Second Chief Steven R. Moses v. State of Alaska Governments

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
SECOND CHIEF STEVEN R. MOSES,
on behalf of Orutsararmuit Native
Council & (229) AK Tribes & also on
behalf of fellow AM Indian Tribesman,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF ALASKA GOVERNMENTS,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:21-cv-00254-JMK
SECOND SCREENING ORDER
On November 15, 2021, Steven R. Moses, a self-represented prisoner
(hereinafter “Plaintiff”), filed a Prisoner’s Complaint under the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a civil cover sheet and Prisoner’s Application to
Waive Prepayment of the Filing Fee.1 	Subsequently, Plaintiff filed numerous
additional 	documents, 	most 	commonly 	titled 	with 	“USCS 	Fed 	Rules 	Evid
R. 201(c)(2),”2 and a motion titled “Request for Representation Through the United
States Attorney’s Office Under [Title 25 USC § 175].”3
1 Dockets 1–3.
2 Dockets 5, 7, 9–19.
3 Docket 6.
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At Docket 22, the Court screened the Complaint, found it deficient, denied
the motion for representation, but granted leave to amend. On February 24, 2022,
Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint, a civil cover sheet, and a “2nd Request
for 	Representation 	By 	and 	Through 	the 	United 	States 	Attorney’s 	Office.”4
Subsequently, Plaintiff has submitted additional legal “briefing” under the guise of
Rules 201 and 1007 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.5
The Court now screens Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. 	The Court shall not consider any of the
additional documents filed with the Court, as that is not proper procedure to amend
a complaint.6
SCREENING REQUIREMENT
Federal law requires a court to conduct an initial screening of a civil
complaint filed by a self-represented prisoner. 	In this screening, a court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action:
(i) 	is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) 	fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) 	seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.7
4 Dockets 23–26.
5 Dockets 28–30.
6 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); see also Local Civil Rule 15.1.
7 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
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To determine whether a complaint states a valid claim for relief, courts
consider whether the complaint contains sufficient factual matter that, if accepted
as true, “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”8 	In conducting its
review, a court must liberally construe a self-represented plaintiff’s pleading and
give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt.9 Before a court may dismiss any portion
of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the
court must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the deficiencies in the complaint
and an opportunity to amend or otherwise address the problems, unless to do so
would be futile.10 Futility exists when “the allegation of other facts consistent with
the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency[.]”11
DISCUSSION
I. 	First Amended Complaint
Plaintiff names Goose Creek Correctional Center, the Alaska Department of
Corrections, and the State of Alaska – Government(s) in their official capacities.12
8 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). 	In making this determination, a court may consider “materials that are submitted
with and attached to the Complaint.” United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th
Cir. 2011) (citing Lee v. L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001)).
9 See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026,
1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
10 See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Albrecht v. Lund,
845 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988)).
11 See Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).
12 Docket 23 at 2.
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In Claim 1, Plaintiff alleges that on October 21, 2020, administrators of the
Goose Creek Correctional Center posted a memorandum that targeted Native
Corporations and cited a policy that prohibits mail that solicits gifts, money, credit
or contractual purchases without the approval of the Superintendent or designee.13
Plaintiff alleges that while the policy does not reference Native Corporations, the
October 21, 2020, memorandum is drafted against Native Corporations.14 Plaintiff
alleges that prizes are a form of tribal property that belong to Native Corporations
and tribal property may not be deprived without due process.15
Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff does appear to allege some facts
in support of a Claim 1 on page 6. Namely, that (1) Policy 810.03 V.E.F. (the policy
named in the Memorandum) is a broad policy of the Department of Corrections;
(2) but that has a discriminatory application through the October 21, 2020,
Memorandum; and (3) as a shareholder of a Native Corporation he may acquire
personal property in the form of a prize.
