which is more than common law negligence and along the lines
of reckless disregard. The State and Estate request that the court approve their
settlement and order immediate distribution of the proceeds.
Robinson opposes the request. She argues that the settlement inappropriately
resolved claims on her behalf without her consent and that the State of Alaska violated
certain duties owed to her under her employment contract. She also asserts that there
are unresolved claims and compensation issues between the parties to this action
which preclude settlement. She opposes any immediate disbursement of funds,
arguing that disbursement runs counter to the state probate court’s order.
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III. DISCUSSION
Settlement approval
Robinson asserts that the settlement should not be approved because the State
did not have her consent to settle. As noted above, the State settled the claims against
the DOC, which include the claims for medical recklessness and negligence in Counts 1
and 3. She contends that Counts 1 and 3 against the DOC actually constitute claims
against her because they are founded upon allegations of her conduct during her
interaction with Murphy. A plain reading of the complaint, however, shows that these
two claims were not, in fact, brought against Robinson. The named defendant for each
of these counts is “State of Alaska, Department of Corrections.” It is the DOC that is
alleged to have breached a duty of care owed to Murphy. The allegations asserted
therein of course refer to Robinson’s actions—the DOC cannot act or fail to act in and of
itself but rather can only operate through its employees. However, the reference to
Robinson and her conduct does not make the claims individual ones against Robinson.
Rather, they are standard employer vicarious liability claims brought solely against the
DOC.
The settlement releases the State of Alaska from “any and all” actions or claims
arising out of the death of Murphy. The parties understand this to include any common
law negligence claim that the Estate may have or will have against Robinson that could
trigger indemnification obligations under Robinson’s employment contract. To fully
effectuate the release, the Estate conceded that Count 6, the § 1983 “deliberate
indifference” claim brought individually against Robinson, is not tantamount to a
common law negligence claim under the applicable legal precedent and therefore does
not trigger indemnity obligations under the employment contract.1 This agreement does
not equate to an unauthorized settling of a medical malpractice claim against Robinson
1Doc. 101-1 at pp. 2-3.
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that must be reported under 42 U.S.C. § 11131(a).2 It simply affirms the understanding
between the State and the Estate that there was never any medical negligence claim
brought against Robinson and that there never will be. To be clear, the State believes
that Robinson did not act outside the scope of her employment with deliberate
indifference and stresses that the settlement does state otherwise.
Robinson also asserts that the State cannot settle and leave her to defend the
remaining § 1983 action without her co-defendants. The Estate and State however
adequately persuade the court that there is no joint defense obligation or ethics violation
preventing the settlement. Assistant Attorney General (“AAG”) Ali Moser Rahoi and
AAG Aisha Tinker Bray, as well as their AAG predecessors in this case, never
represented Robinson. They entered appearances on behalf of the DOC, Schramm,
and Corcoran. Robinson had separate, independent counsel assigned to her from the
Special Litigation Section within the Civil Division of the Alaska Attorney General’s
Office. Robinson also retained private counsel to represent her, who has since
assumed the role of lead counsel. The state AAG from the Special Litigation Section
still represents her as co-counsel.3 Nothing in the record or applicable rules suggests
that there is any conflict with this arrangement or that professional rules of conduct have
been violated in relation to her representation or the settlement.4
Robinson also argues that remaining indemnification issues prevent the Estate’s
settlement. The argument is without merit. The indemnity provision of the applicable
collective bargaining agreement limits coverage to certain types of claims, namely those
for common law negligence occurring within the scope of employment. It states that the
State of Alaska “will indemnify [Robinson] for a judgment or legal obligation if the
judgment or legal obligation arose from [her] action within the scope of [her] office or
2See 42 U.S.C. § 11151(7) (defining the term “medical malpractice action or claim”).
3Doc. 118-2.
4See doc. 120 at pp. 9-10; doc. 121 at pp. 4-5.
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employment[.]”5 By definition, an employee can only act within the “scope of office or
employment” when his or her conduct does not “constitute willful, reckless, or intentional
misconduct, gross negligence, or malicious conduct.”6 The Estate’s § 1983 claim
against Robinson falls outside the indemnity provision because it avers that she was
deliberately indifferent, which, under the applicable case law, requires a plaintiff to
“prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless
disregard.”7 The Estate has acknowledged its heightened burden and conceded any
argument to the contrary by explicitly releasing any potential claim it may have for
common law negligence. The Estate is able to define its case as it wishes and has
done so in a manner that makes it absolutely clear that its only remaining claim is the
§ 1983 deliberate indifference claim against Robinson. In any event, as noted by the
State, if a judgment is entered against Robinson that she believes is covered by the
indemnity provision, she may assert her claim at that time. “Nothing in DOC’s
settlement deprives [her] of her rights. The risk of judgment against Robinson for a
covered claim requiring indemnification is entirely the State of Alaska’s risk.”8
Robinson also contends that settlement is not proper because she has claims
against the State. To the extent those claims are based on its failure to defend her
adequately, there is no merit to such claims. Robinson has state-provided co-counsel in
this case. The fact that she has retained private counsel to take the lead in her defense
does not diminish the state provided one. It is not clear what additional claims she has
against DOC or its attorneys, but any such claims are distinct from the settlement of the
Estate’s claims against the DOC, Schramm, and Corcoran. Robinson “cannot be
5Doc. 101-2 at p. 28.
6Doc. 101-2 at pp. 28-29.
7Gordon v. Cnty of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018).
8Doc. 121 at p. 10.
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permitted to prohibit settlement of co-defendants by threatening spurious litigation
against their counsel.”9
Immediate disbursement
Robinson argues that the request for immediate disbursement of the settlement
funds should be denied because it violates the probate court order that “all distributions”
from the Estate should be put on hold until “the resolution of [this federal lawsuit] or until
such time as the court can make a full determination of all costs and expenses as may
be owed to [Robinson].”10 For the reasons set forth in the Estate’s briefing, the court
concludes that immediate disbursement is warranted. The court is not restricted by the
jurisdiction of the probate court to enter an order on the question of disbursement of
settlement funds. Furthermore, there is no remaining dispute as to fees. The
settlement resolves all claims against the DOC, Schramm, and Corcoran, as well as any
issues of fees. The settlement does not resolve any claims against Robinson and thus
she cannot be deemed a prevailing party for purposes of claiming attorneys’ fees from
the proceeds. The sole claim remaining is a § 1983 claim, and Robinson can only
recover attorneys’ fees on that claim in the “exceptional circumstance” where the court
finds that the claim, at the time of filing, was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation.”11 The court concludes that it was not. Therefore, Robinson has no
potential claim to the settlement funds now owed to the Estate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the preceding discussion, the joint motion for approval of the
settlement between the Estate and Defendants DOC, Schramm, and Corcoran is
hereby GRANTED; all claims between these parties are dismissed in their entirety with
9Doc. 121 at p. 10.
10Doc. 119-1.
11Harris v. Maricopa Cnty. Superior Court, 631 F.3d 963, 986-69, 976 (9th Cir. 2011);
see also Braunstein v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 683 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 2012).
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prejudice. The Estate’s further request for the immediate disbursement of settlement
proceeds is GRANTED.
DATED this 22nd day of June 2020.
/s/ JOHN W. SEDWICK
SENIOR JUDGE. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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