Snead et al v. Wright et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ALASKA
MONIQUE R. SNEAD, Individually and)
as Personal Representative of the )
Estate of John H. Snead; JOHN G. )
SNEAD, Individually and as Trustee )
of the Snead Irrevocable Trust; )
MONIQUE R. SNEAD and JOHN G. )
SNEAD, both individually and as )
beneficiaries of the John H. Snead )
Revocable Trust and the Snead )
Irrevocable Trust, )
)
Plaintiffs, ) 3:19-CV-00092 JWS
)
vs. ) ORDER
)
GUADALUPE C. WRIGHT; and ) [Re: Motion at Doc. 70]
MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER )
& SMITH INCORPORATED, )
)
Defendants. )
)
I. MOTION PRESENTED
At docket 70 Defendant Guadalupe C. Wright (Wright) moves for an award of
fees and costs for claims pursuant to Rule 41(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiffs Monique R. Snead and John G. Snead, in their various capacities (collectively
Plaintiffs), oppose the request at docket 75. Wright replies at docket 76.
II. BACKGROUND
The court need not repeat the complex procedural posture for purposes of this
motion for fees. The factual and procedural background of this case is set forth in the
court’s order at docket 35, wherein the court granted a stay as to the claims against
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Wright because of pending state court litigation of a similar nature. Suffice it to say,
Plaintiffs have subsequently amended their state court complaint to remove reference to
the Merrill Lynch trust accounts. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion asking the court
to lift the stay based on their amendment, arguing that it separates the state court
issues from the federal issues. Before the court ruled on the motion to lift the stay,
Wright filed this motion requesting an award of fees and costs under Rule 41(d), arguing
that “if this Court grants the motion and lifts the stay” she should be awarded fees and
costs associated with the dismissal of the Merrill Lynch trust claims in the state court
action. The court subsequently denied the motion to lift the stay. In her reply, Wright
argues that she is still entitled to fees and costs under Rule 41 despite the stay, arguing
that Plaintiffs’ amendment effectively dismissed the claims against her to the extent they
were based on the Merrill Lynch trust accounts.
III. DISCUSSION
Rule 41(d) does not apply to the procedural posture of the ongoing litigation
between Plaintiffs and Wright. Rule 41(d) states as follows:
If a plaintiff who previously dismissed an action in any court files an action
based on or including the same claim against the same defendant, the
court: (1) may order the plaintiff to pay all or part of the costs of that
previous action; and (2) may stay the proceedings until the plaintiff has
complied.1
What constitutes a dismissal of an action under Rule 41 is set forth within the rule itself.
For voluntary dismissals: “The plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by
filing (i) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a
motion for summary judgment; or (ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who
have appeared.”2 Plaintiffs have not filed any notice of dismissal or stipulation of
dismissal in the state court. They only filed an amendment. Moreover, the amendment
did not release Wright from the litigation; rather, it simply sought to limit the factual basis
1Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(d).
2Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a).
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for the claims against her. This is not enough to trigger the application of Rule 41(d).
As the Ninth Circuit has stated, “Rule 41 is reserved for circumstances in which the
result of the alleged dismissal is that one or all of the defendants are released from the
action.”3
Moreover, costs under Rule 41(d) may only be awarded for “the preparation of
work product rendered useless by the dismissal.”4 The court agrees with Plaintiffs that it
does not appear that work completed in the state litigation has been rendered useless
by the amendment of the complaint.
Wright alternatively argues that fees and costs are warranted under Rule 15.
While the rule does not explicitly permit the imposition of costs or sanctions, “a district
court, in its discretion, may impose costs pursuant to Rule 15 as a condition of granting
leave to amend in order to compensate the opposing party for additional costs incurred
because the original pleading was faulty.”5 However, here, Wright is seeking fees
associated with the Plaintiffs’ amendment of their state court claims, not an amendment
of their claims in this federal action. There is no basis for such an award.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the preceding discussion, Wright’s motion for fees and costs at
docket 70 is DENIED.
DATED this 17th day of August 2020.
/s/ JOHN W. SEDWICK
SENIOR JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
3Gen. Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 66 F.3d 1500, 1513 (9th Cir. 1995).
4Esquivel v. Arau, 913 F.Supp. 1382, 1388 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (quoting Koch v. Hankins, 8
F.3d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1993)); Nielson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 2003 WL 27374136, at *4
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 31. 2003 (“Federal court interpreting Rule 41(d) generally deny costs incurred
for work that will be useful in the later filed case.”).
5Gen Signal Corp., 66 F.3d at 1514.
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