In Claim 2, Plaintiff alleges that from July 7, 1958 through the present the
State of Alaska Government(s) through the “AKDOC Memo” violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.16 	Plaintiff does not provide
13 Docket 23 at 3.
14 Docket 23 at 3.
15 Docket 23 at 3.
16 Docket 23 at 4.
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factual allegations regarding this claim but does allege generally the State of
Alaska has failed to recognize the indigenous people of Alaska.17
In Claim 3, Plaintiff alleges that from December 18, 1971, to the present the
Alaska State Legislature did not create a positive policy for recognition and violated
his civil right to “the [promotion] of NATIVE RIGHTS.”18 Plaintiff does not provide
factual allegations regarding this claim, but does allege generally that the Alaska
State Legislature has not met its obligations under the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act or Public Law 280 to promote the rights and welfare of Alaskan
Natives and the lack of interstate recognition equates to individual discrimination
as displayed by the October 21, 2020 memo.19
In support of his claims, Plaintiff includes six pages of “legal briefing”20 and
two copies of the Memorandum at issue—the version previously submitted with
typed case citations and commentary and a version with a handwritten attestation
from Plaintiff.21 	The Court notes in its prior Screening Order, the Court explicitly
instructed Plaintiff to submit this exhibit without writing or commentary; Plaintiff has
failed to follow the Court’s prior instruction.
17 Docket 23 at 4.
18 Docket 23 at 5.
19 Docket 23 at 5
20 Docket 23 at 6–11.
21 Docket 23-1.
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For 	relief, 	Plaintiff 	requests 	(1) 	damages 	of 	$10,000,000.00 	per 	tribe;
(2) punitive damages of $30 billion dollars; (3) an order to “enact state POLICY in
accordance with various tribal rights or (229 AK TRIBES)”; (4) a declaration that
“FEDERAL LAW preempts state policy”; and (5) the intrastate recognition of 229
Alaska tribes.22
II. 	Standing
Article III standing “is the threshold question in every federal case” which
determines whether the court has the power to hear a lawsuit.23 The “irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing consists of three elements . . . [t]he plaintiff
must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged
conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.”24 	The requirements of standing maintain these jurisdictional
limits by “identify[ing] those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the
judicial 	process[.]”25 	A 	plaintiff, 	as 	the 	moving 	party, 	bears 	the 	burden 	of
establishing standing.26
22 Docket 23 at 14.
23 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
24 Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2013) (internal punctuation omitted) (citing Lujan v.
Def’s of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) and Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000).
25 Munns v. Kerry, 782 F.3d 402, 409 (9th Cir. 2015).
26 Id.
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Standing requires that a plaintiff demonstrate an injury. Injuries to common
law, constitutional, or statutory rights are sufficient to meet the injury requirement
of standing. “A federal court's jurisdiction . . . can be invoked only when the plaintiff
himself has suffered ‘some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively
illegal action[.]’”27 	“An injury sufficient to satisfy Article III must be ‘concrete and
particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”28
An alleged injury must be traceable to the defendant in order to meet
standing requirements. 	Often referred to as causation, a plaintiff must show how
the 	defendant’s 	action, 	or 	lack 	thereof, 	caused 	his 	injury 	of 	common 	law,
constitutional, 	or 	statutory 	rights.29 	Lastly, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	demonstrate
redressability. 	Redressability is the concept that a favorable judicial decision
would remedy the plaintiff’s injury.30
As explained in the next section of this Order, Plaintiff has not pleaded
sufficient facts to demonstrate an injury traceable to a defendant eligible for suit.
Furthermore, Plaintiff may only bring suit for his own injuries. Plaintiff’s allegations
of 	discrimination 	must 	be 	“concrete 	and 	particularized,” 	not 	conjectural 	or
hypothetical. Therefore, as to Claim 1, Plaintiff could have standing, if he alleged
27 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (citing Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617
(1973)).
28 Munns, 782 F.3d at 409 (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341,
(2014)).
29 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
30 See, e.g., United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743 (1995).
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sufficient, plausible factual details—that if proven true would demonstrate—that
specific administrators of Goose Creek Correctional Center applied Policy 810.03
in a discriminatory manner, which caused him an actual, particular injury. However
as to Claims 2 and 3, Plaintiff’s broad systemic allegations lack the fundamental
functions of standing: 	particularized injury, causation, and redressability.31 	As
plead, Plaintiff lacks standing, because he has not plead sufficient plausible factual
details to demonstrate a traceable injury.
