Lopez v. 47 Brand LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
OMAR ANTONIO LOPEZ,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 5:26-cv-1115-HDM
47 BRAND, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Omar Antonio Lopez, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against
Defendants 47 Brand, LLC (“47 Brand”), New Era Cap Company, Inc. (“New Era”),
and Club Forty7 on June 29, 2026. (Doc. 1). The case is before the court on Lopez’s
two Motions for Relief from Judgment, (docs. 15; 16). Lopez’s motions seek relief
from final judgment in this case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and
(6). For the reasons below, both motions are due to be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
The court first dismissed Lopez’s claims without prejudice on July 14, 2026,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. (Doc. 4). After Lopez filed an amended complaint, (doc. 7), the court
reviewed it again under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), found that it still failed to
FILED
2026 Oct-07 PM 03:02
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
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state a claim, and thus dismissed the action with prejudice on August 14, 2026, (doc.
9). Lopez then filed two motions under Rule 59(e) asking the court to alter or amend
its judgment without stating a proper basis for the court to do so. (Docs. 11; 13).
Accordingly, the court denied those motions. (Docs. 12; 14). Lopez then filed two
Motions for Relief from Judgment under Rule 60(b) asking the court to vacate its
judgment and reopen the case. (Docs. 15; 16). Lopez attached a proposed amended
complaint to his first motion, requesting leave to file said complaint in addition to
the Rule 60 relief. (Doc. 15-1).
LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits a party to seek relief from a
final 	judgment, 	and 	request 	reopening 	of 	his 	case, 	under 	a 	limited 	set 	of
circumstances.” Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 533 (2022) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Courts may reopen a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) when there
is “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
Rule 60(b)(2)–(b)(5) provides other grounds for granting such relief. “Finally, Rule
60(b)(6) provides a catchall for ‘any other reason that justifies relief.’” Id.
When a party seeks Rule 60(b) relief, he must establish “a justification for
relief so compelling” that the court is “required to grant [his] motion.” Jones v.
Hugine, No. 22-13366, 2023 WL 4340514, at *4 (11th Cir. July 5, 2023) (quoting
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Rice v. Ford Motor Co., 88 F.3d 914, 919 (11th Cir. 1996)). Rule 60(b) motions
cannot be used “to relitigate old matters, raise argument[,] or present evidence that
could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Startley Gen. Contractors,
Inc. v. Water Works Bd., 857 F. App’x 540, 543 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Rice, 88
F.3d at 919). There is “a high standard for granting post[-]judgment relief under Rule
60(b).” Zakrzewski v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2007). Because
Lopez proceeds without counsel, the court construes his filings liberally. Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Liberal construction does not allow the court to
rewrite a deficient pleading, supply facts that have not been alleged, or disregard the
minimum requirements of the federal rules. See Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760
F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
Lopez has not carried his burden as the movant for Rule 60(b) relief to
establish adequate grounds for the court to reopen his case. Neither of Lopez’s
motions for Rule 60(b) relief does more than state that granting relief is necessary to
avoid “manifest injustice,” (doc. 15 at 2), or “a manifest miscarriage of justice,”
(doc. 16 at 1). This does not present the court with “a justification for relief so
compelling” that it should be “required” to grant these motions. Jones, 2023 WL
4340514, at *4. Accordingly, both motions are due to be denied.
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I. 	First Motion (Doc. 15)
Lopez’s first motion presents no facts to support granting the motion. After
his vague, conclusory statement that “relief from prior judgment is warranted to
prevent manifest injustice resulting from initial pleading overbreadth,” (doc. 15 at
2), Lopez provides no facts or further argument on whether Rule 60(b) relief is
proper and simply attaches a proposed amended complaint, (doc. 15-1).
