Stern v. Houser

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
JOACHIM STERN,
Petitioner,
vs.
EARL HOUSER,
Respondent. Case No. 3:21-cv-00016-RRB
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Joachim Stern, representing himself from Goose Creek Correctional Center,
filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming the state court is denying
his rights in his state criminal case.1 The Court takes judicial notice2 that Mr. Stern
was arraigned and indicted on Class A Felony and Class A and B Misdemeanor
charges in February 2020, that his criminal case in the Superior Court for the State
of Alaska is still ongoing.3
1 Docket 1; State of Alaska v. Joachim Laron Stern, Alaska Superior Court Case No. 3AN-
20-00935CR.
2 Judicial notice is the “court’s acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without
requiring a party’s proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact. . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary
(11th ed. 2019); see also Foster Poultry Farms v. Alkar-Rapidpak-MP Equip., Inc., 868 F.
Supp. 2d 983, 990 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (“Courts routinely take judicial notice of publicly
available records . . . from other court proceedings.”) (citing Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. South
Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 498 F.3d 1031, 1039 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2007) (additional
citation omitted)); Fed. R. Evid. 201.
3 See https://records.courts.alaska.gov/eaccess, Alaska 	v. Stern, 3AN-20-00935CR,
(showing dismissal by the prosecution of one felony charge, and showing representation
hearing held on 5/26/21, and discovery hearing scheduled for 7/2/21).
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The Court screened the Petition, using liberal construction,4 and because a
petitioner may properly challenge state pretrial detention under § 2241,5 appointed
counsel to represent Mr. Stern in these proceedings.6 Counsel has now filed a
Motion for Leave to Withdraw Pursuant to Anders v. California. 7
DISCUSSION
A writ of habeas corpus allows an individual to test the legality of being
detained or held in custody by the government.8 The writ “is a vital ‘instrument for
the protection of individual liberty’ against government power.”9
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, this Court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a
prisoner “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.”10 This habeas statute provides federal courts with general habeas corpus
4 See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d
1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
5 See Stow v. Murashige, 389 F.3d 880, 885–88 (9th Cir. 2004). Magana-Pizano v. INS,
200 F.3d 603, 608 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1999) (federal courts have general habeas jurisdiction
under 2241).
6 Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District
Courts. The same procedural rules for 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and § 2255 govern 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.
7 Docket 15.
8 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004).
9 Gage v. Chappell, 793 F.3d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir. 2015); quoting Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723, 743 (2008).
10 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
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jurisdiction.11 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is the proper avenue for a state prisoner who
wishes to challenge his state custody without a state judgment.12 When examining
a § 2241 petition from a pretrial detainee claiming a violation of his or her right to
a speedy trial, a significant delay in the proceedings must be shown.13
In McNeely v. Blanas, 336 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit
found a delay of three years to be substantial, such that prejudice was presumed,
triggering an inquiry under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). The four-
part test articulated by the Supreme Court in Barker is used to determine whether
government delay had abridged a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
trial.14 The factors to be considered in a Barker inquiry include: “(1) the length of
the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the accused’s assertion of the right to
speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. 	No single factor is
necessary or sufficient.”15
11 See Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d at 608 & n.4.
12 Stow, 389 F.3d at 885–88 (quoting White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir.
2004) (“By contrast, the general grant of habeas authority in § 2241 is available for
challenges by a state prisoner who is not in custody pursuant to a state court judgment-
for example, a defendant in pre-trial detention or awaiting extradition.”).
13 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–31 (1972).
14 McNeely, 336 F.3d at 826 (citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1
(1992)).
15 Id. (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530); see also United States v. Sheikh, No.
2:18-cr-00119 WBS, 	___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2020 WL 5995226 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9,
2020) (Discussing the right to a speedy trial in a federal criminal case, explaining that “the
coronavirus alone does not give the court the liberty to simply exclude time. Rather, the
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I. 	Appropriate Relief
For relief, Mr. Stern requests his “release from the Dept. of Corrections for
violation of [his] civil right[s] . . .”16 The due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments bar pretrial detention unless detention is necessary to
serve a compelling government interest.17 Thus, although a state may “impose
conditions on an arrestee’s release, such as bail . . . [b]ail set at a figure higher
than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill [its] purpose [of assuring the
presence of the accused at trial] is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.”18
Mr. Stern’s request that he be released from incarceration raises the issue of
whether the state has set appropriate conditions for his release pending trial. This
request for relief is appropriate under a § 2241 petition.19
A speedy trial claim may be reviewed under § 2241 if a pretrial detainee is
seeking to compel the state to bring him to trial, rather than seeking dismissal of
court must conduct a ‘deliberate inquir[y] into whether an ends-of-justice continuance is
justified by the circumstances surrounding a particular case.’”) (citation omitted).
