USA v. Lebron

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ALASKA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SAMUEL LEBRON,
Defendant.
3:23-CR-00056-JMK-MMS-1
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS [DKT. 35]
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
EVIDENTIARY HEARING [37]
I. 	MOTION PRESENTED
The indictment, filed in June 2023, charges Samuel Lebron (“Lebron”) with one
count of possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute,1 one count of
possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking,2 one count of possession of a
firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon,3 an enhanced statutory penalty,4 and a
criminal forfeiture allegation.5
Lebron filed a motion to suppress evidence found on his person and in his residence,
as well as unspecified statements pursuant to Miranda. Dkt. 35. In support of this motion,
Lebron argues 	(1) 	that the 	Pretrial Enforcement Division 	(“PED”) officers lacked
1 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), (B), and (C).
2 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
3 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8).
4 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(B)(1)(a).
5 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) and (2), 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a).
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reasonable suspicion under Terry to detain and frisk him because the basis of the suspicion
was an unsubstantiated anonymous tip; (2) that the pat down exceeded its permissible scope
when law enforcement seized items from his person; (3) that, after excising the items from
his pockets from the analysis, the subsequent arrest was not supported by probable cause;
(4) that Alaska law requires cause for its officers to arrest a probationer; (5) that Lebron
was subject to an interrogation in violation of Miranda; (6) that the search of his residence
was unreasonable because Lebron’s privacy interest outweighed the state’s interest in this
instance. See generally, id.
The government responded that Terry is inapplicable to this matter. 	Dkt. 36.
Instead, it directs this Court to law pertaining specifically to probationers, but nevertheless,
it argues that the tip provided reasonable suspicion and that Lebron made no statements
that would implicate Miranda. 	Id. 	The government also argued that this matter can and
should be resolved without an evidentiary hearing.
Lebron, in a separate motion, moved this Court for an evidentiary hearing on his
motion to suppress. 	Dkt. 37. 	He argued that there are contested issues of fact and gaps
within discovery that could be resolved with such a hearing. Id.
No evidentiary hearings were held, and this Court finds that one would not be
helpful for the resolution of this matter. 	Accordingly, and for reasons detailed more
thoroughly below, this Court DENIES Lebron’s motion for an evidentiary hearing at Dkt.
37.
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This Court hereby issues its Report and Recommendation regarding Lebron’s
Motion to Suppress. 	Dkt. 35. 	For the reasons below, the Motion to Suppress should be
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
II. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following statement of facts is extracted from the parties’ briefs on this motion.
While an evidentiary hearing has not been held to establish these facts, this Court will
accept the parties’ representations where they overlap.
On February 24, 2023, Alaska PED officers and state probation officers went to
Lebron’s residence to conduct a wellness check/follow-up on a tip that he had aimed a
firearm at a woman, threatened to shoot her, and that there were controlled substances in
his residence.6 	However, when the officers arrived, Lebron was not home.7 	Instead, he
was reporting to a PED office. 	Id. 	The officers traveled there, searched his person, and
found capsules which were believed to contain controlled substances, a large sum of cash,
and personal effects such as his phone, wallet, and keys.8 	Afterwards, the officers
transported Lebron back to his residence and used a key provided by him to enter.9 Inside,
the officers found narcotics and a firearm, and Anchorage Police Department sought and
obtained a search warrant. 	Id. 	The government represents that it found a loaded Glock
10mm pistol, over 500 grams of methamphetamine, 100 grams of fentanyl, almost 50
6 Dkt. 35 at 2–3; Dkt. 36 at 2–3.
7 Dkt. 35 at 2; Dkt. 36 at 2.
8 Dkt. 35 at 4; Dkt. 36 at 3.
9 Dkt. 35 at 5; Dkt. 36 at 3.
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grams of heroin, as well as “some LSD,” scales, and transaction ledgers.10 The defendant
does not reference these.
During this time, the defendant was on probation for a state charge of domestic
violence with “L.S.” as the victim.11 The government argues that this is the same victim
as the person referenced in the tip which precipitated PED officers’ contact with him, and
Lebron appears to acknowledge that.12 	Id. 	One of the conditions of Lebron’s probation
was as follows: “The defendant shall submit to a search of their person, personal property,
residence, vehicle, or any vehicle over which they have control, for the presence of illicit
drugs or drug paraphernalia.”13
III. 	DISCUSSION
Lebron has moved to suppress certain evidence and statements and has separately
requested an evidentiary hearing. 	While Lebron presented many arguments in the
alternative for this Court to consider, he has failed to overcome the hurdle that presents
itself to probationers: a dramatically decreased expectation of privacy. 	Because the
resolution of this motion is framed with that limitation, the facts that could be developed
with an evidentiary hearing would not materially alter this Court’s analysis. Instead, to the
extent that additional information is needed by the defendant, he has different avenues to
pursue.