There is a high standard for granting Rule 60(b) relief, and requests for such
relief cannot be used to reassert the reasons the movant believed his prior allegations
were sufficient. Zakrzewski, 490 F.3d at 1267; Startley, 857 F. App’x at 543. In
Startley, the Eleventh Circuit held that a district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying two Rule 60(b) motions. 857 F. App’x at 543. The movants there identified,
among other reasons, “the need to correct a manifest injustice” as one basis for
reopening judgment in the case. Id. The court found that the movants did “not
identify which subsection of Rule 60 they rely on,” and did not actually discuss “why
Rule 60 would have afforded them relief.” Id. The court further found that the
movants “fail[ed] to directly respond to the district court’s concerns, nor [did] they
argue that the district court erred by, for example, relying on an incorrect standard
of law.” Id. at 543–44. Rather, the Rule 60(b) motions were merely attempts “to
relitigate old matters” and “reassert the same reasons previously raised as to why
they think their allegations are sufficient,” and thus were due to be denied. Id. at 544.
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Similarly, Lopez does not actually discuss why Rule 60 should afford him
relief in either of his motions, and only his first motion invokes specific subparts of
Rule 60. The motion argues that under Rule “60(b)(1) and (6), relief from the prior
judgment is warranted to prevent manifest injustice resulting from initial pleading
overbreadth.” (Doc. 15 at 2). Beginning with Rule 60(b)(1), the court finds no
“mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” in Lopez’s noncompliance
with the court’s order to amend his complaint in accordance with Rule 8,1 (doc. 4).
Although “mistake” under Rule 60(b)(1) does encompass a judge’s mistakes of law,
see Kemp, 596 U.S. at 535, the only “mistake” or “neglect” Lopez identifies is his
own “pleading overbreadth,” (doc. 15 at 2). Lopez’s failure to address the pleading
issues identified in the court’s order is not the kind of excusable “mistake” or
“neglect” that qualifies a party for relief under Rule 60(b)(1).
Courts also have discretion to relieve a party from final judgment under Rule
60(b)(6) for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Relief
under subsection (b)(6) “should only be applied in extraordinary circumstances.”
Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Nothing in Lopez’s motion or the record convinces the
court that there are extraordinary circumstances here justifying Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
1 “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . . (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)–(2).
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Lopez’s motion fails to argue why Rule 60 should afford him relief from a
final judgment here. Although his proposed amended complaint narrows his
previous assertions to one claim, it entirely ignores most of the court’s concerns set
out in its order dismissing his first and amended complaints. (See Docs. 4 at 4–5; 9
at 5–6).2 Instead, it largely restates the conclusory allegations laid out in Lopez’s
prior complaints. As in Startley, 857 F. App’x at 544, this motion does not properly
state the grounds for Rule 60 relief and instead attempts to assert that Lopez’s
previous allegations were sufficient to state a claim. Accordingly, Lopez’s first
Motion for Relief from Judgment, (doc. 15), is DENIED.
II. Second Motion (Doc. 16)
Lopez’s second motion does not actually state what specific grounds under
Rule 60(b) qualify him for relief. See Startley, 857 F. App’x at 543. Rather, the
motion’s conclusory statement argues that relief is warranted “to correct the
application of pleading standards, establish that genuine factual issues require
examination, and prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice resulting from premature
dismissal before a factual record could be developed.” (Doc. 16 at 1). The motion
then sets out a “Corrected Factual Theory” as well as a section arguing the
“Necessity of Discovery.” Id. at 2–3.
2 For example, the proposed amended complaint still does not allege any facts supporting New
Era’s liability, and it fails to assert a cognizable cause of action. See infra Part III.
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Construed broadly, Lopez’s pro se motion wishes to “correct,” presumably
under Rule 60(b)(1), the court’s “application of pleading standards” to his previous
complaints. Lopez does not identify how the court erred in applying pleading
standards to his prior two complaints. Indeed, his first Rule 60(b) motion even
admits that his earlier complaints contained “structural defects,” contradicting the
assertion that there was an error in applying pleading standards. (Doc. 15 at 2).
Regardless, having once again reviewed Lopez’s prior complaints, the court does
not find that it erred in dismissing them even under the broad construction afforded
pro se pleadings. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. Construing Lopez’s pleadings
broadly did not require the court to rewrite his deficient pleading, supply facts that
he failed to allege, or disregard the minimum requirements of the federal rules. See
Campbell, 760 F.3d at 1168–69. To the extent the motion seeks relief under Rule
60(b)(6) to “prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice,” (doc. 16 at 1), the court still
finds no extraordinary circumstances here justifying such relief.
