Charles v. State of California et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
MARVIN L. CHARLES, Sr.,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:22-cv-00141-SLG-KFR
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO
ORDER DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
On June 3, 2022, Marvin L. Charles, Sr., a self-represented litigant (hereinafter
“Plaintiff”), filed a Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with
a civil cover sheet and an Application to Waive the Filing Fee.1 	The Court now
screens Plaintiff’s Complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
I. 	Screening Requirement
Federal law requires a court to conduct an initial screening of a civil complaint
filed by a self-represented litigant seeking to proceed in a lawsuit in federal court
without paying the filing fee.2 In this screening, a court shall dismiss the case at any
time if the court determines that the action:
(i) 	is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) 	fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) 	seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.3
To determine whether a complaint states a valid claim for relief, courts
consider whether the complaint contains sufficient factual matter that, if accepted
1 Dkts. 1–3.
2 See, e.g., Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Charles v. St. CA, et al.
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as true, “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”4 	In conducting its
review, a court must liberally construe a self-represented plaintiff’s pleading and
give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt.5 Before a court may dismiss any portion
of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court
must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the deficiencies in the complaint and
an opportunity to amend or otherwise address the problems, unless to do so would
be futile.6 	Futility exists when “the allegation of other facts consistent with the
challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency[.]” 7
II. 	Discussion
A. Complaint
Plaintiff 	names 	the 	State 	of 	California 	and 	Los 	Angeles, 	California 	as
defendants.8 	Plaintiff’s Complaint is hard to decipher due to his interchangeable
reference to Marvin Charles, Jr., and Marvin Charles, Sr. 	Plaintiff, using the first-
person pronoun “I” in reference to Marvin Charles, Jr., alleges that he has “been
locked up since August 1st, 2019, . . . because of my wrongful arrest, and was taken
out of Alaska [illegally], and the warrant was expired[.]”9 However, Plaintiff later
refers more clearly to Marvin Charles, Jr., as his son10 and says that “the victim said
Marvin Jr. was not the guy that broke into her house” and “Long Beach Calif. lost
Marvin L. Charles, Jr. [original] file and the discovery.”11 Plaintiff states that Marvin
4 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In making this determination, a court may consider “materials that
are submitted with and attached to the Complaint.” United States v. Corinthian Colleges,
655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Lee v. L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001)).
5 See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d
1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
6 See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Albrecht v.
Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988)).
7 See Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir.
1986).
8 Dkt. 1 at 1.
9 Id.
10 Dkt. 1-1 at 5.
11 Id.
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
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Charles, Jr.’s “case started in 2004 in the State of Calif.”12 	Lastly, Plaintiff alleges
that “Ketchikan court house said Marvin Jr. was crazy and can’t take care of himself.
Marvin Jr. Has a very large family.”13 	In support of his Complaint, Plaintiff submits
116 pages of exhibits, largely comprised of letters of support and assertions of tribal
jurisdiction over Marvin Charles, Jr., and printed documents addressing tribal policy,
tribal relations, and federal law effecting tribes.
In its totality, the Court interprets this Complaint as Marvin Charles, Sr.,
attempting to file a complaint on behalf of his son, Marvin Charles, Jr.. However, as
explained below, he lacks standing to do so. 	In addition, Plaintiff does not make a
request for relief, nor is the Complaint signed.14
B. Standing
Article III standing “is the threshold question in every federal case” which
determines whether the court has the power to hear a lawsuit.15 	In order to have
standing to sue, a plaintiff must (1) allege that he suffered “injury in fact” or is
imminently threatened with such injury; (2) allege that the injury is “fairly traceable
to” the defendant’s violation of some legal norm; and (3) show that the harm he has
alleged will be “redressable” by the relief that he seeks.16 	Absent a sufficient
personal stake in the outcome of the litigation as indicated by these three inquiries,
standing 	to 	sue 	will 	be 	denied. 	Therefore, 	third-party 	claims 	or 	generalized
grievances, where a citizen is unable to allege particularized injury to himself apart
from the interest in governmental regularity, are generally off-limits to federal
courts.17
12 Id. at 3.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 7.
15 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
16 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
17 See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
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As mentioned above, the Court’s interpretation of this complaint is that
Plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, is making allegations regarding the treatment
of his son within the criminal justice system in the State of California.18 	A self-
represented plaintiff does not have standing to assert the constitutional claims of
other people.19 	This includes a parent or guardian attempting to raise a claim on
behalf of a child or family member.20 Accordingly, Plaintiff does not have Article III
standing, and therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter.21
III. 	Legal Standards
A. Failure to State a Claim
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs that a complaint must
contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the [complainant] is
entitled to relief.” A complaint should set out each claim for relief separately. Each
claim should identify (1) the specific harm that Plaintiff is alleging has occurred to
him, (2) when that harm occurred, (3) where that harm was caused, and (4) who he
is alleging caused that specific harm to him. 	Rule 8 also requires a demand for
relief.22
Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to plausibly allege a claim in violation
of Rule 8. As pled, Plaintiff tells a narrative about Marvin Charles, Jr. However, no
specific 	claims 	are 	made 	as 	to 	Plaintiff 	Marvin 	Charles, 	Sr.’s 	own 	rights.
Additionally, without a demand for relief, Rule 8 has not been satisfied. 	While the
lack of standing alone is dispositive of this action, the Court provides the following
guidance because Plaintiff also fails to meet Rule 8 pleading requirements.
18 Dkt. 1-1 at 5.
19 United States v. Mitchell, 915 F.2d 521, 526 n.8 (9th Cir. 1990).
20 See Johns v. Ctny of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876–77 (9th Cir. 1997).
21 In addition to Plaintiff’s lack of standing, based on the facts presented, the Court cannot
discern any apparent venue it may have over this case.