III. 	Failure to State a Claim
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs that a complaint
must 	contain 	a 	“short 	and 	plain 	statement 	of 	the 	claim 	showing 	that 	the
[complainant] is entitled to relief.” A complaint should set out each claim for relief
separately. Each claim should identify (1) the specific harm that Plaintiff is alleging
has occurred to him, (2) when that harm occurred, (3) where that harm was
caused, and (4) who he is alleging caused that specific harm to him.
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to plausibly
allege 	a 	claim. 	As 	plead, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	a 	Memorandum 	applied
Policy 810.03 in a discriminatory manner to Native Corporations and to him as a
shareholder. Plaintiff provides the Memorandum as an exhibit. However, Plaintiff
does not provide factual details that would be required to fulfill basic Rule 8
31 See Cole v. Oravec, 700 Fed. Appx. 602, 605 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming the dismissal of Native
American plaintiffs’ broad substantive due process and treaty-based claims alleging stigma and
denial of basic safety for lack of standing).
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pleading. 	For example, that (1) he was asked to take a survey by his applicable
Native Corporation; (2) he won a prize, but could not receive it; or (3) other non-
Native inmates take surveys and receive prizes, etc. 	In order for Plaintiff to
sufficiently plead facts to demonstrate a plausible claim, Plaintiff needs to describe
how he was harmed by a defendant’s actions. 	Plaintiff need not include legal
reasoning or briefing. Plaintiff merely needs to explain when, where, and who took
an action that harmed him. 	Accordingly, as a threshold matter, Plaintiff has not
met the basic Rule 8 pleading requirements to state a claim upon which relief may
granted.
IV. 	Civil Rights Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
42 U.S.C. § 1983 permits an individual to sue for a violation of constitutional
or civil rights in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a federal statute that “is not itself
a source of substantive rights,” but provides “a method for vindicating rights [found]
elsewhere.”32 	To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
“plead that (1) defendants acting under color of state law (2) deprived plaintiff of
rights secured by the federal Constitution or federal statutes.”33
32 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
144 n.3 (1979)).
33 Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986).
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a. 	42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a defendant to be a state actor
42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires that a defendant must be “acting under the color
of state law.”34 	A defendant has acted under color of state law where he or she
has “exercised power ‘possessed by the virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’”35
States or state agencies are not persons under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	States
have sovereign immunity due to the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
which makes them immune from suit unless that immunity is waived.36 “States or
governmental 	entities 	that 	are 	considered ‘arms 	of 	the 	State’ for 	Eleventh
Amendment purposes” are not ‘persons’ under [Section] 1983.”37 Plaintiff cannot
sue the State of Alaska or any of its governmental branches, agencies, divisions,
offices, or departments. 	Therefore, Goose Creek Correctional Center, Alaska
Department of Corrections, and the State of Alaska – Government(s) are not
proper defendants. In order to properly plead a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must name
a person or entity that is considered a person under § 1983.
34 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988).
35 West, 487 U.S. at 49 (internal citations omitted); see also Tongol v. Usery, 601 F.2d 1091, 1097
(establishing that when state officials are administering a federal funded program, the state
officials are still acting under the color of state law).
36 In re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (holding federal courts may not hear suits against a
state brought by their own citizens, “because of the fundamental rule of which the [Eleventh]
Amendment is but an exemplification.”); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
37 Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997); quoting Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989)).
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b. 	A state actor must violate a pre-existing federal constitutional or
statutory right
42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not confer federal constitutional or federal statutory
rights. 	Instead, it provides a mechanism for remedying violations of pre-existing
federal rights.38 Constitutional rights are those conferred by the U.S. Constitution
to individual citizens. Section 1983 can be used as a mechanism for enforcing the
rights guaranteed by a particular federal statute only if (1) the statute creates
enforceable rights and (2) Congress has not foreclosed the possibility of a § 1983
remedy for violations of the statute in question.39 	Section 1983 does not provide
a mechanism for remedying alleged violations of state law.40
i. 	Fourteenth Amendment, Equal Protection
The 	Equal 	Protection 	Clause 	of 	the 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	protects
prisoners from discrimination based on race.41 In order to state a claim based on
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff
must allege that defendants acted with intentional discrimination against plaintiff,
or against a class of prisoners which included plaintiff, and that such conduct did
not relate to a legitimate penological purpose.42 	Plainly, Plaintiff must allege
38 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989).