The “Corrected Factual Theory” and “Necessity of Discovery” sections of the
motion argue that Lopez is entitled to proceed to discovery based on the same
arguments he made in his previous complaints. (Doc. 16 at 3–4). Lopez’s attempt to
assert that his previous allegations were sufficient to state a claim is not a proper
basis for granting his motion. See Startley, 857 F. App’x at 544. Accordingly,
Lopez’s second Motion for Relief from Judgment, (doc. 16), is DENIED.
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III. Futility of Amendment
Alternatively, even if Lopez had asserted a proper basis under Rule 60(b), the
court would still deny the motion to file his proposed amended complaint as futile.
A court may refuse to vacate a judgment and allow amendment of a complaint when
such amendment would be futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Hall
v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004). “[D]enial of
leave to amend is justified by futility when the complaint as amended is still subject
to dismissal.” Hall, 367 F.3d at 1263 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169
F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999)). Lopez’s proposed amended complaint would still
be subject to dismissal because, like his previous complaints, it fails to state a claim.
To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[C]onclusory
allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as
facts will not prevent dismissal.” Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 485
(11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188
(11th Cir. 2002)). Similarly, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action” is inadequate. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Lopez’s amended complaint relies on insufficiently pleaded facts and the
conclusory statement that Defendants’ actions “constitute[] common law unfair
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competition and misappropriation of established market goodwill.” A “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, fails to
meet the Rule 8 standard, and Lopez’s complaint falls short of even this—it does not
identify the elements of his claim of “Common Law Unfair Competition and
Misappropriation of Goodwill,” (see doc. 15-1). There is no distinct Alabama
common law cause of action for “unfair competition,” see L.A. Draper & Son, Inc.
v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc., 813 F.2d 332, 335–36 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Alabama does
not 	recognize 	a 	tort 	that 	is 	distinctly 	called 	‘unfair 	competition.’”), 	or
“misappropriation of goodwill.” Lopez identifies no legal basis and recites no
elements for the claim. As pleaded, he may be attempting to assert a cause of action
akin to interference with business relations, common law trademark infringement,
both, or something else entirely.3 Lopez’s proposed complaint thus “requires
Defendants and the [c]ourt to speculate what law or statute acts as the legal basis for
this claim, which is unacceptable, as a defendant cannot prepare an adequate defense
if it does not know what claims are being brought against it.” Patterson v. Bryan
Cnty., No. 4:23-cv-225, 2025 WL 948058, at *7 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2025). Such
3 To the extent Lopez attempts to assert a common law trademark infringement claim, it fails to
state a claim for the same reason the court dismissed his Lanham Act claim. (See Doc. 9 at 6);
Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1026 n.14 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n unfair
competition claim based only upon alleged trademark infringement is practically identical to an
infringement claim.”). The Lanham Act’s “likelihood of confusion” test is also a central element
of a common law trademark infringement claim in Alabama, Fuqua v. Roberts, 110 So. 2d 886,
887 (Ala. 1959); Alfa Corp. v. Alfa Mortg. Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1175 (M.D. Ala. 2008), and
Lopez’s proposed amended complaint fails to allege any facts related to consumer confusion.
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complaints are due to be dismissed. See, e.g., id.; Hamilton v. Carrington Mortg.
Servs. LLC, No. 1:24-cv-3765, 2024 WL 4649383, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2024),
report and recommendation adopted, 1:24-cv-3765, 2024 WL 4649383 (N.D. Ga.
Oct. 3, 2024). Accordingly, Lopez’s proposed amended complaint would be
dismissed for failure to state a claim and allowing him to file it would be futile.
CONCLUSION
Lopez’s motions do not adequately identify any grounds under Rule 60(b) that
would afford him relief or allege facts to support his threadbare assertions that he is
entitled to such relief. Alternatively, Lopez fails for a third time to state a claim for
relief in his proposed amended complaint and allowing him to file it would be futile.
Accordingly, both of Lopez’s Motions for Relief from Judgment, (docs. 15;
16), are DENIED. The court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail a copy of this
Order to pro se Plaintiff Omar Antonio Lopez at his address of record.
DONE and ORDERED on October 7, 2026.
_________________________________
HAROLD D. MOOTY III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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