22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3).
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
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B. Civil Rights Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have specific required elements that a plaintiff
must plead. Section 1983 is a federal statute that “is not itself a source of substantive
rights,” 	but 	provides 	“a 	method 	for 	vindicating 	rights 	[found] 	elsewhere.”23
Constitutional rights are those conferred by the United States Constitution to
individual citizens. Section 1983 can be used as a mechanism for enforcing the rights
guaranteed by a particular federal statute only if (1) the statute creates enforceable
rights and (2) Congress has not foreclosed the possibility of a § 1983 remedy for
violations of the statute in question.24 	Section 1983 does not provide a cause of
action for violations of state law.25 	In order to plead a proper § 1983 claim, a
plaintiff must allege plausible facts that if proven would establish each of the
required elements of: 	“(1) a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or
created by federal statute, (2) proximately caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4)
acting under color of state law.”26
Importantly in a § 1983 action, claims must demonstrate causation, or show
how the alleged defendant, acting under color of state law, violated the plaintiff’s
federal rights. 	A person deprives another of a federal constitutional or statutory
right, “within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in
another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to
do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’”27 The required causal
connection “may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by
23 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 144 n.3 (1979))
24 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997); Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020,
1027-28 (9th Cir. 1999).
25 Galen v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007).
26 Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991).
27 Preschooler II v. Clark Cty. Sch. Bd. Of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)).
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
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others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to
inflict’ constitutional harms.”28
Section 1983 also requires that a defendant must be “acting under the color of
state law.”29 	The question of whether a person who has allegedly caused a
constitutional 	injury 	was 	acting 	under 	the 	color 	of 	state 	law 	is 	a 	factual
determination.30 A defendant has acted under color of state law where he or she has
“exercised power ‘possessed by the virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’”31
This essential element of the statute limits who may be a proper defendant
under § 1983. For instance, private citizens, state governmental agencies, and states
are generally not proper defendants in a § 1983 action.32 States have sovereign
immunity due to the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which makes
them immune from suit unless that immunity is waived.33 “States or governmental
entities that are considered ‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes”
are not ‘persons’ under [Section] 1983.”34
In a § 1983 action, a defendant may be sued in either an individual or an
official capacity. 	For a defendant to be individually liable under § 1983, that
defendant must personally participate in an alleged rights deprivation.35 	“In a
28 Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743).
29 West, 487 U.S. at 49.
30 See Brunette v. Humane Soc’y of Ventura Cty., 294 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2002).
31 West, 487 U.S. at 49 (quoting Classic, 313 U.S. at 326); see also Tongol v. Usery, 601 F.2d
1091, 1097 (establishing that when state officials are administering a federal funded
program, the state officials are still acting under the color of state law).
32 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Flint v. Dennison,488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007); Hale v.
Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
33 In re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (holding federal courts may not hear suits
against a state brought by their own citizens, “because of the fundamental rule of which
the [Eleventh] Amendment is but an exemplification.”); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
34 Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997); quoting Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989)).
35 Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 2010).
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
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§ 1983 action, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was
the actionable cause of the claimed injury.”36 A defendant sued in their individual
capacity may be held liable for money damages.37
Alternatively, in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff may sue a defendant in an official
capacity as an alternate way of pleading a claim against the governmental entity for
which that individual is an officer or employee.38 	A plaintiff suing a defendant in
their official capacity is not required to allege the “named official’s personal
involvement 	in 	the 	acts 	or 	omissions 	constituting 	the 	alleged 	constitutional
violation.”39 Instead, a plaintiff must only (1) “identify the law or policy challenged”
and (2) “name the official within the entity who can appropriately respond to
injunctive relief.”40 However, a defendant sued in their official capacity may not be
sued for damages, only for injunctive relief.41
In this action, Plaintiff has named the State of California. 	Under § 1983,
Plaintiff cannot sue the State of California or any of its governmental branches,
agencies, divisions, offices, or departments. 	In order to properly bring a § 1983
claim, Plaintiff must name a permissible state actor defendant who caused him harm,
indicate the capacity in which the defendant acted, and state a corresponding
demand for relief.
IV. 	Conclusion
Because Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant, he may not plead claims on
behalf of another person. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff does not have Article III standing,
and this Court lacks jurisdiction. 	Furthermore, Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient
plausible facts and the procedural elements to meet the pleading requirements of
36 Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).
37 See Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016).
38 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991).
39 Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013).
40 Id.
41 See Will v. Mich. Dep’t. of State Police, 491 U.S. 64, 71 n.10.
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
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Rule 8 of Federal Civil Procedure and a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:
1. 	This action should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of
jurisdiction.
2. All pending motions should be DENIED AS MOOT.
3. The Clerk of Court should enter a final judgment.
DATED this 7th day of October, 2022 at Anchorage, Alaska.
/s/ Kyle F. Reardon
United States Magistrate Judge
District of Alaska
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), a district court may designate a magistrate judge
to hear and determine matters pending before the Court. For dispositive matters, a
magistrate judge reports findings of fact and provides recommendations to the
presiding district court judge.42 A district court judge may accept, reject, or modify,
in whole or in part, the magistrate judge’s order.43
A party may file written objections to the magistrate judge’s order within 14
fourteen days.44 Objections and responses are limited to five (5) pages in length and
should not merely reargue positions previously presented. 	Rather, objections and
responses should specifically identify the findings or recommendations objected to,
the 	basis 	of 	the 	objection, 	and 	any 	legal 	authority 	in 	support. 	Reports 	and
recommendations are not appealable orders. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed.
R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment.45
42 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
43 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
44 Id.
45 See Hilliard v. Kincheloe, 796 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1986).
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