39 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41 (1997); Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020,
1027–28 (9th Cir. 1999).
40 Galen v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007).
41 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
42 See Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,
528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that equal protection claims may be brought by a “class of
one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v.
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(1) the 	alleged 	policy 	or 	regulation, 	even 	if 	facially 	neutral, 	resulted 	in 	a
discrimination; (2) that defendant acted with intent, at least in part, to discriminate
against plaintiff, or a group of similarly situated prisoners that includes plaintiff, and
(3) that the policy 	or regulation 	does 	not relate to a legitimate penological
purpose.43 	However, Ninth Circuit precedent dictates that an official’s “[m]ere
indifference”44 to the “unequal effects on a particular class does not establish
discriminatory intent.”45
ii. 	Fourteenth Amendment, Property Interest
The Due Process Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals, including
prisoners, from state deprivations of property. 	Though a prisoner retains rights
under the Due Process Clause, a prisoner’s property rights are subject to vast
restrictions due to the nature of being incarcerated.46 In order to have a “property
interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or
desire for it.”47 Further, the Constitution does not confer property interests, rather
they are created by an independent source, such as state law, that “that secure
Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940
F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985).
43 Id.; see also Cole v. Oravec, 700 Fed. Appx. 602, 605–06 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding plaintiffs
sufficiently plead equal protection claim under theory of disproportionate impact).
44 Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005).
45 Smith v. Cruzen, No. 14-CV-04791 LHK (PR), 2017 WL 4865565, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26,
2017), aff'd, 735 F. App'x 434 (9th Cir. 2018) (relying on Thornton, 425 F.3d at 1167).
46 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
47 Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
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certain benefits and support the entitlement to those benefits.”48 In order to allege
a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim for a property interest, Plaintiff must
allege sufficient plausible facts that, if proven true, would demonstrate (1) a
protected benefit that he is entitled to; and (2) interference of a deprivation of that
benefit.
As pled, Claim 1 Plaintiff does not establish a viable constitutional claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff would need to plead sufficient plausible facts to
meet 	the 	elements 	of 	an 	equal 	protection 	or 	due 	process 	claim 	under 	the
Fourteenth 	Amendment. 	Claims 2 	and 	3 do not allege 	federally 	protected
constitutional or civil rights, but rather systemic grievances best addressed through
the legislative and political processes, such as letter writing to representatives.
c. 	A state actor must cause a violation of rights
In a Section 1983 action, a defendant, who is a state actor eligible for suit,
may be sued in either an individual or an official capacity.
i. 	Individual Capacity
In order for a defendant to be individually liable under Section 1983, that
defendant must personally participate in an alleged rights deprivation.49 	“In a
§ 1983 action, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was
the actionable cause of the claimed injury.”50 	A defendant sued in her individual
48 Id.
49 Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 2010).
50 Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).
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capacity may be held liable for money damages.51 	In order for Plaintiff to sue
defendants in an individual capacity, then as to each defendant, he must allege
facts that if proven would demonstrate that the named defendant (1) personally
participated in depriving Plaintiff of his rights and (2) that defendant’s actions
caused Plaintiff ’s injury.
ii. 	Official Capacity
In a Section 1983 action, a plaintiff may sue a defendant in an official
capacity as an alternate way of pleading a claim against the governmental entity
for which that individual is an officer or employee.52 	A plaintiff suing a defendant
in her official capacity is not required to allege the “named official's personal
involvement 	in 	the 	acts 	or 	omissions 	constituting 	the 	alleged 	constitutional
violation.”53 Instead, a plaintiff must only (1) “identify the law or policy challenged”
and (2) “name the official within the entity who can appropriately respond to
injunctive relief.”54 However, a defendant sued in her official capacity may not be
sued for damages, only for injunctive relief.55 	In order for Plaintiff to sue a
defendant in her official capacity, he must (1) identify the policy he challenges and
51 See Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016).
52 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991).
53 Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013).
54 Id.
55 See Will v. Mich. Dep’t. of State Police, 491 U.S. 64, 71 n.10.
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(2) demonstrate that that particular defendant is able to respond to the injunctive
relief he requests.