//
10 Dkt. 36 at 3.
11 Alaska v. Lebron, 3AN-21-00896CR; Dkt. 35 at 2 n.1; Dkt. 36 at 2.
12 Dkt. 35 at 2 n.1; Dkt. 36 at 2.
13 Dkt. 35, Ex. 3 at 4.
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a. 	An evidentiary hearing is unnecessary.
In a separate motion,14 Lebron asked this Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing.15
Lebron advances two specific arguments in support of having a hearing: (1) that the
government equates PED officers with state probation, and that, without offering authority,
these two groups have different zones of authority under Alaska law; and (2) that he lacks
information regarding Lebron’s interactions with law enforcement at the PED office, such
as whether he was detained initially, how the pat down was performed, and whether he was
questioned. Id.
The government did not respond to this motion, but it separately argued that one
was unnecessary in response to Lebron’s substantive motion.16 	The government argued
that the motion offered only legal questions, rather than material factual disputes. Id.
This Court agrees with the government, but it has its own observations. First, much
of the information Lebron seeks is in his possession or knowledge. His counsel is able to
interview him and provide an affidavit for this Court to consider. If the government were
to then offer a different account, then the disparities could be resolved with an evidentiary
hearing. However, no such proffer was made, and the purpose of an evidentiary hearing is
to resolve factual disputes, not to substitute for investigation or the discovery process. This
Court is unconvinced that any difference in the scope of authority between PED officers
and state probation officers has a material effect on this Court’s analysis. For the reasons
14 His substantive motion did not expressly request an evidentiary hearing.
15 Dkt. 37.
16 Dkt. 36 at 8–9.
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stated infra, most of the facts that could be established by such a hearing would not inform
the resolution of the case because Lebron erroneously relies on Terry instead of case law
specific to probationers. 	As such, this Court denies Lebron’s motion for an evidentiary
hearing.
b. 	Lebron’s condition of release should not be read to require probable cause.
Lebron’s condition of release should be read as waiving the requirement of probable
cause. 	While it could have been written in a clearer way, this Court finds that the more
probable reading of the condition lends itself to this interpretation, and that the rule of lenity
does not alter this analysis.
Neither party engaged in a full construction analysis on what this Court believes to
be a critical issue, if not the critical issue, for this motion’s resolution, but because
construction is a matter of law, this Court is equipped to address it, nonetheless. 	The
relevant condition reads as follows: “The defendant shall submit to a search of their person,
personal property, residence, vehicle or any vehicle over which they have control, for the
presence of illicit drugs or drug paraphernalia.”17 The plain text of this condition does not
indicate whether law enforcement is required to have probable cause before conducting
such a search.
“Under Alaska law, ambiguity exists when the contract as a whole and the extrinsic
evidence support differing reasonable interpretations.”18 	A contract is not ambiguous
17 Dkt. 35, Ex. 3 at 4.
18 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ellison, 757 F.2d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 1985).
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merely because parties disagree as to its meaning.19 Instead, “ambiguity is found to exist
‘only 	when 	the 	contract, 	taken 	as 	a 	whole, 	is 	reasonably 	subject 	to 	differing
interpretations.’” Id.
This Court is guided by a few maxims of construction.
• 	Omitted-case canon. 	“[A] matter not covered is to be treated as not
covered.”20 Silence, in other words, can be dispositive.21 If a meaning is not
conveyed in the text of a provision, courts are to be hesitant to enforce such
a meaning.
• 	Whole-text canon. 	Courts are “to consider the entire text, in view of its
structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts.”22 	It is
not enough for a court to simply focus on the provision at issue, but instead,
it should consider the entirety of the legal document to determine what its
entire meaning conveys.
• 	The presumption against surplusage. 	Words and clauses are presumed to
have meanings.23 “If possible, every word and every provision is to be given
effect [. . .] None should be ignored. None should needlessly be given an
interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no
19 Jarvis v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 633 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Alaska 1981).
