American President Lines, Ltd. v. International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Alaska Longshore Division, Unit 60

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-1-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ALASKA
AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD., )
)
Plaintiff, ) 3:10-CV-00183 JWS
)
vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION
)
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND ) [Re: Motion at docket 88]
WAREHOUSE UNION, ALASKA )
LONGSHORE DIVISION, UNIT 60, )
)
)
Defendant. )
)
I. MOTION PRESENTED
At docket 88, defendant International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Alaska
Longshore Division, Unit 60 (“Defendant” or “ILWU”) moves pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56 for summary judgment. Plaintiff American President Lines, Ltd.
(“Plaintiff” or “APL”) opposes the motion at docket 94. Defendant’s reply is at
docket 100. Neither party requested oral argument, and it would not be of assistance to
the court.
II. BACKGROUND
APL operates marine terminals in Alaska and ocean-going vessels that transport
cargo. APL’s primary port is in Dutch Harbor. APL is part of a multi-employer
bargaining unit known as the Alaska Maritime Employers Association (“AMEA”). The
only other current member of the AMEA is Horizon Lines. Prior to 2003, North Star
Terminal and Stevedore Company (“North Star”) and Southeast Stevedoring Company
(“SES”) were also part of the AMEA.
Case 3:10-cv-00183-JWS Document 102 Filed 02/18/14 Page 1 of 14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Doc. 91 at p. 15 (Ex. A at p. 4); Doc. 96-1 at p. 5.	1
Doc. 91 at p. 45 (Ex. A at p. 34); Doc. 96-1 at p. 36.	2
-2-
The ILWU is a labor union that represents all longshore workers in specified
Alaska ports, including the Port of Seward. Unit 60 is a constituent unit of the ILWU
that represents longshoremen in the port of Seward.
The AMEA and the ILWU are parties to a collective bargaining agreement known
as the All-Alaska Longshore Agreement (“AALA”). North Star and SES are also parties
to the AALA: prior to 2003 they were parties through their affiliation with AMEA and
after 2003 they were individual signatory employers.
The AALA covers “[a]ll movement of cargo on vessels, or loading to and
discharging from vessels of any type and on docks or to and from railroad cars.”1
Seward is identified in the agreement as an “ILWU Port.” The agreement also contains
a work preservation provision, which states that the employer, which includes the AMEA
and the individual signatory employers, “hereby assures [the ILWU] that it will use its
best efforts to act in good faith in preserving as much as possible all of the work
covered by [the AALA] for the registered work force.”2
APL’s large vessels cannot access many of Alaska’s smaller ports, including the
port in Seward. As a result, APL enters into connecting carrier agreements (“CCA”)
with barge operators to move APL’s export product from these smaller ports to Dutch
Harbor. APL has a CCA with Samson Tug and Barge (“Samson”), pursuant to which
Samson uses its barges to transport APL’s shipping containers between Dutch Harbor
and Seward. At Dutch Harbor, APL uses ILWU labor to load its empty containers onto
Samson’s barges. Once in Seward, Samson employees unload the empty containers
on the docks for APL customers to fill with their export products, and then Samson
employees reload filled containers on the barges to be transported back to Dutch
Harbor. ILWU employees unload the containers from Samson’s barges once they are
back in Dutch Harbor.
Case 3:10-cv-00183-JWS Document 102 Filed 02/18/14 Page 2 of 14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
It is disputed whether ILWU indirectly performed cargo-handling work for APL: the	3
parties disagree as to whether Samson was transporting APL cargo when it contracted with
North Star for cargo handling operations in Seward.
Doc. 91 at pp. 111-120 (Ex. B).	4
Doc. 91 at pp. 122-127 (Ex. C).	5
-3-
Samson is not a member of AMEA, nor is it an individual party to the AALA. It
does not employ ILWU labor in Seward but, rather, has its own workforce there. Its
employees are represented by the Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Association (“MEBA”)
union. For some period of time prior to 2003, before it had its own workforce in
Seward, Samson used North Star as a contractor to perform cargo handling in Seward.
North Star, at that time a member of the AMEA and at all times a party to the AALA,
used ILWU labor for that work. APL has never had any cargo-handling operations or
employees of its own in Seward, and it is undisputed that ILWU labor never directly
performed any cargo-handling operations for APL in Seward.3
In August of 2006, the ILWU filed a grievance against APL for APL’s use of non-
ILWU employees to offload APL containers in Seward and sought arbitration. The
ILWU claimed that APL, through its CCA with Samson, had displaced ILWU workers in
Seward with Samson’s MEBA-represented workers in violation of the AALA’s work
preservation provision.