16 Docket 1 at 8.
17 Reem v. Hennessy, Case No. 17-cv-06628-CRB, 2017 WL 6765247, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 29, 2017) (unpublished) (citing Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 780 (9th
Cir. 2014)).
18 Id. (quoting Lopez-Valenzuela, 770 F.3d at 777).
19 Id., at *2.
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the charges.20 Thus, although a federal court can order a state court to bring a
petitioner to trial, federal courts do not order that state charges be dropped.21
Additionally, for state prisoners alleging speedy trial violations, the doctrine of
abstention applies.
II. 	Abstention
The Younger abstention doctrine provides that federal courts may not
generally exercise jurisdiction when doing so would interfere with state judicial
proceedings.22 The core of Younger abstention is that a federal court cannot
interfere with pending state court criminal proceedings, absent a “showing of bad
faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable
relief.”23 A federal court
20 See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489–90 (1973)
(“Petitioner does not, however, seek at this time to litigate a federal defense to a criminal
charge, but only to demand enforcement of the Commonwealth’s affirmative constitutional
obligation to bring him promptly to trial.”) (citation omitted).
21 Compare United States v. Olsen, No. SACR 17-00076-CJC, 2020 WL 6145206, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2020) (“Because the Central District denied Mr. Olsen a public and
speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment, this Court now must dismiss the [federal]
indictment against 	him.”), appeal 	filed 11/13/20, 9th Cir. No. 20-50329, 2020 	WL
6145206.
22 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
23 Younger, 401 U.S. at 54; see also Carden v. Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 84 (9th Cir. 1980)
(In Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971), the Supreme Court “limited the category
of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ to encompass only ‘cases of proven harassment or
prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid
conviction,’ or where ‘irreparable injury can be shown.’”); Brown v. Ahern, 676 F.3d 899,
901 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Consistent with this observation, we specifically rejected in Carden
the argument that a claimed violation of the Speedy Trial Clause . . . sufficed in and of
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must abstain under Younger if four requirements are met: (1) a state-
initiated 	proceeding 	is 	ongoing; 	(2) 	the 	proceeding 	implicates
important state interests; (3) the federal plaintiff is not barred from
litigating federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding; and
(4) the federal court action would enjoin the proceeding or have the
practical 	effect 	of 	doing 	so, 	i.e., 	would 	interfere 	with 	the 	state
proceeding in a way that Younger disapproves.24
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has directly addressed abstention,
regarding the claim of a state court violating the right to a speedy trial, explaining:
Younger does not “require[ ] a district court to abstain from hearing a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the conditions of
pretrial detention in state court” where (1) the procedure challenged
in the petition is distinct from the underlying criminal prosecution and
the challenge would not interfere with the prosecution, or (2) full
vindication of 	the petitioner’s 	pretrial rights 	requires 	intervention
before trial.25
The State of Alaska has an important interest in enforcing its criminal laws,
and Mr. Stern’s criminal case in state court remains ongoing.26 Mr. Stern’s
allegation, that he is being denied his right to a speedy trial in state court, should
normally be addressed in his state court criminal proceedings.27 This Court should
itself as an independent ‘extraordinary circumstance’ necessitating pre-trial habeas
consideration.”) (citing Carden at 84).
24 San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Committee v. City of
San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008).
25 Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Arevalo, 882 F.3d at 764, 766–
67).
26 See Alaska v. Stern, Case No. 3AN-20-00935CR.
27 See Brown, 676 F.3d at 900–01 (A “federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a habeas
petition that raises an affirmative defense to state prosecution before trial and conviction
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not interfere with the trial court’s fact-finding responsibilities and legal decisions in
that 	case, 	unless 	“full 	vindication 	of 	the 	petitioner’s 	pretrial 	rights 	requires
intervention before trial.”28
Counsel 	for 	Mr. 	Stern, 	in 	his 	Motion 	to 	Withdraw 	under 	Anders 	v.
California,29 concludes that “Mr. Stern does not have any non-frivolous claims for
federal court intervention based upon the State of Alaska’s purported violations of
his federal constitutional rights to due process and a speedy trial as guaranteed
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and the habeas statute.”30 Although
Mr. Stern’s “loss of liberty for the time of pretrial detention is ‘irretrievable’
regardless of the outcome at trial,”31 he received bail hearings on February 26,
2020, March 24, 2020, and January 28, 2021.32 And Mr. Stern’s bail, while he
can have the same effect as a direct injunction of ongoing state proceedings.”) (citing
Carden, 626 F.2d at 83).
28 Page, 932 F.3d at 903.
29 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see also United States v. Griffy, 895 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1990).