20 A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 (2012).
21 GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC,
140 S. Ct. 1637, 1645 (2020).
22 Reading Law, supra n.20 at 167.
23 United States v. Lopez, 998 F.3d 431, 440 (9th Cir. 2021).
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consequence.”24 “[W]ords with no meaning—language with no substantive
effect—should be regarded as the exception rather than the rule.” Id. at 178.
• 	Lenity. When there is a significant power imbalance, a contract of adhesion,
or a public policy favoring a particular party, ambiguities in a provision may
be read against one of the parties.25 In the criminal context, ambiguities may
be construed in favor of the defendant.
• 	Mandatory vs. permissible language. “Shall” imposes a duty, while “may”
grants discretion.26
With these canons of construction in mind, this Court agrees with the government
that probable cause is not required pursuant to this special condition. First, Lebron errs in
how he presents these conditions of release. Read in their entirety, these conditions impose
duties on him, rather than limitations on the government. With that framing in mind, this
condition makes more sense. 	The condition reads that Lebron “shall submit to” such
searches without reference to probable cause. Adding a qualifier here would only condition
when Lebron had to comply, rather than limiting when the government could demand a
search. 	Further, the lack of mention of probable cause cuts against Lebron here. 	As
24 Reading Law, supra n.20 at 174.
25 Fort Vancouver Plywood Co. v. United States, 747 F.2d 547, 553 (9th Cir. 1984),
abrogated on other grounds by DaVinci Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.3d 1117 (9th
Cir. 2019); United States v. Spear, 753 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that a contract
prepared by the government should be construed against it because it has “steadfastly
applied the rule that any lack of clarity in a plea agreement should be construed against the
government as drafter.”) (cleaned up).
26 Reading Law, supra n.20 at 112.
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currently written, Lebron must submit to these searches, without limitation. 	Without
indication in the text, this Court is reluctant to read in a qualifier that is not suggested in it.
Further, it is ordinarily the case that law enforcement needs probable cause to search
non-probationers. If this condition were to include a probable cause requirement, it would
have no effect, rather it would place Lebron in the position of any non-probationer. This
Court is reluctant to read this condition in such a way as to render it meaningless.
However, this Court notes that Lebron was a probationer and is here a criminal
defendant. 	The power imbalance between the state and Lebron sufficiently warrants the
Court construing probation term against the government when ambiguity persists after
applying other canons of construction.27 The applicability of this canon is limited. When
contracts are ambiguous, this is but one of many considerations, and it should not trump an
otherwise much more likely interpretation. 	Here, ambiguity must mean more than
debatable. There must be dueling reasonable interpretations after exhausting other canons
intended to resolve ambiguity. 	This Court does not believe that both readings are
reasonable, and therefore does not find this condition to be ambiguous. As such, this Court
interprets this condition to not place a requirement on law enforcement that it have probable
cause before searching Lebron.
//
//
27 See, Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347, 361 (2016) (“We have used the lenity
principle to resolve ambiguity in favor of the defendant only ‘at the end of the process of
construing 	what 	Congress 	has 	expressed’ 	when 	the 	ordinary 	canons 	of 	statutory
construction have revealed no satisfactory construction.”).
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c. 	Terry and its progeny are inapplicable.
Lebron has argued that the law regarding stop-and-frisk, or “Terry stops,” applies
to this dispute.28 	The government opposes this, arguing that a separate litany of cases
specific to probationers is more appropriate. This Court agrees with the government.
“The 	touchstone 	of 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment 	is 	reasonableness, 	and 	the
reasonableness of a search is determined ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to
which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’”29 	One’s “status as a
probationer subject to a search condition informs both sides of that balance.” 	Id. at 119.
“Inherent in the very nature of probation is that probationers ‘do not enjoy ‘the absolute
liberty to which every citizen is entitled.’” Id.
In Knights, the Supreme Court found that when a probationer’s conditions of release
expressly authorized a “search anytime, with or without [. . .] probable cause” and when
there was reasonable suspicion, law enforcement could search the probationer’s residence.
Id. at 114 and 122. In Samson, the Court revisited Knights to answer whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibited a suspicionless search of a parolee.30 The search there was “based
solely on [the] petitioner’s status as a parolee[.]” Id. at 847 and 852. In reviewing Knights,
the Court reiterated that the privacy rights of probationers were “significantly diminished.”