Arbitration was held based on written submissions in September 2006. The
Alaska Arbitrator issued an award in the ILWU’s favor, concluding that the AALA’s work
preservation provision required that APL assign the disputed work in Seward to the
ILWU. Specifically, the Alaska Arbitrator found that the disputed loading work was4
previously done by the ILWU, and he found that APL controls who handles its cargo.
He ordered APL to assign the work to the ILWU. APL made “in-lieu-of” payments with
respect to the disputed work covered by the award and appealed. On appeal, the
Coast Arbitrator remanded the case to the Alaska Arbitrator for a full evidentiary
hearing.5
Case 3:10-cv-00183-JWS Document 102 Filed 02/18/14 Page 3 of 14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Doc. 91 at p. 149 (Ex. G).	6
Doc. 91 at pp. 155-56 (Ex. H at pp. 5-6).	7
Doc. 91 at pp. 155-56, 157 (Ex. H at pp. 5-6, 7).	8
29 U.S.C. § 158(e).	9
Doc. 91 at pp.162-163 (Ex. I at pp. 4-5).	10
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(A), (B).	11
-4-
In the fall of 2008, after a full hearing, the Alaska Arbitrator concluded that there
was no compelling evidence presented that would modify or change his original
arbitration decision that the AALA required APL to assign its cargo-handling work in
Seward to the ILWU. In a written decision, the Alaska Arbitrator found that ILWU6
workers had performed cargo-handling work in Seward through North Star, a signatory
to the AALA. As a result of these findings, the arbitrator ordered APL to assign the7
cargo-handling work to ILWU’s Unit 60. He also suggested ways in which APL could
satisfy its obligation, but ultimately concluded that it was APL’s decision as to how APL
would comply.8
Rather than transition the work to the ILWU as ordered, APL continued to make
“in-lieu-of” payments and appealed the renewed decision, arguing that implementation
of the Alaska Arbitrator’s award would require it to violate section 8(e) of the National
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). The Coast Arbitrator determined that “as a precondition9
to appealing his decision in the case,” APL had to actually assign the work in question
to the ILWU, consistent with the Alaska Arbitrator’s award.10
APL filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”). It alleged that the arbitrator’s award violated section 8(e) of the NLRA and
that the ILWU violated sections 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B) of the NLRA by pursuing an11
unlawful interpretation of the AALA. The NLRB General Counsel’s Division of Advice
concluded that APL’s allegations lacked merit because the ILWU’s grievance and the
Case 3:10-cv-00183-JWS Document 102 Filed 02/18/14 Page 4 of 14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Doc. 96-15.	12
Doc. 91 at p. 168 (Ex. K).	13
Doc. 91 at p. 173 (Ex. L).	14
29 U.S.C. § 187.	15
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).	16
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).	17
Id.	18
-5-
resulting arbitration award were lawful. The NLRB Regional Office dismissed APL’s12
charges, and APL’s appeal to the Central Office of Appeals was denied.13 14
APL then filed the current action under section 303 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (“LMRA”), which permits an employer to sue for damages in federal15
court for any unfair labor practice defined in section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA. APL asserts
in its complaint that the ILWU violated subsections 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B) when it
advanced an interpretation of the work preservation provision that would force APL to
enter into an illegal agreement with Samson or force it to cease doing business with
Samson. The court dismissed the complaint after concluding that APL lacked the
requisite standing. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case back
for determination on the merits. On remand, the ILWU filed its motion for summary
judgment.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The16
materiality requirement ensures that “only disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Ultimately, “summary judgment will not lie if the . . . evidence is such that17
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” However, summary18
Case 3:10-cv-00183-JWS Document 102 Filed 02/18/14 Page 5 of 14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).	19
Id. at 323.	20
Id. at 323-25.	21
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.	22
Id. at 255.	23
Id. at 248-49.	24
29 U.S.C. § 187.	25
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(A), (B).	26
-6-
judgment is mandated under Rule 56(c) “against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”19
The moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact. The moving party need not present evidence; it need only point20
out the lack of any genuine dispute as to material fact. Once the moving party has21
met this burden, the non-moving party must set forth evidence of specific facts showing
the existence of a genuine issue for trial. All evidence presented by the non-movant22
must be believed for purposes of summary judgment and all justifiable inferences must
be drawn in favor of the non-movant. However, the non-moving party may not rest23
upon mere allegations or denials, but must show that there is sufficient evidence
supporting the claimed factual dispute to require a fact-finder to resolve the parties’
differing versions of the truth at trial.24
IV. DISCUSSION
APL brings suit against the ILWU pursuant to section 303 of the LMRA to25
recover damages stemming from the arbitration instigated by ILWU, which APL alleges
was an illegal unfair labor practice under sections 8(b)(4)(ii)(A) and (B) of the NLRA.26
Case 3:10-cv-00183-JWS Document 102 Filed 02/18/14 Page 6 of 14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(A).	27
29 U.S.C. § 158(e); see also Am. President Lines, Ltd. v. Int’l Longshore and	28
Warehouse Union, Alaska Longshore Div., Unit 60, 721 F.3d 1147, 1152 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013).