30 Docket 15 at 1, and Exhibit 1 (Affidavit of James Corrigan).
31 Page, 932 F.3d at 904 (quoting Arevalo, 882 F.3d at 766); see also United States v.
Henning, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2021 WL 222355 at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2021) (“The
Court also is acutely aware of the statistics of how many people continue to be infected,
hospitalized, 	and—tragically—die 	due to the coronavirus every day, all across the
country. 	But the Constitution does not turn on these considerations. Instead, to protect
the fundamental right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth 	Amendment, the
Constitution requires that a trial only be continued over a defendant’s objection if holding
the trial is impossible.”).
32 Docket 15 at 2.
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awaits trial for felony robbery, is currently reduced to “a $250 performance bond
and PED electronic monitoring with house arrest. 	However, Mr. Stern has been
unable to obtain a suitable address for the electronic monitoring conditions.
Consequently, he has remained incarcerated since he was charged on February 1,
2020.”33 And “[g]iven the seriousness of the charges that he faces, counsel cannot
state that Mr. Stern’s bail has been set in an amount higher than can be reasonably
calculated to assure Mr. Stern’s appearance at trial while at the same time assuring
the state’s compelling governmental interest in assuring public safety.”34
Moreover, continuances have been requested by Mr. Stern’s attorney “due
to discovery issues. 	Mr. Stern’s counsel has not yet obtained the entirety of the
discovery from the state of Alaska.”35 Further, Mr. Stern’s state appointed lawyer
has filed a motion to dismiss the indictment in his criminal case.36 As pointed out
by counsel in the current case, “in light of Mr. Stern’s constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel, and opportunity to prepare a defense under the Sixth
33 Id.; see also Docket 15-1 at 1 (before appointment of counsel, bail was initially set at
a $1,500 cash performance bond).
34 Id. at 7.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 3, 6.
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Amendment, the period of delay caused as a result of counsel’s preparation of the
case would be an improper basis for a speedy trial violation.”37
These facts indicate that the federal court should abstain from intervening in
state court proceedings.
III. 	Exhaustion
Exhaustion is required under common law before bringing a federal petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.38 Although there is no statutory exhaustion requirement
for a petition brought under § 2241, principles of federalism and comity require the
court to abstain until all state criminal proceedings are completed, and the
petitioner 	exhausts 	the 	available 	state 	judicial 	remedies, 	unless 	special
circumstances warranting federal intervention prior to a state criminal trial are
found. 	A violation of the right to a speedy trial is not, alone, an extraordinary
circumstance warranting federal intervention.39
37 Id. at 6.
38 See Braden, 410 U.S. at 488 (allowing petitioner to raise speedy trial claim prior to trial
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, where he had exhausted available state remedies); Stow, 389
F.3d at 886. 	“The exhaustion requirement addresses the same concerns of comity
between federal and state courts as Younger does. See Dickerson v. State of La., 816
F.2d 220, 225–26 (5th Cir. 1987) (‘The exhaustion doctrine of section 2241(c)(3) was
judicially crafted on federalism grounds in order to protect the state courts’ opportunity to
confront and resolve initially any constitutional issues arising within their jurisdictions as
well as to limit federal interference in the state adjudicatory process.’).” 	Reem v.
Hennessy, Case No. 17-cv-06628-CRB, 2017 WL 6765247 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29,
2017) (unpublished).
39 Carden, 626 F.2d at 83–85.
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Given status of Mr. Stern’s state criminal case, this Court will only address
Mr. Stern’s speedy trial claim after 	his remedies are appropriately and fully
exhausted in his state court case.40
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. 	The Motion for Leave to Withdraw Pursuant to Anders v. California,
at Docket 15, is GRANTED.
2. 	This case is DISMISSED.
3. 	Any other outstanding motions are DENIED as moot.
4. 	The Clerk of Court will enter Judgment accordingly.
Dated at Anchorage, Alaska this 17th day of June, 2021.
/s/ Ralph R. Beistline
RALPH R. BEISTLINE
Senior United States Magistrate Judge
40 See, e.g., Stack, 342 U.S. at 6–7 (“While habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy for
one held in custody in violation of the Constitution, . . . 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(c)(3), the
District Court should withhold relief in this collateral habeas corpus action where an
adequate remedy available in the criminal proceeding has not been exhausted.”) (citation
omitted); Webb v. Simpson, Case No. 3:19-CV-5561-BHS-DWC, 2020 WL 589818 at *1
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 6, 2020) (slip op.) (“Petitioner alleges his constitutional rights are being
violated, including violations of his right to be free from excessive bail and his right to a
speedy trial. . . . Petitioner has not shown there is an absence of available state corrective
processes or that circumstances exist rendering any state process ineffective.”).
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