Id. at 849. The Court conclusively ruled “that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a
28 See, Dkt. 35 at 8–9.
29 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001).
30 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848–57 (2006).
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police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.” Id. at 857. See also,
United States v. King, 736 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that suspicionless does
not include “illegitimate reasons, such as harassment.”).
As found supra, Lebron was subject to a condition of release that diminished his
privacy interest against suspicionless searches. As such, the initial search of Lebron at the
PED office was sufficient because the officers did not need reasonable suspicion.
d. 	The tip might have provided reasonable suspicion.
The parties disagree as to whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain
and frisk Lebron. Lebron argues (1) that “there was no reliable evidence that he posed any
kind of risk when detained at the PED office”; and (2) that the anonymous tip was
inadequate.31 The government argues (1) that reasonable suspicion was not required; and
(2) that it nevertheless was present.32
As stated supra, the officers did not need reasonable suspicion. However, the tip,
even if this Court were to use the Terry framework, may have been sufficient, though this
Court would need additional development of the record to find so conclusively. 	Under
Terry, a law enforcement officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop upon a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is occurring.33
Law enforcement may not solely rely on an anonymous tip without some indicia of
reliability to establish reasonable suspicion. However, a tip may qualify if it (1) includes
31 Dkt. 35 at 6–9.
32 Dkt. 36 at 6–7.
33 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 & 27 (1968).
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a “range of details”; (2) predicts the suspect’s future actions rather than simply describing
observed facts; and (3) is corroborated.34
“Predictive information that reveals a detailed knowledge of an individual’s
intimate affairs is more reliable than predictive information that could be observed by the
general public, and such self-verifying detail is considerably more valuable if it relates to
suspicious activities than if it relates to innocent activities”35 	A mere accusation of
wrongdoing is insufficient.
Lebron argues that discovery is unclear regarding (1) when and by whom the tip
was received; and (2) whether it was one tip or three.36 	He also repeated that it was not
corroborated. 	Id. at 8. 	He directs this Court’s attention specifically to Fla. v. J.L.,37
wherein “an anonymous caller reported [. . .] that a young black male standing at a
particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.” 	Id. at 268. The Court
found that this provided law enforcement no ability to test the informant’s basis of
knowledge nor their credibility. 	Id. at 271. 	Further, simply possessing a firearm is not
inherently unlawful conduct.
However, J.L. is distinguishable from the present case. Here, the parties agree that
law enforcement was provided a tip that Lebron, a particular person indicted for domestic
violence, had threatened the same named victim with a firearm in his residence. However,
additional details would greatly contribute to this Court’s analysis as to whether there was
34 United States v. Morales, 252 F.3d 1070, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2001).
35 United States v. Rowland, 464 F.3d 899, 907–08 (9th Cir. 2006)(citations omitted).
36 Dkt. 35 at 7–8.
37 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000).
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reasonable suspicion. 	Since this Court does not find that there is a need for reasonable
suspicion here, it will withhold a specific finding of one. To the extent that a Terry analysis
is necessary, further fact development would aid this Court on this issue.
e. 	The frisk did not violate Lebron’s rights.
Lebron argues that the pat down search at the PED office exceeded its permissible
scope.38 He argues that the capsules, money, and keys removed from his person were not
“plainly contraband nor could they have plausibly felt like a weapon.” 	Id. at 10. 	This
Court disagrees for two reasons. 	First, pursuant to its findings supra, the officers were
permitted to fully search him and therefore, the stop-and-frisk rules do not apply. Second,
these items could have felt like contraband.
Under Terry, an officer may pat down a suspect’s outer clothing.39 As an analog to
the plain view doctrine, “plain feel,” or what is “immediately apparent” upon the pat down
is within the same scope of privacy that was authorized to be intruded upon by the
underlying reasonable suspicion. Id. at 375–76. As such, if the officer could feel that an
item was a weapon or contraband upon the pat down of the outer layer of clothing, its
discovery was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
From the filings, this Court does not have enough information to determine what
the patting-down officer felt. 	However, if the officer felt the pills, it may have been
38 Dkt. 35 at 9–10.
39 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993).
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immediately apparent that it was contraband. Nevertheless, because this Court finds as a
matter of law that Terry and its progeny are not applicable to Lebron in this context, this
Court will not order an evidentiary hearing to develop these facts.
f. 	Lebron’s arrest was supported by probable cause.