29 § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).	29
NLRB v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO (“ILA II”), 473 U.S. 61, 74-76,78-79	30
(1985).
Id. at 81.	31
NLRB v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO (“ILA I”), 447 U.S. 490, 504 (1980).	32
-7-
Both subsections (A) and (B) prohibit union coercion. Subsection (A) prohibits
coercing an employer to enter into an agreement which is prohibited by section 8(e) of
the NLRA. Section 8(e) prohibits “hot cargo” agreements, which are agreements27
where a union and an employer agree that the employer will not handle the goods of
another or will cease doing business with another person and include “union signatory”
agreements that prohibit an employer from subcontracting with any business who does
not use union labor. Subsection (B) prohibits coercing any employer to cease doing28
business with another party, regardless of any agreement.29
A union’s actions will not be deemed coercive under section 8(b)(4) if the
purpose of those actions are aimed at preserving work for its employees in the
bargaining unit (primary union activity), rather than accomplishing union goals
elsewhere (secondary union activity). Secondary union activity includes disrupting30
business relations of a non-union employer or expanding the reach of the union to claim
work not traditionally performed by bargaining unit members. The relevant inquiry is31
whether the union’s efforts are directed at matters involving the labor relations of the
contracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees.32
A union’s pursuance of a grievance through arbitration can be considered
coercive under section 8(b)(4) if that grievance is based on an interpretation of a
Case 3:10-cv-00183-JWS Document 102 Filed 02/18/14 Page 7 of 14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
See Nelson v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 46, 899 F.2d 1557, 1562	33
(9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Miller v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449 (9th
Cir. 1994); Truck Drivers, Union Local 705 v. NLRB, 820 F.2d 448, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
ILA I, 447 U.S. at 504.	34
192 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 1999).	35
-8-
collective bargaining agreement that furthers an unlawful object. That is, it is coercive33
if a union pursues an interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement in arbitration
that promotes secondary union activity and not primary work preservation activity. The
court applies a two-part test when determining whether an agreement is a lawful work
preservation agreement: (1) the union’s objective must be the preservation of work
traditionally performed by employees represented by the union; and (2) the contracting
employer must have the power to give the employees the work in question.34
Here, APL argues that ILWU’s interpretation of the AALA—that requires APL to
use ILWU labor in Seward for cargo handling—is an unlawful one because it
necessarily results in a de facto union signatory requirement for Samson or forces APL
to cease doing business with Samson. The ILWU asserts that its interpretation of the
AALA work preservation provision is a lawful prohibition on employers from
subcontracting outside the bargaining unit, which is a broadly defined unit consisting of
all ILWU represented longshore workers in a multi-port area used by the multiple
employers who are parties to the AALA.
The ILWU’s interpretation of its contract rights is colorable given case law
applicable to collective bargaining agreements involving multi-employer, multi-port
longshore work. Specifically, Bermuda Container Lines Ltd. v. International
Longshoremen’s Association, provides support for ILWU’s contention that multi-35
employer, master collective bargaining agreements in the longshore industry that
prohibit carriers from subcontracting outside the bargaining unit can be lawful if the
primary objective of the prohibition is work preservation for the bargaining unit
employees, even if the incidental effect is that an employer must cease doing business
Case 3:10-cv-00183-JWS Document 102 Filed 02/18/14 Page 8 of 14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Id. at 256-57.	36
Id. at 257.	37
-9-
with other entities. In Bermuda, Bermuda Container Lines (“BCL”), a marine carrier like
APL, was a party to an East and Gulf Coast-wide master collective bargaining
agreement with a longshore union, the ILA. BCL shipped cargo between Bermuda and
the Port of New York on a daily basis. The master agreement contained a provision
that sought to preserve certain longshore work for union members. BCL had
subcontracted with Maher Terminals, a stevedore company also bound to the master
agreement with the ILA, for dock work at the Port of New York, but then sought to
relocate from the Port of New York to the port in Salem, New Jersey, where non-ILA
workers were employed. The ILA union filed a grievance alleging that BCL’s move to
Salem violated the master agreement by diverting work away from ILA union members.
