Singh v. Phoenix, City of et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Krish Singh,
Plaintiff,
v.
City of Phoenix, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-21-00099-PHX-JJT
ORDER
Qualified immunity is an oft-litigated issue in excessive force claims arising under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case is no exception. On November 11, 2019, Plaintiff was shot
during an interaction he had with police officers Smith-Petersen and Batway. Plaintiff
survived his injuries and sued the officers and the City of Phoenix on three state-law claims
and, as relevant here, one federal law claim against Officer Smith-Petersen for excessive
force under § 1983. (Doc. 1-3 ¶¶ 22–60.) Defendants eventually moved for summary
judgment (Docs. 52–53), arguing inter alia that the § 1983 claim failed because Officer
Smith-Petersen was entitled to qualified immunity. The Court considered various Ninth
Circuit cases that, according to Plaintiff, would have clearly put Officer Smith-Petersen on
notice that her conduct violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right against excessive force
and, if so, would have meant that she was not entitled to qualified immunity. The Court
ultimately disagreed with Plaintiff and found that qualified immunity applied. (Order at
18–19 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).) The Court entered partial summary
Case 2:21-cv-00099-JJT Document 113 Filed 06/25/26 Page 1 of 3

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judgment in favor of Defendants only as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Officer Smith-
Petersen and remanded the remaining state law claims to the state court. (Doc. 73 at 20.)
Plaintiff appealed, and the Ninth Circuit held that its earlier decision in Glenn v.
Washington County, 673 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2011) “put Smith-Petersen on notice that her
use of deadly force plausibly violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free of
excessive force.” Singh v. City of Phoenix, 124 F.4th 746, 750 (9th Cir. 2024) (See Doc.
82). The Ninth Circuit issued its mandate on February 12, 2025 that “reverse[d] the district
court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant Smith-Petersen with respect to Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claim, reverse[d] the dismissal of the state-law claims, and remand[ed] for further
proceedings on the § 1983 claim and for reconsideration of whether to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims” Id. (See Doc. 82).
Upon remand, this Court dismissed two of Plaintiff’s state-law claims and permitted
one state-law claim and the § 1983 claim to proceed to trial. (See Doc. 90.) Pre-trial efforts
commenced but were soon halted by the surfacing of new evidence regarding Plaintiff’s
medical damages (see Doc. 104), and the Court allowed the parties to narrowly reopen
discovery on that issue (Doc. 110). Pursuant to the new discovery schedule, the Court
ordered that all discovery be completed by January 29, 2027, and dispositive motions be
filed by February 26, 2027. (Id.)
Meanwhile, Defendants moved the Court to reconsider “the denial of their Motion
for Summary judgment based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision” in Zorn v.
Linton, 146 S. Ct. 926 (2026). (Doc. 106 at 1.) But, as Plaintiff notes in response, this Court
entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the issue of qualified immunity. (See
Doc. 112 at 2; see also Doc. 73 (Order granting partial summary judgment).) It was the
Ninth Circuit, not this Court, whose decision adversely affected Defendants when it
reversed this Court’s holding. Accordingly, the Court construes Defendants’ motion as one
urging it to reconsider the Ninth Circuit’s February 12, 2025 mandate (Doc. 82).
Under the Rule of Mandate, “[a] district court that has received the mandate of an
appellate court cannot vary or examine that mandate for any purpose other than executing
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it.” Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2012). “But while the
mandate of an appellate court forecloses the lower court from reconsidering matters
determined in the appellate court, it leaves to the district court any issue not expressly or
impliedly disposed of on appeal.” S.F. Herring Ass'n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 946 F.3d 564,
574 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). In other words, a mandate does not “shut the
courthouse doors” as to matters raised before the district court not decided earlier by the
appellate court. Id.
Here, the Ninth Circuit considered the issue of qualified immunity, disagreed with
this Court’s holding, reversed that holding, and remanded the matter to this Court to
proceed accordingly. The mandate is clear, and the Court will not disturb it.
While the Court lacks authority to reconsider the Ninth Circuit’s mandate, it is not
foreclosed from considering new summary judgment motions based on intervening
Supreme Court authority that took place after the mandate issued. Having already re-
opened discovery and reauthorized dispositive motion practice as to new evidence of
Plaintiff’s damages, it is appropriate to extend to the parties a chance to raise arguments
pertaining to intervening legal authority on the discrete issue of qualified immunity and the
§ 1983 claim. Should either party find it appropriate to do so, they may raise those
arguments in dispositive briefing pursuant to the applicable scheduling order (Doc. 110).
IT IS ORDERED denying Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 106.)
Dated this 25th day of June, 2026.
Honorable John J. Tuchi
United States District Judge
Case 2:21-cv-00099-JJT Document 113 Filed 06/25/26 Page 3 of 3