Lebron argues that he was arrested at the PED office.40 	The government did not
respond to that argument. 	For the purposes of this motion, this Court will accept that
Lebron was arrested at this point. He was handcuffed at the PED office and brought to his
residence, which was searched, and then he was remanded to jail. 	Id. at 12. 	With these
facts and the government’s non-response to this argument, this Court will operate as if it
has found that he was arrested at the office.
He argues that such arrest was improper for two reasons: (1) because it was not
supported by probable cause; and (2) that Alaska state law did not permit the PED officers
to arrest him without “cause.” Id. at 12–15. As to his first argument, this Court disagrees.
Warrantless arrests require probable case.41 Probable cause exists when the totality of the
circumstances would lead a reasonable person to conclude that there was a fair probability
that a crime had been committed.42 Mere suspicion or a hunch is insufficient, but officers
do not need to have conclusive evidence of guilt.43 “[P]roof beyond a reasonable doubt,”
is not “required for probable cause to arrest.”44
40 Dkt. 35 at 10–12.
41 See, Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981).
42 United States v. Valencia-Amezcua, 278 F.3d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 2002).
43 United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007).
44 United States v. Talley, 12 F. App’x 512, 513 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted).
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The officers permissibly finding the capsules and money in his pockets, in addition
to the tip, made it sufficiently likely that a crime had been committed. But that is not the
core of this issue. Instead, it is primarily a conclusion of excising the evidence discovered
on his person and finding the tip to be unreliable. As such, this Court will rely on its earlier
findings.
As to the second argument, this has more nuance, but ultimately, it does not move
the needle. As Lebron informs, “evidence in a federal prosecution must be suppressed if
it was the product of an arrest illegal under state law.”45 Lebron points to AS 33.05.070(a)
as the state law authority for this rule. This paragraph provides in relevant part that “[a]t
any time within the probation period, the probation officer may for cause arrest the
probationer whenever found, without a warrant.” Lebron argues that “for cause” has not
been clarified by the courts, suggesting that it could mean probable cause or perhaps
reasonable suspicion.46
For the purposes of this motion, this Court will read “for cause” in the light most
favorable to the defendant as meaning probable cause. 	This should not be taken as an
affirmative interpretation of the statute, nor does it indicate how this Court might or should
interpret it. It is merely for demonstrative purposes. As stated supra, law enforcement had
probable cause to arrest Lebron. Therefore, his arrest was not in violation of Alaska law.
//
//
45 United States v. Shephard, 21 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended (Apr. 21, 1994).
46 Dkt. 35 at 14.
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g. 	The subsequent search of his residence did not run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment.
Lebron argues that the search of his residence was derivative of unlawfully obtained
information about him, making it tainted under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.47
To support this argument, Lebron argues that his privacy interest outweighed the
government’s interest, referring this Court to United States v. Lara,48 Knights, and King.
Lara is particularly instructive on this matter. 	In Lara, the Ninth Circuit was
presented with a case wherein a probationer had expressly waived his rights under the
Fourth Amendment.49 However, the court disagreed that the government could search his
cellphone. The court found that the search must still be “reasonable.” Id. at 609–10.
The court balanced the interests of the defendant and the government. 	When
weighing the defendant’s interest, the court closely analyzed the facts of the case, finding
that his interest was heightened as compared to the defendant in Knights for two primary
reasons: (1) the waiver was ambiguous as to whether it would apply to his cellphone; and
(2) the court found that a cellphone search was peculiarly intrusive. 	Id. at 610–12. 	The
court wrote: “[a] phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously
found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a
47 Dkt. 35 at 16.
48 815 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 2016).
49 Id. at 607 (“I understand under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, I have a right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. I
waive and give up this right, and further agree that [ . . .] I will submit my person and
property, including any residence, premises, container or vehicle under my control [. . ]
with or without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion.”).
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home in any form—unless the phone is.”50 	The court further reasoned that “especially”
because the probationer was nonviolent and the cause for the interaction was simply failing
to meet with his probation officer, the government’s interests were diminished. Id. at 612.
Here, while Lebron has argued that the search provision is ambiguous, it is
materially clear where it intersects with Lara: it explicitly refers to his residence being
subject to his obligation to permit a search.51 	Lara waived the right to searches of
“property, including any residence, premises, container or vehicle under [his] control[.]”52
The government had to argue that Lara’s cellphone fell under “property” or “container.”