In any further amended complaint filed by Plaintiff, Plaintiff will need to
identify whether each defendant is sued in their individual or official capacity.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient plausible facts to meet the requirements of
standing, Rule 8 of Federal Civil Procedure, or a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The Court grants leave to amend his complaint, as to the allegations made
in Claim 1 in accord with the guidance provided above.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. 	The Complaint at Docket 23 is dismissed for failing to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. 	The Court grants leave to amend Claim 1.
Claims 2 and 3 are dismissed for lack of standing.
2. 	The “Plaintiff’s 2nd Request for Representation By and Through the United
States Attorney’s Office at Docket 26 is DENIED. 	The Court already ruled
on this issue in its original Screening Order at Docket 23. 	As previously
explained, 25 U.S.C. § 175 does not create a mandatory duty for the United
States Attorney to represent Alaskan Native individuals or tribal entities in
any or all lawsuits.56 	Rather, 25 U.S.C. § 175 creates a discretionary
function for the United States to serve as a guardian and trustee for tribal
56 Siniscal v. United States, 208 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1953).
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interests in certain instances.57 	Further, legislative history indicates that
25 U.S.C. § 175 may only apply to disputes related to public lands.58
Accordingly, the Court neither has the power to compel the United States
Attorney to accept this case, nor does legal precedent support that the
United States Attorney apply such discretion to a prisoner civil rights action.
3. 	Plaintiff has until July 5, 2022, to file one of the following:
a. 	Amended Complaint, in which Plaintiff would resubmit his claims to
the Court after correcting the deficiencies in accordance with this
order. An amended complaint would replace the current complaint in
its entirety.59 	Plaintiff need not supply legal research, only the facts
that he alleges in support of an amended complaint. 	Any exhibits
should be submitted without alteration by Plaintiff.
b. 	Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, which would inform the Court that
Plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue his lawsuit and would dismiss the
entire action.
4. 	Any amended complaint should be on this Court’s form, which is being
provided to Plaintiff with this Order. 	As discussed above, an amended
57 Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. Arizona Sand & Rock Co., 353 F. Supp. 1098, 1100
(D. Ariz. 1972).
58 United States v. Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty., 391 F.2d 53, 56 (9th Cir. 1968).
59 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 and Local Civil Rule 15.1.
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complaint will replace the prior complaint in its entirety.60 	Plaintiff must
include all of the claims he seeks to bring in an amended complaint. 	Any
claims not included in the amended complaint will be considered waived.
Plaintiff should ONLY file an amended complaint. Filings not in the form of
an amended complaint or procedurally appropriate, meritorious motions will
not be considered.
5. 	If Plaintiff does not file either a Second Amended Complaint or Notice of
Voluntary Dismissal on the Court form by July 5, 2022, this case will be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 	This
dismissal will count as a “strike” against Plaintiff under § 1915(g).61
6. 	At all times and as previously done, Plaintiff must keep the Court informed
of any change of address. Such notice shall be titled “NOTICE OF CHANGE
OF ADDRESS.” 	This notice must not include any requests for any other
relief, and it must be served on any Defendant’s attorney who makes an
appearance in this case. 	Failure to file a notice of change of address may
result in the dismissal of this case under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
60 See Local Civil Rule 15.1.
61 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner who files more than three actions or appeals in any
federal court in the United States which are dismissed as frivolous or malicious or for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, from bringing any other actions without
prepayment of fees unless the prisoner can demonstrate that he or she is in “imminent danger of
serious physical injury.”
Case 3:21-cv-00254-JMK Document 31 Filed 06/02/22 Page 17 of 18

Case No. 3:21-cv-000254-JMK, Second Chief Moses v. State of Alaska Governments.
Second Screening Order
Page 18 of 18
7. 	The Clerk of Court is directed to send Plaintiff the following forms with this
Order: 	(1) form PS01, with “SECOND AMENDED” written above the title
“Prisoner’s Complaint Under the Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 1983”; (2) form
PS09, Notice of Voluntary Dismissal; (3) form PS23, Notice of Change of
Address; and (4) the District Court’s handbook, “R EPRESENTING YOURSELF
IN ALASKA ’ S F EDERAL C OURT .”
DATED this 2nd day of June, 2022, at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/Joshua M. Kindred
JOSHUA M. KINDRED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 3:21-cv-00254-JMK Document 31 Filed 06/02/22 Page 18 of 18