The grievance was sustained, and BCL was required to pay damages for each shipping
container that non-ILA workers handled in Salem. BCL filed suit to challenge the
arbitration award, arguing that the agreement as interpreted by the arbitrator required it
to refrain from doing business with companies in Salem or required those companies to
hire union workers.
The Second Circuit found that the agreement was not an unlawful union
signatory requirement, concluding that it lawfully prohibited subcontracting outside the
bargaining unit in order to preserve work for the bargaining unit employees. In so36
holding, it rejected BCL’s argument that the appropriate bargaining unit would only
encompass those ILA union employees who did work for BCL through Maher Terminals
at the Port of New York and that the union’s grievance challenging its move to Salem
was aimed at expanding the union’s reach to Salem and not preserving ILA union work
in the Port of New York. Instead, the court stressed that BCL was party to an37
industry-wide collective agreement, where the relevant bargaining unit was defined on a
multi-employer, multiple-port basis, and thus the bargaining unit employees were all the
Case 3:10-cv-00183-JWS Document 102 Filed 02/18/14 Page 9 of 14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Id.	38
Id.	39
-10-
longshore workers represented by ILA on a coast-wide basis. BCL was therefore38
required to preserve work for all ILA union members on a coast-wide basis and the use
of non-ILA workers in Salem would directly hurt existing members of the bargaining unit
by reducing the number of jobs available in the relevant geographic area.39
Based on Bermuda, an agreement that prohibits subcontracting outside the
bargaining unit by requiring contracting employers to hire bargaining unit employees
either directly or indirectly through other signatory employers can be a lawful work
preservation agreement in situations like here, where the bargaining unit consists of a
multi-port, multi-employer pool of longshore workers. Indeed, APL concedes that a
union contract can lawfully preclude subcontracting. It argues, however, that here
ILWU’s interpretation is not an outright prohibition on subcontracting but instead is a
prohibition on subcontracting based on union membership. It argues that limitations on
who can be subcontractors are only lawful if those limitations are directed at economic
standards and not union affiliation. APL incorrectly focuses on itself as the relevant
employer rather than the collective group of employers under the AALA when arguing
that the ILWU limits its ability to subcontract based on union affiliation. The primary
employer here is not just APL; it is collectively all employers subject to the AALA. The
ILWU’s interpretation of the AALA amounts to a prohibition, directed at the primary
employers collectively, on subcontracting out work covered under the AALA. The fact
that this means APL might be forced to use other signatories to the AALA as
subcontractors if they do not directly hire ILWU workers in Seward is a consequence of
APL’s status as a signatory to a multi-employer collective bargaining agreement.
Thus, the court concludes that the interpretation of the AALA sought by the
ILWU was not clearly unlawful: it did not necessarily amount to a hot cargo or union
signatory agreement. The remaining issue is whether the ILWU’s interpretation of the
Case 3:10-cv-00183-JWS Document 102 Filed 02/18/14 Page 10 of 14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
ILA I, 447 U.S. at 504.	40
Doc. 91 at pp. 111-120; Doc. 91 at p.149; Doc. 91 at pp. 155-56.	41
721 F.3d at 1557 n.7.	42
359 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1966).	43
Id. at 602-03.	44
-11-
AALA can be considered a lawful work preservation agreement as applied to the work
in question. As noted above, the court must consider whether the cargo-handling work
in Seward was fairly claimable by the ILWU and whether APL has control over the work
in question.40
The Alaska Arbitrator made findings of fact that resolve these two issues when
he considered whether APL was in violation of the AALA. He found that ILWU workers
had previously performed the disputed cargo-handling work in Seward and that APL
had the right to control the assignment of its cargo-handling work. As instructed by41
the Ninth Circuit, the court must decide whether and how much to defer to the
Arbitrator’s findings of fact.42
APL argues that the court cannot defer to the Alaska Arbitrator’s findings of fact
because it is not challenging the Alaska Arbitrator’s decision regarding the contract
under section 301 of the LMRA but, rather, is challenging the union’s conduct under
section 303. It argues that the limited judicial review and deference required under
section 301 has not been extended to section 303. It cites to Old Dutch Farms, Inc. v.
Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees Local 584, where the Second Circuit stated that the43
strong policy favoring arbitration and deference to an arbitrator’s findings related to
collective bargaining agreements does not have equal force in suits arising under
section 303 where the dispute is concerned with an employer’s right to recover
damages caused by an unfair labor practice, “which is entirely separate from any right
conferred on him by section 301.”44
Case 3:10-cv-00183-JWS Document 102 Filed 02/18/14 Page 11 of 14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
ILA I, 447 U.S. at 507.	45
Doc. 91 (Ex. L).	46
-12-
While this dispute was brought pursuant to section 303, APL’s claim for
damages is not entirely separate from the underlying contract claim that was the subject
of the arbitration. APL’s claim for damages arose from the ILWU’s prosecution of
contract grievances, and APL argues that ILWU advanced an unlawful interpretation of
the applicable contract when pursuing arbitration against it. Thus, APL’s section 303
claim directly and inextricably involves the contract issues decided by the Alaska
Arbitrator. The court agrees with the ILWU that the Alaska Arbitrator’s findings related
to whether the work sought had been performed by ILWU workers and to whether APL
controls the work, the critical facts in this case, should be given significant weight given
the fact that he is intimately familiar with the longshore industry.
Even disregarding the Alaska Arbitrator’s findings, the court concludes that the
agreement as construed by the ILWU has a lawful work preservation purpose given the
undisputed evidence on the record. When looking at the nature of the work involved,
the focus is on the work of the bargaining unit employees. Here, the bargaining unit45
employees include all longshore workers represented by the ILWU doing work at
certain Alaska ports for multi-employers under the AALA. It is undisputed that
bargaining unit employees have performed cargo-handling work in covered Alaska
ports, including Seward, pursuant to the AALA. North Star hired ILWU to perform such
work in Seward prior to 2003. North Star was and is an employer bound by the AALA.
Thus, the ILWU has handled cargo in Seward under the AALA in the past. The work is
fairly claimable.
APL argues that the work is not fairly claimable because the work done by the
ILWU in Seward was not on behalf of APL. This court agrees with the NLRB General
Counsel in that it is irrelevant whether or not the work was performed for APL
specifically. Again, the court must look to the work done by the bargaining unit46
Case 3:10-cv-00183-JWS Document 102 Filed 02/18/14 Page 12 of 14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Doc. 91 at p. 134 (Ex. D at p. 6).	47
Doc. 91 at p. 139 (Ex. D at p. 11).	48
Doc. 91 (Ex. F).	49
-13-
employees as a whole and not with reference to the particular employment practices of
an individual employer. As noted above, the bargaining unit here is defined not just in
terms of the employees of one employer, but in terms of employees doing work for
multiple employers bound by the terms of AALA and functioning collectively as the
primary employer. It is clear to this court, as it was to the Alaska Arbitrator and the
NLRB, that the ILWU has historically performed such cargo-handling work under the
AALA, even in Seward.
APL appears to find it significant that North Star is only an individual signatory to
the AALA and is no longer a part of the AMEA, the organization that negotiates the
collective bargaining agreement on behalf of APL. Even if the bargaining unit
employees should be narrowed to those ILWU members doing work for the AMEA
employers, at the time North Star used ILWU labor to do loading and unloading work in
Seward it was, in fact, a member of AMEA along with APL.
Not only is the disputed loading work in Seward fairly claimable by the ILWU,
APL has the right to assign such work to the ILWU. As noted by the ILWU in its
briefing, the evidence shows that APL “controls where APL’s containers go, when they
go, where they go, when they get there, and who takes them.” The evidence also47
shows that the reason APL did not have ILWU workers handle its cargo in Seward and
agreed to let Samson’s non-ILWU workforce do the work instead is because they
wanted to avoid a jurisdictional issue with Samson’s MEBA-represented workforce. It48
is undisputed that the MEBA ended up disclaiming the Seward work. APL’s current49
practices demonstrate that it could have the ILWU handle its cargo when at port, even
though the cargo is transported by Samson barges. Samson barges deliver APL
customers’ cargo from the smaller ports, including Seward, to Dutch Harbor. Dutch
Case 3:10-cv-00183-JWS Document 102 Filed 02/18/14 Page 13 of 14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-14-
Harbor is another port covered by the AALA, and APL chooses to employ ILWU
longshore workers from the joint dispatch halls to do its cargo-handling work on the
incoming and outgoing Samson barges in Dutch Harbor. This practice demonstrates
that APL can have Samson, its contractor, agree to this type of arrangement in Seward
or otherwise arrange for ILWU labor to perform such work.
Given that the cargo-handling work in Seward is fairly claimable by the ILWU and
that APL has the power to assign such work to ILWU workers, the interpretation of the
AALA advanced by the ILWU and adopted by the Alaska Arbitrator is a lawful work
preservation interpretation, and thus, there is no violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii). APL’s
section 303 claim fails as a matter of law.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the preceding discussion, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
at docket 88 is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court will please enter judgment for the
defendant.
DATED this 18 day of February 2014,th
/s/
JOHN W. SEDWICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 3:10-cv-00183-JWS Document 102 Filed 02/18/14 Page 14 of 14