Lebron’s condition here clearly puts him on notice that his residence is subject to being
searched.
Further, the government’s interest is not diminished here as in Lara. 	Lebron
referred to the government’s interest in preventing recidivism and helping probationers
reintegrate into a community, but there are additional interests at stake. 	“[D]iscovering
criminal activity[,] preventing the destruction of evidence[,]” and “protecting potential
victims” are valid state interests as well.53 Here, Lebron was initially searched after a tip
that he had been violent towards a victim in another case and that there were drugs in his
residence. 	Additionally, Lebron’s history, particularly of the case for which he was on
probation, cannot be characterized as nonviolent, nor does the accusation of aiming a
firearm lessen the urgency.
50 Id. at 611 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396 (2014)).
51 Dkt. 35, Ex. 3 at 4.
52 Lara, 815 F.3d at 611.
53 United States v. King, 736 F.3d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 2013).
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Lebron argues that the condition of release pertains specifically to search for drugs
and related items.54 He wrote, “the only plausible basis for a search under his conditions
was an uncorroborated, anonymous, bare-bones tip that Mr. Lebron had drugs in his
residence.” 	Id. at 20–21. 	This Court disagrees with this framing. 	By the time that the
officers had entered his residence, they had already found evidence of illicit drugs and a
large sum of cash. While possessing cash is not itself criminal, combined with the illicit
drugs, having thousands of dollars on your person suggests an illicit purpose. 	Law
enforcement had, at a minimum, reasonable suspicion, which is all this Court finds is
required to enter a probationer’s residence under Knights and King.
As such, the evidence found in Lebron’s residence should not be suppressed.55
h. 	This Court accepts the government’s representation as to Lebron’s lack of
statements, but insofar as it wishes to offer certain statements prior to Lebron being
read his Miranda rights, it should be barred from doing so.
Lebron argues that he was subject to a custodial interrogation without having been
advised of his Miranda rights and that any statements that he made should be suppressed.56
The government argues that Lebron invoked his right to remain silent and thereafter made
no statements.57 An evidentiary hearing is not necessary to resolve this dispute. With the
government’s representation, this Court finds that this disagreement can be settled.
54 Dkt. 35 at 20.
55 Lebron preemptively argued that it was not inevitable that the officers would search his
residence, 	so 	the 	independent 	source 	doctrine 	would 	not 	save 	this 	evidence 	from
suppression. Dkt. 35 at 16–17. This report does not address this because it finds the issue
to be moot and because further fact development would be needed.
56 Dkt. 35 at 15–16.
57 Dkt. 36 at 3, 7–8.
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If the government seeks to later introduce evidence of pre-Miranda advisement
statements, they should be prevented from doing so. The government has been given the
opportunity to make an argument for their inclusion here and should not be permitted to
reopen this argument at a later stage of the proceedings without an exceptional showing.
Insofar 	as 	the 	government 	seeks 	to 	offer 	such 	statements, 	the 	motion 	should 	be
GRANTED.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Lebron’s Motion to Suppress should be GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
Lebron’s motion for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED.
DATED this 19th day of March, 2024, at Anchorage, Alaska.
MATTHEW M. SCOBLE
CHIEF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to D. Alaska Loc. Mag. R. 6(a), a party seeking to object to this proposed finding
and recommendation shall file written objections with the Clerk of Court no later than the
CLOSE OF BUSINESS on April 2, 2024. Failure to object to a magistrate judge’s findings
of fact may be treated as a procedural default and waiver of the right to contest those
findings on appeal. Miranda v. Anchondo, et al., 684 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth
Circuit concludes that a district court is not required to consider evidence introduced for
the first time in a party’s objection to a magistrate judge’s recommendation. United States
v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2000). 	Objections and responses shall not exceed five
(5) pages in length and shall not merely reargue positions presented in motion papers.
Rather, 	objections 	and 	responses 	shall 	specifically 	designate 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations objected to, the basis of the objection, and the points and authorities in
support. 	Response(s) to the objections shall be filed on or before the CLOSE OF
BUSINESS on April 9, 2024. 	The parties shall otherwise comply with provisions of D.
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Alaska Loc. Mag. R. 6(a). Reports and recommendations are not appealable orders. Any
notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the
District Court’s judgment. See Hilliard v. Kincheloe, 796 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1986).
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